

FRIEDRICH
KAINZ

AESTHETICS
THE
SCIENCE

translated by Herbert M. Schueller

Friedrich Kainz AESTHETICS
THE
SCIENCE

The impact of the arts on our lives has never been effectively credited.

In this work, an aesthetician examines the nature of the viewer's response. The art object and the viewer have always been of equal importance to the artist. The predisposition and cultural sophistication of the viewer are affected by the art object in a way we have come to call the aesthetic experience. The variety and quality of this response is central to Professor Kainz's discussion.

Kainz regards aesthetics as a science but relates it to philosophy and psychology. He clarifies the methods commonly followed in aesthetic inquiry and compares them with those concerning artistic material, general theory of art, social, biological and evolutionary matters. He summarizes what has been said about the relation of aesthetics to other realms of value and focuses upon generally accepted psychological views about sensation, perception, image-making, association, feeling, will, and pleasure, as these are brought together in the aesthetic response. Kainz's aesthetic embraces considerations of painting and sculp-


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AESTHETICS THE SCIENCE

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ÜBER | THE
ÄSTHETIK | SCIENCE

Friedrich Kainz

The University of Vienna

translated, with an Introduction, by

Herbert M. Schueller

Detroit Wayne State University Press 1962

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by Wayne State University Press,
Detroit 2, Michigan

Published simultaneously in Canada

by Ambassador Books, Limited,
Toronto, Ontario, Canada

Library of Congress
Catalog Card Number

62-8226

Grateful acknowledgment is made to the American Society for Aesthetics for permission to publish this translation and to the Franklin J. Matchette Foundation for financial assistance.

PREFACE

In presenting one's own translation of a book so complicated and comprehensive as Friedrich Kainz's *Vorlesungen über Ästhetik* one can hardly insist that he has gone it alone. Had it not been for Dr. Thomas Munro of the Cleveland Museum of Art and the American Society for Aesthetics, I should not have undertaken this project at all. Dr. Munro approached me about doing this work as the initial one in a series of translations of foreign books on aesthetics, and the American Society for Aesthetics with financial support from the Franklin J. Matchette Foundation agreed to certain monetary reimbursements. Dr. Munro hurried me on, gave me words of cheer, and furnished me opportunity for discussion with him whenever I felt a need for encouragement and enlightenment. As editor of *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* he has also approved of the publication in this volume of my article on Professor Kainz, which appeared in the Fall, 1961, issue of that journal. It now serves as the introduction to Professor Kainz's work, because I incorporated much of his introduction into my own text.

I must thank Professor Kainz for giving me permission to print this translation of his major work in aesthetics. His kindness to me has been equaled only by that of Dr. Elfriede Schönbaumsfeld, also of Vienna, who read my manuscript and made many suggestions. In both instances, I feel, friendship has resulted from work pursued in common.

There have been other generous people. My friends the late Albert Stoll and his wife Mira assisted me in my first efforts, as did Professors Bernard Valentini and Carl Colditz; and Mrs. Robert Kopka cheerfully saw me through hours of drudgery. All of these were more than kind whenever I called for help. I cannot similarly thank my granddaughters whose charm often took me away from

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my duties. But my wife, who never hesitates to encourage me when I want to indulge in activities which occupy the mind despite their materially unrewarding character, too is among those to whom I must express gratitude. Finally, there are Mrs. Bernard Goldman and my colleague Ralph Nash, who illumined Latin and Greek passages, respectively, for me.

I must of course also thank Dr. Harold Basilius, director of the Wayne State University Press, for his every consideration, his enthusiasm, and his patience in working on the many administrative details necessary to the production of a book like this. Mrs. Ita Kanter, my editor, has been conscientious, careful, and understanding in every way. My secretary, Mrs. Cecil Gelfund, often has my load when the going was difficult.

Only someone who has grappled with the German words *Geist*, *Sinn*, *Wesen*, and all of the forms related to them knows the difficulties I have had to cope with. Furthermore, these difficulties have been increased by the variety of the subjects which Professor Kainz relates to aesthetics. Despite the problems, however, and despite the fact that all errors (as translators conventionally say) must necessarily be my own, the value of Professor Kainz's book to English-speaking people is so great that the work of translation, no matter what its complexities, was eminently worth doing.

HERBERT M. SCHUELLER

Detroit
February, 1962

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INTRODUCTION

FRIEDRICH KAINZ AS AESTHETICIAN

In 1948 there appeared in Vienna a book called *Vorlesungen über Ästhetik*. The author was Dr. Friedrich Kainz, then as now a professor of philosophy in the University of Vienna.¹ Like his four-volume *Psychologie der Sprache*, (1941-1956), two parts of which were published before the *Vorlesungen* and the two remaining parts of which followed it, it was a systematic examination and analysis of the various problems centered in its subject; but it was neither entirely complete (being only the first volume of a larger projected work) nor a logic-tight exposition of all of the problems associated with aesthetics. It was loosely systematic without embodying a system in detail, though a theory was inherent to all of it; and the reason for its looseness might well have been its aim: In keeping with his humanistic principles and in keeping with the unusual breadth of his cultural idealism, Kainz's intention, explicitly enunciated in the Introduction to the book, was less to add another work to those technical books on aesthetics already in existence than to offer a teaching device, a true introduction, to everyone interested in the subject. These people could be philosophers whose systems seem to them incomplete without aesthetics; or persons who, as they are interested in cultural-anthropological and cultural-psychological matters, are also concerned with the important human realms of value which we call the beautiful and art; or historians of literature, art, and music who search for universal laws and principles which are the theoretical foundations of their research work. As Kainz said, he published his work with a certain hesitancy. Entreated to do so by people who had attended his university lectures, he presented his book as a kind of textbook and as a modified bibliographical guide to its subject.²

The uniqueness of Kainz's book—and therefore the source of its value for American and other English-speaking readers—is that it takes up in detail certain crucial problems in aesthetics and, in looking for answers to them, summarizes the best aesthetic thought in German in the last fifty to seventy-five years. By nature anti-Hegelian and non-idealistic (in the strict philosophical sense of the word), Kainz takes the empirical non-abstractive approach which Hegelianism denies (though he dwells on the concrete which Hegel saw as the actualization of the Ideal). Yet he is not positivistic either, for positivism in concentrating on fact does not adequately grasp the epistemological character of fact. Kainz sticks to that which is scientifically valid in terms of demonstrable theory: He describes aesthetics as a science; he relates it to philosophy and psychology—and necessarily does not discard either one; he makes plain what are the commonly followed methods in aesthetic inquiry compared with those concerning artistic material, social and biological matters, evolutionary ones, and general theory of art. He separates axiological singularists (monists) from axiological dualists and pluralists; normative from descriptive aesthetics; absolutism in the sphere of value from relativism and correlativism. He summarizes what has been said about the relation of aesthetics to other realms of value and focuses upon legitimate psychological views about sensation, perception, image-making, association, feeling, will, and pleasure, as they are brought together in the aesthetic response. Though the psychological material may be the most valuable in his book, Kainz also carefully and artfully analyzes—and therefore brings together 20th century positions about—the aesthetic object as it is distinguished from the physical one, the elements of that object as they are distinguished from the whole, aesthetic form, and questions regarding the objectivity of aesthetic space, time, and word. (His analyses on the one hand of the expressive qualities of color, surface figures, and stereometric forms, and on the other of the expressive values of tones in single, simultaneous, and successive appearances, are in themselves penetrating and rewarding.) He brings all of these objectivities together under the hypothesis that there are objective principles for the effect of beauty. Summarizing certain aesthetic questions as they were recently pursued in Germany and Austria, the *Vorlesungen* is that kind of comprehensive work which brings together what has already been accomplished so that one can ask, "Where do we go from here?"

Even a superficial examination of Kainz's book will show that it is based chiefly on German references, though among the over 600

citations there also appear French, English, Finnish, and Slavic sources. Both the *Vorlesungen* and the *Psychologie der Sprache*, which are a combination of an impressive number of earlier shorter studies, reveal an immense number of works read, of ideas pursued, and of methods of procedure analyzed. Furthermore, their methods have much in common. In the manner of the best university teaching of philosophy, in which definition and the making of distinctions is a primary matter, they follow the procedure of: 1) *making a statement* embodying a principle or problem; 2) *defining terms* carefully; 3) *describing the extreme positions* thinkers have taken with respect to the problem; 4) *analyzing the problem as a whole*; 5) *indicating his* (Kainz's) *own position*; 6) *finding a solution* to the problem in the light of present learning; 7) *estimating the position* (weight and importance) *of the problem* in the totality which is the subject of the entire work. Thus the method is both analytical and synthetic, though the aim is always inherently the latter. The casual reader may make several observations: The concentration on theory and the failure to emphasize historical background make for an effect which is comparatively arid in its totality; besides, certain statements are often, sometimes annoyingly, repeated, though of course in different contexts.³ But this second factor can readily be justified: Kainz is a gestaltist in psychology and a holist in philosophy. Each separate individual principle and problem is related to an entirety, is an organic part of a continuum, and thus its relevance to the whole must be indicated each time the particular organic division of that whole or the whole itself comes into view. Kainz's own apology in his Introduction for his repetitiveness was thus as unnecessary as it is conscientious. The repetitions are intrinsic to the method of presenting the whole.

The American way would have been for a committee to devise a book like Kainz's. But from past experience one knows that the result would have been pale, neutral, and blunt in judgment and point of view. If it is true that no author who attempts a book like the *Vorlesungen* can do justice to everything he attempts, at least his individuality is stamped on his work. The faulty whole view which Utitz deploras⁴ may be more rewarding to the reader than more correct partial ones. And Kainz's entire work on aesthetics is marked not only by his concern for the whole, but also by a theory of personalism which treats life as an element of the aesthetic view and serves to neutralize today's fashionable structuralism. It has affinities with contextualism as defined and described by Stephen Pepper, and its foundations are those basically psychological ones

which support the activities we call language and art and also the condition and relation which we call aesthetic.

I

Like Ernst Cassirer, Kainz believes in the epistemological primacy of law over things. If the layman feels that aesthetics as the discrimination of the obvious is the tail that wags the dog, Kainz as aesthetician thinks of it as a humanistic study which is in fact scientific. Scientific knowledge, as Pepper indicates in another context, is not "merely description of empirical uniformities";⁵ it is the discovery of universal laws in terms of the structures of the realm of fact with which it deals. Kainz believes that, as it is limited by such boundaries, aesthetics is a science dealing with something irrational and subjective; but at the same time it is objective too. It decides about feeling, but is itself a rational, non-feeling phenomenon. It can employ experiment. Determining what it can do with the means at hand, it attempts to grasp a complex and complicated reality. It treats value-experiences and feeling-states scientifically. Though it includes the basic universal and categorical problems of philosophy, it cannot set up strict categorical standards or a strict definition of an absolute, permanently valid ideal of the beautiful. But it can set up four things: a differentially-typologically flexible theory of a limited kind, an objective theory which has general legality, a comparative aesthetic axiology, and a psychology of artistic creativity and receptive enjoyment.

And from both the individual and the cultural points of view the psychology comes first. The scientific basis of aesthetic activity is "original" humanity, its basic predispositions, capacities, states, and attitudes. The most thorough-going of Kainz's accounts of such basic phenomena occurs in his work on intensification (*Steigerung*), an essay which makes a genuine contribution to the understanding of aesthetic phenomena and reactions. Intensification is an elementary determination of psychically basic functions; on the cruder levels it is revealed in the excitement caused by gossip, in which one constantly finds an entrancing, new formation of what has already been perceived; its reason for being lies in the achievement of reactions based on expression, in the demand for and joy in mental (*geistig*) reproduction (that is, in the formation-demand which results in art); it is an urge for the new, the significant, the most progressive; it is the desire for an effect (say, that of tension) based on the need to make a stronger impression.⁶ Consciously or unconsciously, it is

teleologically oriented. It is the strengthening, the increasing in size, the multiplication and reproduction, the "heaping up" or "blowing up" of every characteristic, the additive unifying of effective qualities, the combining and blending of individual and separate traits into a more effective whole; it is concentration and centralization. As the ineradicable element of every imaginative activity, it is a pre- and sub-artistic phenomenon, and by extension it is an aesthetic and artistic phenomenon operative in certain worlds: for example, in that of the literary writer.⁷ It is an intuitive, an apperceptive function basic to every aspect of life, economic, ethical, and scientific, and thus it is fundamental in aesthetic response to works of art or to nature in its aesthetic aspects.

But besides intensification there are other basic psychological factors which cannot be omitted if they have any aesthetic relevance at all. Take, for instance, speech and language, which are the bases of literary art: The psychology of language is a science of a psychical and physical activity of human beings; its realm is the entire complex of psychophysical events and functions which are called to the service of speech.⁸

Especially significant here is the phenomenon of convergence: In the individual there are certain general *a priori* factors which are part of the make-up of human beings as a whole, and these converge with certain results of an individual's upbringing, of his experiences occurring in the earliest stages of his life, and so forth. *A priori* functional factors converge with the influences of environment, experience, and training, with the taste of a period and group, with the special way an epoch approaches art.⁹ A psychology of feeling derives also in part from the object; language and art are creations of the objective spirit (*Geist*).¹⁰ But convergence makes for types, and thus the preoccupation of aesthetics is not only certain value-products but also certain typical forms in which the feeling-life of human beings can be revealed in creative-objectivizing or postcreative (*nachschöpferisch*)-sympathizing ways. There is the aesthetic attitude in general which, as a special feeling-capacity, is distinguished from other tendencies in the composite which is a mental-psychic condition; and there are also typical colorations of this attitude or state. And because it is both expression and form in convergence, art has a structure with component parts which have their own language and laws.¹¹ Observed convergence immediately and intuitively tells us as much about the individual himself as about his artistic and aesthetic creativity and response per se. "Subjectivity" converges with "objectivity" to bring about a correlative relation.

Either the creative or the receptive "attitude" of a particular individual tells us much about that individual's affective life, contributes to our knowledge of feeling-types among human beings, and can then tell us about those weighty laws of a life of feeling which are higher than and beyond individual-psychological ones.

II

The balance of factors being the proper one, there are no elements which Kainz excludes from the aesthetic attitude and the aesthetic object as these two converge. While he is on the whole not "metaphysical" in the Schellingian sense and accepts all kinds of empirical evidence, including that of the psychological laboratory, he knows that scientists must base their researches on hypotheses or all-embracing theories. Like Kant, therefore, he assumes the existence of complete wholes harmoniously ordered: for him the Whole is Gestalt apperceived as Person.

Admiring Goethe's "wholeness," Kainz has aimed at justifying the gestaltist approach to all aspects of life and art.¹² Explaining the separation of literary study and psychology in the 19th century as the failure of the former to derive useful categories from experimental psychology, which was mathematical and pseudo-(natural) scientific in character, he finds a corrective for this division in the *Gestalt* psychology of Wertheimer, Köhler, and Koffka, a psychology which has been related in different degrees to production-theory (School of Graz), to thought-psychology (School of Würzburg), to the complex-theory of G. E. Müller, and to the personalistic psychology of Stern. The law of totality applies to all realms of spiritual life; it pertains not only to psychology, but also to our entire age and to every aspect of life: Gestalt theory combines with structuralism to counteract abstractive analysis and attain a totally fused, concentrated image of the world. It pertains to physics and biology (medicine) as well as to aesthetics. The given is not an aggregate of elements additively perceived, but a structural form apperceived in its totality. The totality has a fused quality which is grasped, not inductively, not deductively, but intuitively, as phenomenology teaches. The meaningful complex being primary, analysis does not supply the ground for an understanding of the whole. Images, feelings, desires are meaningless materials by themselves; individual colors and tones, individual plane figures, units of all kinds, achieve significance only as they are embedded as parts in an object which, aesthetically or otherwise, is conceived as a whole.

Influence- and parallel-hunters, the biographical, philological, and historical critics, people who concentrate on material, techniques, or milieu—all destroy the character of art and miss the essential which is especially artistic. Their opposites who look for totalities are Wölfflin, Schmarsow, Frankel, Panofsky, Worringer, and Hausenstein. In aesthetics there are Stern and Müller-Freienfels (*Lebenspsychologie*), Emil Utitz (characterology), Dilthey (*Geisteswissenschaft*), and Cysarz.¹³ Every literary form is a unitary, peculiarly original total form: The ballad is not an arithmetic mean between epic and lyric; nor is drama an additive synthesis of lyric and epic. Each is its own whole. Study separate elements if you want, but your work will not reveal how a color operates in a picture. The individual work or a technical device like metaphor is significant in a style only as it is organically a part of it.¹⁴

Thus nothing exists in isolation, and the resulting totalities take on an "as if" character as though they were personalities. Kainz in a thorough-going fashion has adopted that philosophical personalism which to many people seems to be an American phenomenon,¹⁵ but which he himself inherits from William Stern. Based on the ideas of Leibniz, G. Teichmüller, Lotze, Dilthey, Fechner, Boström, and others, Stern's personalism, like Kainz's aesthetic as a whole, is vitalistic rather than mechanical. His basic antithesis between person and thing¹⁶ was of course pre-formed by Kant. Still, Stern may seem to be an eccentric in modern thought: he is opposed to the impersonal and the mechanistic, for example; yet his basic theory of form and totality is related not only to philosophical and psychological phenomena like *Lebensphilosophie*, the Gestalt theory, humanistic structure-psychology, and so forth, but also to medicine and biology¹⁷ and to the thought of Bergson and Troeltsch.

In Stern's thought there is a balance between technology and mechanism: mechanical law in maintaining its relative independence is classified as a personal being and is conceived of as a necessary consequence of value of a personal kind. The form appears as the ground of the law, the person as the presupposition of, the living being as prior to, the dead thing. To make this theory aesthetic, we need only assume that as a norm personalism traces abstract-functional law back to concrete substance. In this way the claimed dominance of conceptually hypostasized universals, of objective norms, values, and fixed quantities is broken, and the personal method of procedure becomes the starting point of all ideal connections. The living form, the unity of the individuality, the scientific understanding of organisms as totalities: these are the concerns of

Stern and of numerous movements in research today. As such movements bring together law and thought, and form and comprehension, they arrive at satisfactory resolutions.

For Stern as for Kainz, as has been already seen in what the latter says about certain literary types, the personal is an organic wholeness as compared with a fragmentary materiality lacking totality. Therefore aesthetics must not be one-sided in the manner of formalism or idealism, but pluralistic with its support in the personalistic attempt to come close to the inner nature and organization of aesthetic objectivities. Personalism is value-directed; it is a specification of the will to live, of the life-force. There is an axiological *a priori*: "I believe in the objectively valuable"; there is a subjective axiological *a priori*: "I evaluate; therefore I am"; and an objective one: "There are values." Values are determined or recognized as qualities, but they are also estimated as to their quantities. These values fall into three basic groups: the values of the self, radial values, and service values.

Self-values are ultimate and encompass the question of true being. The "hierarchical monism" is the synthesis in which are suspended an "I-pluralism" and a "value-monism." Only persons have self-value, and all persons have self-value, a "totality determining itself" (*Selbstbestimmungsganzheit*). This self-determination is made possible only through "convergence" with the world. In "convergence" the real person is developed into an ideal personality. For a person so "converging," the world is a thing or fact; but only through "introception" does the world become a cosmos of self-values because "introception" is a positive relation between the value-center and the value-cosmos. Because it is only through "introception" that a person realizes his own values in their abundance (*Selbstwertfülle*), it is only through "introception" that a person enriches himself and ultimately approximates the divine. In Stern's philosophy, "introception" amounts to a categorical imperative. Its basic forms are 1) love, 2) understanding by way of perception, 3) aesthetic susceptibility, 4) introception of religious matters. Love is the most immediate and subjective of these forms; understanding thorough perception is its opposite and, being scientific, is the most objective. The third and fourth forms proceed from the subordination of the ego to what is superior to it.

In its aesthetic aspect introception deals with radial values: These are derived values which have a position between self-values and thing-values; they are the expression-values of the individual as a human being, of peoples and of humanity, even of objects of

nature and the cosmos. Radial values include subjective-spiritual ones and objective-spiritual (*geistig*) ones. The former range from pleasure to displeasure; they represent the self-value of the struggling ego; the latter are the values of truth, idea, intuition, and ideals. But fundamentally a person is the real source of value, the highest standard, the ultimate worth; and in aesthetics, therefore, the law of personal value is primary.

III

The holism and personalism of Kainz extend to his work on linguistics. Space does not allow me to deal adequately with Kainz' linguistic writings, even as they impinge on aesthetics. For he does believe that linguistic theory at points cooperates with aesthetics.¹⁸ Both, for instance, like the subjects with which they deal, oscillate between the two opposite poles of the subjective and the objective.¹⁹ The basis of speech, which in large part is aesthetic by nature, is imagination rather than the impulse towards reproduction or imitation. Language is a *human creation* based on the functional needs of the psyche and like other aesthetic phenomena is subservient to the laws of human psychology.²⁰ A piece of literature is not merely the author's medium for making himself understood—as is conversation, but it is an expression, an utterance of inner experiences that are urgent and pressing. Leading to an objective view of things, literary language differs from practical language because of intensification,²¹ and as an aesthetic phenomenon it can be distinguished in descriptive terms (gothic, baroque, epic) which are not dependent on value, or in normative terms (for instance, of organic inner unity and totality) which are value-based.²²

Thus even in language one can detect the aesthetic "moment," which is both subjective-psychological and objective-ontological, which is dynamic and not static. It is an active doing. The subject takes a certain unique attitude towards the object, a contemplative one; in this state and condition a human personality apperceives an aesthetic or artistic personality which is the work. Aesthetics is therefore other than a confirmation taste, other than a study of art, other than a concern with emotion, feeling, or pleasure—though all of these are allied with the aesthetic experience. It is not concerned with the sensations upon which art-works are based because sensations are not aesthetic in themselves. Beauty is not a property of phenomena, but an evaluative judgment by a subject of an object. Aesthetics is a study of ideal value.

Primarily autotelic, the contemplative aesthetic attitude is intuitive, as Kant insisted, is a direct understanding. It is a mode of apperception which is in opposition to practical, truthful, and moral states of mind, to the serious concerns of real life. It is not conceptual, though neither is it true that, as Kant maintained, it has nothing to do with the concept: A horse or a man is beautiful precisely as it conforms to the concept of what a horse or man is and must be, and not merely as it is form per se. Still, aesthetic contemplation is concerned with appearance as such, with the sensuous-phenomenal, not the conceptual-abstract. It is not a logical function. Yet logic, intellect, and concept can be a part and are a part of the aesthetic experience, and can take on a peculiar coloration because of their presence there—provided that the aim of the experience is contemplative and personality-apperceptive, not logical, discursive, or practical. The aesthetic state is self-significant. Like play, it has its own ends; like play, it is a free activity of the mind as the agent of a total personality. Its meaning is not something *other*, as is that of science, ethics, or sociology, but immediate. All dynamics of willing, of practical interest, all concerns with the real existence of the object blend with the whole and thus retreat to the background, and appearance causing pure, feeling-filled contemplation comes forward. Though they resemble things in real life, aesthetic objects are illusionary, and aesthetic contemplation directs itself in an active fashion towards the forms of appearance in their "as-if" character.

Kainz distinguishes three kinds of beauty: There are 1) the neutral, "comprehensive," and undifferentiated beauty of everyday life; 2) the beauty which is synonymous with the aesthetically valuable; and 3) the beauty which is a subdivision of the aesthetic: an aesthetically basic form judged to be simple, pure, and ideal (as in Mozart and Raphael). Yet all three have certain characteristics in common: all are an independent, self-sufficient value based on one of the fundamental dispositions of human beings.

This value is not moral or practical; neither is it sensuous, however much it is based on the concrete and founded on the sensuous and on the pleasures attached to the sensuous. The pleasure is higher than that of the sensuous-agreeable of Kant's distinction; it is universal and necessary as the agreeable is private and contingent. Nor is it the same as truth, which is not an "immanent," but rather a "transcendent" value. Artistic truth, so-called, is not scientific truth, but only an organic lack of contradiction and an "as-if" or inner effect of truth. Both truth and the good are tied to interest and have greater claims than does the beautiful on universality, objectivity,

and necessity. Both are less modified than the beautiful by subjective determinations of age, education, and so forth. The good and the beautiful are closer together than are the true and the beautiful; yet each is an "original" factor. The useful is further removed from the beautiful than are the good and the true; for the beautiful is the purest of the intensive values, and the useful is at one extremity of the scale of values judged in their consecutivity.

The aesthetic situation itself is really a nexus formed by the interpenetration of an attitude of the apprehender and the objectivity which is the work of art of deep structural unity. Aesthetic judgment is the consequence of the coming together of these two totalities, not of the elementary analysis of either or of both. (One of the most successful aspects of the *Vorlesungen* is Kainz's analysis of the form-content unity, which, he always reminds us, is an unbreakable whole.) A non-musical person may be able to grasp the elements of a fugue, but only a musical one can grasp the fugue as a total structure. A total personality contemplatively grasps a total structure as though it too were a personality: sensations, images, associations, intellectual acts and feelings all play parts, but none alone is the whole.

Kainz knows that feeling, a concomitant of all activities of living creatures, is allied with aesthetic contemplation. But here a totality is present too: Aesthetic feeling is higher and more intellectual than feelings of sensuous perception, which are lower; feelings attendant upon the satisfying of human functions are also present; but aesthetic feelings are primarily those caused by semblance; they are illusionary; they are modifications of and softenings of real-life feelings.²³ At the same time they are feelings attached to the apparently easy accomplishment of the act of comprehension; they are an awareness of feeling and a kind of self-enjoyment in one's own feelings. But essentially they are based on object-awareness: Thus there are feelings ("objective ones") for the object as object: we feel what the characters in a play seemingly feel; and there are participatory or sympathetic feelings: these are the feelings we have for the dramatic characters who, however, "act out" only the "objective" feelings of the first class; there are feelings (like that of "catharsis," for instance) with which we leave the work and which are connected with the work as a whole; and in connection with non-representational (music, ornamentation) or non-human art (landscape) there are feelings of mood. And all of these feelings when they are present are fused into one vivid whole.

Now arises the question of empathy based on content: In a long and thorough analysis, Kainz objects to empathic singularism and,

calling the theory into question, substitutes personality-apperception for it. What is wrong with empathy as a characterization of the aesthetic state? The fact that there are genuine acts of empathy outside art and that there are cases in which an aesthetic state is devoid of empathy (in connection with decorative structures, for instance). Thus it cannot be the single source of aesthetic feelings, which are attended by a certain pleasure based upon an intuition of the content. The feelings, like the pleasure, are based upon an intuition of content and form, on the satisfying of functions, on the vividness of the feeling itself, on harmony, on one's own intellectual and imaginative activity.

What is the aesthetic object which stimulates the aesthetic contemplation which is accompanied by feelings and pleasures? To begin with, it is different from its substrate (the physical object) and is on a plane of existence different from that substrate. A certain subjectivity belongs to it, and this is the subjectivity of value as found in the impression. Yet in describing the aesthetic object Kainz is neither a subjectivist nor an objectivist: he is a "correlativist" who finds that the attributes of the aesthetic object and the contemplative act of the subject converge as correlates which, in existing only by way of and for each other, shape a whole. Aesthetic value is no more entirely in the object than it is entirely in the subject. The contemplator himself helps to create the forms which are determined by the object he contemplates.²⁴ Creation and reception are a unit. The aesthetic object is the result of the contemplative act as it is turned on certain "appearances."

IV

Now, there is a hierarchy of persons. The producing and the receiving of aesthetic value are not separate and mutually exclusive acts, but belong to an organized system. Style and taste as aesthetic rules are not relative merely; they have inter- and intra-individual variations within themselves. Every individual has his aesthetic stance and requirements, and these are meaningful not only in his own terms, but also in typical-representative ones. Apart from his unconscious agreements with others, the individual shares values with other persons of his own intellectual and cultural position; thus his individuality is only a variant of the typically and the intrinsically human; the result is agreement and harmony on the basis of that introception by which the ego in a creative way broadens its own set of values, broadens itself from the narrow "point" with which it

begins into a microcosm in which values from outside its limited self become its own through inner appropriation; thus it is governed by norms and requirements which transcend it. The great artist and the great critic as personalities widen their own individual points of view into world views without their being required at the same time to relinquish their "personal notes."

Kainz has repeatedly treated the representative and the typical,²⁵ but more detailed treatment may follow in the second volume of the *Vorlesungen*. Just as people earlier investigated variants in intelligence and types of temperament, so today, he thinks, there is an interest in variants in aesthetic feeling and in types of artistic creativity. Aesthetic totalities are based on standards or norms: A beautiful man or woman is so because the form conforms to the kind of form expected. "Normal" kinds of beauty conform to certain forms because of the objects they represent; the determinant is conformity to species, type, or Idea; even psychic expression has norms though it may go beyond standard forms; and the individual work is not only individual, but typical also. But typicality, like perfection of type, is not itself an aesthetic criterion: Beauty is superior to both: The type itself must be beautiful if the individual work is to be deemed beautiful. There are forms of effect too, and these also represent typical forms like the tragic, the comic, the sublime, and so forth, which are subdivisions of beauty.²⁶

But it is in the realm of taste, the concept of which Kainz has examined in the closest particularity, that the differential and typical are most clearly necessary to a definition of the aesthetic relation between the apprehending sensibility and the apprehended object. Here as everywhere else Kainz rejects absolutism and monism: Law is superior to things; there are legitimate and legal variations in taste within the history of an individual's taste and within the complex which is the tastes of many persons. Whenever these variants are caused by contingent additions of the subject (such as his reveries) for which the object does not call, the variants are unwarranted and unjustifiable. But among individuals there are differences in maturity, in readiness for aesthetic contemplation, and in aesthetic training; furthermore, every person belongs to a psychological type; besides, he is in a special situation each time he judges a work (sometimes he is psychically unbuttoned, sometimes more soberly disposed): he has different moods and sometimes rejects what he otherwise accepts; sometimes habit and its attendant blunting of the impression show their face; and the unfamiliar eventually becomes the familiar. Such differences as these are warranted.

Then there are interindividual differences: The incompetent are more certain of their judgments than the trained: one must be able to group objects aesthetically and to maintain aesthetic presuppositions (not everyone can). But differences based upon insensibility and ignorance, like extra-aesthetic ones, can be ignored. Nor need pseudo-aesthetic considerations bother us. Training is a necessity, but justifiable differences in comprehension remain: organs of sense vary, powers of imagination are not the same, powers of understanding are differently distributed. There are national kinds of taste as there are national kinds of creativity. Differential aesthetics is based on the recognition of constitutional-psychological and cultural-sociological types in their legitimacy. And all are to be viewed under the lamp of the concept of development. Creation and taste are differential-typological. "Universal validity" is not something unqualified, absolute, universal, but something comparative-differential. What is more, it is under the shadow of time and place.

V

Kainz's aesthetics seems to be a consolidation of aesthetic opinion and theory up to World War II. Anti-Hegelian and pro-empirical in the phenomenological fashion, he adopts what is relatively certain and established in Vischer, Lotze, von Hartmann, Herbart, Konrad Fiedler, Lipps, Volkelt, and others, and brings their insights up to date by way of an anti-mechanistic personalism.

This is not to say, however, that in his work as a whole there are no *lacunae* or, indeed, that he has thoroughly disposed of all problems. He skirts many of the preoccupations of recent aesthetic discussions. To be sure, one feels relieved that Kainz is cavalier about the seriously minute and the often irrelevant analysis of statements which has invaded aesthetic thought from its focal position in philosophy. (His own notion is that aesthetics and philosophy, autonomous as the former must be as a science, are interrelated.) But one misses discussion of the medium in its importance as such, of style, of artistic intention, and of greatness or mediocrity as value-judgments of works of art. Nor that these subjects are not touched upon. No one insists more strictly than Kainz on the importance of the object and no one has more thoroughly analyzed the objectivities which by way of psychic law arouse aesthetic contemplation and cause its various modifications. But the question, which may be a metaphysical one, of the importance of the medium itself is absent.

Nor, to refer to a specific art, does one find music treated in a

mode which is quite fashionable today: as pure form and not as expression. A believer in personalistic apperception as a kind of empathy, Kainz assumes the existence of a musical content without going beyond the opinion that the expressive qualities are in the tones and the tonal structures. Nor does he treat any of the problems which are certainly inherent in the subject of the contemplation of the musical *Gestalten*. Furthermore, he brushes aside polytonal and atonal developments in the interest of the standard major-minor tonal system which familiarity has caused almost everyone in the Western world to think of as "natural."

While one is not surprised to find him unconcerned about the problem of poetry and belief—which, after all, is only a fairly recent preoccupation among aesthetically-minded thinkers, one misses a thorough treatment of symbolism. And one is even more disturbed by the absence of the names of Freud and Marx, to say nothing of those of their various disciples and enemies. I. A. Richards receives no mention, though we might well suppose that Richards' notion of aesthetic response as an organization of attitudes would be more than congenial to him. What is the relation of artistic creation to neurosis? The question is not asked. At the same time one is grateful for Kainz's concern with aesthetic norms and his failure to rely on that hypothetical construct the "unconscious."

Most disturbing perhaps are Kainz's historical conservatism and the highly theoretical impression his work gives. As I have indicated, no one is more aware of the art-work than Kainz and no one has objected more strenuously to subjectivism. But his thoroughness in arguing the topics he takes up obscures his concern for the concrete, and his failure (I do not say "inability") to give examples from all periods of history rather than from the primarily classical and romantic ones gives an incorrect impression of his convictions. His approach to style seems separated from such a consideration of social change as motivated Erich Auerbach's *Mimesis* (1946), for example. The balancing factor is his anti-absolutism and his belief in differential standards. These must by their very nature be based on historical presuppositions. His historical observations are sometimes very telling: *nota bene* his comparison of the qualities of the more modern and the older orchestras as based on the "perfection" of present-day instruments and the "imperfection" of older ones. And his discussion of the doctrine of taste has obvious historical bases.

In the end, Kainz finds support in his immediate predecessors for a position which is not identical with leading trends in present-day aesthetics.²⁷ He is not a formalist; Herbart's "pure visibility" is not

for him; nor is he an idealist, though, like Volkelt, he admits that the aesthetic approaches the ideal. He is not primarily a hedonist; he is not a sensualist; nor are his assumptions those of emotion-aesthetics. His qualified acceptance of empathy we know. He is primarily concerned with the plenitude of the whole of life as it achieves an autonomous total form in art, that form being an inseparable blend of form *and* content and the whole artistic or aesthetic personality which results being intuitively contemplated in its "as-if" character by an individual human personality which too has its own peculiar figuration, as determined by capability, inheritance, and training. Aesthetics itself he sees as a science which, by way of a plurality of principles, recognizes the duality of subjectivity and objectivity as components of the aesthetic relation, and attempts to pinpoint a kind of value which is universal in its relevancy, though not absolute in its formulation. Finally, it seems to be undeniable that Kainz makes the classical suggestion that aesthetics defines an educative process which is a deep and rich experience of value, making for the broadening of the individual personality itself.

Yet no one can exhaust all subjects, even those of his own field, and even his limitations can be fruitful ones: if Kainz remands the history of art and aesthetics to the historians, still he has not failed to deal with that element—namely, time—which affects both aesthetic object and aesthetic response. If he has not treated the problem of aesthetic belief in the aesthetic situation, this may be because belief (or its absence) is a particularity of that situation which interests him as a whole "evolving" and "developing" within the confines of the convergence which changing object and subject create. Kainz reminds one of Nicolai Hartmann,²⁸ who has attempted an ontology in terms of modern science and the contemporary world. Kainz's apparent abstractness is in keeping with his preoccupation with the ontology of the aesthetic relation. His convergence is based on a rejection of the old idealistic, materialistic, and teleological modes of philosophizing about art (and about the world). He has attempted to observe existing realities; but as a result he must abjure absolutism, and apriorism becomes passé; for him the hypothetical is never absent. It is the object of authentic aesthetic contemplation which is his focal point. Thus epistemology is part of ontology: the *mode* of understanding in part creates the being. Nor to be forgotten, however, is the fact that becoming, more even than space, is the prime condition of being: as Hartmann says, becoming is a form of being. Kainz, like Pepper, takes into account the element of time with its consequent factor of freedom, both the artist's and the apprehender's,

a freedom which is conditioned by many dependencies and which asserts itself in opposition to them. Man is ordered towards aesthetic contemplation, and aesthetic objects are ordered for him: Here is created a world different from the one with which each of us struggles every day. Kainz is defining the ontological status of the nexus of aesthetic object and aesthetic behavior. He is defining a particular stratum of being in human experience. Despite his sometimes extreme atomization of aesthetic response (the fir tree points "defiantly" upward), he is skeptical of metaphorism and analogy in definition, just as he is of deductive speculation. What he seeks are the categories of aesthetic being.

And Kainz is tireless in stressing the breadth rather than the pointedness of that being: the number of aesthetic states is beyond reckoning as time and place take their toll or make their contributions. In itself this point of view indicates the scientific invalidity of many of the speculations and conjectures of certain previous aestheticians. Aesthetic object and aesthetic state as convergence effect a broader range of realities and anticipate a broader range of possibilities than more conventional earlier thinkers supposed.

As Kainz's aesthetics points away from the isolational analysis which is inherent to one aspect of his method and towards a breadth of view which is inconsistent with present-day particularism, it becomes more scientific than some endeavors which are more self-consciously so. For as Kainz analyzes the aesthetic object and the aesthetic attitude, he makes one aware of the precise character of the relation we call aesthetic, and takes a step forward on that long path—which constitutes the history of aesthetics—from the descriptive to the normative, from definition of what aesthetic experience and value are to a designation of what they should be.

NOTES

1. Born in Vienna in 1897, Kainz received his early education there. After being awarded the usual certificates from the *Staatsgymnasium* in 1915, he was taken into the army. During World War I he served on many fronts, was wounded several times, and received a number of decorations. While he was on convalescent leave from the army, he began his studies at the University of Vienna in philology, art-history, philosophy (aesthetics especially), and psychology. He received his Doctorate in 1921 and studied briefly at various non-Austrian universities, the most valuable of these experiences, according to his own account, being his sojourn at Hamburg, where he associated with William Stern and Ernst Cassirer. He returned to Vienna and studied further, primarily in the fields of medicine, psychology (with Bühler), and natural philosophy (with Schlick), subjects which impinge on both his

aesthetics and his psychology of language. After a brief excursion into what in this country would be called professional education—though probably something with a difference, Kainz was certified in 1925 to teach aesthetics; in 1931 he became a special university lecturer and eight years later regular university lecturer in philosophy with aesthetics and the psychology of language as his specialties. During World War II he served chiefly as psychologist; 1950 brought him his full professorship. He is a member of the Austrian Academy and foreign member of the *Accademia Scientiarum Fennica* of Somaliland.

2. The reprimand by the German aesthetician Emil Utitz (in a review of Kainz's book in *Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, LXXIII [1952], 33-38) that Kainz did not give such a guide seems somewhat severe. In the first place, the guide might well be a part of Volume II, if it eventually appears; in the second, the footnotes contain a plethora of references and are therefore in part a "guide." *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* (JAAC) is indeed not mentioned, as Utitz points out, but articles from *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* (hereafter designated as ZÄAK) are, and Kainz's whole book is in the shadow of this latter journal. That Kainz did not mention the annual bibliographies of these journals is a quibble, especially in the light of Utitz's further reprimand that Kainz did not select his sources well or sharply enough. For a more favorable estimate see Karl Aschenbrenner's review of the *Vorlesungen* in JAAC, XIV (1955), 269-270.

3. Thus, for instance, the principle of unity in multiplicity enters as a factor in connection with sensation and perception. But this of course is because this principle is the basis of another fundamental principle in aesthetics: namely, "complexibility," which is the apparently easy bringing of materials into a unity. I could give many other examples, and one might even be attracted by the possibility of making a chart of these repetitions of statement and principle in different contexts.

4. *Op. cit.* fn. 2, p. 38.

5. *World Hypotheses* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1942), p. 184.

6. Friedrich Kainz, *Das Steigerungsphänomen als Künstlerisches Gestaltungsprinzip* (Leipzig, 1924), pp. 26-66.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

8. *Psychologie der Sprache*, Vol. IV (Stuttgart, 1956), p. 1.

9. *Vorlesungen über Ästhetik* (Wien, 1948), pp. 261-262.

10. "Ein Beitrag zur Werk- und Leistungspsychologie des höheren Gefühlslebens," *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*, CXXXII (1934), p. 11.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 53. A closer following of the convergence theory is to be found in "Gestaltgesetzlichkeit und Ornamententstehung," *Zeitschrift für Angewandte Psychologie*, XXVIII (1927), 267-327. One must mention the following three works as also dealing in direct or contingent ways with psychological bases for artistic and aesthetic creativity and response: "Zur Psychologie der Sprachfunktionen," *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*, CXXXIX (1936), 38-97; "Die Sprachpsychologie der deutschen Romantik," *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*, CLXIII (1938), 317-390; and the *Einführung in die Sprachpsychologie* (Wien, 1946), which is excellent for the general intelligent reader.

12. One of the best studies based on the gestalt (whole) principle that I know is Kainz's "Die Familie als dichterisches Problem," *Die Literatur*, XXVIII

(1925-1926), 629-632, in which he discusses the family in literature beginning with Oedipus.

13. Material in this context is developed in "Literaturwissenschaft und Neue Psychologie," *Euphorion*, XXVIII (1927), 172-195.

14. See *Euphorion*, XXVIII (1927), 336, where the editor in a note disclaims responsibility for or agreement with Kainz's (anti-analytical) position.

15. For a brief but rather comprehensive account see Ralph T. Flewelling, "Personalism," in *Twentieth Century Philosophy*, ed. by Dagobert D. Runes (New York, 1943), pp. 321-341.

16. William Stern, who worked with Clara Stern in the field of child psychology, wrote *Person und Sache, System des Kritischen Personalismus* in three volumes (Leipzig, 1918-1924). For an outline of Stern's System see Richard Müller-Freienfels' review of Volume III in ZÄAK, XX (1926), 68-71, and Kainz, *Personalistische Ästhetik* (Leipzig, 1932), pp. 10-38. See also William Stern, *Grundgedanken der Personalistischen Philosophie* (*Philos. Vorträge der Kant-Gesellschaft*, number 20, 1918); and Stern, *Selbstdarstellung* (*Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen*, VI, 1927), pp. 129 ff.

17. This is emphasized in Heinrich Adolph, *Personalistische Philosophie* (Leipzig, 1931).

18. See "Sprachphilosophie and Ästhetik," ZÄAK, XXIX (1935), 141-158 (a discussion of Julius Stengel's *Philosophie und Sprache* [Munich and Berlin, 1934] and Karl Bühler's *Sprachtheorie* [Jena, 1934]). He asks for a philosophical linguistics in "Entwurf eines Systems der Sprachphilosophie," *Kant-Studien*, I.XI (1936), 380-402.

19. Among the most interesting of Kainz's shorter works is that on the lie, which is based on fundamental characteristics of the human psyche and which clearly underlies fiction in general and romance in particular ("Lügenerscheinungen in Sprachleben" in Otto Lipmann and Paul Plaut, *Die Lüge* [Leipzig, 1927], pp. 212-243). He treats the lie as a linguistic phenomenon and raises the question, skeptical by implication, of whether language can express anything adequately or whether everything one says is a semantic fiction. He discusses lies based on tabus, hidden meanings, euphemisms, lies based on the non-literal (aesthetic) character of language.

20. So, for instance, there is the question of the psychological bases of the language of courts of law ("Gerichtliche Sprachpsychologie," *Sprachforum*, I [1955], 20-33) and of that of religious life ("Sprachpsychologisches zum Thema 'Religion und Sprache,'" *Die Sprache*, I [1949], 101-115).

21. "Zur dichterischen Sprachgestaltung," ZÄAK, XVIII (1925), 195-222.

22. "Vorarbeiten zu einer Philosophie des Stils," ZÄAK, XX (1926), 21-63.

23. This is as close as Kainz comes to subscribing to Bullough's "aesthetic distance," which, so far as I know, he fails ever to mention.

24. One recalls Percy Lubbock's opinion that the reader as he reshapes what the novelist has written is himself a novelist (*The Craft of Fiction* [New York, 1931], p. 17).

25. See especially "Differentielle Psychologie und Ästhetik," *Zeitschrift für Angewandte Psychologie*, I.XV (1933), 209-261.

26. In admitting to various kinds or modifications of beauty like the gay, the sublime, the characteristic, and the energetic, Kainz seems to follow August

Endell ("Möglichkeit und Ziele einer neuen Architektur" in "*Deutsche Kunst und Dekoration*," ed. by A. Koch [Darmstadt, 1898], I, 141-152), though he does not mention him. See "Höhere Wirkungsgestalten des sprachlichen Ausdrucks im Deutschen," ZAAK, XXVIII (1934), 305-357.

27. See Ernest K. Mundt, "Three Aspects of German Aesthetic Theory," JAAC, XVII (1959), 287-310, for an analysis of modern trends which Kainz recognizes but tries to transcend.

28. See, for instance, *The New Ways of Ontology* (Chicago, 1953).

ONE | THE SCIENTIFIC THEORY OF AESTHETICS

1. THE NATURE AND THE TASK OF AESTHETICS

Aesthetics is the discipline and science whose aims and achievements can be imagined, at least in an approximate fashion, even by people not professionally trained. Even a person who has no inkling of the objects which most of the other sciences have in view usually knows that in some way or other aesthetics is connected with the beautiful and thus that it is the science of the beautiful.

This is the current view, not only in popular thought, but in learned definitions of aesthetics as well. Reference to the beautiful is often the starting-point of an examination of the themes and the task of aesthetics.¹ It is said, for instance, that aesthetics has to ascertain the nature of beauty; that as it attempts to establish the inner laws which guide the human spirit in the creating, the enjoying, and the judging of the beautiful, it has to track down and ferret out those common matters which are at the base of all of the appearances of the beautiful; and, finally, that it must show what kind of value the beautiful has in our spiritual lives and in the cultural development of mankind. Even where other leading and programmatic concepts have been adopted for the purpose of describing the nature of aesthetics, the central relation to the beautiful is still contained in the definition.² That it is constitutive there is no doubt; at the same time it is in need of certain more precise designations.

Thus aesthetics is the science of the beautiful. But what kind of a science: a philosophical, or a separate and autonomous one? In earlier periods it was predominantly thought to be a philosophical discipline; but today a great number of aestheticians clearly incline towards the opposite view.³ It is said, for example, that because it shows itself to be accessible to experimental treatment, aesthetics by its very conception ultimately detaches itself from its source in philosophy and becomes a real science,⁴ even a natural one: ⁵ one can no longer close his eyes to the trend in the development of scientific theory which is of influence here. I too think of aesthetics as primarily an autonomous separate science, even though in this book I shall occasionally take into account philosophical currents of thought also; one should not forget that for a long time aesthetics played a role as a subdivision of the discipline of philosophy (and also of that of value-theory, or axiology). But the fact that a person has one object in view does not make another false or impossible. A person may pursue aesthetics from the philosophical point of view as well as from that of a separate science, just as one can approach psychology from the philosophical point of view as the metaphysics of the psyche, or from that of science as a natural science closely related to physiology. The methodological either/or is replaced by a more moderate partly-this/party-that. To anyone who would claim that aesthetics belongs exclusively to philosophy, one may counter that it must earn a large part of its factual material with the means employed by an individual science and that it has tasks which are just as important as those "real" problems, the ultimate questions of mind and of value, which are successfully treated only from the philosophical standpoint.⁶ Aesthetics does undoubtedly include a not insignificant complement of universal, basic, and categorical problems; it shares them because it is an integrally constituent part of a system of philosophy which in turn would to a large extent be incomplete without it; but it also includes other questions which must be reserved to the research work of a separate science. Champions of philosophical aesthetics decidedly resist the fact that aesthetics, which they think can solve its central problems only as a philosophical discipline employing philosophical means, has been changed into a psychology of aesthetic contemplation and artistic creativity. Confronted by the success of psychological-experimental aesthetics as derived from the tradition of Fechner,⁷ they insist that the pursuit of such research produces only preliminary studies and that these studies, when they are completed, must give way to a genuine and complete aesthetics. This total aesthetics is not merely the philosophi-

cal kind, however, but one which unites and compresses the two methodologies of philosophy and of individual science into a higher synthesis.

I am thus already led to another programmatic duality in point of view: namely, that of the problem of method: is aesthetics, or must it be, primarily a subjective-psychological study or an objective-ontological one? For example, Oswald Külpe⁸ stresses that aesthetics is the science of aesthetic attitude: it is a matter of the subjective-functional "moment," not of the material essentiality of things called beautiful. Aesthetics only says something about how certain objects affect us when we occupy ourselves with them in a certain mood of receptivity. Beauty and ugliness are not qualities of objects which continue to adhere to them when no judging mind is engaged with them. To say, therefore, that aesthetics treats of the facts of the beautiful, is to mean merely that aesthetics investigates certain effects of objects, that it explores certain phenomena which occur wherever objects are apprehended with aesthetic receptivity.

Advocated chiefly by psychologists at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of this one, this point of view may be called aesthetic subjectivism and psychologism. But there is an opposite opinion whose champions try to investigate what the beautiful is from the objective view-point: By means of what peculiar signs and by what objective characteristic features can one describe an object designated as beautiful? What objective presuppositions must be met if aesthetic effect is to take place? In these terms, probably Schiller⁹ and, at the present time, Theodor A. Meyer¹⁰ would be objectivists, the former when he tried to identify the beautiful by the characteristic sign of freedom in appearance and the latter when he defines it as life's plenitude which has become form in appearance and which approaches us in a pleasantly functional manner through a unified-various ordering of our powers of comprehension. Greek theorists of art who saw beauty as measure and number¹¹ could therefore also be classified here because they believed in the possibility of a canon of beauty which is objective and valid because it transcends the individual and the particular.

As often happens, one must decide in this case too, in terms not of an either/or, but in those of one/as-well-as-another. Aesthetics must examine the psychological structure of the aesthetic deportment of the spectator because, unless there is such a psychological structure and a sensibility coming from it, there is no beauty. On the other hand, aesthetics must make clear what the objective traits are which arouse the aesthetic reaction of the observer and satisfy his suscepti-

bility. For not all things in the world are equal in beauty, even for the person who thirsts for it. There are a Yes and a No, as well as a More and a Less, and each must be objectively caused.

The attempt to define the nature and the task of aesthetics in terms of beauty is of course not without its difficulties. People have critically demurred that a definition like this is acceptable only because the concept of the beautiful is ambiguous. The word "beautiful," in the first place, designates that which grants a high degree of spontaneous and undisturbed satisfaction to aesthetic taste—as do, for instance, the works of Raphael, of Mozart, and of Goethe in his mature years. These would belong, therefore, to the beautiful in the narrower and proper sense. But if one defines aesthetics as a science of beauty, another and broader meaning of the concept must clearly be fundamental. For there are natural objects and works of art about whose aesthetic effects there is no question even though they can be called beautiful only in a certain figurative sense. Places of rough, violent grandeur, storm-swept seas, tragedies with gloomy and frightening qualities: all of these can in large measure be aesthetically effective though anyone with an unsophisticated sense of language resists calling them beautiful. They have beauty in a wider sense, therefore: This includes everything that is aesthetically relevant and meaningful and hence what appeals to us as fundamental aesthetic forms or modifications of the beautiful: the tragic, the sublime, the comic, the humorous, and so forth. Thus it is said that the object of investigation in aesthetics is not the beautiful in the usual narrower and proper sense, but everything that is aesthetically effective even up to crudenesses bordering on the revolting. To avoid error, therefore, many aestheticians usually omit the concept of the beautiful from their definitions of their science. For them, aesthetics is the science of the aesthetic objects. But this definition, being tautological, says nothing. It seems the lesser error at one's first approach to definition to take the concept of the beautiful into account. Having observed its ambiguity, one can apply it too.

Another attempt to define aesthetics sets up an intrinsic coherence between aesthetics and the confirmation of taste: Aesthetics is the philosophy of taste. This kind of definition was taken into account by Odebrecht,¹² after Kant¹³ had already given certain hints of this meaning. One cannot attack the position that taste does in a figurative sense play a central role in aesthetics. In this sense, taste is understood as a capacity for the proper aesthetic verifications of the productive and of the receptive sorts, and above all for the making

of right and secure aesthetic judgments. Similarly, Kant defines taste as "the faculty of the judgment of the beautiful." By stressing the confirmation of taste as an original faculty in the psychic lives of human beings Kant in his critical transcendental philosophy succeeded in affirming an autonomous realm for the aesthetic; he freed it from an amalgam of rational and sensuous constituents. He conceived of it neither as confused knowledge nor as sensuous pleasure, but as an elementary psychic phenomenon with its own *a priori* laws whose definition is the merit of his transcendental philosophical method. Kant's critical philosophy was governed by the interests of a theory of cognition which made his aesthetic into a structural analysis of the judgment of taste.

Important for aesthetics as the question of taste is, one still cannot recommend that the concept of taste be a part of a leading initial definition of aesthetics, for the concept proves nothing unless one immediately and promptly appeals to the concepts of the beautiful or of the aesthetic. The introduction of the idea of taste therefore has the value of an approximative clarification only, such as occurs when a person to a certain extent explains an obscure concept by referring to more familiar ones with which it is connected.

If one cannot recommend the use of the concept of taste in an initial definition of aesthetics, neither can one rely on those downright false and misleading assertions which set up a close relationship between aesthetics and art. It is sometimes said that aesthetics is the philosophy of art, the systematic science of the principles and laws of art. But this limitation of the realm of aesthetics is inadmissible; for no matter how much art falls into the sphere of aesthetic research, no matter how much the one has to do with the other, it is still incorrect to admit the relationship into the definition. To begin with, aesthetic and artistic matters are not identical. The aesthetic is not exhausted by the artistic. Even in nature, in the real lives of men, and in the spheres of extra-artistic culture, there are phenomena capable of calling up an aesthetic effect and, despite great differences, of causing analogous pleasures for the apprehending sensibility. The task of aesthetics, whose scope of work cannot be entirely filled up with the artistic, is precisely that of discovering the common elements which join together realizations of the beautiful in these spheres which are so different.

Nor is the province of art completely exhausted by the aesthetic. Not everything related to or in art is aesthetic. Present also are many other matters, such as intellectual, sociological, religious, and moral

factors; and such functions as illustrating, demonstrating, cultivating, and those which are apotropaic (the warding off of action) and protreptic (the arousing of action). In the end, every art-work is also a problem of the will,¹⁴ and not for the creator alone. While the province of aesthetics is wider than that of art, the latter includes phenomena which cannot be subsumed under the aesthetic. The extra-aesthetic aspects of a work of art are often very powerful; moreover, they are often of primary genetic importance. Frequently it is precisely they which have given the impulse for the origin of the work of art and which are therefore far more than secondary co-products arrived at accidentally or incidentally. Certainly art is the creative, aesthetically basic function of human beings, but there are more decisive factors in the quality of art than the aesthetic. Moreover, art is a phenomenon in the structure of culture as a whole and receives its existential signification only as it is embedded in the totality of that culture. Only a shallow aestheticism would want to free art from these extra-aesthetic relations and problems. We interpret aestheticism as an aesthetic kind of contemplation adopted in the wrong places, as a one-sided and unwarranted extension of the demands for aesthetic value. The aestheticist employs aesthetic criteria where they do not apply, just as the aesthete is committed to the experience of aesthetic values even where other kinds of experience alone would be proper. Because the subject-sphere of aesthetics and the sciences dedicated to the entire complex of art are in a relation of cross-breeding to one another, a divorce between aesthetics and the general science of art¹⁵ has recently been proposed. It is the task of the latter to do justice to art in all of its relations, and therefore not merely to grasp the aesthetic aspect of it.

To set up a close connection between the aesthetic and feeling is to achieve a definition which is widely accepted today. It is said that aesthetics is a philosophy of feeling,¹⁶ as though feeling were something peculiar to the phenomenon of the aesthetic things alone. As a theory of the ideal of the feeling spirit, aesthetics has been placed alongside logic and ethics, which have to do with the ideal of the mind as it thinks and wills. Here the platonic triad of Ideas is in operation, a triad which is coupled with a cleavage of the psychic functions of man as found in the faculty psychology. These value-ideas and these mental faculties are further coordinated with three spheres of culture and the three primary disciplines in philosophy; and the inclusiveness of a system of classification so derived has acquired such power of conviction that for a long time it has been

accepted without challenge even though it forces an excessive oversimplification of the facts.

Value-Ideas (Ideals):	Truth	Goodness	Beauty
Psychic Functions:	Thinking	Willing	Feeling
Cultural Spheres:	Science	Practical Life	Art
Philosophical Disciplines:	Logic	Ethics	Aesthetics

This classification reduces the aesthetic attitude to feeling and the theory of this attitude to an analysis of feelings—and it is untenably one-sided. It is true, of course, that, of all psychic activities, feeling plays a more decisive role within aesthetic behavior than do thinking or willing. Yet, in opposition to such neat distinctions as these, one must stress the fact that the mind in all of its manifestations is something whole and unitary. The entire man is a party to every experience. It is impossible for a function to emerge in its purity: we can never act exclusively in terms of feeling or thinking or willing. That feeling is significant in the aesthetic mode of behavior is beyond a doubt; but it does not predominate alone and by itself. Perception and representation act with equal vigor, as do understanding and the producing of relations, though these function, not with logical nakedness, but with a certain approximation of and likeness to feeling. Beyond this, there are spheres of life in which feelings assert themselves far more conclusively: religion, above all. Precisely for this reason it will not do for us to define aesthetic objects in terms of their appeal to feelings. Other counter-appeals assert themselves too, and hence the existence of the so-called thought-aesthetic object, for example, which speaks primarily against the complete emotionalization of the aesthetic object. There are other matters to remember besides: the aesthetic is a matter of cultural significance; it is not a category of the psychological situation which could be satisfactorily described in terms of purely functional characteristics (say, that of feeling) and thus adequately delimited from other intellectual tendencies in psychic-mental behavior, from other kinds of behavior in performance. To begin with, feeling dominates in other places too; and then there are other matters besides feeling that are so decisively a part of the context of aesthetic activity that a final definition of the nature of the aesthetic things cannot be achieved by a one-sided emphasis on it. The aesthetic state cannot be characterized in terms of its psychic elements—not, for instance, by one's pointing out the predominance of a single structural element. It must be characterized only in its totality, only as it is understood as a peculiar total form of psychic behavior.

There are two more attempts at definition which are connected with the emotionalistic designation of the aesthetic. Thus one occasionally hears that beauty is what pleases.¹⁷ Consequently aesthetics would be a science of pleasure, or of a person's pleasure. Yet there is a critical counter-argument to this view: namely, that everything possible can please someone without its therefore becoming aesthetically valuable. To treat pleasure as the characteristic of the aesthetic, one would have to achieve a far-reaching specialization of the concept. Pleasure would then be understood simply as a quite individual and direct state of one's being pleased as, in feeling-filled intuition, he grasps a life-content become form. Thus with this phrase one would designate only the specific aesthetic peculiarity of a value-impression and would mean that the pleasant as such is of concern, and not pleasure as a concomitant of any kind of furtherance of life or of any kind of satisfying of the necessities of life. Saying this, one would already have referred to the autotelic character (*Selbstzweckhaftigkeit*) of the aesthetic object as well as to the contemplative character of the attitude turned towards it; thus the attempted definitional result would be burdened with other aesthetic aspects besides that of pleasure. To the pleasure-theory belongs the assertion of Wallaschek¹⁸ that aesthetics is the study of things which please men only for the sake of joy itself. Also, the definition resulting from an extension of a scholastic statement could be cited here: *Aesthetica est scientia de pulchro. Pulchrum autem dicatur id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet.*

The relation to the pleasant and to the pleasurable resulting sensation, a relation which proves meaningful in aesthetics and which is one of its problems, is often introduced into definitions. Thus, according to Fechner,¹⁹ aesthetics has to do with objects as regards their effect of pleasure or displeasure. For him aesthetics is the science of pleasure or the lack of it because he sets up a close relationship between the aesthetic and the sphere of pleasure and its absence. But this does not follow: for if something is pleasant, it still need not be aesthetically relevant. Every sphere of value includes a correlate of pleasure, and every adequate satisfying of a function or of a necessity is pleasurable. It is important for the aesthetic and characteristic of it that a certain pleasure be aroused; this is pleasure in pure contemplation. Even Fechner finds himself forced to draw up a *differentia specifica*: The science of all relations of pleasure and pain would be, not aesthetics, but hedonics. Aesthetics is connected only with that side of the experience of pleasure through pain, thinks Fechner, which depends directly on sensations and images aroused

from the outside. But he holds that the relation of pleasure-lack to pleasure is the decisive criterion: what in this respect is a matter of indifference can never be aesthetic. And he is correct; on the other hand, however, not everything that arouses effects of pleasure is aesthetically significant by a long shot. Pleasure is a conditional determination of consciousness which is not characteristic of the aesthetic alone, especially because it is also often found outside it. Besides, the aesthetic experience cannot be satisfactorily designated by the expression "pleasure." With one's pleasure in the tragic and the pathetic, for instance, are often mixed intensely painful factors, and the value of the aesthetic experience is not destroyed by them, the experience itself being a peculiar enhancement of the sense of life.

Thus I shall hold to my opening definition: Aesthetics is the science of the beautiful values of life understood in the widest sense. A more detailed exposition of this very general statement will be given in the sections devoted to the phenomenology of aesthetic objects. Although the definition I accept seems to be the best starting-point for the analysis of the tasks of this science, I do not mean to say that the paraphrasing of concepts or ideas which are rejected would be entirely without point. Rather we could learn all sorts of things from them. I have recognized that the problem of taste, the characteristic questions grouped around art as a center, the dominance of feeling, the peculiar form of the delightful effect called pleasure—I have recognized that all of these represent important problems for aesthetics. Therefore, one cannot deny that these ideas play constitutive roles when one determines the subjects of aesthetics, and the sections to follow will reveal what significance I myself give them. But I do not think it advisable to admit them into a preliminary definition.

2. METHODS AND PROCEDURES IN AESTHETICS

A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

One cannot talk about a single or even about a merely uniform method in aesthetics. The modes of procedure in this science are completely unhomogeneous, though among them can be distinguished three [*sic*] major groups which can include most of the others one may encounter: 1. the philosophical method, 2. the empirical method, which is in turn divided into a) the psychological branch and b) the objective scientific branch concerning matters artistic and cultural.

The philosophical method works with abstract methods of in-

ference and thought which we call speculation, critical reasoning, and the deductive working with concepts. In a far-reaching way it also takes into its service psychological methods of work, however, just as philosophical and psychological methods work closely together in the field of philosophical endeavor as a whole (and therefore also outside aesthetics). It is in the nature of things that psychological methods should participate in philosophical investigations. According to Anton Marty,²⁰ those studies have to be called philosophically valid which either are psychological in nature or which according to the rules of a useful division of labor must depend on the psychological. A similar view is held by Brentano,²¹ who undertook the building of a scientific philosophy based upon inner experience, the psychological having to officiate at its core: All philosophical disciplines are bound together by the fact that their objects are exclusively psychical phenomena;²² only metaphysical ontology examines the universal laws and attributes common to everything that exists (thus to the physical and the psychical), but even here the psychic plays a critical role.

To oppose the philosophical method within aesthetics to the empirical one is not to say that close connection to experience is unimportant in philosophy; one is only scientifically and systematically following a useful classification of disciplines into 1) the philosophical one and 2) those which as sciences are separate. It is necessary for us to pursue aesthetics as a separate science because its factual materials do not come ready furnished by certain positive disciplines, say by the studies of art, music, and literature; it must collect and work over its own materials, and, indeed, it must earn them. Moritz Geiger²³ points out the deficiencies of any unitary methodological principle and the difficulties growing out of it: Aesthetics does not have the advantages of a practical science; it cannot derive from a well-defined body of fact. Instead, it is a value-study which tries to establish the laws of aesthetic value without being able unequivocally to point to what the objects are from which it gathers these laws. It is not in the situation of being able to make secure against contradiction the values with which it deals. For this purpose is needed an insight into the nature of beauty that can be gained only from such objects or works. This is the logical circle which is the primary methodological problem of all sciences which are concerned with value.

Among these difficulties there are various ones which people have tried to avoid by rejecting the idea that aesthetics has an axiological-normative character and by attempting to make it into

an empirical-descriptive study of certain data of psychic life. They have made it the duty of aesthetics to investigate these psychic phenomena by way of experiment in as exact a fashion as does psychology (within whose broader confines aesthetics must be included) with all of the data of psychic life. They have tried to guarantee exactness to aesthetics by relinquishing its philosophical, supra-descriptive character. The notion that aesthetics in its research aspect is definitely separated from its guardian, philosophy, and that it has its own scientific methods to develop has been advocated by a number of researchers since the year 1900. But at the same time, there is no dearth of aestheticians just now coming more markedly to the fore to declare that the philosophical method is the most adequate one. For this reason, it is not our concern to play the philosophical and the autonomous methods against one another. One must grant to each its respective rights.

In making this comparison, one has pointed to a famous antithesis in method: namely, that distinction which Fechner made in connection with Jean Paul ²⁴ when he separated an "aesthetics from above" from an "aesthetics from below." He means the antithesis between philosophical and empirical attitudes, between the deductive and inductive methods.

"The dual way in which human knowledge tries to ground and develop itself holds good in aesthetics also. . . . One pursues aesthetics from above when he starts from the most general ideas and concepts and descends to a particular one. . . . from below when he climbs from single ones up to a general or universal one. In the one, the realm of aesthetic experience is classified in terms of an ideal framework constructed from the highest point of view; in the other one builds an aesthetics from below on the ground-work of aesthetic data and laws. On the one hand, there are the ideas of beauty, art, and style. . . . their relation to truth and goodness, and an ascending to the Absolute; on the other, one proceeds from the experience of what pleases and displeases and, generalizing more and more, looks for aesthetic laws with regard to the universal laws of what ought to be, laws to which those of pleasure must always be subordinate."

Fechner does not entirely reject aesthetics from above; it only needs, he thinks, an empirical under-pinning. Therefore aesthetics from below belongs among the most vital of the preliminary conditions for that aesthetics from above which is to be achieved. Fechner apparently even sees the completion of this discipline in the aesthetic from above, provided that the propositions utilized for the

purpose of deduction are reached inductively from the broad materials of experience and are therefore empirically established.

Here one notices the antithesis between the method of research and the method of statement. One can reach his results by way of pure induction based on experience, to formulate them as general laws; then in a statement he can reason out from them the more special and particular ones; and then "descend" from these to concrete instances. The discussion thus appears to be deductive without its basically being so.

Yet one must not wipe out the distinctions in method which Fechner made so sharp, as Katann²⁵ would like to do when he says that even the idealistic philosophers have always built their thought on experience; and that, consequently, there is not a special difference, but only a gradual one, between the two methods brought into such sharp contrast by Fechner. This is true: to philosophize without a foundation in experience is impossible. Nevertheless, the extremely rationalistic attitude as compared with the purely empiristic one sets up very serious methodological differences. One thinks, for instance, of the supercilious disdain which speculative philosophers feel towards the "merely empirical" procedure and of the conviction they repeatedly express that a really speculative thinker needs hardly any experience at all—or at least that he can be satisfied with a minimum of the empirical.

There is really a graver objection than the one just mentioned: If Fechner believes that in the duality of method he has specified are included all possible methods of procedure in aesthetics, he is patently wrong; to oppose the inductive and the deductive methods is not to separate them completely; they are not entirely disjunctive.²⁶ Instead, a third method, the intuitive, is possible. For example, the sentence, "Orange has its place between red and yellow in the circle of colors," is not acquired by deduction; it is not logically inferred from a more general statement. But it is not the result of induction either, of a generalization of insights achieved by the combining of a number of concrete instances. Rather, it is a simple intuition of a single event that convinces one that it is so and that it must be so, that this relationship is true once and for all. Increased empiricism does not bring about increased certainty in the insight already achieved through the single observation. Knowledge based on a single act is possible because of one's insight into the universal nature of such relations. Intuition, not induction and deduction, brings this about. There is no scientific procedure which in practice does not use intuition, at least for the making of fundamental statements

(axioms) from which something further can be concluded. Intuition has had conscious and fundamental encouragement and respect primarily from the philosophical movement called phenomenology.

It would be entirely possible, therefore, to broaden Fechner's duality of method into a tripartite one and to add to inductive and deductive aesthetics an intuitive (phenomenological) one. But for practical reasons it seems more advisable to draw intuitive aesthetics into the philosophical, from which, indeed, it cannot be sharply distinguished, and, for the rest, to retain the duality of the philosophical and the empirical modes of procedure.

B. PHILOSOPHICAL AESTHETICS

The movements in philosophical aesthetics are so abundant that they cannot be discussed fully or even be merely enumerated. But to do so is unnecessary because I intend only to indicate certain typical points of view which come into consideration as impressive examples of the methods to be described. A major portion of philosophical aesthetics could be called deductive, though in most cases certain modifications of the mode of procedure "from above" assert themselves. At its purest, the deductive method operates in connection with speculative aesthetics as it was developed from out of extremely idealistic trends in thought and, further, in connection with the *aprioristic* transcendentalism of the neokantians of Marburg.²⁷ Examples of the former group are aesthetics-directed statements by Plato,²⁸ Plotinus,²⁹ Schelling,³⁰ Hegel,³¹ and Schopenhauer³²—to mention only a few. At the beginning, these thinkers set up primarily a metaphysical formulation of the concept of beauty, a concept from out of which one then tries to attain the concrete; except that their endeavors towards that formulation were mostly far too intensive, and consequently did not make possible a satisfactory grasp of the truly concrete and individual. As a pure case of deductive procedure, metaphysical aesthetics begins from almost any kind of superior universal concepts and attempts by means of logic to grasp the beautiful as a special case of this highest universality. Therefore aesthetic phenomena are brought into a coherence with a certain conception of the nature of ultimate world-principles, and an understanding of these phenomena based on this coherence is attempted. In explaining the beautiful, therefore, Schopenhauer takes up the Ideas as degrees of objectivation of the World-Will, even to the extent of explaining music in terms of the Will itself; he deduces the nature of art from its most ultimate and most essential task: the presentation of Ideas. According to Plato, a complete and pure beauty belongs

only to the Idea, to the ultimate and utmost archetypal of essences. The Idea in the aesthetic and ethical respect is the perfection of its kind, a perfection from which reality always falls short. The beauty of the thing lies in its participation in the Idea. A horse is beautiful when it as clearly as possible embodies the Idea of horse-ness. In his discussions of aesthetics, Schelling employs the concept of the Absolute and attempts an idealistic "construction" of the aesthetic thing and of art: that is, an elucidation of the mode of existence of things in the Absolute. In very abstract ontological discussions, the aspects of the Absolute—that is, Spirit and Nature—are shown to be suspended in the Indifference of the Absolute and then to be in turn differentiated among themselves. As a first potency of nature, there is matter, as the second, light, and as the third, the organism. The analogous potencies of Spirit (*Geist*) are knowing, acting, and art. These three degrees of the Subjective or Ideal correspond to the three Ideas of truth, goodness, and beauty. Thus Schelling sees the task of his aesthetics as the showing of the relation of the beautiful to the Absolute. His transcendental Idealism comprehends art as the supreme Third, in which the antithesis of subject and object and of theoretical and practical attitudes appears to be suspended. The beautiful is the presentation of the Infinite in the finite; in sensuous appearances it conveys the Identity of the Real and the Ideal. According to Hegel, the beautiful is the Absolute (the eternal in the temporal) in sensuous existence, the Idea in finite appearance. Different types of art are deduced from the relations of these aspects, from the prevalence of the outward form, or of the inner content, or from a balance of the two. Deduced, respectively, are symbolical, romantic, and classical art-forms. The basic idea of Plato and Plotinus of the *μετοχή εἶδους* as the true foundation of beauty is more or less important in all idealistic aesthetics insofar as the view is adopted that things are beautiful, not as individual phenomena as such, but only as they are adequate to the ideal of their species. Plotinus thinks of the shining-forth of the godlike, and similar notions are to be found in scholastic and neoscholastic theories of the beautiful.³³

Even in our own time, metaphysical aesthetics is not completely dead. One could cite H. Glockner's neohegelian aesthetics,³⁴ M. Beck's tackling of an aesthetic under the influence of modern ontology, P. Häberlin's philosophical aesthetics,³⁵ and that metaphysical final chapter in the eminently important aesthetic works of Johannes Volkelt³⁶ and Theodor Ziehen³⁷—to mention only a few. Putting his "normative aesthetics on a psychological basis" on a sufficiently secure empirical foundation and therefore dispelling the

danger of a one-sided aesthetics from above, Volkelt allows speculative trains of thought to speak about ultimate questions of the nature of the aesthetic and its rightful place in a system of values. Theodor Ziehen too does not want to exclude all deduction from aesthetics; nor does he want to give up the relationship of aesthetics to philosophical axiology. After establishing the laws of aesthetics by way of induction, he tries to show how the aesthetic which he has ascertained has its proper place in the universal context of given things. In so doing, he turns towards individual metaphysical systems and asks this question: Which of these systems makes conceivable the situation of aesthetics as it has been inductively established?

Alongside metaphysical aesthetics at the beginning of the 20th century, there was a critical aesthetics one of whose branches was completely deductive. It treated of aesthetics as the Marburg school of neokantians (Hermann Cohen and Natorp)³⁸ have developed it. This critical philosophy, which Kant founded, discovers in the different spheres of culture judgments which claim to be universally and necessarily valid. The task of critical philosophy, then, is to prove the right of these claims. The laws by which these legitimate claims are decided are the universal laws of consciousness. Such judgments occur in the realms of thought, of the ethical will, and of beauty. The peculiarity of critical aesthetics lies in the fact that it tests the title of aesthetic value-judgments and aesthetic value by looking for their bases in the highest conditions of consciousness. An example of the apriorism which, really not experience-saturated, is transcendental-philosophical, and of the deduction which, being completely divorced from actuality, is based on pure concepts of the kind produced in absolutistic thought—an example is “the aesthetic of pure feeling,” called so by Hermann Cohen. Also present in the transcendental-teleological method as championed by Lenore Kühn³⁹ is a dialectic of concepts and a flight from reality which are unfruitful for aesthetics.

If in the realm of aesthetics the transcendentalism and pan-methodism of the Marburgers is conceivably unsuitable as a method of procedure for the mastery of the problems we have raised, the approach of the neokantians of Freiburg (in Baden) is far more productive. A distinguished work in this tradition is the critical value-aesthetics of Jonas Cohn,⁴⁰ who undertakes to furnish a supplement of content to Kantian criticism for the realm of subjects in aesthetics without relinquishing the soundness of its critical foundations. He makes it clear that the method he has devised is not the same as the aesthetics from below, but that deduction plays a decisive role in

his thought and that he is only trying to derive the principles of his deduction from the aesthetic sphere itself. Meumann⁴¹ designates this aesthetics based on the earth of the Kantian dogma of aesthetic judgment as a special judgment of taste which cannot be further explained and which belongs to the original furnishings of our minds; he calls it a "pure normative aesthetics," and he includes even Kurt Lasswitz⁴² among its followers. This way of carrying on aesthetics moves in many more abstract paths than does empirical-inductive descriptive aesthetics and is much closer to the aesthetics from above, with which it has in common a rejection of procedure depending on fact or a making use of fact in an incidental fashion only.

Friedrich Kreis⁴³ has drawn up an aesthetic program based on the axiology of Rickert: as compared with the mere perception of real objects, aesthetic experience is a peculiar kind of meaning-comprehension and of evaluation. Aesthetic meaning is given us intuitively; we understand it directly and immediately and without the intervention of concepts. With this definition of the nature of the aesthetic as an atheoretical sensuous content and of the peculiarity of the grasping of such content, Kreis proceeds from Kant's theory of knowledge; but at the same time he goes decidedly beyond it. Kant had used his conception of knowledge for the purpose merely of elucidating reality; for him atheoretically given material and the purely sensuous coincide. Now, today we know that an intelligible meaning-content is given us as directly as are sensuous impressions, and this new insight has made both possible and necessary a transfer of Kant's epistemological concept into a theoretical interpretation of sense-phenomena. And, indeed, it was Heinrich Rickert who expanded the critical concept of knowledge beyond the standpoint adopted by Kant and made it of use for the theoretical understanding of sense-phenomena. To the category of being which is valid for the elements of reality he has opposed the category of value which is pertinent to the intelligible contents of perception; and in a universal value-system, he has looked for a satisfactory interpretation, not only of theoretical, but also of atheoretical, values. Aesthetics understood in this way is concerned, not with objects or events in the realm of real existence, but with the comprehension of images of sense passing as unreal. An accentuated constructivism of concepts is a methodological characteristic for this trend in aesthetics.

If philosophical aesthetics in its different degrees of nearness to reality and of saturation with experience is essentially deductive, it is the method of phenomenological aesthetics⁴⁴ to be intuitive. We are considering the latter here because it is a very influential move-

ment in philosophy as a whole, although the phenomenologists themselves are convinced that their discussions of aesthetics are contributions less to an aesthetic as a philosophical discipline than to aesthetics as an autonomous separate science. By phenomenology one means that tendency in philosophy developed by Husserl⁴⁵ in conjunction with Brentano⁴⁶ and Bolzano.⁴⁷ Its method consists primarily of the analysis of "meanings," and thus of that which is thought in concepts and asserted in judgments. The aim of analysis is to achieve complete clarification of meanings, to realize intentions properly, and to bring about a reduction to ultimate simple facts which prevail as intuitions and which are experienced with intuitive certainty (evidence). Such phenomenological analysis of meaning claims to be not simply a descriptive procedure which is content with unclarified results, but one which employs a deeply penetrating critical, systematic, and comparative phenomenology.

Phenomenology sees its task in aesthetics as the seizing of the characteristic-aesthetic, and this lies (for it) in aesthetic *valuc*. This does not belong to objects insofar as they are material, however, but insofar as they are given us as phenomena (appearances). Thus phenomenological aesthetics examines the aesthetic object in terms of its phenomenological nature, and the starting from the phenomenon is characteristic of it. Phenomenology does not ask how the object works, but how and what it is. Analysis of aesthetic objects takes the place of the method of psychological aesthetics, which reduces all aesthetic problems to aesthetic experience. But at the same time there is concern, not about the single work of art, but only about the nature (*Wesen*) of the ballad in general, the nature of the dance, of the plastic arts, of music, and so forth. Phenomenology interests itself in universal structures, not in individual ones. But how, then, can aesthetics proceed from a dissection of objects towards such universal structures and principles? The deductive method, which tries to attain its results from a superior principle, cannot hit the target, for instance through such propositions as, "The aesthetically valuable depends on unity in variety," "Art is imitation," and so forth. But the opposite mode, which approaches problems from below, too cannot by itself accomplish what it promises. When a person in trying to establish the universal nature (*Wesen*) of tragedy looks for the tragic in Sophocles, Racine, Shakespeare, Schiller, and Hebbel, then what he finds in all of these poets must be the nature of tragedy. But to be able to point out the tragic even in a single poet one must already be implicitly familiar with its essence. If this were not so, why does one look for it in *Hamlet* and *Macbeth*, and not in *Mid-*

summer Night's Dream? It must therefore be possible to discover the nature of tragedy, not merely in a series of dramas, but even in a single work of art—to find the universal character in a single example. Then the individual work of art becomes as though transparent: By means of it, a person sees through to a universal or a general law of being which has been embodied and worked out. In this way phenomena are grasped, not in terms of their accidental and individual conditions, but in those of the universal aspects of their being. This intuitive phenomenology makes scrupulous analyses and extended comparisons not only not superfluous, but absolutely required. Otherwise it might be that one might see the particular case of Schiller's theory of tragedy as the essence of tragedy per se; he might feel that tragedy in its central aspect has been justified as the triumph of freedom over necessity; at the same time, however, one could find that in an equally genuine writer of tragedy like Grillparzer, necessity triumphs over freedom. It does not depend so much on the content of a contingent single observation as on the universal nature which is intrinsic to and realized in the particular.

Phenomenological aesthetics⁴⁸ strives for a strictly objective character; it hopes to present a phenomenology of aesthetic objectivity,⁴⁹ not an anatomy of the aesthetic state and experience. It therefore is not interested in knowing about the subjective aspect of the aesthetic state. Even so, it finds it necessary to supplement its method by means of an aesthetics carried on from the psychological point of view; and it is noteworthy that it is not *toto genere* different methodologically from psychological aesthetics despite all the marked programmatic opposition between these two. For the psychological, single observation of the introspective kind is at its core not completely divorced from phenomenological intuition, even if the latter is much more strictly aimed at the central nature, at constitutive traits, and even if it avoids and neglects events in their concreteness. Thus the phenomenological method makes a transition for us without a break into the psychological method, into the investigation of the aesthetic state and attitude; on the other side, however, it also leans towards the onto- and objecto-centric tendencies of empirical aesthetics, with which it shares a starting from the object.

C. EMPIRICAL AESTHETICS AS AN INDIVIDUAL SCIENCE

a.¹ *Psychological Aesthetics*.⁵⁰ If an aesthetic effect is to take place, an object from the external world (or a reproduction of it in a representation) must meet the receptive attitude of a living person.

Within every aesthetic effect there are an objective factor and a subjective one, both being characteristic components. Attempts have been made to approach the nature of the aesthetic from both of these aspects, often to the neglect of one or the other of them at any given time. If a person follows a one-sided position and puts the object at the center of his thought, he is pursuing objective aesthetics. Important as this method doubtless is, it can never be satisfactory by itself; it urgently needs a complement—to begin with, because a satisfactory definition of the objectivity of what is aesthetically valuable as a matter of fact meets with almost insurmountable difficulties. For different kinds of things can produce the same effect in observers so that a universal and inclusive account of objective presuppositions is difficult and even basically impossible. But there is a second difficulty: During a discussion with phenomenological aestheticians, Külpe⁵¹ said (and rightly) that the aesthetic object is a unique object only under the hypothesis that the aesthetic attitude is assumed. Every object can therefore be an aesthetic object, and no object need be one. If one is not to be without a guide in the analysis of the aesthetic object, it is absolutely necessary for him to enter into the aesthetic attitude; and the psychological view of the aesthetic experience is therefore an indispensable core of all aesthetic researches. To be sure, it cannot be treated as absolute; nor can it be treated as the unique process any more than can the objective manner of observing. Yet this sort of thing is what has taken place: in despair at ever being able to wrest from the objective method propositions which are universal, certain, and necessary with respect to the aesthetically effective, or at ever being able by means of "objective" statements to declare what it is that must always arouse aesthetic effect and what in all cases must be followed by reactions of pleasure—in despair of accomplishing these things, people have tended to limit themselves to psychological descriptions of the aesthetic experience and to think of these descriptions as the primary task of aesthetics. The only conceivable, universally authentic, and secure legitimacy of the aesthetic experience is supposed to lie in the attitude of the person experiencing something aesthetically. And thus psychological aesthetics has claimed to be the only possible scientific aesthetics. During the decades when this program of research was carried on and when it gained in reputation, not only did aesthetics work in terms of psychological method, but it was often expressly defined as a field of psychological practice, even as a part of psychology itself. Lipps⁵² did so, for instance: his aesthetics carries the subtitle, "Psychology of the Beautiful and of Art."

In this constant psychologizing of aesthetics, in the total basing of aesthetics on psychology, there is a one-sidedness which we must completely reject. Aesthetics is not identical with psychology even if the two are related and closely contiguous; their methods do not coincide. The use of psychological methods of procedure in aesthetics is indeed indispensable because the question of the aesthetic attitude and of the structure of the psychic experience connected with it are problems which our discipline cannot relinquish. And because these are not by any means the sole tasks, a series of other methods must accompany and supplement the subjective-psychological one. But I must stress the fact that I object only to the absolutizing of the psychological method, not to the method itself, which is of undoubted importance in certain departments of the structure of aesthetic investigation and of a certain group of problems.

The methods used in psychology have been classified by Bühler⁵³ in the following manner: 1. self-observation or introspection (the method of subjective experience-psychology), 2. observation of the behavior of others (the methods of objective psychology, reflexology, and behaviorism), 3. the analysis of creative results (the work and the creative act): this is a reasoning by the creator himself *a posteriori* from the objectified expressive contents of the works back to the creator's specific psychic moments; this is the method of a psychology which begins with the object. Psychological aesthetics can successfully make use of both of the first two methods; but the third has no connection here, its better place being in objective and onto-centric aesthetics, into which it inevitably flows. Within aesthetics in the narrower psychological sense, therefore, we must distinguish self-observation and the observation of others. The first of these is the central procedure of every psychologist and only from it do all of the other procedures attain value and applicability, whether one wants to admit this to be true or not. The psychologist must first derive his knowledge from his own experience; he must know the facts of psychological phenomena as he has observed them in himself before he can observe them in others. The aesthetician too will have to turn his own inner perception towards the psychic acts asserting themselves in aesthetic experience, towards that attitude which comes into play with the enjoyment of art-works, and towards that characteristic difference it has from other modes of psychic behavior. Of what do aesthetic pleasure, emotion, and shock consist? What takes place in the judgment of taste? If questions like these are answered by way of introspection, then the aesthetician can, and indeed must, go further. Thus a

"unified self-perception" is possible,⁵⁴ and by way of examination and inquiry one can try to discover what are the reactions of many individuals. Self-observation is also an indispensable component of every aesthetic experiment, though in this case the aesthetician does not observe himself, but, rather, allows his subjects (*Versuchspersonen*) to examine themselves about what they experience when they are presented with certain works. The records of investigation will include nothing except the results of the inner observation of the informants.

By contrast, the observation of others cannot claim the same degree of importance, though it too gives us interesting results. For instance, we come to know something about how persons are members of particular aesthetic types: So-called participants (*Mitspieler*) behave differently at the points of high tension in a film or in a drama than do people who are merely spectators (*Zuschauer*).⁵⁵ At a circus one can observe the motorally empathic responses (*Homokinaesthesia*) of the many persons who are watching the performance of the trapeze-artist; moreover, it is important to study closely the changes in facial expression which occur in people who are aesthetically preoccupied; for this purpose, all kinds of recording mechanisms have been used: the spirometer to measure breathing, the plethysmograph to measure blood-pressure, the cardiograph to measure heart-beats, and the sphygmograph to measure frequency of pulse. Yet the precision of psychological method does not depend on these apparatuses. One may reject them, just as many psychological aestheticians have desisted from experiment itself (Lipps, Volkelt, Groos, Witasek, and others). As a matter of fact, as compared with the introspective method, experiment does not always in every respect discover something new. The chief value of the experimental method⁵⁶ lies in its going beyond the collecting of occasional observations; it makes the scholar independent of the mere chance of the moment, and it strips the material of its accidental character—all of which makes for reliability of observation.

Since the text to follow will contain enough about introspective-psychological aesthetics, I shall say nothing more about its methods here. But a few words about the experimental method itself: how it happened that people began to make use of this method to answer questions in aesthetics becomes clear from the scientific view of positivism which dominated the closing years of the 19th century; positivism, so much fascinated by the advances of science, thought it could claim a similar measure of "exactness" for itself in the humanistic studies, the supposition being only that these studies could

be carried on according to the methodological pattern of science. People did not bear in mind, or at least they considered too little, that a certain method which works with a high degree of exactness in one area of study may be extremely inexact in its results when it is used in an area to which it is less suited. For this reason, aesthetics for the time being allied itself closely with psychology, which in those years worked according to the model of physics and physiology. And as psychology then began to be pursued experimentally, aesthetics followed suit. The mutuality of these sciences was all the more intimate because the founder of experimental psychology was also the founder of experimental aesthetics. In his *Psychophysics*, the physicist Fechner began to apply experimental methods of observation to establish the relations between irritation and sensations, the laws concerning the threshold of sensation, and so forth. Presently he applied this experimental method of his making to aesthetic questions also, and he did so to test the statements by A. Zeising⁶⁷ about the aesthetic significance of the Golden Section. From here on, Fechner turned towards the experimental examination of the elementary relations of pleasant forms. He intentionally studied them, not in complicated works of art, but in conceptually simple figures (sections of lines, right angles, crosses, ellipses), so that every kind of distracting association and every idea of purpose or use could be avoided—so that the aesthetically pure fundamental relations per se would be in the foreground. The statements which resulted from this method are interesting, though today we can see through the errors in elementary psychology which Fechner fell victim to: the pleasantness of a specific single line (even as it is independent of all associations) is not always and immutably the same: it is largely determined by the total form of which it is a part. In order to discover the simple relations of beauty, Fechner presented to a large number of subjects lines of different lengths and right angles whose sides were of different proportions as to length, and he then collected the judgments of preference which were called up by the individual relations.

To do this, he used three methods: 1. The method of choice or selection. The subjects of the experiment were presented with many painted shapes, and of these they were asked to select the most pleasing. (The selection-method was refined by later aestheticians into a "method of the comparison of pairs." Two figures, and only two, or two colors, and so forth, were given to the subject whose problem was to name the more pleasing. The stimuli were in this way so selected that the preferences of the subjects pro-

duced sure information.) 2. The method of construction or creation. The subjects in this case were not given ready-made figures, but were asked to ascertain the most pleasant relations, say by arranging in one way or another the cross-beam of a paper cross at the vertical strip until the result was the most beautiful relationship of the upper and the lower parts. Fechner thought that the method of choice and that of construction have equal experimental weight. Yet the two do not correlate as they should: the method of construction or creation is only an unnecessary modification of the method of choice. If the subject identifies what is for him the most pleasing arrangement, he does so by continually probing here and there, a practice which in the last analysis is nothing but the method of making a choice. 3. The method of application. This consists of the examination of the simplest proportions as they are applied in works of art and useful objects. In terms of this method, Fechner took numerous measurements of the forms of certain objects like grave-crosses, books, letter-paper, and so forth. There followed no systematic questioning of subjects, and this method is not therefore in keeping with the experimental method in the true sense.

The aesthetic experiments of Fechner as an aesthetician are materially different from his physical and psychophysical ones. They require neither laboratory nor complicated apparatus—a fact of fundamental importance. The “higher” the data to be examined, the simpler the tools. For investigations into the psychophysical stratification of the threshold of sensation, the most complicated laboratory equipment is necessary. But before high and more complicated problems, even these mechanisms fail. The tachistoscope (an apparatus which permits only the shortest time of exposure) can be used in aesthetics only for that kind of experiment which, so to speak, destroys its own force: tachistoscopic presentations of pictures reveal that impressions must wait for a certain period of time if they are to achieve aesthetic relevance and to make empathy and aesthetic evaluation possible. Or people have used the apparatuses already mentioned to measure the actions of the heart, the breath, and the pulse when a person looks at pictures. But the results are far more interesting for physiology and psychology than for aesthetics.

The order of investigation which is standard for the technique of aesthetic experiment, then, is as follows: A number of subjects are given certain well-selected pleasing objects and are asked to make reports of the impressions and effects which the objects produce. Records and suitable evaluations are made of the reports. According

to Theodor Ziehen,⁵⁸ the experimental character of this kind of procedure lies in the fact that a systematic examination of a number of individuals replaces the casual investigations of separate individuals. Depended on, therefore, is not the apparatus, but the purely systematic character of research itself, the greater number of persons consulted, and the variations, systematically chosen, in the objects which are used. Ziehen too is of the opinion that experimental aesthetics must work with systematically simplified pleasant objects, most aesthetic forms in art and nature being so complicated that inquiry into the aesthetic principles they illustrate meets with the most serious difficulties. Therefore it is necessary that, besides the complicated forms which nature and art offer us, artistically produced simple forms should be tested by many subjects for their aesthetic effects. The latter method, according to Ziehen, is the experimental method in the stricter sense, while that which undertakes the observing only of the effects of complicated works of art and of nature in many persons is, in his terms, subexperimental. The experimental method proceeds synthetically; after it has examined the aesthetic effect of the simplest structures, it proceeds to the more complicated ones; this can lead to valid results only, of course, in terms of basic rules of form which Ziehen did not sufficiently take into account. By contrast, the subexperimental method is analytical: here by analysis we try to reduce the aesthetic impression of a complicated composition to its separate components. The subexperimental method proceeds from the total impression; the experimental tries to achieve it. For the ascertaining of the processes of sensation and representation which take part in aesthetic experience, as well as of the feelings which result, Ziehen⁵⁹ makes use of two methods: The first is that of choice (the comparative, pluralistic, or relative method). Here one presents his subjects two or more objects of a certain type and asks them to report how these objects relate to aesthetic pleasure. The subjects must make statements indicating which object pleases them best, which second-best, and so forth; and also how the pleasure is qualitatively varied, how the related associations are differentiated, and so forth. The second type of method which Ziehen employs he calls that of the absolute predicate (the singulative or absolute method). The subject is presented only one object each time, and to this object he is to give an absolute predicate (very pleasant, pleasant, indifferent, disagreeable, very disagreeable). Here also one need not confine himself merely to the evaluation of quantity, however; he must take into consideration related associations too, or

the qualitative shadings of feeling-tone. By the first method the aesthetic experience is examined in terms of direct comparison; by the second method direct comparison is lacking.

We need not go further in distinguishing experimental methods from one another because the one which matters in this context has already been elucidated.

b.¹ Other Methods of Procedure. In contrast to psychological (individual) aesthetics (the epithet being understood in Wundt's sense ⁶⁰) as discussed in the preceding sections, there are other trends which I must consider summarily. These are either objectivistically aesthetic and scientific as to art, or collective-psychological. As psychological aesthetics in a one-sided way places the aesthetic attitude and experience in the foreground, so aesthetic objectivism proceeds from an analysis of the aesthetic-artistic object considered as the basis of aesthetic experience. Dessoir ⁶¹ has energetically carried on a programmatic discussion of this antithesis in method.

Aesthetic objectivism, he thinks, is "the theory that the sphere of aesthetic nature, culture, and art all together possesses objective characteristics of an objective individuality. Included here is the notion that phenomena of a certain nature have an unusually strong capacity for arousing aesthetic approval or censure, in contrast with other phenomena which are less suited to the arousal of aesthetic feelings and intuitions. As subjectivism, this intuition is in opposition to the sum of those theories which are not concerned with the objective signs of aesthetic being, but which believe their task to be solved with the characterizing and exploration of the aesthetic attitude." Aesthetically effective objects have their aesthetic value in themselves: This means that such objects differ in some kind of material way from extra-aesthetic things and consequently do not derive their significance only from the manner of thinking which is turned upon them. What events are comic, tragic, pretty, or sublime is not determined only by the turn of mind of people appraising them; certain things can never be called pretty absolutely, others never tragic. As regards the perceptions, representations, and feelings which occur, aesthetic experience is bound to the object. The legality of aesthetic being is therefore not psychological merely; it has its own particular laws and therefore its own objective reality. "The content of aesthetic objects is one of the groups or degrees of reality, a class with real signs and characteristic rules." The duty of aesthetics as presented by objectivism is to discover and formulate these signs and the constituent permanent aspects of this objectivity.

It was no accident that Max Dessoir the aesthetic objectivist

should also be one of the creators of "the general science of art," a study which has been established as having its own aims alongside those of the narrower kind of aesthetics. Forerunners here, among others, are Konrad Fiedler,⁶² and H. Spitzer;⁶³ a co-worker and important follower is Utitz.⁶⁴ This general science of art is something more than merely a psychology of artistic creation and enjoyment; and the "more" or "plus" lies precisely in its objectivistic character. Of all of the spheres in which aesthetics can be realized, the general science of art, as indicated by its name, is the most important; to be sure, it does not concern itself merely with the purely aesthetic factor. The general science of art comes to terms with a whole series of other aims of research (one could cover them under the term "genetic tendencies") in aesthetics interpreted in the broader sense; it places art in the foreground as a communal creative activity, as a function of culture, and as certain categorical aspects of its being (style, material, technique). At the same time this kind of research results also in not a small number of basic aesthetic insights. To this group belong contributions to pure aesthetics and the general science of art as brought forth by ethnologists and students of phylogenetic primitivism (prehistorical archeologists) (Ernst Grosse,⁶⁵ Yrjö Hirn,⁶⁶ Carl Stumpf,⁶⁷ Wallaschek,⁶⁸ M. Hoernes,⁶⁹ O. Menghin,⁷⁰ M. Verworn,⁷¹ K. Weule,⁷² A. Vierkandt).⁷³ These men accept an assumption which is basically important (though, methodologically speaking, it is open to question), that certain simpler and more elementary forms of artistic creation and aesthetic requirement are found in the beginnings of art coming from primitive tribes of time immemorial or of the recent past, forms from which certain essential insights are more readily derivable than they are from the complicated relationships in high civilizations which are differentiated from one another.⁷⁴ This movement frequently concerns itself with folk-psychology as well as with art-research and aesthetics as they are pursued by sociology and by the science of civilization. Here can be included the great work by Wundt,⁷⁵ the sociological aesthetics of Guyau,⁷⁶ the very interesting attempt of Hippolyte Taine⁷⁷ to explain artistic creation in its different modifications by way of the factors of environment (milieu), race, climate, and geo-morphological influences, Hellpach's⁷⁸ accounting for the beginnings of productive and receptive aesthetic experience as belonging genetically to the remaining basic values, and the placing by Weinert⁷⁹ and Dingler⁸⁰ of art at the center of the intellectual and spiritual ascent of mankind; and there are others.

The great English philosopher Herbert Spencer⁸¹ created an evolutionary aesthetics (that is, one understood scientifically in terms of the idea of evolution). Biological kinds of thinking are found in the work of K. Groos⁸² and, combined with the sociological, in that of Wilhelm Jerusalem.⁸³ Jerusalem is concerned about an essentially heuristic principle only: this is the argument that everything connected with human action, if it is to make good in the course of evolution and not be displaced by something more practical, must reveal a life-furthering character; but in other writers biological thought concentrates itself on strong physiological arguments. One may speak, therefore, about a group of physiological aestheticians who, though numerically not very great, are intellectually quite consistent: As a title, the phrase "physiological aesthetics" appears in the work by the Englishman Grant Allen.⁸⁴ There has been no dearth of followers: Thus Karl Lange⁸⁵ wants to explain the individuality of aesthetic enjoyment in terms of certain vaso-motor events; further, the attempt has been made to apply the results of sense-physiology and of research on the central nervous system to the solving of problems in aesthetics and the science of art, as did Hirth,⁸⁶ for instance, who explained plastic "seeing" as a constriction of the cortex. The programmatic claim that one can explain the derivation of aesthetic data by the results of research in brain-psychology was made by Carstanjen.⁸⁷ That a complete aesthetics can be based on it can reasonably be doubted. It cannot be doubted, however, that aesthetics can for its own purposes learn many things from modern brain-physiology and psychology as they are pursued, say, by H. Rohrer.⁸⁸ Thus the phenomena of brain-electricity as confirmed by the electroencephalograph can sometimes successfully explain aesthetic phenomena based on time (examples of elementary pleasure in rhythm were used).⁸⁹

Aesthetics as found in the work of the famous architect G. Semper⁹⁰ is extremely positivistic, but it is not scientific at all, being instead artistic-technical and even technological. Semper wanted in his "artistic-materialistic way" to derive the individuality and the nature of compositional forms in the technical and tectonic arts from the presuppositions of material, technique, and useful aim. Less special technologically, but based to a greater extent on what is fundamentally aesthetic, is the art-aesthetics of H. Cornelius.⁹¹ On the basis of the nature and conditions of apperception in his art, the sculptor Hildebrand⁹² tried to win insights in terms of principle about the event of seeing as it takes place in connection with works of sculpture and about the sense of plastic form which

is connected with it. The art-historian Wölfflin⁹³ attempted to project certain metahistorical categories of artistic seeing by contrasting the modes of seeing current in the Renaissance and in the Baroque. In this way, aesthetics and research in art based on system and principles (and thus not art-history only) have been made to share significant impulses.

3. POINTS OF VIEW AND TRENDS IN AESTHETICS

When one speaks about points of view and trends in aesthetic research, he is concerned about something which asserts itself in the methods discussed in the preceding sections, something which so to speak threads its way through them. One may pursue aesthetics by working with philosophical thought, but then he may still assume different standpoints and follow contradictory and opposing tendencies. Psychological methods overlap in the same way: there are far-reaching differences in point of view and consequently a plurality of trends. For reasons of space one cannot do more than aphoristically discuss these differences in point of view and divergencies of aim.

As for that which concerns philosophical aesthetics, one must say first of all that the majority of points of view and trends which appear in the sphere of philosophy as a whole have had their effect on our discipline also. Thus there is an aesthetics that is rationalistic, another that is empirical, and another that is critical. The first kind runs from Descartes and Leibniz to Wolff and Baumgarten;⁹⁴ Burke,⁹⁵ Home,⁹⁶ Hutcheson,⁹⁷ Reid,⁹⁸ and Stewart⁹⁹ are aesthetic empiricists; and the critical thinkers in the sphere of aesthetic research are followers of Kant: their tradition reaches from certain works by Schiller to the neokantians of our day. In terms of fundamental differences in tendency in philosophy as a whole, aesthetics may be idealistic, realistic, and materialistic. Idealistic aesthetics is found in Plato and Plotinus, in the Scholastics of the Middle Ages, and in the neoscholasticism of recent times, in German speculative aesthetics, and also in thinkers like Schelling, Schleiermacher,¹⁰⁰ Solger,¹⁰¹ Hegel, Schopenhauer, and many others. Realists in aesthetics as well as in philosophy are Herbart and his followers; J. von Kirchmann¹⁰² has written an *Aesthetics on Realistic Foundations*. In Russia today there are aesthetic works of the materialistic kind based on the dialectical materialism.¹⁰³ There is an aesthetic dogmatism which has been widely disseminated (the critical ques-

tions and doubts which have become known in works of metaphysics and epistemology since the time of Hume and Kant have only in small measure brought to light analogous results in the sphere of aesthetics). But alongside this dogmatism is an aesthetic skepticism, the program of which was sketched by Max Dessoir¹⁰⁴ and which has the strong tendency, because of the opaqueness of the difficulties to be solved and the lack of clarity in method in many of the realms of aesthetic questions, to involve aesthetics in a skeptical avoidance of judgment (*ἐποχή*), to refuse to devise theories hastily, and to see as relative many suppositions of the past which were assumed to be permanent. Just as in general philosophy there are periods of speculation which are free of metaphysics and which, conversely, are positivistic and inimical to speculation and metaphysics, so there are similar movements in aesthetics. One finds such an antithesis, for instance, in the aesthetics which is among the permanent after-effects of Hegel and in that influenced by Comte and Spencer. It may be said that the largest part of the aesthetics outlined in the years between 1860 and 1910 is alien to metaphysics, until Volkelt again made timid attempts at a reconciliation with it.

It is obvious that great personalities in thought directly or indirectly have influenced aesthetics. There is a series of aestheticians who present themselves as academic philosophers and as tradition-bound expositors of works because they attempt to draw aesthetic inferences from general philosophical theories. Again, there are others who are markedly eccentric. One could mention Albert Görland,¹⁰⁵ for example, who invests aesthetics with an entirely original meaning. He defines it as the critical philosophy of style, "style" being understood as a distinctive form of expression of a world-view. If, according to him, notions of the world are compositional structures, then aesthetics is something like a study of world-views and consequently includes a whole series of broader philosophical areas, ethics for example. Besides people who create a movement by themselves, there are representatives of the most varied of philosophical trends within the scope of affairs aesthetic. At present, there is hardly a philosophical fashion which is so remote that it does not have its promoter in aesthetics and which has not grown there either by a direct transfer or by the following of analogous intentions in thought. Thus "Fictionalism,"¹⁰⁶ which is the philosophy of "As-if," has found its aesthetic-scientific counterpart in the art-theory of Konrad Lange¹⁰⁷—at least Vaihinger claimed it as such. Existential philosophy (that of Heidegger,¹⁰⁸ for example) has been worked into this discipline through the aesthetics of Hermann

Pongs¹⁰⁹ and H. Oppel;¹¹⁰ practical philosophy (*Lebensphilosophie*) and practical psychology (*Lebenspsychologie*) are important for the art-psychologist Richard Müller-Freienfels;¹¹¹ and I myself¹¹² have patterned my aesthetics on the philosophical personalism of William Stern.

Besides the direct transfers of philosophical problems and their solutions to the sphere of aesthetic research, there are less direct analogies between the two disciplines. Thus in philosophy we recognize pluralists, dualists, monists (singularists), depending on whether thinkers believe they are able theoretically to master given conditions by adopting a number of ultimate ontological principles which coexist irreducibly and independently; or by limiting themselves to an elementary duality of principles (such as the psychical-physical, the soul-body, *cogito-extensio*); or by reducing everything in existence to a single principle in which ultimate reality presents itself (the Absolute, *deus sive natura*). In a more formal methodological sense, the expressions "singularism" and so forth can be transferred to aesthetics. Singularists are the kind of aesthetic theorists who employ one category of method, a single principle of being, in the sphere of aesthetics. In this sense, Volkelt is an aesthetic singularist, for instance, because for him everything in the aesthetic attitude is empathy, which for him is a fusion of seeing and feeling. Karl Groos¹¹³ recognized "inner imitation" as a unique principle. Lipps in his heart of hearts is a singularist because he emphasizes the principle of empathy without any qualification. For him, aesthetic experience is objectified self-pleasure on the basis of empathic behavior. To be sure, alongside the principle of content-aesthetic he puts still another set of laws (the law of uniformity, that of unity-in-variety, that of monarchical subdivision); but the crucial thing for aesthetic experience is always the content, life attaining to expression in forms and deeply seized through the event of empathy. The physical, the form, means nothing in itself; it is only the symbol of a life-content. To trace the arts in all of their multiplicity back to a single principle of creation (that of the selective and beautifying imitation of nature) was the task which Charles Batteux set for himself in *Les beaux arts réduits à un même principe* (1746); but modern philosophy of art takes for granted an irreducible plurality of functions in art (expression, imitation of nature, beautiful formation).

Dualists are the kind of aestheticians who adopt a duality of ultimate principles of the existential or behavioral sort: contemplation-empathy, or beauty of form-beauty of content. Such a dualism

is probably best exemplified in the aesthetics of Theodor A. Meyer. For him, beauty is the plenitude of life become form, though he thinks that the poles of form and content are independent tendencies and potentialities of effect. The beautiful pleases because of its contents, which are the plenitude of life in appearance, and at the same time because of its form, which is beautiful as it is felt to be appropriate to the end of comprehension. Seen from the point of view of content, beauty is a power giving off life and filled with life; ugliness is its opposite: the negation, the destruction of life, deficiency, poverty. Beauty of form depends on the appropriateness of the formation of the aesthetically contemplated object to the state of contemplation. Beauty in its highest development unifies the beauty of substance and that of form and is to be characterized as form filled with a heightened kind of life. Therefore Meyer in his aesthetic calls for a dualism of principles which have often been contrasted in a sharp antithesis as inimical to each other; and from this dualism there results the opposition of content-aesthetic and form-aesthetics. Content-aesthetics finds the vital in the sensitive, deeply-moving life-contents of the aesthetic object, in the idea here embodied and realized in sensuous appearance. By contrast, form-aesthetics applies to the labelled arrangement and the law of the outward appearance. The idealistic aesthetics of content is represented in the speculative theories of Schelling, Solger, Schleiermacher, Hegel, Vischer,¹¹⁴ and others. The object of enjoyment is the aesthetic content of the art-work which can manifest itself in different outward phenomenal forms. Opposed to the idealistic content-aesthetic is an aesthetic of form based in part on realistic foundations; according to this aesthetic, outward, sensuous modes of appearance of aesthetic objectivity (the formal elements and their legitimate formal relations) are vital and must be the true aesthetically efficacious "moment." Thus Herbart,¹¹⁵ the philosophical inspirer of a more recent formal aesthetic, emphasizes that what pleases or does not please is always the form and always an organizational relation of the parts of a manifold. To determine these pleasant formal relations is the task of aesthetics. This obligation was undertaken by a follower of Herbart who is the founder of systematic formal aesthetics, R. Zimmerman;¹¹⁶ he tried to master these pleasant relationships by means of abstract modes of thought and mathematical relationships. For the idealistic aesthetics of content, beauty lies in the psychical content and its expression; for the formalists, it lies in the good organization of the structural aspects of the phenomenon and in their harmonious congruity, in measure and number, in

rhythm and proportion, in the easily and therefore pleasantly graspable phenomenal forms. This antithesis of principles is found in theories of the individual arts. Thus Paul Moos¹¹⁷ along with E. von Hartmann pursued a concrete-idealistic aesthetics of content in the theory of music; E. Hanslick¹¹⁸ declared for an extreme formalism. If for Moos and Hartmann music is the expression of psychic moods and of feelings, for Hanslick it is form in moving tone.

A person who acknowledges a single principle is inclined strictly to carry out a central, fundamental idea. He is thus inclined to create a system in the more restricted sense. But the pluralists are not ashamed of hastily collecting their principles, even though strict deductions based on secure axioms do not guarantee that there could not be any more of them or any others. Fechner's multiplicity of aesthetic laws is an example of this loose kind of pluralism which is inimical to system. The maker of a system claims to have developed a controlling method, a single procedure suited to the mastery of the whole area of his problems. In modern aesthetics, there is no such system. The last one was outlined by Hegel and his followers. "Here all definitions of the beautiful and all phenomena in art were brought into a coherent order which appears to be necessary under the presuppositions of dialectical thought. In other enterprises, there is a lack either of a framework of a philosophy encompassing all existing things or of the organization-principle of a method which is always applicable."¹¹⁹ An approximate form of such a strict philosophical system in aesthetics is the work of Paul Häberlin,¹²⁰ which clearly exhibits also the reverse side of such an attitude: that is, a poverty of data, a strict limitation of the problems to be treated, no sort of discussion with fellow-workers, but merely the following of one's own system of thought.¹²¹ The opposite of this is the products of the encyclopedic minds of many parts who give rather comprehensive information about the extensive diversity of work in scientific-aesthetic research.

A basic difference in points of view is brought about if the aesthetician adopts an axiological attitude on the one hand or if on the other he thinks that he must confine himself to descriptions which avoid statements about aesthetic value. This antithesis is one between normative and descriptive aesthetics. Related to, but not identical with it is the opposition of absolutism to relativism. In terms of the one, valid, objective positions, universally binding evidence, and standards and measures of value are possible in aesthetics, as, consequently, is an evaluation of the judgments of taste themselves, though not all of these are accepted as equal. But

relativism proceeds on the basis of the following convictions: beauty is what pleases; but everything possible has the capacity of pleasing; and every person from his own point of view is right because everyone has his own taste.

If a person thinks that psychic functions are the vital point, he differentiates emotionalistic from intellectualistic tendencies. One of the chief exponents of emotionalistic aesthetics is the Finnish aesthetician Kaarle S. Laurila,¹²² who has made a program of this point of view, of this kind of aesthetics which attempts to grasp the nature of art and of the aesthetic state from out of the feeling-life of human beings.

Of concern, according to this conception, is a state of feeling: that is, a dwelling on the pure, direct feeling-value of phenomena. Therefore emotionalistic aesthetics differs from the so-called aesthetics of beauty (Vischer, Lipps, Th. A. Meyer, Crousaz,¹²³ Cousin,¹²⁴ Jouffroy,¹²⁵ and others) and from the aesthetics of expression, whose founder has been said to have been Plotinus. According to Plotinus, an object is beautiful, not because of symmetry, unity in variety, or otherwise because of a characteristic of form, but because the Idea, Reason, the Spirit (that is, the ultimate and final end of the Ultimate-One [*Ur-Eine*, *Εν*] itself) is expressed there. In the second *Ennead* it is said that "The beautiful body is formed because of the share it has in the Reason which emanates from the Divine."

But those theories are thought to be intellectualistic which hold that the aesthetic experience is essentially an act of awareness of the object, a perceiving or an imagining: thus Konrad Fiedler and, even before him, Schopenhauer, for whom the aesthetic state fell entirely on the side of representation. Schopenhauer sees it, not as a matter of feeling, but as one of pure intellect and intuitive intelligence, insofar as this functions contemplatively and without interest and grasps the pure nature of things without classifying them in a context of purpose or making them subservient to the interests of the will. Here the intellect officiates, not as a servant to the will, as it always does otherwise, but according to its own bent.

It is to be expected that within the aesthetics which is psychologically oriented the points of view of different psychological schools should assert themselves. Therefore there is an associational-psychological aesthetics, the leader of which has recently been Theodor Ziehen. Similarly, there is Wundt's apperception-psychology which has left its traces in aesthetics, as an example of which one may mention the literary aesthetics of Elster. But because the

immanent legality of their object-realms meets the aesthetic mode of contemplation half way, the psychologies of form (*Gestalt*), totality, and structure have become especially fruitful.¹²⁶ A form-aesthetics in terms of the production-theories of the school of Graz was written by Stephen Witasek.¹²⁷ Humanistic psychology (already used for questions about the aesthetics of poetry and literature by its creator Dilthey¹²⁸) has made a marked contribution to aesthetics in Spranger's *Life-Forms* (*Lebensformen*).¹²⁹ The linguistic aesthetics of Theodor A. Meyer¹³⁰ has the closest of contacts with the fundamental thesis of thought-psychology, with that of the unintuitive contents of consciousness. An anti-mechanistic kind of thinking enriched by vitalistic trains of thought, or closely related to them, which asserts itself in organism (*Organismus*) aesthetics as it was exhibited by many different thinkers in the early days of aesthetic theorizing (primarily by Shaftesbury¹³¹) has been followed in our own day by Oskar Walzel.¹³²

But even the trends in philosophy and psychology which because of their interests have been quite far removed from the producing of detailed works on aesthetics, even these have exerted a certain influence on this science. I shall call attention only to reflexology, that movement in brain physiology and psychoneurology which in Russia has taken the place of psychology, or at least is disposed to take over its heritage. Even from this point of view there have been advanced programmatically leading ideas for the theoretical understanding of the aesthetic state, which is presented as a certain form of associational reflex. Thus Bechterev¹³³ believes that the mechanism of artistic phantasy and inspiration can be satisfactorily explained in terms of the categories of reflexology.

I shall break off here because I am not trying to outline the history of aesthetics;¹³⁴ nor am I giving an over-view¹³⁵ of it as found in contemporary works. I am interested solely in describing certain typical points of view and tendencies which repeatedly assert themselves in the research-work in aesthetics or which for a time have played roles of importance in it.

4. THE POSSIBILITY OF AESTHETICS AS A SCIENCE

It is necessary for us to answer the question implied in the title of this concluding section because doubts have frequently been expressed that aesthetics can be a science at all. The objections which have been brought against the view that it can may be stated as follows: the objective sphere of aesthetics, which is taste-evaluation

directed at the experience of beauty in its wider sense, cannot be treated logically and rationally; it is impossible to classify subjective impressions and individual feeling-reactions according to universally binding laws; one cannot unify the multiplicity of phenomena in this area according to an intellectual ratio; for here caprice, chaos, lack of rule, and chance predominate. The object of aesthetics resists logical treatment and therefore shuns scientific frames of reference; consequently (so it is said), aesthetics is a research which employs inadequate means and is an undertaking condemned to failure from the very beginning, is an attempt to rationalize the plainly irrational, the subjectivity, and the feeling which are inevitable and cannot be got rid of. The experience of beauty and the judgment of taste are subject to the caprice of the individual. One thing pleases one person, another pleases another; many get enchantment from what leaves others cold or from what others reject completely; and in this respect, not even one and the same individual succeeds in being always the same. In this area there are vast inter- and intra-variants, so much so that any attempt to discover a law, to establish the constants, the regulatives, or the norms, or to say what is universally valid is completely impossible. Aesthetics cannot describe the objective conditions which must be met if a certain givenness is to cause correspondingly positive reactions in all spectators; nor can those aesthetic reactions of the spectator be estimated as are logical judgments and ethical decisions in the sense that one reaction alone must be thought of as right or permissible and another as false. An objective concept of beauty which could enable a person to recognize beauty with certainty is not within the realm of possibility; thus one cannot with certainty say what attributes cause an object to be beautiful. The relation to an evaluating consciousness and to its requirements (which do not continue always the same) contains a subjective aspect which cannot be excluded. Very different objects and qualities can bring about an effect of beauty because the spectator also takes a part in them. The repeatedly employed concept of the irrationality of the beautiful will prove that the aesthetic experience in which aesthetic value is realized relies only on aroused and interested feelings, on emotional affections, whereas concepts, judgments, reasons, and rational deliberations play no part, or they play only an inessential one. In what concerns the beautiful there are no universal rules as regards either the object or the spectators and their judgments of taste. Every objective feature of an object, each of its formal elements, is under conditions of concrete form and can thus bring about differ-

ent effects because the part is defined and made precise by the whole which gives it meaning. A certain kind of arch does not work the same in every architectural form in which it is embedded. The impression-value of every objective situation is dependent on extremely complex conditions of structural organization and of an embeddedness of an objective sort; but at the same time, it also depends on very complex and rationally ungraspable subjective conditions which lie in the personality of the spectator. Every concrete aesthetic effect, every state of aesthetic appeal, is embedded in the readiness of the concrete personality for experience and in that personality's value-requirements; these in turn are determined by two factors: that of duration (age, sex, temperament, type of constitution, degree of education, previous aesthetic experiences) and that of the much more variable factors of actuality (embeddedness in situations, moods of the moment, and states of mind). Alongside the universally valid, about whose presence there is no doubt, there is an abundance of particularities which are of very great importance, and these "imponderables" are hardly as decisive in any sphere as they are here.

These objections—and in the course of these studies we will often have to occupy ourselves with them—do have a kernel of truth, but they far over-shoot the mark. In terms of what is correct in these statements, it is still not impossible for aesthetics to be a science—if, that is, one takes the proper concept of aesthetics and of science as a base. The object is not entirely beyond law; nor is the attitude of the observer or the judgment of taste so. Above all, one must not interpret the concept of the irrational incorrectly. It can signify, not that in the area of aesthetic events everything which occurs is metacausal or acausal, lawless, capricious, and fortuitous; but only that the series of causes, motives, and effects, the foundations and the conditions in their necessary accompaniments, lie deeper here, are more secret, and are therefore incomparably more difficult to grasp than is true in many areas of the physical and the psychological, and also of the logical and ethical. As I shall attempt to show in exhaustive detail later, it is not true that caprice constantly occurs and that chaotic disjointedness prevails when taste is manifested. And just as in the area of aesthetic objectivity it is possible on the basis of the laws of form, which are indeed very complicated, to make certain general statements that are legitimate assertions, so also in the sphere of experiences of taste there occur certain general assertions which are legitimate, though, to be sure, they have, not the binding force of things

generally well founded, but at best only a typological-differential validity.

A clear decision about how the aesthetic object must be created if it is to operate beautifully under all circumstances—of this there are certainly no strict accounts or assumptions in aesthetics. But neither do they occur in realms which seem far less “vague” and where the scientific character of the appropriate discipline is usually never in dispute. Reality in all it encompasses is more complicated than any theory, and our laws of nature are possible only because we considerably simplify real circumstances. Moreover, the character of science does not depend on a theory of legislation, on the possibility of drawing up laws and making hypotheses. If it did, the ideographic sciences of the arts and of culture as a whole would not be sciences either. Aesthetics has to assent to the subjectivity and irrationality which cannot be eliminated and to admit them into the definition of its nature. It can do this without sacrificing its character as a science. And if beauty is something irrational, if the experience of taste is something subjective in the mode of feeling, aesthetics itself is still not irrational or subjective; or at least it does not have to be so. The irrational in no way entirely rejects rational treatment; one can make rational assertions about the irrational, and in subjective feeling-reactions one can identify objective traits because feeling too has its objectivity. Furthermore, aesthetics is the science of beautiful things; but it is not therefore a beautiful thing itself. The realms of fact and of the knowledge of fact are not identical, even though the methods of work with respect to knowledge are defined to a great extent by the structure of the realm of fact. Despite all methodological adaptation, however, aesthetics as a science of the irrational is not something irrational itself. That it has to do with a sphere of objectivity which is particularly complicated and difficult to penetrate doubtless makes the work to be done difficult; but this does not destroy its character as a science. Though it concerns itself with feeling-decisions, it is not itself a feeling thing,¹⁸⁶ and the aesthetician does not have to be an aesthete. And if one actually meets up with a great many conditions which one cannot penetrate completely and if it is impossible to get at them from universal points of view, then aesthetics must do as must the other sciences when they find themselves in a similar position: it must see how far it can go with the means that are at hand and, for the rest, always try for a closer understanding of a complex and complicated reality.

Moreover, it is interesting that the principal objections to the

idea that aesthetics is a science come, not from the strict methodologists and the epistemologists, but from that group of sensitive aesthetes who dislike aesthetics because it puts the experience of beauty under the scrutiny of reason, a process which to them means profanation and sacrilege. Yet aesthetic pleasure and the scientific penetration of precisely this pleasure are *toto genere* something different.

About these matters Katann¹³⁷ has said some especially striking words: "Aesthetic pleasure is as bewitching and easy as the intellectual work connected with understanding is difficult. The fact that the aesthetician not only does not scorn the pleasure which has not been sullied by the work of the intellect, but must even of necessity experience it before he can attain aesthetic certainty—it is just this fact which indicates that we have different things before us; both are legitimate, and just because they cannot be said to be commensurable, they cannot be considered illegitimate either and be played off against one another; one cannot prove the excellence of the one by demonstrating that the other is deficient. . . . Now, it is indeed true that work in the field of aesthetics is beset by great difficulties; the objects with which aesthetics works seem to be unfathomable; and what takes place in the subject feeling pleasure cannot, as a consequence of its characteristics, which melt into one another, be classified unequivocally. Still, to concede that a thing is difficult is not to concede that it is impossible."

It is without a doubt far more difficult to treat value-experiences and feeling-decisions scientifically than it is to treat, say, the data of the life of the senses so; but this extreme difficulty does not contain a negation of the scientific character of aesthetics. Rather, within its own sphere and with its own means of investigation, it is possible for aesthetics to achieve results which can be claimed to be scientific. It is only that one must not ask of aesthetics what it is not in its nature to do or what does not pertain to the nature of science. When Kant attributes scientific character only to mathematics and physics and when Schopenhauer allows history to be only a kind of learning, and not a science, both are attempting to base science on too narrow a conception. The scientific character of a discipline depends, not on a theory of legislation or law, but on systematization and method. And in aesthetics both are not only possible, but have often been sufficiently realized. Only an exact material logic and doctrine of the judgment of taste are impossible for aesthetics; impossible too as carried to the ultimate of particularity are an objective theory of the aesthetic object and a presupposition of its properties. Impossible,

further, is a strict and categorical standardization, an erection and a definition of an absolute, eternally valid ideal of beauty, as is also the deduction of all of the axiological consequences growing out of it. But a differential-typologically uncrystallized theory of taste is quite feasible, a standard of a limited kind, a theory of the aesthetic object which is content with exhibiting a general legality (that is, one not realized in its most minute details), a comparative axiology of aesthetic value, and, finally, a psychology of aesthetic creativity and enjoyment. All of these matters suffice to give certainty to aesthetics as a science. These general and programmatic principles will be discussed in more detail and demonstrated in the individual chapters to follow. The themes of this introductory chapter are a series of statements made for the first time much in the manner of statements of themes in the overture of an opera. They will be the subjects of the work now begun.

TWO | THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE AESTHETIC

1. THE NAME

The words *aesthetics* and *aesthetic* come from the Greek *αἰσθάνεσθαι*, which means "to observe with the senses" or "to perceive." *αἰσθησις* is sense-perception, intuition (*Anschauung*), sensation; and this meaning is still retained in the medical term, (local) anaesthesia. According to this original meaning, aesthetics would be the theory of the science of sensation and intuition and thus a division of physiology and psychology.

Yet we interpret *αἰσθησις* differently today, and we do so on the basis of a development in meaning which is clear from the usage of Kant, among others. The older meaning of the word (the theory of the sensuous, of the faculty of sensations and intuitions) is to be found in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, a section of which carries the title "Transcendental Aesthetic." The principal question of the entire work is, How are synthetic a priori judgments possible? Differently phrased, this means: Why are there statements about reality which do not stem from experience? This question then divides into the sub-questions: How is pure mathematics, pure science, and how is metaphysics possible? Transcendental aesthetic answers the first question as a critique of sensuousness and of the faculty of intuition.

The second meaning of the word is found in the *Critique of*

Judgment, and this meaning is virtually identical with the one used today. Judgments are called aesthetic if they have to do with the beautiful and the sublime in nature and in art. But the two meanings of the word are not juxtaposed in an unrelated fashion. According to the original tenor of the word, aesthetics means the science of that which is apprehended in pure intuition; in the broader sense it means that which pleases or displeases directly on the basis of intuition alone, and thus without the intervention of conceptual thought. Gradually, through an easy, sensible shift, there occurred a change in the core of the concept, a shift from the notion of physical sensation to that of perception accompanied by feeling. Thus the name *aesthetics* became the designation for the science of the procedure of perceiving, contemplating, and intuiting (in the broader sense) which we adopt in connection with the beautiful. It is a characteristic feature of the beautiful that it pleases immediately on the basis of mere sense-perception. And this definition, which *de facto* is too narrow, is still not entirely dead even today. Thus a recently published book on psychology contains the statement that aesthetic feelings reveal the attitude which a personality takes to the contents of perception.

The creation and the use of the expression *aesthetics* as a designation for a particular division of the discipline of philosophy goes back to A. G. Baumgarten, who in 1750-1758 published a work called *Aesthetica*.

He thought of aesthetics as the science of the lesser powers of the soul and, in further consequence, as the science of the beautiful. He believed, namely, that aesthetic pleasure is attached to the lower (sensuous) faculty of knowledge and that representations which arouse aesthetic pleasure are indeed clear (meaning that, according to the opinion of Leibniz, they are clear enough for recognition), but that they are confused withal. Aesthetic sensation is therefore a sensuous (confused) knowledge, and aesthetics is the theory of this kind of knowledge. This aesthetics grew out of the requirements of the architectonics of a system of philosophy: Baumgarten, a Wolffian, found something wanting in the complicated system of his teacher. In his ethics, Wolff gave a guide for correct willing, and in his logic a guide for correct thinking. But he failed to give advice about the proper functioning of sensuous knowledge (of observing and feeling). In order to fill this gap, Baumgarten wrote his *Aesthetica sive theoria liberalium artium*, which, according to him, was to be a logic of the lower powers of the soul (a *gnoseologia inferior*), a science of sensitive knowledge. The last is not a matter simply of sensuous

representations (*repraesentationes sensuales*), but of representations of the obscure feeling kind which have no logical distinctness. Wolff had turned his attention almost from the beginning towards higher intellectual knowledge. It is true that in his *Psychologia empirica* (1732) he occupied himself with the lower faculty of knowledge also; but a detailed theory failed to emerge. The *lacuna* in his system was already recognized by his disciple Bilfinger, who in his *Dilucidationes metaphysicae* asked for a logic of the lower powers in the soul. J. J. Breitinger in his essay on the parables also developed a logic of the imagination: like understanding, the imagination too has need of a certain logic. It is Baumgarten, then, who combined Bilfinger's notion of the logic of the lower faculty of knowledge and the Swiss writer Breitinger's idea of a philosophical poetics into the new science of aesthetics.¹ Even earlier, Baumgarten in his *Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus* (1735) had occupied himself with such questions. In the imaginative writer there operates an inferior faculty of sensuous cognition for which one must create a new kind of logic, namely, a science of sensuous knowledge based upon the principles of psychology. The name for this new science which was still to be systematized (and which in fact had existed since Aristotle) grew out of philosophical tradition. A careful distinction between *αἰσθητά* and *νοητά* already existed in Greek philosophy and in the Church Fathers, a distinction according to which the former was interpreted not only as sensuously perceived objects, but also as representations (products of imagination). While the *νοητά* (creations of the mind) make up the object of the higher faculty of knowledge and of logic, the *αἰσθητά* form the object of inferior sensuous knowledge and of aesthetics. In principle, Bilfinger had already discovered this science, though he neither named it nor showed its consequences as it applies to art. Baumgarten, who then did both, also supplied aesthetics with a series of explanatory secondary designations: *theoria liberalium artium*, *scientia sensitiva cognoscendi et proponendi*, *scientia cognitionis sensitivae*, *ars formandi gustum*, *ars pulchre cogitandi*.*

From the juxtaposition of these definitions, two pairs of ambiguous realizations of meaning with which Baumgarten furnished this concept become evidence. On the one hand, he interprets the concept as pure science and theory (*ἐπιστήμη*); on the other, as an applied or at least as an applicable science (*τέχνη*) which is appointed and

* The theory of the liberal arts, the perceptive science of acquiring knowledge and presenting ideas, the science of perceptive knowing, the art of the forming of taste, the art of thinking beautifully.

able to form and train both the taste of the person enjoying art and the creative capacity of the artist. One must mention in connection with the second aim that Baumgarten chose the terminal syllable of *-ic*. As is well known, words ending in *-ic* (originally attribute-words to the substantive τέχνη) like τέχνη, ἡθικὴ τέχνη indicate skills and technologies of practical value; while constructions based on *-y* (philosophy, zoology) are thought to indicate disciplines which are preponderantly theoretical. Of course, Baumgarten did not come to a free decision here, but he had to choose a designation in analogy with logic, ethics, and poetics. Thus we see, however, that the double interpretation mentioned by Kant is already met with in Baumgarten. For him aesthetics means: 1) the science of sensuous knowledge, the theory of the faculty of the sensations (intuitions), in contrast to the science of thought as that of the higher, comprehensive understanding; 2) the science of the beautiful and of art.

The union of the two interpretations is brought about by the fact that experience of the beautiful occurs to a large extent on the basis of the intuitive knowledge of the senses and is free of reflection based on thought.

Thus O. Katann² stresses that the name *aesthetics* reflects the view of the teachings of Baumgarten, according to whom the taking in of the beautiful belongs in the realm of sensuous perception. Through the name of the discipline, Aristotle would presumably have referred his theory to mental knowing and feeling. So the name *aesthetics* could and can be satisfactory only to a person who is content with the theory of Baumgarten. Many persons have not been so content, and, despite this, the name has remained; other designations (Hegel's *Kalliologie*, Fechner's *Hedonik*) have not been able to make their way.

The survival of the term *aesthetics*, which has gone into other languages [than German] also, must be regarded as justified. For ultimately one cannot require that a term include a well-formed theory together with all possible critical considerations. It is enough if it refers to one constitutive aspect, and it is precisely this which occurs here. Baumgarten's service remains undisputed, therefore. To be sure, he did not in fact entirely create the new discipline; he did not even invent the term; but he systematized this discipline and also discovered a great number of new aspects and problems. Therefore the effort of Benedetto Croce³ to award to his countryman Giambattista Vico⁴ Baumgarten's place of priority in the creation of aesthetics is in vain.

2. THEORETICAL, PRACTICAL, AND AESTHETIC ATTITUDES

The expression *aesthetic* does not have an objective meaning for us, but primarily a dispositional and functional one. For us it designates a certain kind of attitude, a kind of apperception, a turn of mind in the experience of grasping values and in mental-cultural behavior. Its originality and its irreducible independence can best be made clear by way of examples which make possible a mutual illumination of other kinds of attitude. Let us say that three men are walking in a forest. One is a botanist. He is indifferent to the beauty of the place; what he expects in seeing the trees and other plants is a theoretical insight into certain morphological facts which he has at heart and into certain facts of genetic plant-physiology and plant-systems. His attitude is theoretical-intellectual. The second man is a forester; he has to deliver a certain amount of wood, and he samples the trees to determine their ages and their fitness for cutting. His approach is thoroughly practical. The third man merely wanders amongst the trees; he is an enthusiast of nature and has no interest in acquiring knowledge and insights; he probably does not even know—and in any case he probably does not care—whether he is in the presence of fir or of spruce trees. Even the material-economic value of the forest is unimportant to him. He asks nothing of the forest but that it allow him to look at it and to take pleasure in its appearance. He does not, so to speak, look beyond the forest, but he sojourns in it in a pure feeling-filled experience of seeing. Here is realized the aesthetic mode of behavior. Or: a number of people in the middle of the night see a burning house. One person racks his brains about how the fire could have started and thinks of the possibility of its spreading. His attitude is theoretical-intellectual. A second person, gripped by an active sympathy for the people taken by surprise and alarm, tries vigorously to help put out the fire; his attitude is practical. In the third possible attitude, the aesthetic, nothing is thought or quenched; rather, the flames are seen as a gruesomely beautiful spectacle.

Though the deportment of the observer is less optional in connection with works of art and though, if it is to be what it properly should, it is led into certain paths by the requirements of the object, there is no certainty even here that the art-works will appeal to the aesthetic sensibility of the spectator. When a professor of statics looks at a gothic dome in terms of the problems of vault-technique

that are mastered in it, he is approaching the architectural work in a theoretical-intellectual frame of mind. And if a person is irritated by the, in his opinion, overwhelming squandering of money and working-skill evident in this building, money and skill which could have been put to more profitable use, his attitude is practical. But a person is seeing the dome aesthetically when he is delighted by the noble beauty of the building, when he sees in it an impression-value coming immediately from the visible formation. The experience of pleasure which takes place in the purely and completely aesthetic behavior is characteristically different from the positive experience of the values of intellectual, ethical-practical, religious attitudes, and so forth. A person who goes into raptures about a dew-fresh bouquet of roses which have just bloomed, who hears a beautiful melody with pleasure, or who emotionally follows the course of a drama—this person has surrendered himself to an experience of a special and peculiar psychic structure. Anyone with even a little capacity for introspection is able clearly to see that the satisfaction of mind occurring in these situations flows directly from a pure seeing or a pure hearing. We behave aesthetically with respect to things and their forms if we perceive and experience them with no other aim than the feelings they produce. The original character of one's being aesthetically enlisted lies in this, that one surrenders to looking and hearing, to a blessed state of satisfaction in connection with them, and that there is no reaching beyond pure impression or striving for anything beyond it. Naturally, the aesthetic state depends not on the external side of sense-perception only, but, instead, on the entire act of mental (*geistig*) comprehension and treatment.

To make a further differentiation between these attitudes: intellectual contemplation when it occurs in its highest development and purity will be theoretical and does not require anything of the object, which for this kind of contemplation has no immediate relation to real life and no furtherance-value. This contemplation attempts to penetrate the object by way of understanding, though without any hope of practical results. The contemplated object becomes a matter of pure knowledge; it is truth that is sought; and to the pure theoretician it seems comparatively unimportant whether it is profitable and useful or not. Purely practical is the kind of attitude which we adopt in the business of real life and which primarily underlies ethical, as well as economic, standards. Here things are seen according to their moral and legal admissibility, and, besides, as being useful and as furthering life; things are valued in terms of their fitness for certain aims of use or agreeableness. The concept of end

or aim is in the foreground, and thus the practical attitude reveals itself to be the diametric opposite of the aesthetic attitude. For the pure contemplation of aesthetic behavior, the object is not a means to an end, but entirely an end in itself: The aesthetic has an autotelic character. Nothing is asked about real usefulness, practical service, the furthering of insight and knowledge, or truth and moral value. Above all, the aesthetic attitude is the strict contrary of the practical attitude which is serious and grave; but because of its decisive traits, it is distinct also from the theoretical, with which it otherwise has certain features in common. But more of this later. According to Köstlin,⁵ we feel ourselves summoned to the aesthetic attitude when the object so attracts us by its form that we give way to observation with satisfaction, that we pause in a state of intuition. The characteristic of this contemplative state which is not intellectual, practical, or sensuously satisfying lies in the fact that we become aroused and pleasantly employed, the latter in a manner easily achieved and free, and the effort of practical work demanded by duty and directed towards practical ends, "serious activity" (*Ernsttätigkeit*), is not present.

3. THE FREEDOM OF THE AESTHETIC FROM THE CONCEPT

Intellectual impulses and aspects of the intellectual function need not be entirely absent from the aesthetic state. Nor is the state as a total form consubstantial with realized acts of thought. Wherever it appears as a pure breed, as it were, thought is the production and the understanding of abstract-unintuitive relations. It goes beyond the observed objects themselves in that it treats them conceptually, classifies them into more inclusive relationships of thought, and subsumes them under superior categories. Because of the universal relations established in the course of the thinking which deduces and abstracts, the concrete individual existence of objects upon which aesthetic contemplation primarily depends is made void and denied. Conceptual conceivability of the kind used for explication is barred from aesthetic experience. Kant therefore says that the beautiful pleases immediately and without concepts. Thus we have mentioned two negatives: the further meaning of this formula is that the beautiful works in an aesthetically positive fashion without one's having a knowledge of the reason for his pleasure and without his knowing how in conceptual terms and in clear cognitions to account for the

cause of this pleasure. The aesthetic judgment of taste never grounds itself on the concept of the object (as does logical judgment) and does not therefore bring about a knowledge of the object either. By the idea of conceptlessness, Kant means, besides this, something somewhat narrower: namely, that universal concepts play no role in aesthetic experience and judgments; or at least that when they emerge, the purity of the aesthetic experience is encroached upon. Recent aesthetics has been right in opposing this theory, as it has been correct also in opposing certain untenable extensions of this definition.

The thesis that the beautiful pleases without concepts means, in the first place, that we stay purely with the intuited image of the contemplated object without our having afterwards to ask (or without our needing to know) what the object is and what it is called. An exotic bird, a flowering plant, and a snow-covered mountain top please us even when we do not know their names. If an aesthetic impression is to take place, a concept of the contemplated object is not required, according to Kant. Now, as a matter of fact, it is true that thought-structures of the conceptual-abstract type are contrary to the nature of aesthetic experience. The logical function of understanding, of subsuming things under general or universal categories, and of establishing causal, genetic, and other connections, is in sharp contrast to the character of the experience which is specifically aesthetic. The logical function directly denies the individual thing; and for the benefit of general and abstract thought, the concrete and separate thing of the single moment is stripped away or put aside. A botanist sees a tree. It is unimportant to him that the tree is beautiful and exerts a particular effect by reason of its place in the landscape: The tree interests him only as a representative of a species, not as something having appearance-values which belong to it as an individual object. His interest as a botanist is satisfied if he succeeds in classifying the object in a proper order. But through this kind of act, it is precisely the aesthetic object which is not grasped, and the reason is that the aesthetic never accompanies the abstract, but remains within the sensuous-phenomenal. Scientific behavior aims at abstract structures of thought (*noumena*), because only with their help is logical-theoretical mastery of the plenitude of empirical phenomena made possible. The scientific attitude is never content with the single phenomenon (as the aesthetic specifically is), but goes beyond it towards contexts of universal ideas. In its search for the concept, science destroys (occasionally even in the full sense of the word) the individual being in order to achieve insight into

the inner structure of the species. The anatomist cuts up the human body, plant-physiologists dissect flowers, minerologists and paleontologists break stones and petrified objects. The concept is a mental image which, because of its intellectual universality, is raised beyond intuition and representation. The merit, which benefits aesthetics too, of the thought-psychologists of Würzburg⁶ is energetically to point out the fundamental difference between un intuited images of thought and all representations. The zoological concept of a horse cannot come into aesthetic question; only the image of perception can, as can also the Idea (as the basic image and pattern of the species) conceived more or less as perceptual representation. In the aesthetic state there is no conceptual work of logical analysis, but a perceptual, simultaneous-total grasping of a given object, not for the sake of the discursive, but for that of the intuitive. The object presented is not treated logically any more than the feeling-reaction, which appears directly as positive or negative, is conceptually grounded on or logically justified by the impression. But (and here I am indicating what is the chief criticism of the exaggeration of the criterion of conceptlessness) the emergence of representations of meaning and the relating of intuition to them are not at all excluded from the aesthetic state; they are excluded no more than is the elementary synthetic function of consciousness, which already in connection with simple experiences of sense displays the effectively most fundamental of intellectual acts. Even the simplest perception includes a plurality of content-factors which a form has combined into a compact unity. This "synthesis" in Kant's sense, in which we have to see the primary function of the perceiving consciousness, is possible even in the absence of explicating logical discussion. A sensing, a perceiving, an intuiting which entirely renounces the assistance of the reproductively produced material of representation in terms of apperception and assimilation: such a thing does not really exist; every perception is already an interpretation of meaning.

Kant's thesis of conceptlessness has met with well-founded opposition. Ziehen⁷ correctly calls special attention to the fact that in many aesthetic objects (in poems, for example) general ideas ("concepts," according to Kant's terminology) also have a characteristic share. Because Kant did not want this to be so, he arrived at the noteworthy insight that a complete and pure beauty is to be found in flowers, humming birds, crustaceans, ornaments, and so forth, which objects he spoke of as having "free beauty" (*pulchritudo vaga*). In opposition to this is human beauty, which, because it presupposes a concept of what a human being should be, has to have a merely

"dependent" beauty (*pulchritudo adhaerens*). What misled Kant into this erroneous opinion was an incorrect drawing of the boundaries between beauty and truth.

Volkelt⁸ too grants that representations of meaning, discarded by Kant as "concepts," play an essential role in contemplated things. If an oak tree is placed in a picture, then it is part of the artistic view of the picture that the nature of this tree is present for us insofar as it expresses itself in the perceptual formation of the oak. The aesthetic representation is distinguished as something quite original from the logical-conceptual presentation of meaning. It is a totality grasped primarily through feeling, but it remains an act of object-awareness. The fundamental deficiency of Kantian aesthetics lies in the fact that it not only does not do justice to the meaning-representation, but that it actually excludes it from the purely aesthetic object. Here Kant overlooks the simple fact that if one is to have aesthetic pleasure in a thing, a knowledge of that thing (the representation of its meaning) is a prerequisite: the grasping of every object presupposes a knowledge of it. In addition, Kant's argumentation is inconsistent. If a horse, in order to please, must be attached to its meaning-representation, then the exotic bird and the mussel are completely effective in the aesthetic sense only when the observer knows what he has before him in these objects. The fact that it is not necessary for a person to have a scientific concept of the flower if he is to enjoy it led Kant astray and allowed him to say that the simple representation of meaning is irrelevant, and even detrimental, in connection with flowers, humming-birds, and mussels. His opponent Herder⁹ seems more impartial on this point. We must have an idea of the nature and the life, of the capabilities and the attributes, of different plants and animal-types if we are to evaluate their characteristic beauty. In those matters which metaphysical aesthetics calls the Ideas of things, the meaning-representation is included.

That a universal governing Idea of the contemplated object is indispensable to a complete aesthetic evaluation of it and that people in most cases when they are not concerned with a beauty of free lines or vague moods do not completely ignore the meaning-representation—this will be clear from the following simple examples. Why are certain forms pleasing in a woman which are absolutely unpleasant in a man? Why does redness of cheek please a person through he rejects the same redness as repulsive if he sees it on someone's nose? Why does a curved line which is intrinsically very pleasing not please us if a horse has it in the form of a sway back or

a heavy belly? Why do we condone the camel's hump even though the slightest suggestion of a "carp's back" (*Karpfenrücken*) on a horse causes displeasure? Clearly because we approach the contemplation of these given objects with certain experience-derived regulatives and standard notions which grew out of our knowledge of what the form of specifically this object or being should be.

The characteristic of conceptlessness is valid, therefore, only in the circumscribed sense that it denies as constitutives of the aesthetic experience the one-sidedness of aesthetic intellectualism and the presence of completely realized discursive intellectual acts. But one cannot therefore assert that universal representations, ideas, meaning-representations, relationships which are emotionalized (discharged in far-reaching analogy with feeling), judgments, and other acts of thought do not play a role in aesthetic experience or may not play one.

But the criterion of conceptlessness has been extended further, even beyond the position taken by Kant: it is said that nothing abstract can ever be aesthetically relevant; that only what presents itself in intuitive form can claim to have aesthetic meaningfulness. Most modern aestheticians of the immediate past with almost complete agreement have taken over the original meaning of the word *αἰσθησιμότητα* as that of the characteristic of direct appeal to the senses and have declared it to be constitutive of things aesthetic. It is only something intuitive (in the wider meaning of the term of the direct working on the senses) which can be aesthetically effective; that is aesthetic which concerns the perceived appearance of the object. It is true that the facts of verbal aesthetics bring pressure for a correction of this view so that we can count even objects of the so-called sensitive faculty of imagination among intuitive phenomena; and thus it is said that the aesthetic object is given either in the sensuousness (*Simlichkeit*) or in imagination. *Tertium non datur*. Only the concrete (that which is perceivable or that which is intuitively representable), not ever anything abstract, can be aesthetically relevant.

And this is exactly the point at which a determined opposition sets in. It has been said that even conceptual structures and logical constructions can give occasion for aesthetic pleasure. The aesthetic kind of attitude can come into play even in the face of given conditions which people at first would not be willing to designate as predestined for aesthetic experience, or which do not fall into the sphere of the sensuous-apparent, of that which can be grasped perceptually and which thus seems to lie beyond the beautiful and the

ugly, as it were. This is the so-called thought-aesthetical object, and according to the theory it seems to follow that, circumstances permitting, aesthetic effect can be caused even when genuinely abstract acts of thought are carried out which are far removed from comprehension based on the looking at concrete objectivities and on the having of perceptual images. The supposition is that thought-transactions are embedded in a condition of pure contemplation and take place in a way which is functionally pleasant and which has a characteristic directness and immediacy. According to the interpretation which thought-aesthetics uses as a means of argument, the province of aesthetic relevancy goes beyond experiences of looking and representation because aesthetic pleasure occurs even in the area of unintuited principles. A difficult mathematical example can be solved in such a way that a knowledgeable observer feels a strong aesthetic pleasure in it. People speak of "beautiful" or "elegant" solutions, and the metaphorical character of this predicate applies to the aesthetic value here experienced. There is no concern about superior correctness or an increased practical valuation, but about something lying beyond correctness and practicality. The solution of the problem is so ingenious, so unexpectedly brief, and so skilfully successful that these qualities which have nothing to do with the intuitively satisfactory are experienced as satisfying in and for themselves. Even a mathematical formula can seem beautiful to a person who knows mathematics if a still further aspect is added to those of correctness and practicality, if a whole series of consequences is opened up to the experienced view at the mere glance at the formula, and if the richness of its contents shows itself in an unexpectedly simple and synoptical form. Machines and technical constructions too can be spoken of as being aesthetically effective if, because of the startling facility, elegance, and economy of means with which certain practical requirements are realized, a vigorous feeling-effect results. Jonas Cohn¹⁰ thinks that a machine can be called beautiful when, as one sees it, one intuitively apprehends it directly as a purposeful cooperation of all of its parts, as the practical utilization of a force, and as the achieving of a difficult result by the simplest means. By itself, usefulness never produces a positive aesthetic effect at all; but intuitively shaped, set off persuasively and convincingly, it does. In such examples of thought-aesthetics, the logical-conceptual must always become an immediate experience if it is to be reducible to an aesthetic effect. Intuitive thinking must unify and make vivid the activity of conceptual analysis. Tedious logical discourse must not take place even in the case of thought-aesthetical matters. If there are

two correct solutions to a mathematical problem and the one is tedious and wearisome and the other is felt to be elegant, there is significant value *sui generis* in the latter, a value independent of the logical results of the solution. The separate steps of the solution are ingenious, complexible, and also surprisingly fruitful. In addition, they proceed on the shortest route to their end and conform to the law of economy, which can and must be important in all spheres, even in that of intellectual life: a maximum of accomplishment and result with a minimum of expenditure of material and effort: this law of economy has already, frequently in a quite general way, been drawn upon in explanation of positive aesthetic effects.¹¹

Using examples from mathematics and Hegelian philosophy, Karl Roretz¹² tries to show that even the highest of the high in logical abstractions can produce aesthetic delight, which as a rule pours only over a person enjoying things by way of intuition. On this basis he tries for a fundamental broadening of the province of aesthetics as it has existed previously. He is concerned with giving the concept of aesthetics a broader interpretation which is not identical with the general meaning of its morphology as taught in the schools. According to Roretz, there is a kind of aesthetic experience in which the sensual factor (with which aesthetics up to now has operated) seems completely to disappear or has at least been sharply reduced in the significance heretofore attributed to it.

The evidence is not entirely conclusive nevertheless, and chiefly because the boundaries between aesthetic effect and logical functional pleasure are not always respected. (This particular functional pleasure is the happiness caused by an easily acquired, surprisingly productive acquirement of insight.) Thus there is still an open possibility that one may consider these examples of thought-aesthetics to be not genuine and pure ways of realizing the aesthetic state, but merely approximate forms of it. In the pleasure of thought-aesthetics there is an easily achieved and surprisingly productive intellectual activity which by means of a certain contemplative-functionally pleasing character in a far-reaching way approximates the total stamp of the aesthetic attitude, without, however, becoming a pure example of it.

Theodor Ziehen¹³ is of a similar view. To be sure, he attacks the notion that sensations are absolutely necessary to aesthetic experience and makes a plea for the existence of aesthetic objects of representation (image) and thought. But such sensation-free representations as do appear as mediums for aesthetic feeling must at least have the character of intuition. According to Ziehen, there are no aesthetic

objects made up only of unintuited representations. In favor of the acceptance of aesthetically effective unperceived representations, one could point to the characteristic "three-note measure" in the construction of the Hegelian philosophical system, to the wonderful architectonic heights in *amor dei intellectualis* of the *Ethics* of Spinoza, and also to the elegance of mathematical formulas and developments. But it is precisely these examples which make evident the fact that we must use expressions like "measure," "architectonic," and so forth, and that, even in these examples, aesthetic feeling very clearly clings to the intuited representations which we must attach to the unintuited. According to Ziehen, sensations or intuited representations are always the carriers of aesthetic experiences. Thus insofar as the laws and unity of the world are accessible to us only with the help of unperceived conceptions and thought-processes, as in science, they do not come into aesthetic question. The correlate of the aesthetic object is only the perceived order of the world, and under "order" (*Ordnung*) (κόσμος) are included uniformity and conformity to law.

Anyone, therefore, who is disposed to see intuitability of the sensorial or of the imaginative types as a characteristic of the nature of the aesthetic object which cannot be abrogated—such a person will not see anything more in so-called thought-aesthetical objects than an anticipatory and approximate form of aesthetic ones or than examples in experience of an intellectual functional pleasure of the aestheticized sort. In this respect, therefore, the characteristic of conceptlessness has validity and is to be barred only as Kant has delimited it. (Kant's limitation is that general ideas in terms of a knowledge of the kind and of the meaning of the perceived object may not even once play a role in aesthetic experience.)

4. THE AUTOTELIC NATURE AND THE SELF-SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AESTHETIC

The aesthetic attitude, as has already been pointed out, is its own aim and end; it rests in itself and follows no purposes beyond those which are its own. Thus it comes to terms with another autotelic activity, which is play.¹⁴ Since the time of Schiller,¹⁵ art and play have often been set in relation to one another. As a matter of fact, they do have profound similarities by nature, though one must not overlook the differences¹⁶ which also exist. Thus the creating of an art-work is not "play," and neither is the pleasurable apprehension of great art. The following sentence applies to difficult music and

literature based on complicated ideas which require of the participant great devotion, concentration, and intellectual effort: *Res severa est magnum gaudium*. But play proceeds more easily; moreover, it creates nothing, is not aimed at enduring works, and therefore is not binding. Art and aesthetic activity (even of the receptive kind) tend to increase one's cultural accomplishments in terms of setting value and experiencing it. Play for its part has only a subjective functional character; its product exists only for the playing subject; one cannot speak of its objective value. But feelings of much greater depth are attached to art; play, on the other hand, does not go beyond a surface-pleasure, even if the quantity of feeling released by it can often be more considerable than that of aesthetic experience.

But if, bracketing off considerations of value-theory and of cultural philosophy, one confines himself to plain psychological description of that which is met with and that which is forthcoming in the modes of experience just mentioned, then many a *tertium comparationis* is evident; and chiefly because in both cases there are pronounced antitheses to all serious activities of purpose and practicality. A child carries on play that is functional, imitative (like a role), and constructive, without his wanting to achieve something, but merely because in this way he can in a suitable fashion enjoy his own individuality to the full or because he can live through a brief mood of that individuality. The same character of self-worth prevails in the sphere of aesthetic matters as a whole and thus in everything in art which is aesthetic. On the strength of this fact, people sometimes compare art-works and machines. Technical work must be adequate to a purpose outside itself; but the work of art includes such a purpose in itself and is therefore self-purposeful, whereas the other is merely purposeful. The machine can never be understood by way of itself; the work of art may never be understood in any other way. The significance of an art-work discloses itself through its absorption in its own purpose; the significance of a machine is shown through appeal to its established relation to an aim of use.

The following notions are not really objections to the asserted idea that the play of children has its own aim and purpose: Karl Groos,¹⁷ among others, has confirmed that the play of children and young animals is not entirely self-contained as to purpose, but that it serves a biological function and has immanent significance for its own life-formations: it is the exercising of skills necessary in later struggles for existence and the cultivation of aptitudes which are important in life. In the play of youth, the proper solutions of problems presented to a growing, living creature are prepared in advance;

the play of youth is therefore made up of anticipations of the individual's serious activities later in life. Only thus is it possible for young organisms in due course through experience to give the finishing touches to inherited aptitudes and courses which are manifestly unsatisfactory in themselves, and to broaden these aptitudes and courses through the gains which are built on what is inherited—and thus the youngsters become equal to the problems of life. In part through the adaptations it achieves, play to a certain degree supplants the finely-formed inherited mechanisms and makes good and completes them. Therefore a human being, who must know many things and who is not specialistically adjusted to his environment (as is an animal), has a long period in his life for playing. In the play of a young girl who tends her doll there is an instinctive disposition for the vocation of motherhood; certain personal tendencies cast their shadows before, and in such a way play can be interpreted as a prognosis of development, or as the foreboding rays of the life-forms which only later assume serious significance for the individual. Play therefore shows itself to be a biological necessity of practical import. But this is not to deny that it has its own aim. For the practical usefulness of play is achieved indirectly only and remains entirely unknown to the person doing the playing because he does not recognize that behind conscious representation directed towards completely self-purposeful activity there hides a biological ratio. This too is an analogue to the aesthetic attitude, of whose usefulness for the organism and consequently of whose biological function the individual is not conscious. Thus it remains that play exists wherever an activity exists purely for the sake of the pleasure derived from it and, above all else, is divorced from all practical-material purposive relations of serious life. Play is an illusionary, purposeful activity which has expressive value. The single *telos* in connection with play is functional pleasure, joy in the distribution of time, in a lapse of time properly filled by a desired activity. But if a child zealously learns a piano-piece so that he can show off at a school-event or if a man sits at a card-table in order to improve his finances, then purposelessness has disappeared as has the character of play; what then is present is not play any longer, but naked seriousness. In other respects too the play of children often becomes serious. It is not at all rare for the unreal character of play to disappear: taking their play seriously, children may think they are in a real war and really hit one another hard as they fly into genuine anger. They cannot retain certain play-fictions in their "as-if" character as semblance. And in this failure of attitude with respect to the fiction of play there is

a significant analogy to the aesthetic attitude, in which it is similarly possible to leave the proper path, to leave the sphere of artistic illusion—for instance, when a naïve person experiences a tragedy as a painful reality.

A person who enjoys a work of art does not do so in a preponderant majority of cases in order to achieve something practical; and in general one cannot even see how such a thing could be possible. In the aesthetic state our total personalities act freely without our being bound to outward considerations or to determinations of purpose. In the aesthetic state, too, the characteristic purposelessness is not destroyed by the presence of an immanent aim, which consists of a desire for the achievement of pleasure and for the enhancement of the sense of life. Ontogenetically and phylogenetically, the aesthetic is not a super-structural phenomenon of luxury which should be pursued only after the practical demands of life are in adequate measure cared for. Art, for instance, is not an activity which results from an excess of energy which remains after the necessities of life are satisfied; rather, it is a cultural goal which is pursued even in the midst of life's hard battles. Similarly untenable are the play-theories which maintain that art arises from a superabundance of energy (*Kraft*). It is much more likely that the play-attitude is an activity demanded in certain stages of life even among undernourished and sickly children and young animals.

There are still other analogies between play and the aesthetic attitude. The enjoyments of play are manifold: pleasure in excitement, in one's own activity, in one's being the originator of something, in imaginative activity, and finally in expectation and tension. All of these gradations in the product of pleasure are found in the aesthetic state also, though deepened and intensified in terms of what is significant for human beings.

Therefore it has been established once more that the aesthetic state is its own purpose and, as an activity in many respects analogous to play, is intrinsically valuable and satisfying. That which contains its own aim within itself is significant in itself and does not have to serve as a means to something else. This is what people as a rule mean when they speak of the self-significance (*Eigenbedeutsamkeit*) of the aesthetic.

Yet this concept is applied in a somewhat narrower sense by R. Hamann.¹⁸ In all object-perceptions, the meaning is caused by something which conforms to the perception and for which the perception is only a sign. The fact that the contents of a perception are only a sign for a judgment attached to them and that their meaning

is therefore in something outside what lies in them—this fact we call the alien significance of the object. By way of this foreign meaning and with the help of the concept, the contents of perception become an object of science, of ethics, or of sociology. Still the contents of perception can also have meaning *per se*, and if they do, they are aesthetically relevant. The contents of a perception are aesthetically significant not as they are objectified in relation to an alien meaning and not as they are conceptually unified, but as they are linked together into a structure and thus are significant *per se*. Thus contents of perception significant in themselves are aesthetic: that is, when they are the goal of a desire merely to see, when we attentively realize a mere perception and reply to it with pleasure or aversion, without our experiencing the thing seen or heard only as a sign of something else that can only be grasped as a concept, or as something which achieves significance with respect to an aim lying outside itself. A farmer looks at a field of corn. The contents of his perception are meaningful to him precisely with respect to what he cannot see at all, the future harvest; and therefore in the rich image before him only the size and weight of the ears of corn, and thus the contents, are of significance and are present only as a fixed sum in the abstract and in the greatest possible numbers because the things he sees are used as signs and omens. The colors of the field mean nothing to him in themselves, but are merely evidence for that which has special significance for him, the larger or smaller yield. But someone strolling nearby will be captivated by the saturated yellow; he looks at it without his being led by any intention but that merely of seeing. His attitude is aesthetic. The contents of perception are meaningful in themselves only as they are experienced in the aesthetic attitude; they are the particular structures one sees or hears, not the objects which we intend to grasp in perception and render accessible only as we go beyond the perception itself. If we are delighted by the graceful appearance as a *roc*, we see in its aesthetic significance not the *roc*, but an impression of sight which is related to something which in scientific terms is called *roc*. Every time the *roc* turns when we are in a state of object-recognition, the different views and appearances of the *roc* can be signs for the same object which therefore does not change in itself, and, consequently, the interpretation of the different contents of object-perception remains. But the aesthetic object changes with each of the contents of perception and its significance does so correspondingly. Not all of the postures have the same aesthetic grace. The fact that every change of the contents of perception results in a new aesthetic object and

therefore also in a change in meaning is called the uniqueness (*Einzigartigkeit*) of the aesthetic image.

To approach the contents of a perception in the aesthetic attitude, to experience them as having a significance all of their own—to do this depends to a great extent on our preparation (training) and attitude in terms of habit and situation. But there is one stipulation which the contents of perception must fulfill before they can acquire a significance unto themselves for us. They must arouse our interest in form. Man is continually forced to observe the conditions of the world about him in order to recognize those things which are vital to him. When the thing is known, however, and named and classified, then the matter is in many cases settled. But this is not by any means always so. There is the contemplation of the thing for its own sake which concerns itself with the form of things by means of which one is affected pleasantly or unpleasantly. The form of the mountain as such remains of interest to me even after I no longer have to look at it to recognize that it does not have a camel's hump. The interest we take in the forms of things for their own sake is something basically different from our interest in their contents or their existence because they are beneficial or harmful to our existence. The interest in form lies in the fact that the outer image of the thing appeals to us. The interest in appearance causes us to occupy ourselves with the form of the thing by dwelling in contemplation. For practical purposes, for the most part, a fleeting glance is enough, provided that it suffices for conceptual and verbal comprehension. In such cases, the "looking-at" will be quickly over and will be interrupted by the intellectual acts for which it is only a preparation and a service. By contrast, the aesthetic attitude based on an interest in form means a complete development and consummation of the act of looking which has become the principal matter here.

Köstlin¹⁰ takes for granted a special interest by human beings in the form of things. In this way the specific disposition for the experience of aesthetic value would be gone back to, an aptitude which would belong to people as an inherited cultural possession. A person is able to derive pleasure from the way things appear and to pause in self-significant contemplation of the forms of these things. The assumption is that the form itself has something to say, that its image-as-appearance does not have the function of merely being a sign and symbol, but that it works as an expression of an inner content become form. Form and content cannot be separated for aesthetic experience. For this experience, content exists only insofar as it has become form (as it comes forward in an adequate appearance); and form exists

as an aesthetically significant given object only to the extent that a psychical something asserts itself through it.

The concepts of sign and (formed) expression have in the most recent times been frequently used to distinguish logical from aesthetic significance.²⁰ A musical note is a sign; we know which tone is intended, but the note is not a tone. But the expression, by contrast, is to a certain extent the thing expressed itself. Every true work of art not only designates that which is expressed, but at the same time includes what is expressed. In Goethe's poem, "Over all mountain-tops . . .," repose is not discussed, but we have a feeling that in these verses repose is corporeally embodied. Here something is not stated, but it is given form through language. Or, to perceive the difference between logically relevant signs and aesthetically meaningful expression, and, further, between the contents of perception which are alien in meaning and those which are significant in themselves, one may think of a certain neighborhood as outlined on a map and presented according to conventional signs, and on the other hand as it is painted by a water-colorist.

5. CONTEMPLATION, INTERESTLESSNESS, AND PURITY

It has been widely agreed that the aesthetic attitude can be defined in terms of the characteristic "moments" or aspects mentioned in the heading of this section. Contemplation is the antithesis of all active procedures exerted for outward ends and in the service of strivings and practical goals determined by the will. Purity likewise applies to the freedom from practical purpose and egotistical interest of the contemplative state in which one surrenders to a feeling-filled intuition. According to Kant,²¹ the psychic attitude of human beings is to be called aesthetic when it is without interest (or, better, when it is disinterested). This aspect, important for the grasping of the nature of aesthetic matters, does not mean a lack of participation; for when we are faced with genuine works of art, our interest is highly aroused. As sympathy aroused by the object, interest is present; but only the relationship with a practical aim is lacking, as are the striving for material gain and the furtherance of material existence. It is well known that the word *interest* is ambiguous. It means 1) the effect of intellectual delightfulness, the excitement of the psychic functions, a mental sympathy with something. This is an intellectual feeling which is attached to acts of looking and knowing, no interruption of aesthetic comprehension taking place.²² 2) Profit, a striving after material advancement in material existence, an

interest in a thing; in this sense we speak of the interest from capital, of an interested person—that is, of one who considers his egotistical and personal gains. Here one means a feeling of the will which drives us to acts of violence to make an object of our desire our own and to attain something of advantage to ourselves. According to Kant, this kind of desire cannot be at one with the purely contemplative attitude which is the criterion for a fully developed aesthetic attitude.

Kant says that "The pleasure which defines the judgment of taste is devoid of any kind of interest. Interest is the name given to that pleasure which we connect with the idea of the existence of the object. Therefore such an interest always has at the same time a connection with the faculty of desire, either as its determinative basis or still as necessarily coherent with its determinative basis. But when the question of whether something is beautiful is asked, we will not know whether there is something suitable and proper for us or for anyone at all in the existence of the thing, or even if there is something which could even be suitable and proper; but we will know how to judge it in terms of pure contemplation (intuition or reflection)."

The material existence of the object of my experiences of aesthetic perception or representation is a matter of indifference to me because I do not want anything practical from it and because I do not stand in a serious relation to it. Instead, the only question is whether the mere representation of the object is accompanied by pleasure in me. According to Kant, "the judgment of taste is purely contemplative—that is, a judgment which, indifferent in considering the existence of its object here and now, brings only its qualities into a coherence with the feeling of pleasure or the lack of it." In these terms, "I have an interest in the object" means that in its existence there is something which serves my convenience; it approaches me in empirical existence, not merely in the image, the representation, the pure *qualitas* and *essentia* of the object. But if, on the contrary, a person means by "interest" a sympathy with or participation in the pure simple being or quality (*So-Sein*) of a certain given thing, then there is nothing which contemplation-aesthetics can object to. Thus one must distinguish between a real (material) and an ideal interest. E. von Hartmann²³ does just this, and here, as at other points, he modifies the aesthetic rigor of Kant and in the form of aesthetic semblance sanctions the ideal interest in the representation of the object, in its unreal existence here and now.

Every other human activity, if it is to be meaningful, must strive for a goal. But the characteristic of the aesthetic attitude is that it is

free of interest interpreted as meaning the relation to a practical goal. Nothing else is desired but the state itself and the object making up its content in its pure appearance as a mere intuitive image. The moment an aim from the outside is dragged into the aesthetic state, that state ends, or at least its purity is stained. A maker of costumes has no aesthetic experience when he studies a historical painting by Delacroix. The aesthetic state must be a surrender in pure contemplation to the object, and it dare not look beyond it—except, that is, for those necessary associations demanded by the object itself. Above all, the aesthetic state must be free of all egotistical impulses of wanting to possess the object or of wishing that it be gone. The forms of naked women are not conducive to an aesthetic experience if the perceiver is filled with erotic excitement or if he is absorbed by the wish that his wife could look “that way.” Here aesthetic experience has become impossible, even if the female figures of the naked models presented are ever so perfect. A person who looks at a superb country-house, not for its architectural qualities, but because it is a symbol of his total attitude of wanting to own a house equally comfortable; and a person who stifles his contemplation with envious desires—both themselves destroy the aesthetic experience. Even more disturbing than the desire to possess something is a consuming wish that it were gone. In the presence of inimical objects people often exclaim, “Ugh, but that is unaesthetic!” With this reaction of aversion, one means that the state of pure contemplation, in which one gladly tarries with the object, is disturbed by nothing more painful than by disgust.

If pure contemplation is to be possible, the object must be put at a distance from us and moved out of the sphere of our practical life, and every material relationship of the beneficial or of the harmful type must be consciously repressed. When this occurs, one speaks of aesthetic isolation.

The aesthetic is an easily damageable value; and it is always harmed by the practical of any sort. A fire which is destroying my own house cannot be an object of aesthetic contemplation to me. A person who is the butt of jokes for others will not himself feel exhilarated by them. The death of Socrates, noble and tragic for us today, could not be anything but shocking and sad for his disciples. Thus before aesthetic contemplation can come to be, all ties of practical interest must necessarily be eliminated. In this interestlessness lies a characteristic aspect of the aesthetic attitude. In professional writing this principle has been terminologically paraphrased in many ways. Kant above all stressed this fact and in describing it proclaimed

formulations which have become classical. But he was not by any means the first person to enunciate it. According to Thomas Aquinas,²⁴ that is aesthetically valuable which pleases directly in perception (*Anschauung*). Purposefulness and beauty were strictly divorced by Hutcheson.²⁵ Similarly, Burke²⁶ held to the view that the beautiful is experienced without an awareness of purpose ("in beauty the effect is previous to any knowledge of the use"). Mendelssohn²⁷ emphasized the lack of desire in the aesthetic attitude, and Montesquieu²⁸ says that "When we find pleasure in seeing a thing because it has usefulness for us, we call it good; when we find pleasure in seeing a thing without discerning a present usefulness in it, we call it beautiful." According to F. J. Riedl,²⁹ that is beautiful which pleases one sensuously without any intention of interest, and indeed even when we do not possess it. In Sulzer³⁰ one finds the pertinent definition that the beautiful pleases without consideration of the value of the material because of its form, which presents itself pleasantly to the senses or to the imagination. It is on this state of the case that Schopenhauer places special emphasis in his aesthetic, the entirety of which he builds on notions of contemplation. In the aesthetic situation we behave in a purely contemplative way and are cleansed of all relations of practical purpose: The will, otherwise restless, is at peace.³¹ Ethel Puffer³² with her concept of "aesthetic repose" means something similar. The same ideas are the core of Volkelt's definition of the aesthetic,³³ which he characterizes by concepts like the nonrealization (*Irrealisierung*) of the sense of reality, will-lessness, and non-materiality (*Stofflosigkeit*). Wundt³⁴ separated the aesthetic attitude as pure contemplation from theoretical reflection and practical reacting. According to Meinong, who in this respect is influenced by E. von Hartmann,³⁵ the aesthetic feelings are feelings of simple existence (*So-Seinsgeföhle*) independent of existence here and now.

In various constantly revived kinds of statement and restatement, people have wrestled with the always more correct formulation of the central fact that the aesthetic state is a surrender to pure qualities, to the image of the thing as it is intrinsically significant, and not a relationship with its material existence here and now.

Thinking thus, Siebeck³⁶ says that "While objects of perception outside aesthetic contemplation at first make known their existence and then only on this basis their further qualities and characteristics, the representation of objective being in connection with the perception of the beautiful is swallowed up immediately into (or by) the awareness of pleasure. Things in their natural qualities show them-

selves to us to begin with as existing, and only because and as they are do they have these and those certain characteristic relationships among themselves and do they possess these and those certain qualities."

But in the experience of the beautiful, these qualities and their products of aesthetic value (the immediate pleasure) are primary, and their real existence, by contrast, is secondary.

Of the most recent aestheticians, Paul Häberlin³⁷ has made especially strong professions about contemplation. We are able to experience beauty only to the degree in which we are capable of standing back from the purposeful requirements of the object. The category of beauty is not one of those which determine purpose; it is outside and beyond the concept of purpose, outside everything of interest. Beauty is a fact of pure feeling (not one consistent with practical ends). Naturally, there is an aesthetic interest; but it is characteristically different from interest in the genuine sense, from an interest which sets up a purpose. As long as we see the beauty of an object, we do not think of possessing it; we do not really think of anything in terms of setting a goal. Being absorbed in the aesthetic object and wanting to possess it are characteristically different and are mutually incompatible. And when we first of all find the object simply to be beautiful by virtue of its pure aesthetic mien and then our wish to possess it is aroused, the wish is a secondary act coming from other springs than the discovery of beauty.

Of course there is a certain difficulty here, and even a contradiction. On the one hand, we view the object contemplatively (that is, we are not interested in its existence here and now), but, on the other hand, we wish for and approve of the existence here and now of this dispenser of pleasure. About this problem, Witasek³⁸ has expressed his opinion in a richly informative way:

The aesthetic object is the object of two kinds of feelings: the aesthetic feeling, which is identical with aesthetic pleasure, and a value-feeling, on the basis of which we perceive its value. The one is a sense of representation; the other is a sense of judgment. The one is the feeling of pleasure which we have at the sight of a beautiful object; the other is the feeling of satisfaction which arises in us at thoughts of the existence of the beautiful object which is the source of our joy: the object is of value to us because it offers us aesthetic delight. But as a value-object the aesthetic object can itself be an object of desire to us; people long for the thing which offers aesthetic gratification, look for views of beautiful landscapes, want to own beautiful pictures. And this is not in contradiction to the disinter-

estedness of the aesthetic attitude, which is and remains a pleasant experience of looking and as such has nothing in common with desire. But precisely because it is a seeing which arouses pleasure in us, the object which arouses this pleasure becomes valuable and is therefore desired as occasion offers. This desiring is, exactly like the feeling of value, naturally something other than the aesthetic behavior; it proceeds only with it and as its result. The looking-experience which is contemplative, interestless, and absorbed by feeling, and the desire and wish to have this pleasant experience and to have the object based on it—these are two entirely different experiences which seem to be co-existent because of their temporal commonality and other binding aspects. When I surrender myself in pleasure to an artistic performance at a concert, my desire-free contemplation is something significantly other than the wish to take part in such pleasurable experiences more often.

With the concept of interestlessness and contemplation one has grasped a characteristic sign of the aesthetic attitude and found a structural criterion by which the character of aesthetic consciousness is distinguished from theoretical-intellectual and practical-ethical kinds. To be sure, this idea must not be taken too literally, and especially so as regards our keeping that pleasure at a distance which we "connect with the idea of the existence of the object." Naturally, I am genuinely glad that Goethe wrote *Faust* and Mozart *Don Giovanni*, and I should not want to miss the existence of these works. Even wanting to share pleasure in a certain work of art abrogates the purity of the aesthetic state, but only for that interpretation which can properly be described as an unwarranted over-emphasis of the principle of interestlessness. Even in this case there is appeal only to an ideal existence of the object, to the fact that it exists as an art-work in connection with which all relations of material interest fail. Interest in the sense of joy in the existence of the aesthetic object as such can actually be present; but it must not confine itself to the ideas of practical purpose. There is something quite different between wanting the Venus of Velázquez for the sake of its value as an art-work and wanting to call the woman presented there his own as a sex-partner, or to possess the expensive portrait itself as a permanently valuable investment.

According to the theory of contemplation, all dynamics of willing and striving in the aesthetic procedure, all active attitudes, retreat behind pure, feeling-filled contemplation. But even this opinion has been most vigorously contradicted. Nietzsche contrasted the Schopenhauerian aesthetic of the "suspended will" with his own aesthetic

of the passionate struggle. Other philosophers also teach that art and all things aesthetic are values operating in life and that even in the sphere of serious problems they have significant actions to accomplish. An aesthetic activism runs alongside the theory of contemplation or counter to it. Examples can be supplied from Russian aesthetics which, developing along the lines of dialectical materialism, is similar to the sociological aesthetics developed in France at the end of the last century and the beginning of this one. One of its leaders, J. M. Guyau,³⁰ is decidedly opposed to the notion that the beautiful has nothing to do with desires and practical interests. Instead, the beautiful in his view is desired just as are all things practical (*"ce qui est beau est désirable sous le même rapport"*): In opposition to Kant, who put the greatest of stress on the sharp distinction between the aesthetic on the one hand and the logical and ethical on the other, Guyau points to the many common connections these areas of thought have in the human situation. For many people, Guyau is right. Nevertheless, if one is to confirm the theory of contemplation, Guyau's central thesis must be answered in the following fashion: because the beautiful is an important human value and includes strong possibilities for human happiness, its desirability is evident. As an object of material pleasure, it even passes over into economic contexts and takes on an exchange-value. Because every receptive requirement and every receptive aptitude begets a productive correlate, or brings with itself an inducement to creation, it is clear that there are people who, to speak in banalities, do their other kinds of work by satisfying their desire for beauty. For the artist, his own acts are not an autotelic, interest-free play, but an activity (that is, hard work) directed by ideas of purpose and considerations of effect. But with all of this, the character of being valuable in itself which is the nature of aesthetic things, and the character of the receptive aesthetic state of having its own goal and of being contemplative—neither of these is invalidated. We want the beautiful because it makes us happy, but it pleases us for its own sake without practical effect and without connections with material purpose. What is desired is solely an illusionary aesthetic pleasure, and thus something which from the practical point of view is non-real and "ideal." Psychically it is quite real, however. Even when we "seriously" want to partake of a certain pleasure in art, this desire, because it is aesthetically immanent, remains within the frames of contemplation. This desire is directed only towards the attainment of the substrate of aesthetic pleasure, not towards the practical advantage with which this substrate is bound. Excluded only is the transgredient will di-

rected towards material gain. When Guyau goes on to say that relations of purpose, considerations of functional suitability, and so forth play a part in the aesthetic state, he is objecting primarily to the absolutism of feeling and to the emotionalism which are often associated with the theory of contemplation rather than to the doctrine of the state of pure contemplation of the object. The kinds of relations he mentions too can be approached in a thoroughly intuitive way. Aesthetic contemplation is not identical with the kind of life lived by a Buddhist monk; it is not an unmoved contemplativeness antithetical to all psychic activity; it is far distant too from a purely passive kind of transport. Despite the phenomenon of aesthetic isolation, it is not a cool putting of the object off at a distance which leads to an inner lack of sympathy; but it leaves room for the strongest movements of feeling and emotion on the assumption that these are independent of the material and practical relationships of life.

6. AESTHETIC OBJECTS AS ILLUSION AND SEMBLANCE

This discussion is merely in explanation of characteristic features of the aesthetic state which have in part already been brought up. It refers to what people call the reduction of the sense of reality in the aesthetic attitude, to the character of illusion or semblance of the aesthetic object. The non-reality of the aesthetic object, as established by a certain one of its aspects, is in a non-real coherence with those characteristic traits which were spoken of in the preceding section. As concerns certain givennesses, I am able to take an attitude that is contemplative and devoid of any interest because, when I am in this attitude, the object in question presents itself to me in its certain traits and attributes, not as a completely real thing, but as an illusionary correlative of a thing. Even a landscape, a real group of trees, can be experienced in aesthetic contemplation much as is a picture. What fills our consciousness in aesthetic experience is an aesthetic semblance, an inner picture or image, which apperception has detached from the object given from the outside. Otherwise the image serves to relate us through knowing or wanting to the reality corresponding with it; here is it intuited and enjoyed⁴⁰ purely for itself—that is, as an image. If in the world of practical things, of serious application, there is the matter of realities, in aesthetic experience it is enough for one to have an illusionary image of those realities, the mere representation of them. The observer experiences

what is before him, not indeed as something totally real, but, with a characteristic reduction of his sense of reality, as semblance. We are behaving aesthetically whenever we are able to take an attitude towards things that is intellectually free, illusionistic, and divorced from actuality, free of egotistical material interests and of connections with practical life. The aesthetic is the world of semblance. In its semblance-character the aesthetic object is declared to be the antithesis of true reality; and in its play-character it is spoken of as an antithesis to the seriousness of life. From this problem there open up fruitful approaches to other central concerns in aesthetics and art-theory: 1) to the problem of the sense of semblance and that of serious matters; 2) to the question of the mode of existence and the sphere of existence of aesthetic matters and of art; thus to the meta-physical-ontological solving of the aesthetic problem. On the basis of a central illusion-theory, Konrad Lange ⁴¹ has outlined an aesthetic and art-theory of the "As-If."

It is just because he is anxious to give especially strong recognition to the non-reality of the beautiful that Paul Häberlin ⁴² refuses to apply the dual concept of reality-semblance, which he thinks is inadequate for an understanding of the true nature of the sphere of aesthetic things. The question of reality cannot really be placed above that of the aesthetic. But this means merely that it is senseless to approach the mode of existence of aesthetic objects with the categories of reality.

7. THE AESTHETIC IN A SYSTEM OF VALUES

A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

If a person says that a flower has a certain color or a certain form of blossom, he is in such judgments asserting something about the objective features of the object in question. But when a person judges that a flower is beautiful, he is not saying anything about an objective attribute of the object. For such an attribute would have to be capable of being substantiated in the same fashion each time it occurs. All red flowers have something in common: namely, the coloristic red quality through which they agree with all other red objects (clothes, for example). But when I say that a certain object is beautiful (that it is aesthetically valuable), I have said something which can apply to many objects quite differently constituted as to shape and character. Things which appear completely different can, despite the greatest heterogeneity of their characteristic natures, exert the same effect, precisely that of beauty. Thus it follows

that the word "beautiful" (which we always use here as shorthand for what is aesthetically valuable) does not serve to bring together a class of objects bound together by characteristics they have in common.⁴³ For what common characteristics can be said to be held jointly by a human figure, a landscape, a melody, a poem, all of which can in meaningful assertions be called beautiful? Not peculiarities of space, nor those of number, nor any of those belonging to a condition of the senses: none are common to all things which are called beautiful; they only have in common the kind of *effect* which has value. But it is not only with respect to such different kinds of classes of given objects, such as an edifice, a piece of sculpture, a musical composition, a given object in nature, and so forth, that this discrepancy in the sphere of the objective and characteristic occurs; it does so even among different exemplars of the same species. If Miss X and Miss Y have black hair, they are similar as to color of hair; but when they are both said to be handsome, they do not have in any way to look the same way: each of them can be called handsome on the basis of different characteristics. Therefore there is a far greater possibility that people will disagree about the agreeableness of their appearance than about the color of their hair. What binds together all objects called beautiful in the widest sense is not a similarity of qualities, but a similarity of value and of effect. Beauty is just as strictly not attached to objects as objective qualities (attributes) are. The categorical judgment, "This flower is red," is a theoretical judgment of an attribute in terms of formal logic; but the statement, "This flower is beautiful," which is also a categorical judgment, is a critical judgment, an axiological judgment, a judgment of value.

These two types of judgment, though they have the same grammatical form, have very different significances. In the judgment of properties, the relation between subject and predicate is interpreted as a relationship of two contents which are theoretically present in consciousness, so that this relationship as belonging to these two contents can either be allowed or rejected. In critical judgments, however, the predicate does not mean a theoretical content of consciousness, but a relation to an aim or a value which the subject must acknowledge or give his verdict against. Only a naïve kind of thinking treats such relations of aim or effect like those called agreeable or beautiful as properties just as inherent to the subject as are other properties. And even the slightest degree of skeptical thinking shows that such value-predicates do not as properties belong to things or relationships in themselves and alone, but that they

merely accrue to them, primarily through a relationship with an evaluating consciousness.⁴⁴

The beautiful is such an effect-relation and such a positive kind of effect as is experienced with an awareness of value. The pleasant and life-enhancing accompaniment of feeling which comes with the appearance of the beautiful comprises the beautiful as a value, and, indeed, as one of the human original or basic values parallel to the good, the true, and so forth. By value we mean that which is adapted to the furtherance of our conjoint human existence, that which satisfies our elementary wants and concerns (dispositions), that which contributes to human happiness and well-being, by which means a sense of pleasure is produced and in which way a good worth striving for is presented.

We therefore assert that: 1) the beautiful is a value; 2) it is an elementary and ultimate human value anchored in the deepest necessities of our human existence and based on its fundamental dispositions; 3) it is a peculiar and independent value, and the characteristic aesthetic effect cannot be traced back to any other kinds of value-experiences. Even people with only an elementary conception of these matters are clear on the point that we attribute a different value-predicate to an object which we call beautiful from those we call useful, agreeable, and so forth. The concepts of the useful, the pleasant, the true, the good, the beautiful, the holy, and so forth are universally used as basic axiological categories; they express the fact that certain givennesses which they designate satisfy in an affirmative way the constitutives (meaning-demands and reality-requirements) of a certain cultural sphere of action. The value-character of the beautiful is perceptual; it is revealed and supported by experience; thus it does not need logical demonstration; appeal to the certainty supplied by experience is enough ("The fire is proved because it burns"). The enhancement of life which accompanies the pursuit of the beautiful is a basic experience shared by all men. With respect to its value, the beautiful is an intuitively guaranteed fact of consciousness and of experience. The value-character of the beautiful is sometimes denied because [it is thought] there are values only in the realm of moral objectives and because aesthetic experience, by contrast, is a state of enjoyment having no contact with judgment; but this kind of thing is possible only through an eccentric realization of the meaning of the concept of value. For us the matter remains thus: in aesthetic experience, we participate (without explicitly judging and comparing in the logical sense) in certain life-enhancing and mind-satisfying experiences, and a positive address is

made to a basic concern of our nature. Saying this, we have indicated the constitutives of the existence of value. At the same time we are not implying the other idea, that the beautiful represents a peculiar value of its own. Here the argument establishing the first point is even more apropos: for experience only in general discloses the character of value. It might ultimately be possible to suppose that, as regards the value-product present, it is not independent, possibly that it in reality coincides with the agreeable, or that it brings along with itself a life-furthering character analogous to that of the ethical. When many rationalists consider the beautiful to be the directly comprehensible intuitive representation of truth, they destroy the beautiful as an original kind of value. I shall now compare aesthetic value with other recognized values in their independence, for the mutual illumination of them all; thus we can learn if aesthetic value as compared with these others is something original and primary or not. We shall use a teleological approach like that of Johannes Volkelt: we shall ask ourselves whether, by means of the peculiar facts of consciousness which can be contrasted as the aesthetic state with the intellectual and the moral, a peculiar value-product can be attained which cannot be achieved by way of other attitudes.

B. THE AESTHETICALLY VALUABLE AND THE SENSUOUSLY AGREEABLE

According to Kant, the agreeable is that which pleases the senses in sensation. Certain affections of our organs of sense are delightful as such. Thus there is a particular pleasure-product, but one not having a deep spiritual effect, deriving purely from the peripheral organs of sense as they are laid claim to. Mild affection of our skin-sense and of our temperature-sense as produced by the mild warmth of summer or by a tepid bath is agreeable, as are the smell of flowers and the taste of well-prepared food. The present requirements of our organism are decisive if we are to have delightful experiences and to base on them judgments as to whether something is agreeable or not. One and the same given condition can be agreeable in certain situations, but under other assumptions it cannot; therefore, it cannot always arouse the same pleasurable sensation. A person who spends an entire evening eating only candy will soon reject the enjoyments he at first found agreeable. The same is true for wine, which, inordinately enjoyed, becomes the more disgusting the more excellent it is. Only sense-perception is the prerequisite for the pleasant product of feeling which is decisive for the agreeable. In the scale of values, the agreeable is truly the most immediate; it is that

which stays closest to the body and which, just for this reason, is the lowest. It exists for animals too, who do without the higher values of the ethical and the intellectual and who are beyond good and evil, but not beyond the agreeable and the disagreeable. A person indulges in the agreeable, not as an intelligent, but primarily as an animal, being—though, naturally, the agreeableness which human beings feel is not entirely unrelated to the mental. Therefore, the value-product of objects of purely sensuous delight, which have no connection with mental ideas, concerns, or necessities, is agreeable. The beautiful, by contrast, produces a contemplative, sensuous-intellectual joy in pure perception; in it something other is present than the pleasurable sensation caused by the bare affections of the senses; thus it goes decidedly beyond the material joy of a sensuously pleasant feeling. One must still show, however, that certain genetic and systematic structural similarities between the agreeable and the beautiful are not prejudicial to this basic differentiation. In any case, the beautiful is of all values the closest to the agreeable because only in certain borderline cases can it forego things given immediately and sensuously. To be sure, in the aesthetic realm central excitements and representational-conceptual acts may quite legitimately replace the peripheral affections of the senses—as is shown when people read literary works silently or when accomplished musicians silently read scores. Here a full aesthetic pleasure is allied with tonal representations merely reproduced from memory and even with a mere knowledge of them. Yet in spite of all of its immediacy (which is the sensuousity of its substrate), the beautiful is an eminently intellectual value at the same time; it has an inner plenitude and depth which the agreeable, even in its most differentiated refinements as they fall to the lot of certain artists of life (that is, of sybarites),⁴⁵ must by the very terms of its nature always do without. It is precisely in its greater depth, according to Lipps,⁴⁶ that the chief difference between aesthetic value and the agreeable lies. Something agreeable can be as agreeable as it wants to be, but I never feel moved, shaken, or upset in my innermost self by it, nor enriched and transported in my deepest being, as I am when I contemplate the beautiful. Many agreeable objects can doubtless produce more violent and moving pleasurable sensations than do most aesthetic impressions, but the quantity of the pleasure and its depth are not in a necessary correlation to one another.⁴⁷ To be sure, even the agreeable can occasionally aim at a deeper mental effect: never directly and as such, however, but only because of its positive influence on a total frame of mind. This is true when, because of its beneficial effect on a total sense of life, it

excites imaginative and reflective activity (as in the enjoyment of wine). Schiller once attested to the fructifying effect on his literary creativity of the mild warmth of the sun following a series of cold, foggy days. But here the agreeable had only the role of a release.

The beautiful signifies a higher, because a more intellectual, value, than does the more animalish and more physical agreeable, which includes gratifications of a far lower and more material kind. Thus the agreeable does not approach that intellectually free character which is an indispensable prerequisite if experiences of aesthetic value are to take place. The feeling of the agreeable is therefore that delightful product which accompanies many sensations as such (that is, independent of any attached associations). In connection with things of aesthetic value, on the contrary, the assistance of indirect, associative factors can hardly ever be foregone. Spoken of in terms of theoretical classes, the agreeable is more vigorously at home in the lower spheres (planes of vitality, instinct, and life), and the beautiful by contrast is on the higher intellectual levels of personality.⁴⁸ This much is certain. Nevertheless, the attempted tidy separation between these spheres of value cannot be carried out so that one can assign the agreeable to the lower and the beautiful to the higher senses. At first glance, indeed, there is something attractive in saying that agreeable things are preponderantly attached to the senses of smell, touch, taste, and temperature, and to the organs, but that aesthetic significance and dignity must belong to the positive affections of sight and hearing. Accordingly, the agreeable would be the experience of delight and value in the givennesses of the senses which are inaccessible to being aestheticized. According to this view, the aesthetic is the result of the sublimation of the agreeable as it is met with in the sphere of the higher senses. From the standpoint of a strict value-system, however, one may enter a protest against so quickly resolved a distinction: for in the realm of experiences of the higher senses, there are positive effects which the spheres of agreeableness cannot go beyond while, on the other hand, in the realm of the lower senses, approximate forms of the aesthetically valuable are not entirely lacking. Nonetheless, this division can be justified from the point of view of developmental psychology, though at the same time one can show that it is not a sharp and absolute one for the reason that the aesthetically pleasant through a continuous synthesizing has gradually evolved out of the primitive pleasure-product of the agreeable and therefore can be considered to be only a peculiarly differentiated form of it.⁴⁹

To this one must make the following critical remarks: it must

be admitted that in terms of genetic-historical analysis, a precise boundary cannot be drawn between the beautiful and the agreeable. But this proves nothing about a phenomenological view of the facts of value as they occur in experiences of civilized human beings and on which aesthetics as a science of the ideal must ultimately ground its statements. Seen phenomenologically, there is a vital difference between the agreeable and the beautiful. The gradual differentiations and constantly more complicated synthesis which, in the course of a long development, have created the aesthetically valuable from out of the biologically significant and the sensuously pleasant have succeeded so well that a fundamental difference has come to be. To the agreeable is attached a purely sensuous enjoyment; to the beautiful, however, is attached an enjoyment which is not exhausted by its sensuous components, but which also includes a mental factor. The sensuous-mental structure of the aesthetic is the reason that its effect, as opposed to that of the agreeable, is an intrinsically deepened one. A one-sided developmental psychologist who does not see any difference between the areas of value here mentioned is like the extreme type of evolutionist who denies that there are differences between men and apes because the former have evolved from the latter. Though there are undeniable genetic connections between the beautiful and the agreeable, however, they also have equally undeniable differences in character; and these differences are the point here.

One must not be deceived by certain mutual connections between beauty and the agreeable. Aesthetic effect is often based primarily on the effect of the sensuous agreeableness of the object; and the beautiful in the narrower sense, the purely beautiful, the basic type of free and undisturbed aesthetic pleasure, absolutely presupposes the sensuously agreeable without any admixtures of the unpleasant. A painter of pure beauty like Raphael in approaching coloring and design avoids all disharmony, all roughness, and every kind of difficulty. Mozart avoids every kind of false note in the harmony, everything sudden or abrupt in the melodic structure, and all coarseness of sound in the instrumentation (things that are liked by the Impressionists).⁵⁰ The hearer revels in pure euphony, even with respect to the acoustical-sensible, and therefore not chiefly with respect to the pleasing complexity of the melodic figures. Consequently, the agreeableness of effect in the area of sensation is often a presupposition of the impression of beauty and is so intimately mixed with that impression that a clean separation of the effective elements is not possible.

In spite of this, the agreeable as such is not yet effective aestheti-

cally, and, inversely, in the realm of aesthetic value there are a series of given factors which are far from having the effect of agreeableness: orchestral excesses in modern music and a shrill, penetrating, nasal, pinched tone-color (in serious music too and not only in jazz), a deliberate disharmony in the colors in many modern pictures, and the crass themes of naturalistic and expressionistic drama. The mere effect of the agreeable alone is superseded and consciously renounced for the sake of certain mental results (enhanced expression, let us say). That this is possible, that a peculiar aesthetic effect is achieved precisely by these means, furnishes conclusive proof of the fact that the two realms of value, the beautiful and the agreeable, are not identical even so, and that, in spite of all of their contacts, they are essentially different at their centers.

In the foreground of attempts to demonstrate the autonomous character of each of these two realms of value there are three principal theses which have received varied repetition: 1) the pleasure one feels in the agreeable is always bound to interests, whereas the beautiful is the object of an interest-free pleasure; 2) the beautiful is the object of a universal and a necessary pleasure, whereas the judgment of the agreeable, as based on "private feelings," is completely arbitrary and whimsical, and appears to display far-reaching, interindividual variations and differences; 3) an aesthetically positive impression can often be erected only on the basis of realizations of intuitive relations and of syntheses of form, whereas the agreeable only to a characteristically more limited degree requires the spectator's activity as it asserts itself in more complex acts of comprehension.

According to Köstlin,⁵¹ the essential difference between the beautiful and the agreeable is this: the agreeable is that which because of its effect or its influence puts us in a condition of pleasure; beauty, by contrast, is that which arouses our pleasure through the impression of its appearance. The agreeable is something affectional, something of a physical condition; the beautiful is something having to do with the perceived appearance of an object, is something aesthetic. The agreeable affects us materially; it brings about in us a substantial change in our condition which causes pleasure (so, for example, the pleasure of wine transforms our organs of taste into an actual state, not in existence before, of being agreeably affected). The beautiful, on the other hand, affects us formally; its impression has to do only with the form of the object, and a real change in our subjective state or our condition does not follow. According to Häberlin, the agreeable means a positive relation of an object to us, the persons

experiencing it. We mean to say of what we call agreeable that it is agreeable to *us*, not that we are pointing at something objective or at an agreeableness existing for itself; we are concerned only with a satisfying relation to us. To the pedestrian a cool breeze is agreeable, but in saying so, he does not mean that the agreeableness is inherent in the moving air itself. He is not surprised, therefore, when others sitting in a shade find the same breeze to be disagreeable. If an object is to be agreeable or disagreeable to me, an interest determining an aim is presupposed on my part; whether it is disagreeable or not depends on the relation of the object to the kind of aim I have set. It is agreeable if it meets this set aim. The agreeable is a category of life determining purpose and having interest. It is precisely for this reason that it is always relative.

But in experience of the beautiful there is always the coercive impression on the observer that something belonging to the object or represented by the object is present, and, in any case, something which exists for its own sake. The beautiful object is not beautiful as the agreeable one is agreeable to me. The beautiful is characteristically other than the agreeableness of a shaft of air whose agreeability rises or falls with its relation to me. There is no question at all here whether a person is correct in his opinion, which is confined to his own experience, or whether beauty is in fact something transcending the relation of subject to object. It is fundamental if we are to differentiate these spheres of value merely that the beautiful always, wherever it is experienced, be thought of as something "objective." An object will never be beautiful because it corresponds with the setting of a goal or aim, and by beauty we never mean something advancing to meet our purposeful interests. Wherever it is experienced, beauty always works as a surprise, not as an affirmative answer to a demand by utility. We are able to experience beauty in the same measure as we are able to put the requirements of the purpose of the object at a distance.

C. THE AESTHETICALLY VALUABLE AND TRUTH

The true or truth is an ideal and the sought-for goal of the entire procedure of understanding by the thinking mind. Like every basic value, the true appears with a certain value-claim; it can present a demand far more emphatically and intensely than can the beautiful. Reflection on an elementary level can already show that the two areas of value do not coincide. The true as such is not as yet aesthetically relevant and effective; and, inversely, the aesthetically valuable in art need not be true at all, as non-realistic art shows. The state-

ment from the rationalistic theory of poetry (Boileau) ⁵² that "Nothing is beautiful but the true" is wrong, therefore. Thus also refuted is the notion that truth which in itself is not as yet aesthetically relevant still has to be considered as a prerequisite of the beautiful—so that a sharp contradiction of facts, for example, shuts out all effects of beauty. Rather, the two values lie on different planes, even where they are mutually striven for and realized. A dully painted landscape is aesthetically unenjoyable, no matter how truly it counterfeits the geographical region it represents; another in which all kinds of liberties have been taken with the natural model can increase the aesthetic effect precisely because these liberties are taken; it is beyond a doubt the more satisfactory aesthetically as it is the better painted.⁵³ Composed and stylized distortion of truth can enhance aesthetic effect. A great number of statements can be correct and true without their attaining any kind of aesthetic value as they realize the presuppositions of formal logic and of objective material fact. In no way, therefore, is the true always beautiful; and the beautiful is very often not true.

If the agreeable in the immediacy of its sensuousness and of its sensuous effectiveness was closely related to the beautiful but because of its material-psychological character (Kant calls it "pathological") far removed from it, then the true as a higher intellectual value in this respect adjoins the beautiful, but because of its completely abstract character and nonsensuousness is divorced from it. The aesthetically effective is primarily (that is, apart from the extreme case of thought-aesthetics) sensuous and intuitive; by contrast, the logically relevant is connected with thought, with concept, and with an absence of intuition. In the borderline cases of scientific illustration, where truth is grasped in intuition, the intuitive is only mediating, its effect is that of a sign, and the intuition itself is of little import. A great anatomist who is also an awkward draughtsman can make a set of facts clear with a few telling strokes and be far more instructive than can a skilful draughtsman who lacks a deep knowledge of things. Mathematical, physical, and chemical formulas which are the models of scientific exactness are completely abstract and therefore quite sterile of feeling, at least for people not specialistically interested in them. Exactly formalized knowledges of any kind are dry (law-texts, technical descriptions, scientific reports). By contrast, the aesthetic use of language in literature turns on feeling and, more intensely, (insofar as this is really possible in language) on imaginative intuition. It tries to produce concrete, vivid, individual representations and as far as is feasible to abolish the abstract universal character

of language. What is striven for is the image, the markedly figurative expression. The scientific use of language based on logical clarity is its opposite in every way. Scientific language strives for the well-defined term and avoids any sort of imaginative expression, as it does anything which is metaphysical (*sphärisch*) and has the character of feeling. While the beautiful is primarily conceptless, truth is composed entirely of concept. Maximal intellectual truth represents the exact opposite of the materially and physically agreeable. The beautiful mediates between these two poles of the natural pattern of human nature.

THE AGREEABLE	THE BEAUTIFUL	THE TRUE
sensation (the purely sensuous)	perception, representation (the sensuous- intellectual)	thought, judgment (the purely intellectual)

Truth agrees with the beautiful because it too has the character of having its own purpose and its own value and because, in the case of purely theoretical procedure, it can be pursued without any interest in an attainable profit. Seen as a whole, it nevertheless is of far more practical use in life than is the beautiful. Quite often knowledge points beyond itself to a profit to be gained or to a danger to be avoided. When in real life we express a judgment, we generally do so for a certain end: an insight is mediated to call attention to something.⁵⁴ This pointing of judgment beyond itself is even more powerful when further practical goals follow the ones nearest one (in the warding off of danger, for instance). But also when no outer purposes are bound with the confirmation of truth, when, instead, facts (data) are communicated for their own sakes (as in pure science), every single element of truth still points beyond itself because it has value primarily as something meaningful for knowledge as a whole. If a historian who has diligently done his research-work establishes a date correctly, he is not concerned with the datum as such, but with the total factual structure with which it is connected. The single datum is arranged in its context of insights, and thus the individual truth does indeed belong to a coherent body of knowledge, not as a means to it, but as a member of it.⁵⁵ Matters are basically otherwise in the field of aesthetics as regards the individual creation and intuition. In aesthetic experience a work of art does not occur as a part of a coherence; it tenders itself to us as a whole which exists in its own right and which dwells in itself. Its value

lies in itself alone, not in its contribution to a superior whole. Over the scientific researcher there hovers scientific coherence; for him, science in its totality or in the totality of its technical problems is a reality into which his activity merges. The artist, on the other hand, has only his work in view, and this is the totality for which he strives. It is exactly the same for the person enjoying aesthetically: he plunges into the work before him and does not look beyond it. The intensive value of the beautiful (sought out for the sake of its own inner significance) is immanent, according to Jonas Cohn: it rests entirely in the single beautiful object. The value of truth, which is also intensive, is transgredient; in its significance it constantly points beyond the single and unique truth.

Theodor Ziehen defines the difference between the aesthetic and the "alethical" value-product in a similar way (*ἀληθεια*—truth). Every impression of beauty is sufficient unto itself, while every impression of truth has a pronounced relational and referential character, precisely in the sense that it is based on the agreement of an idea, of a formulation, with objective circumstances. An example: I see an ellipse whose longest diameter is 8 cm. and whose shortest is 5 cm. As being harmoniously and beautifully shaped, such an ellipse will arouse aesthetic pleasure in most people. To have such a reaction, one need know neither the length of the diameter nor anything about any other characteristic of the ellipse (the fact, for instance, that it has the pleasant relation called the Golden Section). But something else takes place when the formula used in analytical geometry for the ellipse $\frac{x^2}{a^2} + \frac{y^2}{b^2} = 1$ is developed. Then

I also have a pleasant feeling, that for truth, and this is based on the agreement between the formula and the figure. Wherever a pleasant sensation occurs in connection with truth, such an agreement and such a conscious recognition of it are present. For aesthetic pleasure, such an agreement and such a recognition are inessential, and often they are entirely absent. With this is connected the fact also that not all ellipses of every kind of diameter can arouse aesthetic pleasure, whereas pleasure in the correctness of the formula for ellipses occurs for all ellipses because the agreement plainly exists for them all. Or: we demand a close agreement with facts in a scientific biography of Joan of Arc, whereas we may allow deviations from fact in the literary treatment of this material. These considerations in mind, Ziehen modifies the statement of Kant that the beautiful is what pleases in the absence of concepts: Ziehen says that that is beautiful which pleases without one's conscious recognition of the

agreement of a representation or of a concept with an object. Now, it must indeed be admitted that such transgredient relations do occasionally appear as one enjoys art. They are apparent in our pleasure in recognition when we are pleased by a very successful portrait of a person we know, when we are delighted with the happy "realization" in a landscape of a region that has become dear to us, or when a historical event which is familiar to us is mastered in a novel. We set up such transgredient relations even when we take delight in the technically successful mastery of things difficult to reproduce (furs, silk, veils, and so forth). And in these cases there is present, not pure aesthetic satisfaction, but, instead, a combination of aesthetic and "alethic" pleasant sensations. Beyond a doubt, such combinations present a possible situation and one that is often realized, but in any event they are not the purest type of experience of aesthetic value. It is with this pure type, however, that aesthetics is concerned: as a science of the ideal it has to do, not with mixed and approximate forms which are very frequently verified empirically, but with a pure and fully developed aesthetic mode of behavior.

Still another vital difference between the beautiful and the true must be stressed: the difference in the territory of the law that is in force. If, agreeing with Kant, one attributes universal and necessary effect to aesthetic value, it is nevertheless evident that this predicate of quantitative value belongs to truth-value in an entirely different kind of measure. If we find something to be beautiful, we expect the same judgment of others too and demand the same pleasure of them. But when we judge that something is true, we demand the concurrence of other people unconditionally. Truth, therefore, has an incomparably more powerful demand-character; here speaks, not subjective feeling, but objective necessity, which is given by way of facts and the laws of logical thinking. I can argue with others about my judgments of beauty, which are manifestations of my subjective taste, because I can perhaps venture to hope to win the concurrence of others; but I can no more argue about truth than I can about the agreeable: not about the latter because agreement is usually as good as hopeless; not about truth because here there is the possibility of a compelling proof which must recognize who acknowledges the fundamentals. But in the realm of the beautiful there is no proof. Truth to a degree entirely different from beauty has an objective, super-individual, universal, and necessary value because it is the result of a logically cognitive judgment based on concepts—in contrast to the judgment of taste, which has its footing only in a feeling-impression and cannot there-

fore claim objective necessity. The establishing and recognizing of truth is a function of the activity of understanding whose laws are free of the subjective and individual variations of the thinking subject and are therefore universally valid. But judgments of beauty depend on the subject and his feeling-life. Here the understanding does not recognize something which exists outside itself and which has value apart from itself; but a certain object is related to an apprehending sensibility, and the subjective disposition of the individual, his habits, and many other factors are of moment. Kant's attempted appeal to the constants of a *consensus communis aestheticus* and to the similarity of human feeling-life in its elementary components misses the real problem. For this problem lies precisely in the fact that despite all the similarity of certain appeals to basic feeling, the most marked differences in evaluation as regards the beautiful and the ugly are nevertheless possible. The contribution of the experiencing subject is fundamentally greater in connection with beauty than in connection with truth, so that adherents of the aesthetic subjectivism which is so wide-spread could set up the thesis that nothing is beautiful or ugly in itself but that only the susceptible attitude makes it so.⁵⁶ Naturally, this attitude has to be summoned up or made possible by the determinant qualities of the object which is contemplated; but the subjective action of the comprehending subject is in any case entirely different in every instance from what it is in connection with cognitive judgment, in which the objectively present facts of the case are recognized in terms of a tightly linked product, and mental requirements play no part.

The independence of the spheres of truth and beauty can also be indicated through the discussions of art-theory. There is an attempt to identify the two in realistic-naturalistic movements in art and in theories allied with them. When Zola⁵⁷ once defined the work of art as a "corner of nature" and when Arno Holz⁵⁸ said that the task of art is to reproduce nature most faithfully, even to the extent, so to speak, of becoming nature itself, the conviction is clear. Yet it can easily be shown that in cases of such consistent theories of mimesis,⁵⁹ there is a confusion between the artistic-aesthetic characteristics and a scientific-logical one. The one-sidedly realistic theories of art which would put the aesthetic value of a work of art in closest possible agreement with the copied circumstances of reality are easily refuted. Reality (and the bare reproduction of it) does not have to be in any way valuable aesthetically, and even the most faithful imitation of reality does not guarantee

the aesthetic worth of an art-work; if it did, the photographer would be a greater artist than any painter.

The "artistic truth" which is demanded of an art-work is in no way identical with genuine truth; it is only a metaphor which is misleading in its figurativeness. This expression means merely the organic nature of the work of art, its lack of contradiction, its self-containment, the lack of lacunae in its motivation, its credibility, and still other qualities; but in any case it does not mean objective truth (the agreement of a formulation or of a formation with outer things or circumstances). Demanded of it is not an outer, but only an inner effect of truth. In terms of inner truth everything is true which the person who is pleased does not feel to be untrue; for its contemporary observer, therefore, the complex of mythical materials of Attic tragedy was true; and for his public the anachronistic and geographical blunders of Shakespeare were not untruths. Under certain assumptions, even ghosts and marvelous events are possible in art.

As regards the demand for truth, therefore, the realm of aesthetic objects stands on an entirely different foundation from those of spheres of life for which the complex of objective truth-demands made up of laws of thought and of agreement with reality is valid. Much that does not directly conform with the laws of understanding may nevertheless arouse aesthetic pleasure. Much that is absurd and markedly alogical in the comic (say, the grotesque, which goes beyond reality in caricature) is an example; the same is true of the world of the fairy-tale, of the fable and of the legend, the spook-forms of E. T. A. Hofmann, the world of magic and wonder as found in romantic literature. Art can create forms which have no correspondence with the real world and for which the laws of nature as we know them have no validity; it can disregard facts that are historically true, a violation of intellectual truth-demands not being tied to a decrease in aesthetic effect, just because something else applies here and because the values of beauty and truth are independent of each other. The artist can go into the non-real and the non-rational to the extent to which he is able to create an inner credibility and to persuade those enjoying his work to go along with him. The right of the artist to exceed reality extends as far into the sphere of the non-real as does his power to create forms. The beautiful mediates meaningful experiences of value even when art runs contrary to truth and to correspondence with actuality. In the realm of aesthetic things, therefore, the postulate of truth has no positive, and at most only a negative, validity: artistic forma-

tion must so proceed that the shock to the observer of the effect of untruth is avoided. Without a doubt, the truths of nature and of life are felt as valuable in an art-work; but still the artist does not have to hold to those demands when he can offer equivalents for them. In an art-work which chooses an object of nature for its subject, any deviation from natural truth which is not aesthetically motivated injures pleasure. This is the warranted core of realistic theories of art which requires that a work of art has to fall in with the image of the world, that it has to agree with actuality. But where the artist's intention is clearly aimed at something else, he does not have this duty. It is precisely for art that the phrase, "The more faithful to reality the better," is not always and not absolutely valid. A maximum of illusionistic faithfulness to nature can actually be a disadvantage to an artifact (painted sculpture, for instance, and bedaubed plastic waxworks).

But in attempting to prove that the two kinds of value are independent, one may not call upon the fact that art has to do, not with reality, but with a world of semblance. For it could still be that the simulated picture of reality should be erected according to the principles of existence and order which are consistent with the real world. But this is not the case considering everything we have said. Aesthetic considerations as well as axiological ones show that between the values of the true and the beautiful there is a characteristic difference.

D. THE AESTHETICALLY VALUABLE AND THE GOOD

The latter concept is interpreted here in the narrower sense of the morally good, of the ethically valuable, as the ideal of the spirit that wills and as the ultimate goal of moralistic action. In everyday speech this value-concept shows the same unreliability as does the concept "beautiful." "Good" in this more lax and broader sense is an affirmative judgment of approval which men commonly apply to all phenomena of life which in any kind of respect are to their advantage. People therefore call many things good which really should be called agreeable, useful, or practical. In the narrower sense, "good" is that which realizes the idea of conventional morals and promotes general human welfare.

According to Fechner,⁴⁰ the good in the widest sense is everything insofar as it, with respect to a circle of circumstances and consequences, is an expected condition which is more pleasant than unpleasant (good crops, the good order of the state). Goodness

in the narrower meaning given it in ethics and religion is related to intentions and deeds, to the striving and the aspiring of a reasonable creature. A person can be called good only insofar as he acts according to an intention by means of which happiness in the world is furthered. For an initial separation of the spheres of value called the good and the beautiful, certain examples of the application of these expressions in everyday language are useful. If one wishes to express the immediate (purposeless, disinterested) joy one feels upon the arrival of a friend, one says, "It is pleasant [beautiful: *schön*] that you are coming." But if one is thinking in terms of pleasure of the consequence of a friend's coming, of how one can use him directly, one says, "It is good that you have come (you can help me close my trunk)." My judgment, "The weather is beautiful," depends on the aesthetically delightful impression of the weather; the judgment that the weather is good is related to gratifying results, of the coming harvest, let us say. One speaks of a beautifully built house with respect to its aesthetic agreeableness; but one calls it good (well-built) when he thinks of the practical nature of the building, of its suitability to its purpose, and of its durability.

The value-judgment having the predicate of the beautiful is attached to satisfaction occurring immediately, to a delightful result which does not extend beyond the appearance presented; but I call something "good" when I look beyond occasion and object and arrange it in a context of purpose.

Of the pleasantness of the good, Kant says that it is bound with interest. "The good is that which with the help of reason pleases by way of a pure concept." Always included is "the idea of a purpose, consequently the relation of reason to the (least possible) intention, and therefore a satisfaction in the existence of an object here and now or in an act: that is, in any kind of interest at all. . . . The good is the object of the will (that is, a faculty of desire determined by way of reason). But to will something and to take an interest in its existence here and now are identical."

To be sure, one must not interpret the concept of interest with respect to the good in the egotistical sense. We have to call an act good even when it contradicts our private aims. Conventional good will is cherished, not because of its usefulness for something, but for itself, though it still does not possess the immanence of aesthetic evaluation. The good too has value-intensity, but it also has a trans-gredient value at the same time. Will—the psychic function of the ethical—includes something that points beyond itself: It strives for

an outer goal and, in contrast to a central feeling, is quite centrifugal. For the ethical evaluation of an act in terms of good or bad there is a transgredient-genetic factor which is next to (and above) the evaluation of the result, of the consequences: this is the evaluation of the intention leading to this goal. Thus a characteristic difference from aesthetic evaluation is given: aesthetic contemplation depends on the impression as such; it does not reach beyond it; not even once does it go to the artistic intention lying behind it. Only that which is attained and accomplished is valid. Ethical evaluation, on the other hand, keeps in mind motives and psychical impulses, and it values as good the kind of act which springs from moral motives and good inclinations. It depends primarily not on the result, but on the intention, on inclination. Aesthetic evaluation, in strict opposition to the ethical, is concerned only with the result, not with the basic aims. An artist must not only have significant experiences and be moved to art by a serious design; but he must also have a skill; he must be able objectively to disclose these inspirations and conceptions coming from out of himself so as to convey them in acceptable outer appearances. Musicians of the kind illustrated in Riehl's "Town-piper" whose heads are filled with the most beautiful melodies but who can write or play none of them are not to be valued as artists. The cleavage between wanting to do and being able to do is less a problem for the genuine artist than the typical complaint of the dilettante.

Because the good, which depends on the most basic of the components of human nature and the recognition and realization of which belongs to the indispensable presuppositions of the communal lives of human beings, has nothing to do with our individual private natures, universality, objectivity, and the necessity of satisfaction are proper to it. What we recognize as good must also be recognized as such by others because the criteria and the determinative bases of our judgments, the ethical norms, are valid for all men. For this reason an incomparably stronger binding-force adheres to the good than to the beautiful. The basic ethical standards have absolute validity; but the aesthetic ones even in their most positive certitude can be interpreted only as relative and partial, and as delimited by cultural spheres, educational groups, and types of tastes, as well as by their capacity for development and change. That I should not kill, that I should not rob my neighbor, that I may not trespass on my neighbor's property so that life is thereby made more difficult for my neighbors—these "categorical" imperatives are as valid for us as for savages, even though specific referents

in the interpretation of the concept "neighbor" vary widely. So, for example, someone strange to a family is as a rule thought of, not as a neighbor, but at first as an enemy, and he is treated as such. But in any case forms of beauty are different among savages from what they are for us. Hottentots, Bushmen, and Zulus represent the ideal woman as dark-skinned, blubber-lipped, and excessively fat of buttock.⁶¹ The greater constancy and permanency in the area of ethical value-criteria is explained by the fact that the ethical proceeds towards direct, immediate possibilities and facilitations of life and that it is consequently more earth-bound and necessary than the aesthetic, which always (so strictly is it anchored to the ultimate natural tendencies of our humanity and to the central necessities of our psyche) presents that something lying outside the most pressing of practical concerns in which our personal inclinations and individualities can be more vigorously reflected.

If we call something beautiful, we do indeed exact our value-judgment of others too, but at the same time we are convinced that here subjective determinations (age, type of constitution, degree of education, and so forth) more vigorously cause modifications than they do in ethical judgment, which we pursue over a greater period of time and the acceptance of which we more vigorously postulate. We do not require that an uneducated backwoodsman discover beauty in the Nine Muses or Goethe's *Elective Affinities*; rather, we ask that he be honest and not brutal. As a result of their more intense practical connections with life, ethical lapses (the least transgressions against what is right as the enforceable ethical minimum) are punished by law; aesthetic lapses are not. There is a characteristic difference even with regard to the psychic aptitudes and functions which are preponderantly claimed: The beautiful turns towards an awareness of the object and of situation while the awareness of intentional motives is largely condemned to silence. But it is precisely this awareness that is at the forefront in the good. That psychologists like Wundt and Ebbinghaus ultimately take for granted an essential identity between feeling and willing, the two being only two sides of the same occurrence and no original psychic traits therefore being recognized in the will—this fact does not concern us here. For we have to do, not with psychic elements analyzed from within, but with forms of action which are total and vividly alive.

Furthermore, the beautiful has certain connections with the agreeable which the good does not have. The good is an inner, spiritual value which cannot immediately be apprehended from

outer appearances. The good does not depend on the phenomenal-figurative, but the beautiful is a so-called surface value (a statement which should not be misunderstood, however). That the actress representing Gretchen is old and ugly "in reality" and that her youthful, beautiful appearance on the stage is due only to the arts of makeup—this fact is unimportant for the aesthetic impression. For this impression what matters is only the apparent, that which presents itself immediately; and so it is all the same whether the statue which is the object of aesthetic evaluation is made of solid or hollow metal.

All of these differences give us the right to place the beautiful as an original, individual value alongside the morally valuable. Something can be good in the highest degree without its also being beautiful for this reason. Inversely, something which is a problematical matter with respect to morals can be quite effective aesthetically. One thinks of Schiller's statements about the delightful criminal who often is of more actual use to the creative writer than is an aesthetically indifferent philistine or a tiresome paragon of virtue. One must look at the lack of identity between these two spheres of value without sentimentality precisely because idealism has the tendency to overrate this relationship. An exaggerated identification of the two implies the Greek ideal of *Kalokagathia* (beauty-goodness). From this teaching is derived the doctrine of Kant and Schiller that the beautiful is a symbol of the moral. The concept of the "beautiful soul" which stems from idealistic theory also belongs here, at least to the extent that a coupling of the two spheres of value is to be expressed by this concept. But if, on the contrary, one wants by way of the concept of the "beautiful soul" to make a case for the aestheticizing of the ethical or for the aesthetic sublimation of it, then one can leave the matter as it was. We very definitely differentiate a beautiful soul from the person who, being merely attached to duty, does not merge himself harmoniously with the good, but who in attempting to realize the good must first struggle with other kinds of inclination and then reach a decision by reminding himself of duty.⁶² One speaks of a "beautiful soul" wherever goodness appears to be effortless and undisturbed by alien elements, wherever the good in a sense is beyond all question, so that it occurs freely, easily, and in a self-evident fashion—something which must be convincingly clear from the mode of action.

As the opposite of the extreme view that only a good thing can be beautiful, that between these two values there is, if not an ultimate identity of nature, at least a necessary connection, there is

the theory of aesthetic immoralism,⁶³ which stresses the heterogeneity of these realms of value and the independence of the beautiful from moral evaluations. Heine, "Young Germany," Oscar Wilde, and, above all, Nietzsche's cult of the "blonde beast" belong here. One does not apply ethical demands and laws to the fact of the beautiful; at least one does not do so in a hard and fast sense. An artist may even use material which is intrinsically immoral if only he understands how to achieve aesthetic values from it and how to absorb the material through form (Boccaccio). To allow the censor to ban such art-works because people who are blind to aesthetic value are not able to grasp the aesthetic product but would remain with the moral indecencies of the material—to do this would be exactly like forbidding the use of knives and forks because children and minors abuse these dangerous instruments and could come to harm. Therefore the autonomy of the aesthetic is in opposition to the ethical; it is original; it is its own value and its own justification—in contrast to the good. Yet this liberal view must nevertheless not lead one falsely into the contrary deterioration: an author sometimes tries to compensate for his inability to win over the reader with aesthetic means by speculating about sexual desire and crude sensations of various kinds. One can vigorously reject this without doing violence to the freedom of art.

Unprejudiced observation is able to show that objects of lesser moral values often contain more considerable aesthetic possibilities than do those having the higher ones; and this is not true for primitive sensualists alone. For young readers the magnanimous acts directed by Karl May's chief hero at his enemies are not as interesting by far as the revenge they subsequently turn out to be; and the audience of children at a Punch-and-Judy show demands that there be exemplary punishment of the villain.

One cannot ignore the fact that there are close connections between the independent values which we call the beautiful and the good and that art may strive after, not only aesthetic effects, but ethical ones as well. In all arts connected with reality, and especially in literature, the ethical is an important factor of matter and content, and there is no doubt that the ethically positive effect of a certain constellation of contents is able to increase aesthetic effect, the best-known example of which is so-called "poetic justice." In poetic justice, ethical satisfaction reaches aesthetic effectiveness to a high degree and contributes to its pleasurable result. But one does not have to explain the, in most cases, very positive effect of poetic justice as exclusively ethical, and certainly not by an appeal to

ultimate identity of the value-spheres. Rather, an ethically positive solution to a conflict works favorably on the reader and observer in terms of a kind of katharsis, of a pleasantly facilitated release of strong tension; and through the producing of an end-result capable of being continued because it is well-balanced and has the badge of form there comes a conventionally moral stopping-place, so to speak, a proper conclusion, which leaves the observer satisfied; when such an organic conclusion is not reached, the play "just stops." Naturally, poetic justice need not degenerate in the philistine fashion of, say the *comédie larmoyante*, of middle-class melodrama, which Schiller so pertinently derided ("When vice vomits, virtue sits at its meal"). When a stupid morality in art is especially unpleasant, when it occurs as a substitute for an artistic deficiency in form, a fact which again asserts the independence of the two value-spheres, good intentions cannot make amends for aesthetic deficiencies. The moral thing is understood only in terms of itself, says F. Th. Vischer; this means that it is a self-evident presupposition, but that it contributes nothing to aesthetic effect. According to Fechner, the goodness of a thing does not necessarily justify its beauty. Still, goodness can contribute to beauty when the pleasurable product of the relationships and consequences on which the goodness of a thing is based transfers itself through representational associations which have become easy to the direct impression of the thing (one value outshines another).

As compared with the good, the beautiful has a task entirely its own to fulfill in the realm of culture and the world of values. Besides, psychological observation can demonstrate that aesthetic experience is governed by an independent structural law.

Ziehen pertinently points to the fact that the pleasurable sensation which accompanies the good is always based on the universal idea of the value of a mode of action. A universal idea grounded thus is indispensable for ethical pleasure, though the idea does not have to be produced in the form of an explicit course of thought. Even when a child's act is accompanied in a quite undefined way by a good or bad conscience, this indefinite ethical feeling is still dependent on an unclear universal idea: nibbling candy is bad; thus nibbling it is forbidden. Pleasure or aversion, respectively, rises or falls on this basic idea of value. An aesthetically pleasant sensation does not require such an idea: an art-work pleases us in the absence of the emergence in the apprehender of any kind of universal idea of aesthetic value. It is self-evident that the beautiful pleases us only because it is beautiful; but a substantiating thought based on

a universal rule of beauty does not belong to the components of aesthetic pleasure. The aesthetically pleasant sensation is free of a substantiating idea, is contemplative and intensive; whereas the ethically pleasurable sensation, as based on the agreement of a concrete act (or the motives for it) with a *must*, on an idea of duty, exhibits a relational and transgredient character.

According to Häberlin, the good is the concern of a mental interest deciding on purpose, an interest which approaches the object with a certain demand. This (as opposed to the agreeable) is not in the form of a subjectively oriented requirement; the determination of mental goals as they occur in the good asks for a realization of significant values which are beyond the subjective, but the requirements and the setting of an aim are absolutely there, whereas they are lacking in the aesthetic. The good occurs where the mental claims are fulfilled for our purposive interests; "good" therefore means the mentally satisfying. The quality "good" does not express a relationship to the spectator in terms of a subject's subjectivistic determination of a goal; but this notion is employed in the sense that it indicates a positive relationship to an objectively meaningful determination of an end. But this objectivity is something entirely other than the existence-for-itself by which we justify beauty and which plainly means the absence of purposeful relations. Associated with this fact is the idea that the good, as compared with the beautiful, is always related to the attitude or state, never to a being. What is good is so by virtue of its position with respect to a mental goal; it is always thought of as the subject of such an attitude or point of view. The aesthetic object, on the other hand, is never beautiful because of a state of activity or a relation to volitional aim. It is perceived, not as the subject of an action, but always as the bearer or representant of beauty: it remains the object of intuition. It is the subject of an action as little as it is the object of a manipulation. Therefore, even something which we do not generally hold to be a real object in the sense of its having a possible efficacy can be beautiful. The good clearly differentiates itself from the beautiful by way of its relation to dynamic purpose. Furthermore, the concept of the good is part of the problematics of all moral life as it determines goals; of this life the aesthetic attitude knows nothing. Moral judgment is banished from aesthetic sensation; therefore the good and the beautiful can never be identical. Even more important: beauty and goodness are mutually exclusive because aesthetic and intellectual interests are so. The latter desires something of the object or in the object, and within the bounds of this preconceived

design lies its goodness. In aesthetic behavior there is an absence of such a design; this is why we do indeed meet with beauty in such aesthetic behavior, but never goodness.

E. THE AESTHETICALLY VALUABLE AND THE USEFUL

The useful, according to Kant, is what is "good for a purpose," is that which serves as a suitable means for the reaching of a practical end and which, because of its maximal claim-character, is definitely in contrast to other means serving the same end. Fundamental here is the relation to something to be reached, to something for whose acquirement the object designated as useful or purposeful is especially suited. The things or methods of procedure spoken of as useful have a service-value; and the useful which is valued at a means to an end is the model case of the so-called consecutivity of value. We prize those values as consecutive which help us reach something else we want. The predicate of the useful or practical can be adjudged only on the basis of relation. I can judge and say whether or not a machine is practically constructed when I know what task it is to perform. The enjoyment of a useful (purpose-fulfilling) object depends on the notion that it suits a more or less definitely conceived purpose. Ziehen calls such a notion of the fulfillment of aim of purpose (that is, of the agreement of the object with the idea of its purpose) a "teletic" idea. The enjoyment of the useful rises and falls with the idea of the fulfillment of purpose; in the aesthetic procedure, however, ideas and considerations like these are entirely wanting; and Kant was right in calling attention to the fact that the absence of the idea of that purpose which is constitutive of the impression of usefulness is a characteristic sign of the aesthetic. Because the aesthetic is independent of all purposiveness, its effect is exhausted in a feeling of pleasure; but in connection with the useful, the teletic feeling of pleasure is unimportant alongside what is useful *de facto*.

In order to make clear the complicated relations of the aesthetic and teletic effects as they cooperate when one observes one and the same object (say, a building), there is still a series of necessary preliminaries to consider. First of all, one must say that aesthetic and practical-teletic values do not coincide, and thus that the hastily devised formula announced with programmatic intensity by a modern architect ("Beauty is function" [*Zweckmässigkeit*]) is incorrect. A building created for its utility can be thoroughly purposeful and consequently very useful without its having to

achieve aesthetic value for this reason. A farmer's shack which is falling into ruins can be far more delightful aesthetically than a model country house. As they are made useful (in approximation to the ideal of utility), certain objects lose much of their aesthetic charm, primarily because the comprehending mind is no longer absorbed in that free play with them which is a constituent part of the "be-getting" of beautiful objects. This is the case because certain changes are undertaken in them when the useful is aimed at which hurt the image-in-appearance. Thus an English park is more beautiful than a vegetable garden; the uncultivated tree is more beautiful than a tree espaliered to produce a maximum yield of fruit. Here, clearly, uglinesses are designed to serve a purpose; the tight, closely-tangled crown which produces shade is avoided, the strongest boughs are broken out, the leaves are sprayed with vitriol of copper, and so forth. The same holds true in connection with animals: utilization in terms of domestication is accompanied by serious aesthetic wrongs to the characteristic appearances and behavior of the domestic animals. Lorenz⁶⁴ has impressively indicated that the domesticated forms are different from the uncultivated ones, to the disadvantage of the former. In the same way, the castration of house-animals and the giving of luxuries to hybrid animals results in pronounced offensiveness. Thus a landscape in which human beings have not interfered too is more beautiful than a cultivated one.

From these kinds of experiences and examples one derives the opinion that the aesthetic and the useful are mostly in an inimical and exclusive relation to one another. The aesthetic and economic forms of life (as understood by E. Spranger)⁶⁵ are opposite types of assessment. The beautiful and the useful are in fact very different values, and their essential heterogeneity is not invalidated because the aesthetic can be transformed into the teleic. This transformation occurs when the "realistic" intention in construction among modern architects erroneously identifies the beautiful altogether with the functional or when an instruction-bent utilitarianism approaches literature with the demand that it not only amuse, but also instruct and improve: that it bind the *utile* with the *dulce*. Still it must be admitted that permanent and valuable combinations and syntheses between these two areas are possible, despite their differences. Art-history teaches that aesthetically valuable buildings, pictures, and pieces of sculpture have come into existence even on the basis of practical-useful assumptions and demands, and that "*Gebrauchsmusik*" (music for the sake of utility) can be thoroughly satisfying artistically if the artist only has known how aesthetically to spiritualize

the practical aims, to "introcept" (*introzipieren*) the demands which are alien (that is, to make them his own inwardly).

Actually there are many combinations of values like those just mentioned. The necessity for having aesthetic pleasure is so great that everywhere there are useful objects that are so formed that they call it up too (as does skilled handicraft); on the other hand, the necessity for the practical is at times so intense that people give to works of art the value of utility also. In the first instance, there is aesthetic transformation;⁶⁶ this occurs when an object which is primarily useful (clothes, utensils) has aesthetic value too. In the second instance (when, for example, one at first composes a piece of literature for instructional or moralistic purposes), there is teleetic transformation.

The aesthetic is the purest example of the so-called intensive values, while the useful is at the other end of this series of values as a model example of consecutive values. In connection with intensive values, we evaluate the object for its own sake; we evaluate it according to its own inner significance. It makes no sense to say that something is beautiful or noble in terms of its purpose. True, an object, say a building, can very well be beautiful and practical at the same time. But then, according to the shrewd formulation of J. Cohn,⁶⁷ there is a coming together of the two values, and the object is not beautiful to the degree that it is purposeful. It has indeed been said that the beautiful contributes to the functional, that it perhaps determines the useful. But if one looks closer, one sees that the useful is beautiful only insofar as it appears immediately and thus is changed into an intensive value. Very often something which to begin with was pursued for the sake of something else has become valuable in its own right; in this fashion, it changed from its value-as-service into a value-in-itself. In many cases such a shifting of values follows precisely from the fact that purposefulness is so to speak taken up into intuition and is experienced with aesthetic immediacy. Beauty is in all cases a formation for the eye or, speaking more generally, for a perceiving organ of sense⁶⁸ (in the wider meaning of the term). Purposiveness alone is therefore never identical with the effect of beauty; only a purposiveness which has become intuitive and has entered into an agreeable formation is so. Purposiveness must have become directly comprehensible and convincing.

In concluding our comparative theoretical treatment of value, I find that I must still make the following statements:⁶⁹ in contrast to the agreeable and the useful, the aesthetically valuable effects a pleasure which depends on the satisfying of higher, universal, intel-

lectual interests; but in contrast to the true and the good, it is more subjective and personal. It is distinguished from the useful (practical or purposive), the chief representative of the group of consecutive values, by the emphatic intensity of its value, through which it corresponds with the higher intellectual values of the true and the good. But while these two in different respects are marked by a clear transgression of value, the experience of value and of pleasure in connection with the aesthetic is value-immanent entirely. Relations and contexts of the theoretical and practical kind are wanting. Logical, ethical, and religious values are directed towards something inward and mental; but the value of beauty in the full sense can only be phenomenal reality, a reality which does not claim to have any practical existence here and now, but which can confine itself to the sphere of the representational, of ideality, and of semblance.

8. THE BEAUTIFUL

At the beginning, I said that the beautiful and the aesthetically valuable cohere. It is just this relationship of what is designated by these expressions which makes a more precise statement necessary. One is not actually concerned only with terms and with clarifying concepts, but, rather, with pushing towards the most central area of aesthetics by this means; and one is compelled to anticipate by allusion certain matters which will receive more searching treatment later. With respect to the conceptual content allied with it, the word "beautiful" reveals that it is not entirely one. Three shades of meaning can be separated from one another: everyday language uses this concept in a pre- and extra-aesthetic sense as a pretty general and colorless expression of assent, and as a predicate of value for positive effects which can have nothing to do with the producing of aesthetic value. Alongside this "beauty in its widest sense" there is a "beauty in its wider sense," in the latter of which the constitutive limitation to the aesthetic realm can already be found. In this second sense, "beauty" is equated with the aesthetically valuable. A later contracting of the scope of this concept (with a correlative enrichment of its contents) leads to the terminological specialization of the word in aesthetics. Now this term means a certain aesthetically basic form which one can also designate as simple, pure, or ideal beauty. As coordinated concepts there are the noble or the sublime, the tragic, the graceful, the comic, the humorous, the characteristic, and so forth.

Lax everyday usage not only speaks about the beautiful in pictures, in statues, in poems, in pieces of music and beautiful representations of them, and not only of beautiful landscapes and objects, human beings, and animals, beautiful legs, hair, and teeth; but it also uses this expression in a still broader sense. One speaks of beautiful deeds and thoughts, beautiful speeches and beautiful souls, and also of a beautiful trip; the physicist speaks of a beautiful experiment, the mathematician of a beautiful proof, the surgeon of a beautiful operation; and all of these learned people are able to congratulate an academic colleague on doing a beautiful job (in his most recent book). If a room is comfortably warm, one says that it is beautifully warm, and if we agree to the proposal of a common undertaking, we say, "Lovely; then we will set about it tomorrow." An interesting example of this is to be found in the history of the meaning of the word *καλός* (*kalos*) in its development from ancient to modern Greek. Many kinds of dialect and commercial speech go still further. Someone from north Germany says that certain materials feel beautiful, that certain foods taste beautiful, and that certain cosmetics smell beautiful. One can do little with such a blurred use of language like this which calls all things beautiful if they arouse our inner assent and if they have a certain agreeableness of effect. From this use of language, it follows: "that one can enjoy the beautiful sensuously as well as admire it ethically and intellectually, that to the beautiful belong the artistically effective and the enjoyable in nature, the good as well as the true, and, in the same way, the practical-useful as well as that which gives a feeling of satisfaction or that which is scientifically convincing. Were it possible to proceed in terms of this usage in language, one could see, hear, taste, smell, feel, think, wish, and do the beautiful. And one could perceive it even by means of the senses of touch and temperature." ⁷⁰

This broad and blurred meaning of the concept "beautiful" has been mentioned only as a *curiositatis causa*: one cannot accept it. Rather, I myself would limit this concept from the start to its function as a basic category of value in the sphere of aesthetic things in order to indicate that which produces a high degree of positive aesthetic effect; but I do not mean to allow this concept to coincide with the concept of the aesthetic. Since a series of characteristic parts of the definition of aesthetic objects have been discussed, I shall rather consider it my task now to indicate in a short over-view what characteristic features and signs enable the aesthetic object to officiate as an authorized bearer of the predicate "beauti-

ful." What can therefore be alleged about the specific differences and the symptoms of difference between the beautiful and the aesthetic?

According to K. Groos, everything pleases one as being aesthetic if it is enjoyed in the fashion of "inner imitation" (empathy). But all objects are beautiful which appeal to our empathic state at the same time as they bring about a sensuous agreeableness through their appearance. He therefore limits the concept of the beautiful to the sensuously pleasant which is contemplated aesthetically. In a similar fashion, Jonas Cohn employs the factor of agreeable sensuous effect to set the beautiful in relief against the wide circle of what is aesthetically effective. If the sensuous qualities of this object are not sensuously agreeable, the object cannot be called beautiful. Shrill tones, dull colors, dirty surfaces can be aesthetically very effective; but they contradict pure beauty. It should be mentioned that nothing that is connected with pain or aversion is mixed with the characteristic of the sensuous-agreeable. Therefore Ziehen says that the sense of the beautiful is that aesthetic feeling which by preference is composed of pleasurable sensations. To carry all of these suggestions further, one might say that the beautiful is the aestheticized agreeable (that agreeable which presents itself in an object of aesthetic submersion) if it arouses not merely a delight in sense-perception, but a pleasure in empathy and a higher mental pleasure cohering with empathy which is free of accents of aversion.

If now we are to ask in particular about the characteristic traits by which the beautiful is distinguished, we shall enter into a discussion which can be carried out completely only after the intrinsic laws of the nature of the aesthetic attitude and the constitutives of aesthetic objectivity have been shown. Nevertheless, I must make some assertions even now. I am well aware of the difficulties which may arise here: they lie in the fact that people want with one conceptual description theoretically to control a simple primary feature which is convincing for experience—something which is possible only if one is painstaking and detailed. The uncomplicated character proper to the beautiful for feeling-filled apprehending is not a property of theory to the same degree.

Reminding us of these difficulties in particularly impressive formulations, M. Beck⁷¹ says that the analysis of the phenomenon of beauty, like that of every value-phenomenon in one of the other spheres of reality, is so difficult because as analysis it must always stand back from what it would like to make genuinely clear, and can speak in a stammering fashion only about what it understands

to be beauty, which it actually experiences in its own intuition. The great danger in philosophy with respect to a characteristically irrational phenomenon is that, looking only at that which can be conceptually fixed and mastered, it blindly goes past the phenomenon proper for its consideration and substitutes in its place something which can indeed be mastered conceptually, but which is not exactly what is under discussion.

Above all, the simplicity of the beautiful as one experiences it must not lead to a short-circuited search for definition. There are a great many definitions thus hastily formed, and they are occasionally quite informative; but yet they are entirely too narrow and imperfect, and at best appropriate for particular types of beauty. In some instances, it has been said that beauty is the plenitude of life become form, expressive form, and perceptual (*anschauliche*) perfection (*perfectio phaenomenon*, Baumgarten calls it);⁷² it is *l'évidente perfection* (Souriau),⁷³ unblemished existence, intuitively apparent purposefulness, freedom in appearance, and the sensuous representation of the Idea (the Ideal), and so forth. Most of these definitions are valid only for the so-called beauty of things, but not for the beauty not connected with things or for beauty of mood, for which an appeal to conformity to species, to the typical, and to conformity to Idea, and so forth, makes no sense. Besides this, the definition of perceptual perfection applies only to individual representatives of species which are already marked by a certain aesthetic valuableness: the most perfect toad is not beautiful despite its conformity to its species. But more about this later.

To begin with, one can only say that if he is going to achieve a useful definition or exposition of the beautiful, he will have to cite a longer series of definition-pieces: when Goethe⁷⁴ sees the beautiful as given where we see the lawful and life in its greatest activity and perfection, for which reason we feel ourselves inclined towards reproducing it so as to feel ourselves also animated and transported into the highest activity—when he sees the beautiful thus, he is combining an objective definition with a functional and conditional one. The same holds true of the definition that the beautiful occurs where a force intrinsically in accord with itself expresses itself so easily and freely that the form as if voluntarily matches the conditions of comprehension. Among the conditions which must be fulfilled if one is to speak of the beautiful, we distinguish 1. psychological factors from 2. objective ones, the latter falling into two parts: that of matter-content and that of form-appearance. For an impression of beauty, therefore, it is requisite that the object offer the

possibility of a sympathetic, easily successful, and perfect empathy, or of a contemplation which is easily achieved, which is alive for us, and which engages us without any difficulty, and that it in this way effect a pleasure which has no conflicts. With respect to objectivity and content, the beautiful is the object's perfection appearing sensuously, the intuitively convincing and the easy fulfillment of the laws of its species, in which the ideal norm of its nature is realized in a way which is intuitively comprehensible. The beauty of the object lies in the fact that it is expressive and penetrated by evident mind and life; but, besides this, in that it also realizes certain formal laws (unity in multiplicity, harmony, symmetry, rhythm, proportion, the balance of the parts), and shows clear, well-arranged flow of line, well-organized space and time, pleasant-sounding tones and relations of tones, saturated colors, and so forth. This dualism of requirements of form and content which must be satisfied if the impression of beauty is to occur is especially emphasized by Vischer,⁷⁵ Theodor A. Meyer,⁷⁶ and Heimann.⁷⁷

Heimann thinks of material beauty (that is, the material components of the beauty of a thing, a human being, and so forth) is that which transcends the mere correctness of proportions, that which hides behind the surface. Material beauty is expression, and this is the utterance of an inwardness; it is the revelation of life. Material beauty is the shining-through and the stepping-forth of those materials and forces which create form through and through. To material beauty is joined a formal beauty as an independent possibility of aesthetic effect which is in a certain relation of the part to a whole.

This dividing of the beautiful into two types of elementary forces (of the beauty of form and that of content) has far-reaching consequences for the two chapters to follow. In them I shall show more than once that these two types of effect correspond to two basically different primary forms of aesthetic experience: expression and the contents of psychic life are grasped by way of empathy; phenomenal good organization as a correlative in experience is answered by an elementary pleasure in the perception and the comprehension of the formal. And in the chapter about aesthetic objectivity, I shall be exhaustive in showing that beauty of content depends on different objective presuppositions than does beauty of form.

Dessoir⁷⁸ correctly sees that objective presuppositions for the beautiful and the aesthetic are not entirely the same, and that the more special presuppositions of the beautiful are more easily specified. An object works aesthetically if it arouses our feeling-experience

of looking and is able to engage us pleasantly, if it invites us to a contemplative, interestless, non-conceptual (and so forth) way of observing. If an effect of beauty in the narrower sense is to take place, however, certain more special qualities are required. Aesthetic effect is not at once to be identified with the effect of beauty. A properly experienced work of art will always be grasped aesthetically (though other attendant values are at the same time possible) even if it displeases us. But even the aesthetically positive effect is not identical in nature with the impression of beauty. The beautiful, in contrast to the aesthetically effective and valuable, exhibits the narrower idea which earns its richer content within a more circumscribed compass. The beautiful in the narrowest sense will be treated in the chapter about basic aesthetic forms.*

* This is the first of Kainz' indications of what the second volume of the present work will probably include. (H.M.S.)

THREE | THE AESTHETIC STATE

I. THE STATE IN GENERAL

In discussing the aesthetic state, I have up to this point treated it as something to be critically examined from the axiological point of view, and I have been concerned with understanding the structure of a turn of mind which in human experience has a certain cultural significance. Now, however, my aim is from the point of view of the psychologist to analyze the psychic-mental activity which comes into play when a person surrenders himself to the contemplation of beauty. For aesthetics this is a very important task. A person may reject that one-sided subjectivism which ascribes the occurrence of aesthetic things entirely to the comprehending consciousness and which advocates the thesis that the aesthetic attitude effects aesthetic value. The contrary view he may adopt is just as erroneous. The beautiful is not simply received as is an attribute adhering to an object, as one which one must be perceived and confirmed whether one wants it to be so or not. Instead, the consciousness doing the comprehending is a characteristic component as aesthetic value is produced, and this value (without prejudice to all of the indispensable stimuli coming from or based on the object) is realized only in a suitable experience. For anyone who does not have the spectator's presuppositions for such proper behavior the greatest work of art is a structure which is aesthetically indifferent or even of doubtful value. Inversely, a person who is susceptible to beauty, because he is open to aesthetic value and pre-

pared to experience it, can see beauty even where other observers do not have the same impression of this kind. It has often been said, therefore, that no given condition in the world is basically excluded from being evaluated as aesthetically satisfactory, provided only that no reactions of fear and loathing are present. Both factors—a proper attitude on the part of the apprehender and stimuli from the object—are necessary in any case if the experience of aesthetic value is to come to be. When one says that the aesthetically valuable is not simply taken in as something already existing and as something apart from the skill of a comprehending consciousness, one also maintains that the spontaneity of the apprehender is characteristically greater in this experience than when one perceives a simple quality of sense: to be sure, perception of simple sense-qualities too requires an act of comprehension and displays no mathematically precise correlation to the physical stimulus,¹ but it is much more powerfully tied to the object.

Experiencing the beautiful, we are purely receptive without being passive. Whereas intellectual activity mostly involves tiring work (nearly all research work does so, and so does even simple learning) and whereas even the moral will because of the victory over oneself which it often makes necessary includes an activity which is underlined by conscious difficulty, we receive and enjoy the beautiful as a gift handed to us without any assistance on our part. Therefore it is not contradictory to say: 1. aesthetic experience characteristically depends on the activity of a living subject; 2. yet the act of apprehension is not an activity in the sense of an effort-full doing and is experienced as it is represented in consciousness, not as such an activity, but as if it were a matter of pure receptivity.

According to Häberlin, aesthetic satisfaction has the character of a something received without our assistance, of an overwhelming gift; it is a happiness, not in the doing of something, not in production, but in reception, in our good fortune in pure experience. To say that there is a "receptive activity" in receiving and experiencing is not a self-contradictory oxymoron. To know how to receive, we must behave or present ourselves in a certain way; we do not approach the object productively, but open ourselves to its incitements. Külpe² too emphasizes that aesthetic receptivity must not be thought of as a passive kind of receiving. "Only through an active aesthetic attitude, through a participation in an individual experience, in an individual spirit and mind, does the dead book come to life and does cold marble speak to us."

Thus there are all kinds of psychic activity which are necessary

for aesthetic experience, but this activity must be carried on without strain and in the manner of something which succeeds easily. Such easy achievement of the activity of comprehension which is constitutive of the aesthetic state and which forms the onset for aesthetically functional pleasure stems from the fact that the aesthetically satisfying object seems to meet this act of comprehension in a friendly fashion. There is a pre-established harmony between the objective comprehension-requirements of the object and our acts of comprehension. These acts, because they are not laden with difficulties, are often not especially noticed and therefore do not seem to be present at all.

I shall now undertake an impartial analysis of the complex psychic facts of which aesthetic experience is composed (and "impartial" here means independent of the outcome of a hastily formed theory and of slogans which have programmatic intent). The first thing which the psychologist lights upon is powerful perceptual experiences which are especially well realized in terms of both of the characteristic constituents of the perceptual act. The sensorial factor (sense-experience) is fully developed and so also is the apperceptive factor, which is the completing of what is sensuously perceived through added ideas and theoretical acts and also through the conception and mental classification effected by them. The feeling-experiences attached to perception are also copiously and vigorously realized; by contrast, strivings and desires are entirely absent or are present in very weak deposits. Intellectual acts of the kind which show relationships (abstracting, categorizing, and thinking in terms of judgments and conclusions) too are characteristically more weakly developed, though they need not be entirely absent; but when they occur, they have a peculiar lack of development, an immediacy, and a similarity to feeling.

In what, then, does the special nature of aesthetic behavior as compared with other psychic activities consist? Do original psychically functional elements assert themselves in it? The answer is no. Do even psychic activities known from other kinds of psychic states appear in a new and peculiar guise in aesthetic contemplation? Only in part can one answer affirmatively to this question. It is true that the pure sense-acts of hearing and seeing are not essentially different in connection with aesthetic experience and with experiences not aesthetic; still, there are differences in the realm of representational activity. According to Ziehen,⁴ aesthetically associative processes very often have a peculiar character which one never finds in the realm of non-aesthetic representation or which one finds there

less often. The treatment of the materials of sensation in perception-events is marked by certain peculiarities; thus there is a special kind of aesthetic apperception. Similarly, the treatment of the representational materials by means of mental-theoretical processes shows certain peculiarities in the aesthetic state which need to be more carefully described. A characteristic feature of aesthetic experience in this respect lies in the giving of immediacy to the associative product and to the conceptual value of the representational material. Volkelt ⁵ indicates this in his phrase, making representations and acts of thought in the aesthetic state similar to feeling (*Gefühlsverähnlichung*). There is a further question, however: is the aesthetic attitude distinguished from other psychic activities and other forms of activity in that a certain basic function dominates in it; or does its individuality lie in the special tenor of the total structure of the psychic state? Can one characterize it, therefore, by declaring for a single function isolated to the maximum; or is this question to be decided only by way of a complex-qualitative definition of the aesthetic attitude as a peculiar psychic form of action of the total sort?

2. TWO POINTS OF VIEW: THE ELEMENTS AND THE TOTALITY

Over and over again there have been attempts to characterize the aesthetic state as an experience of pure feeling. It has been believed that one could define it in terms of a predominating function, and that he could do this through a one-sided over-accentuation of the factor of feeling, something belonging equally to elementary psychology and to faculty psychology. To make clear its condition of contemplative self-containment, a central feeling has been attributed to the aesthetic state as the domain reserved to it, in comparison with centrifugal acts of will and centripetal acts of knowledge. This state of affairs has been presented as if the catalog of pure feelings were drawn into the aesthetic act alone. Thus K. S. Laurila ⁶ defines aesthetic experience as a state of pure feeling, as a remaining with the feeling-value of appearances. Up to the present time, elementary functions of the psyche have been gone back to in definitions of aesthetic experience; by isolating the different ones, one was supposed to arrive at particular kinds of culturally significant states of the psyche. According to this view of the aesthetic state, understanding and will retreat to the background and the isolation of the emotional is accentuated.⁷

Absolutism of feeling tries to seize a highly complex total situa-

tion in terms of a single component. Without a doubt feeling-absolutism can urge many things in its favor: feeling does play a characteristic role in the aesthetic state, particularly in the sense that the other psychic functions which are present become effective only as they are being emotionalized in a far-reaching fashion. Furthermore, the concept of emotionalization corresponds with the formal law of integration, which, like Ehrenstein,⁸ we interpret as the transfer of the qualities of certain controlling parts to the whole. Certainly the whole governs and determines the part, but at the same time certain salient constituent parts are capable on their part of putting their stamp on the whole. Despite this, absolutism of feeling is untenable. Modern aesthetics, as it allies itself with the achievements of *Gestalt* psychology, the theory of structure and totality,⁹ tries to surmount the one-sidednesses of the atomistic elementary standpoint with its suggested isolation of discrete elements; it therefore takes a decided stand against these one-sidednesses, though, to be sure, not in the way, say, of Konrad Fiedler,¹⁰ who because of his open opposition to the idea of the absolutism of feeling defines the aesthetic state as a contemplation devoid of feeling and thus merely replaces one kind of partial theory with another which is still more incorrect, without his being able to avoid the error of the elementary point of view. Today we know that all of a person's psychic inwardnesses as a matter of course exist only within structures and that there really are no psychic elements, at least not in what is directly met with in the reality of experience;¹¹ therefore an analysis which dissolves the primary and original unity is inadequate. If a person does not take into consideration the important principle of the relation to a whole of all secondary structural components prepared from within, his view is turned only on the elements set in maximal relief, elements which become completely isolated and independent.¹²

I shall attempt to hold to the characteristic of totality and to avoid the error of burdening the aesthetic state with a single function raised to the maximum. Even if feeling is vigorously set off in the aesthetic state, it still in spite of this remains embedded in the whole. It is just this whole that a theory of the aesthetic attitude and state must grasp and adequately describe. It must make clear how in aesthetic experience certain psychic functions in a context of sense and act undergo a characteristic ordering and stratification, and how sensations, perceptions, representational images, acts of thought, feelings, and drives are something other as they are embedded in the aesthetic state and become something else as they are

embedded in the other procedural structures which we call intellectual, ethical, and so forth. The aesthetic attitude lends a special hue to consciousness, a hue which is characteristically differentiated from the total quality of the conscious stance one adopts in connection with scientific knowledge, ethical willing, and so forth. A psychology of the elements does not give one a suitable medium for the adequate understanding of the meaningful context in connection with aesthetic experience: characterizing it by means of an isolated partial aspect will not do.

A practicable way out of this difficulty as one makes a first approximate definition is to combine two factors and to name them as one characteristic. It is sometimes said that the aesthetic state is a feeling-filled experience of viewing.¹³ This of course is not an outer addition of viewing and feeling experiences, but an organic combining of the two mutually influential factors into an original total quality in which every constituent part becomes something new. If one is to see more in this formula than a handy short description which grasps at the most easily contrasted aspects, it is necessary that he be aware of the very complex substructuring of factors making up this psychic activity. "Viewing" as interpreted here extends to all acts of perception, to all experiences of object-awareness. The emphasis on looking or viewing must mean that the factor of perception is dominant and that the total complex of theoretical acts called up for the mastery of that which is perceived is, so to speak, recessive. The acts which produce thought and association as they are embedded in the aesthetic state have a characteristic immediacy and intuitivity, and they thus very closely approximate the stamp of the prevailing viewing-experience. The emotional component too is variously structured. The total form of the psychical as it is realized at any particular moment in aesthetic experience has a special significance. The sadness we feel when we see a tragedy and the compassion with which a poem moves us are not absolutely identical with the analogous ethical reactions we have in the practical, serious behavior, but are non-real correlates of these reactions, correlates which, being different from these reactions because of certain qualitative differences, result from an embeddedness in a context of aesthetic meaning (here one surrenders himself to perceptions meaningful in themselves and is not responsible for serious consequences).

One of the difficulties inherent in the presentational material of science (that is, in language) is in the theoretical formulation of the total character of aesthetic objects. If one uses a single concept

for the whole, he runs the danger of being understood in terms of a theory of the elements. In the abstract, this should not be necessary because it is possible to indicate a complex total situation with a single concept. Thus the phrase "dominance of feeling" would indeed be incorrect as a characterization of the aesthetic state insofar as one understood by it monarchical control by an isolated feeling; but it would apply more if it were meant to express the idea that in the aesthetic state all psychic functions share in a characteristic similarity to feeling. Yet it is dangerous to try to seize a complex state like the aesthetic with one single term. Thus no other possibility is left for our conceptually "possessing" the total structure of the aesthetic state than to combine certain very important concepts. With this in mind, we may call the aesthetic attitude a contemplative intuiting saturated with feeling. If we interpret value of the apractical kind thus, feelings and drives of the ego are not absent, and yet everything in the totality which is independent of intellect and removed from the practical responsibilities of duty in life's seriousness is submerged in the "play" which catches fire from that which has semblance. As for feeling-saturation, what has been said about the dominance of feeling is true here. Finally, by "intuition" we mean the functioning of the logical-intellectual as embedded in the context of the aesthetic whole. We are concerned therefore with acts of perceptual comprehension which grasp shaped unities directly in intuition. One thinks in this connection of the life-philosophy (*Lebensphilosophie*) of Bergson,¹⁴ in which intuition is considered a unitary act combining viewing and feeling into the closest possible relationship.

Schmied-Kowarzik¹⁵ has especially pointed out the important role which intuition plays in the aesthetic method of procedure. He tries to show that sensations, feelings, and drives do not suffice to explain aesthetic experience, but that here one must receive a peculiar kind of experience whose content is the perceiving of the formal unity (that is, it is an organizing synthesis): this is intuition. Intuition is able to grasp unity in multiplicity; thus it has the same rank as judgment, which is also a combining and unifying event. The nature of things aesthetic lies in their formation-character, and the specific aesthetic peculiarity of intuition is marked by the fact that it is capable of grasping form and harmony. Sensing, feeling, and willing are not capable of embracing unity in variety; nor is thought. To be sure, thinking also is the perceiving of a unity; this is not the aesthetic unity of form, however, but the logical one of relation.

The contents of thought (similarity, diversity, and so forth) are quite different from organic-synthetic unities (harmony, melody, proportion).

From the point of view of one modern theory of totality, there is something basic to object to in this theory of the synthesis of aesthetic form. It rejects not only "destructive analysis," but also that "creative synthesis" which allows the novel kind of totalities to proceed from elements, in doing which it does indeed reach beyond an outward summation, but holds fast to the priority of the elements. (Wundt¹⁶ admits that in their qualities the psychic structures combined out of elements extend beyond the elements themselves.) For this reason, the related production-theory of the *Gestalt*-psychologists of Graz is to be rejected also. They too are of the opinion that a person has to think of forms as syntheses of elements, these syntheses being traceable to collectivizing factors, and chiefly to synoptical attention. The perceived forms are added by way of a synthetic process to the isolated structural aspects and thus are produced only by means of the creative activity of the individual grasping them. The school of *Gestalt* psychologists in the narrower sense of the term¹⁷ is opposed to the view of the production-theorists. For these *Gestaltists* the primary given conditions are not atomistically isolated data of consciousness, but totalities having form. The tendency towards amalgamation lies in the elementary contents themselves. According to Köhler,¹⁸ the phenomenal forms given to consciousness appear as a purely structure-like reaction to the forms of stimulation. They are produced directly from the state of stimulation in conformity with the law of totality. At the beginning, then, there are, not atomic elements, but totalities. The expression "synthesis of form" can therefore be used to characterize the aesthetic state only with the reservation that it be interpreted, not as a building-up of something out of primary, given separate fragments, but as the immediate comprehension of a primary totality of form.¹⁹ The objective world of potential aesthetically effective stimuli is already formed and pre-ordered, but the adequate grasping of these forms is an active *doing* of the person who is apprehending them.

I shall now by way of an example try to clarify matters important for us at this point, and I shall choose the art-form of the fugue and the process of grasping it. A fugue is without doubt a well-ordered and well-organized tonal form; but if it is to be experienced as was intended by the creator, if it is to be grasped adequately, a certain activity on the part of the hearer is required. An unmusical

person or someone who has never been in contact with this musical form hears, not a fugue, but a confused chaos of tone. He does not bring along with himself just these formal-apperceptive presuppositions necessary for the comprehending of this kind of difficult form (he does not have a readiness for comprehension depending on developed listening-habits), whereas he might be equal to the simpler demands for realizing form required by the melody "*Muss i denn . . .*" or even by the second movement of the "Kettle Drum" symphony of Haydn. Using this illustration, we have taken care of older atomistic theories which start with the elements of a given state of consciousness (sensations) and allow forms to be given simply by the summation of these elements. For the concrete tonal form of the fugue is not even present for the unmusical person and thus cannot be given as something obligatory. We have also taken care of the theory that form occurs because of a particular synthetic process through which the form was only added to the original isolated aspects. For the fugue is objective and already pre-organized, and its parts (its tones) are, on the basis of a creative act of the composer, in a relation to one another of significant form and totality. Here the tonal object to be understood is pre-ordered in a form; a formative process in terms of form-synthesizing acts is superfluous; but the comprehension of the form is wanted, an understanding able to do justice to properly realized arrangements and organizations in the form in which they are present in fact. Therefore we prefer to speak of acts of formal comprehension rather than of syntheses of form, and I would understand the expression *intuition* in this sense. Furthermore, such intuition need not be interpreted in terms of an original psychically elementary function. Instead, one only means a peculiar combination of functions or a form of psychic action.

The humanistic psychologist Spranger²⁰ is also concerned with understanding the total structure of the aesthetic situation. The aesthetic act need not be limited to a single psychic activity, he thinks. Rather, all basic forms of meaning-producing acts are contained all at once in every meaningful total act: in every mental act, a totality of mind holds sway. The meaning of aesthetic experience is rooted in other factors than the theoretical and the economic; and, indeed, aesthetic acts turn chiefly towards these other factors which are not completely exhausted by the intellectual: these factors are the sensuously concrete and the image-related. In the aesthetic state, the theoretical and the economic vibrate as undertones without robbing that state of its independence. Volkelt²¹ too gives a definition of the

nature of the aesthetic situation in terms of the totality of the psychic. In aesthetic experience as in no other, all sides of a personality have a proportionate opportunity to speak: sensuous intuition, imaginative activity, feeling, willing, intelligence. Then Volkelt again takes up a leading-motive of the aesthetic writing of his young days: "The completely fulfilled individuality must be reared in the pleasures of the beautiful in active vibration (*Schwingung*)."

But it is not only the psyche which is claimed in the totality of its functions; the physical too plays a part to a certain degree, and in any case it is more powerful here than in intellectual or religious behavior. In the aesthetic state, we are affected not merely psychically, but as whole persons. One may think, for example, of the physical component in connection with ringing laughter or the reaction of a spectator to the aesthetically basic form of coarse comedy; here one notices that many technical terms in aesthetics are not assertions about states of consciousness only, but psychophysically neutral terms which are related to the physical as well as to the psychological. Especially in connection with the state of "empathy" is it clear in what way motor impulses, experiences of tension and pressure, kinaesthetic sensations, and different types of organic sensations can be part of an aesthetic experience. In experiments with empathy, many persons have reported bodily oppression or relaxation as characteristic components of the total experience. Certainly one does not want to overrate these things, as behaviorism, for instance, with its theory of visceral reactions did, or as did physiological aesthetics, which gave behaviorism full value in the James-Lange theory of feeling by seeing the fundamentals of aesthetic enjoyment in changes in breathing, pulsation, heart-beat, muscular reactions, and expressive motions like crying and laughing, and moved the basic forms of the tragic and comic to the body with sphygmographs, plethysmographs, and cardiographs. But it would be even more of a mistake to ignore all of these matters entirely.

From this there follow instances for verifying things which have already been said. The information that in the aesthetic state all functions and dispositions of the psyche have a part contradicts chiefly the attempt to discard the intellectual by isolating feeling. Intellectual factors are at work in aesthetic behavior too, except that as a consequence of their being embedded in an aesthetically coherent act, they are differently colored there from what they are where they predominate.

Intellectual connections of the relating and organizing kind occur in the aesthetic state too, though they are emotionalized and

made immediate as a result of the embeddedness of the logical in the sphere of aesthetic meaning superior to them. Without a doubt, the aesthetic state differs basically from the logical, not because the factor of intellect is condemned to silence in it, but because the intellectual functions have a subordinate position, take on a recessive stamp, and look different in the context of aesthetic action. In place of fully developed logical inductions and deductions, there is intuition understood as an immediate grasping of a whole, and also a short-circuited kind of judgment "according to feeling" (an intuitive sense of language),²² a static, mechanical feeling, which, to be sure, one may interpret not as a genuine emotional condition, but as a crystalized knowledge about leading schemata and model examples which is governed by a far-reaching automatization and immediacy; thus it is an experience-deposit which is at one's disposal in intuition.

Max Dessoir²³ urgently emphasizes that the perceiving of aesthetic form is not a sensation and not a feeling, but an intellectual act. Divorcing a sense of form from a feeling of sensation, he holds that certain intellectual adjuncts are indispensable. The parts of an aesthetic object are in certain relations to and connections with one another; perhaps the tone just heard is higher than the one preceding it, lower than the one following it. In the single representation or idea there is as yet no relation to contents shared in common; a comparative judgment is necessary if such a relation is to be had. The relations are built on absolute contents as facts (data) of another order distinguishable from them. Acts of observation and comparison thread their gentle and peculiarly floating ways through all parts of the aesthetic impression. These intellectual transactions are indispensable for one's sense of form in the aesthetic experience. When Dessoir distinguishes feelings of sensation, of form, and of content in the aesthetic experience, acts of relating, organizing, and grasping are made into presuppositions of feeling alongside sensation and representation.

The new and special coloration which logical functions take on as they are embedded in the context of an aesthetic act is especially clear when in the experience of aesthetic-artistic viewing one observes documents related in style. Assuming that he has a normal amount of information, a person who sees a gothic or baroque building at once recognizes that the object is gothic or baroque, and he does so without having in the least to take on the explicating attitude of the art-historian; nor need he abandon the attitude of the aesthetic apprehender because of relations of perceptual similarity with other art-works which follow the artistic intentions of the same artistic

period.²⁴ This is the case too when the personal style of the artist is conclusively revealed in a work, when the personality of Rembrandt or of Raphael can be immediately recognized in a painting because of the intuitive unity between the picture one sees and the works by the same master one saw earlier and has remembered. Behind every artistic-aesthetic experience is our total experience with art which is an immediately available cultural possession working along with the concrete impression; but this must not result in direct reflections and reminiscences, and the sphere of things known latently and implicitly is not abandoned. Dessoir²⁵ gives experimental proof for this: a sharp separation between experiences of aesthetic and of historical styles is hardly ever successful; below the threshold they are always related. In many of our most modern churches there are skilful imitations of romanesque or gothic domes. If we overlook the fact that the gothic style, which grew organically and rankly, has occasionally been rationalized on the drawing-board into a gothic which is far too correct, what has been achieved are undoubtedly beautiful buildings. Yet there is hardly one trained viewer who will have the same powerful experience from them that he does from the original gothic. Even when an apprehender is concerned with a viewing-experience based on the feeling-impression of the work, he is still not entirely able to hold off certain intellectual admixtures (in this case, for instance, the knowledge that the form in such a copied style lacks creative originality).

The notion that the aesthetic state cannot be got at by means of a simple, homogenous, elementary function is making its way increasingly. Thus it is recognized today, for example, that the concept of "empathy" is far too narrow and that in a purely terminological way it counterfeits a *de facto* non-existent functional unity in the events of aesthetic experience. The act of fusion and projection called empathy does not in any case derive from feeling alone, but includes images and drives also. As a supplementary matter, it remains to mention that the perceiving of the whole which we are advocating as the aesthetic experience has had important sanction from the anthropological psychology of our day. I am protecting myself from that long-time reduction of the aesthetic attitude to a single function brought into relief and then isolated because I see the distinctive character of this experience precisely in a living participation and interpenetration of all psychic functions such as cannot be met with in a like fashion in any other states. Similarly, E. R. Jaensch²⁶ sees the distinguishing sign of the nature of aesthetic consciousness in the fact that the functions of perceiving, repre-

senting, and feeling, which are usually separated from one another, interpenetrate in a union which cannot be pried apart. Whenever the aesthetic attitude is announced, that permeation of psychic functions has been reached. The entire man, the personality in all parts of its being, is a part of every complete aesthetic experience, and it is just the totality of this psychic requisition that is characteristic for the aesthetic state. Here the concept of integration as understood by Jaensch is relevant; this idea means the unified and undivided working together of functions otherwise separated. The integrated type of person is interpreted as a kind of talent in which perceiving, thinking, and feeling are brought into a vibrant unity. This type reveals a special affinity for the aesthetic-artistic form of life. And, finally, it should be possible to find in the idea of integration that desired total characteristic of the total structure of the aesthetic state and to designate it as a model of an integrated state.

An appeal to feeling does not suffice to explain and describe the aesthetic state: to set up a specific separate aesthetic function, a peculiar sense of beauty, is no less inadequate. This short-circuited solution is unsatisfactory because it is a simplification in terms of an unauthorized faculty psychology of circumstances which are actually very complex. In the aesthetic state everything takes an active part which was formerly assigned to certain kinds of state only. The original character of the aesthetic attitude which cannot be abrogated, the individuality which characteristically differentiates it from other active attitudes of the person, lies in the original total quality of the separate functions and dispositions as they work together in a certain arrangement, accentuation, and shading in the direction of an individual kind of context of meaning and totality of action.

We will be protecting our point of view, which fixedly holds to the total relationship, from misunderstanding if for pedagogical reasons we now speak about the roles of sensation, perception, and so forth, separately.

3. SENSATIONS

Sensations normally play a decisive part in every aesthetic experience, though, to be sure, in different degrees. Thus in experiences of aesthetic verbal objects, genuine sensation is at a minimum because in the hearing or the reading of literature the peripheral organs of sense are merely relatively unimportant avenues of thought. Further exceptions are the extreme cases of surrender to the images of inner

perception which are especially vivid and pleasant when one is under the influence of narcotics like opium, hashish, and mescaline. Besides this, not all areas of the senses (classes of sensation) are of equal importance.

Modern psychology admits to ten classes of sensation: those of 1. sight, 2. hearing, 3. smell, 4. taste, 5. pressure on and touching of skin (skin-sense, sense of touch), 6. temperature, 7. tension of the muscles, sinews, and joints (kinaesthetic sensations), 8. balance of the head, 9. pain, and 10. those of the vital organs (life-bearing organic ones or those held in common). Often the sensations of vibration in the sensation of shaking are added as a special class.²⁷ Now, these separate classes of sensation are not of equal significance, aesthetically speaking. It is not difficult to see, for instance, that an experience of the sensation of pain can never contribute to the structure of an aesthetically relevant objectivity. Almost the same is true for experiences of the chemical sense of taste. Many people who love wine say that they can so sublimate its pleasant taste that an aesthetic experience comes to be; but it is at best a kind of approximation which has resulted. One must be skeptical also of the frequently advanced idea that it is possible for works of art to be based on a sense of smell; yet it cannot be denied that the scent of resin, flowers, and hay can enhance intrinsically the experience of the aesthetic aspects of nature in a beautiful landscape; and that the smell of frankincense can impressively supplement the events taking place in a Roman Catholic church. Kinaesthetic sensations play a role in empathic experiences; therefore people who are gifted with a motoral sense clearly feel homokinaesthetic effects in their muscles and joints when they follow the trapeze artist as he does his acts in a circus. Sensations of balance and stasis occur when one looks at buildings. The fact that much remains below the threshold and can hardly be noticed does not deny the fact that something is really present. Almost all realms of sense, therefore, are able to contribute intrinsically to an aesthetic experience, but only the two higher ones (seeing and hearing) can really support and make up such an experience. Recently, to be sure, effort has been made (for instance, by Wallaschek and Sterzinger) to take a stand against aesthetic scorn for the so-called lower senses.

Volkelt²⁸ in particular has written about the aesthetic superiority of the higher senses. All aesthetic objects, he thinks, are given as perceptions of form and color, or as perceptions of hearing, or as a combination of the two (the art of drama, for instance); the other senses are not able either by themselves or in combinations

to make up an aesthetic object: they cannot present an independent aesthetic object; yet they can belong to such an object as a support and an accompaniment. While the lower senses are contact senses so-called, the higher ones may be called distant or remote ones. With the latter there is an aesthetically advantageous retreat of physical sensation. In seeing and hearing, objects do not reach towards our bodies; they do not ask to be felt as matter. Therefore every characteristically free and floating mood which is indispensable for aesthetic enjoyment can develop in these higher senses. The required free imagery and the quality of semblance are not possible in connection with the sensations of taste, touch, and temperature, all of which adhere to our bodies. With the higher senses the contents of sensation and feeling-tone are set more clearly in relief before us. By contrast, we feel the experience of the lower senses as a sodden mass because the contents of sense and the subjective raw materials are mixed together in them in an obscure way. Seeing and hearing are able to offer us perceptual combinations which as a whole or in their parts make a definite and clear impression on the senses and can be definitely and clearly impressed on the memory. Perceptual combinations present themselves as relatively independent, intrinsically homogeneous and meaningful structures. The sensations of the lower senses, on the contrary, never prove to be arrangements which can be precisely and exactly grasped by the senses and stamped on the memory, or such as can be meaningful homogeneous wholes belonging together. Rather, they appear in a separation which flows away and in groupings which are obliterated. Therefore the sensations of the higher senses are aesthetically preferred because they are less material and importunate, because they are more definite, better ordered, more complexible, more plastic in form, richer in quality, and more easily reproduceable.

Psychology carries even further the analysis of sensations, which are not really found in a pure and isolated state, but are products of theoretical abstraction, and within each sensation it differentiates the following simple elements: 1. quality, 2. intensity, 3. organization in space, 4. organization in time. At this point I shall be brief about these matters because many of them will undergo thorough discussion in other contexts too (primarily in the chapter on aesthetic objectivity).

The most important qualitative distinction in the realm of seeing-sensations is that between variegated colors and non-variegated gradations of luminosity from black to white. To these is then added the distinction of degrees of saturation. If we ask the appar-

ently simple question of what is more valuable aesthetically, colors or uncolored luminosity, we find that the answer is not so easy. As simple sense-objects, colors are naturally more pleasant than non-variegated gradations of luminosity, and indeed saturated luminous colors are better than unsaturated and muddy ones; but there can be cases in which the situation can be the exact reverse: namely, when a color appears in a certain object. A dismal grey which is unpleasant in itself or which serves as a decoration in a festival-hall can be quite moving in a positive way as a color in a sacred gothic cathedral. One can see how, in the realm of aesthetic objects, the effects of pure sense-qualities are modified step by step through an intermixture of representations and intellectual connections. In the realm of hearing-sensations the division between sounds and noises forms the most important qualitative distinction. Seen purely from the point of view of sensation, tones work far better than does noise. Therefore, music prefers to work with the one and yet is at the same time able to achieve positive effects from the other (as in striking). Here too the aesthetic impression of pure sensation can be sacrificed forthwith to higher interests: a jangling, smashing cymbal which to the ear is a pure sensorial pain can in certain places produce the highest effects for the ends of expression, of rhythmical articulation, of the decisive stressing of high points, and so forth. Important for aesthetic effect as the pure sense-impression is, it can still retreat behind other requirements. The screaming of a wind-machine in a theater is intrinsically a discordant noise, but in certain places in a dramatic performance it can produce a magnificent effect, and in any case a far greater one than the harmony of the spheres could bring about in the same place. Here I can refer incidentally to the law of aesthetic excellence (*Höchstwert*), which is always caused in a complex way and which presents the value of relative position. One and the same thing does not produce the same good effect in all places. In the example just given, one can also see that the aesthetic effect, which is always something intellectual (*etwas Geistiges*) too, must be something more than and something different from a mere feast of the senses, great as pleasure in sensation can be.

An important qualitative distinction in the sphere of acoustical relevancies is that of timbres (sound-colors). Sounds that are very rich in overtones produce effects that are nasal, smashing, dull, screeching, snarling—and are often unpleasant. In spite of this, these qualities contribute to the fullness of musical effects in the bassoon, the horn, the saxophone; the maximum of sensorial pleasure

does not in any case lie in sounds which are completely without overtones, as, for example, in a certain register of the flute and in tones of the tuning-fork, which are thin and empty. Thus it is apparent that the most extreme pleasantness in connection with the senses and sensations is not the extreme opposite of the maximum of unpleasantness, but that it is a median value which is measurable from the two poles of unpleasantness [an excessive number of overtones, and the complete lack of them], even if it is not always equidistant from them. But this also is only a noteworthy case among many others.

In terms of aesthetic significance, intensity of sensations is alongside quality. Here one can distinguish two matters: 1. the intensity of the aesthetic-sensorial and perceptive occurrence per se, and 2. the aesthetic valuableness of the degrees of intensity of particular sensorial givennesses. Concerning the first point one must say that for aesthetic enjoyment a certain above-average development and live cultivation of sensorial-perceptual factors are a prerequisite and a condition. Perceptions of pure sense are so alive and stimulating here that a peculiar (specifically, the sensorial) functional pleasure is attached to them. In the extra-aesthetic state we do not for the most part give ourselves up to the impression of the senses. We see things only to the extent that is necessary for our mastery of them in terms of knowledge; thus we usually conclude sensuous intuition (perception) quickly as we interpret meaning and concept. But things are different in the aesthetic state. Here sensorial-perceptual events function vigorously, and it is a foregone conclusion that we will surrender ourselves to them lovingly and submerge ourselves within them. Here the concept of *αἰσθάνεσθαι* again comes into its own. It is quite right of Volkelt²⁹ to say that for the aesthetic state a fleeting touching of the thing with a glance and a superficial "listening-to" it is not enough. Sensorial experience must be expanded to the optimum and must be bound with a sensuous vigor, sensuous ability, and sensuous power. A certain joyful activity in sensorial experience must occur.

As regards the degrees of intensity of particular sense-stimuli, one may say that the extremes of strong and weak are equally without value. If a color is so dazzling that our eyes hurt, if an impression of light is so strong that our eyes are blinded, then no positive aesthetic impression is achieved. The same is true when orchestral excesses cause our ears to roar. But even when the intensity of the stimulus offered us is so limited that an extreme strain of laborious attention is necessary if we are to grasp it—then aesthetic pleasure

is done for, because even in the sensorial realm, this pleasure has a presupposition that it will be brought about with ease.

4. PERCEPTIONS (ACTS OF COMPREHENSION)

Again I must say that there are no sensations in the reality of psychic experience, that (to agree with Metzger³⁰), sensations do not belong to what has immediate existence in the realm of the psychic. Instead, they are theoretical abstractions; they are neither elements nor data closely related to life; nor are they the start of psychic existence.³¹ Wundt³² already alleged that a dual abstracting is allied with the concept of pure sensation (he thought of sensations as psychologically simple qualities of sense): that of representations in which the sensations appear, and that of the simple feelings with which they are combined. In the reality directly met with in psychic experience, there are merely perceptions; that is, they are manufactured at the moment the materials supplied by the senses emerge. Psychologically considered, sensation comes into being by way of the excitement in the sensation-centers of the cortex, an excitement which as a rule is evoked through a stimulation of the nerves of sense. But this excitement immediately transfers itself to the cortical centers of memory and association, and thus there comes into being a new content which is set into relation with the already existing constituents, into a relation which now in an almost unexpanded point of time makes the sensations present into a perception. If, as concerns perception, one rates the sensations as relatively simple elements of intuitive experience, one must be aware of the fact that in so doing he has clearly explained only the pedagogically more easily understood constituent pieces, but not anything primary in actual-genetic fact.

Processes of organizing, arranging, synthesizing, analyzing, and comparing are directly combined with the sensorial raw material; that which is given in sense is apperceived—that is, it is grasped in terms of a rapidly appearing representation of meaning. This is true even in connection with the usual everyday perceptions. In the aesthetic process, this entire event is accomplished even more rapidly and powerfully, as suits pleasantly stimulated functional energy and functional activity in the aesthetic state.

A genuine sense-activity plays a role only at the outside limits of the aesthetic state. Through a series of formal acts of comprehension (perceiving form, relating, organizing, structuring, collecting, and so forth) and through certain theoretical-intellectual acts

involving content we take immediate possession of every complex of stimuli which confronts us. Even a simple geometrical form presupposes an act of perception if I am to apprehend an outline of a triangle or of a circle. The image of an aesthetic object comes into existence only by way of the expanded apperceptive spontaneity of the subject "because the data of the senses supply only the outer impulse; and the organizing of the form, the inventive acts of the intellect like feeling, association, and understanding, have to produce the main subject."³³ This psychic process, which is stimulated by way of the sense-data, begins with acts of comprehension, which must be discussed here as the core of the experience of perception. Later I shall discuss the completing and the interpreting of perceived objects by additional representations. But here I am concerned chiefly with the formal processes which make a perception out of sensations, and with the formal part of apperception.

I shall rely in what I now say on Theodor Ziehen; at the same time, I shall try to avoid certain narrownesses in his theory. Different procedures in representation and thought are stimulated in the observer by the sensations given by aesthetic objects, and they fall into two groups: 1. the process of analyzing, grasping, and comparing which is allied directly with the knowledge or the recognition of the object presented, and the processes of interpretation and understanding attached to these; 2. the thinking of added new representations and ideas not immediately given by way of the object. Ziehen covers the first process mentioned by the term "comprehension"³⁴; the second group he calls the "adjunctivizing (annexing) activity of representation." Even when the aesthetic effectiveness of sense- and perception-experiences is independent of the attached representations, not all activities of the intellectual functions are absent because these activities are in force in the simplest sense-experiences, as Kant showed in connection with the synthetic (collectivizing) function. By "independence from attached representations" one means merely the absence of any kind of representational content which goes beyond the component of a given sensation. Functions which lie beyond the activity of mere sensation play a part even in the effect of sensational factors: to be specific, the synthetic function by virtue of which we concentrate lines into a figure and tones into a melody. Yet that representational activity which is inseparably bound with the factor of sensation is completely formal and does not reach in terms of content beyond the given component of sensation. When I experience the

rhythm of a series of windows in a palace or of the tones or words of a song, I do not have to think of any single new representational content; a formal activity (a comprehension of form) which compares and unites is enough.

Ziehen discusses the picture by Menzel called "Falcon and Dove" in terms of the events of comprehension which are in operation there. Certain intellectual processes are directly bound with the recognition of the two birds. Out of the total picture, we isolate the forms of the falcon and the dove. But a combining is always attached to this isolating process (which is one of analysis or dissection). We not only unite the form of the falcon and that of the dove by combining them into a unitary complex, but we also combine the two birds into a group in terms of a complex of a more superior order. These combinings are further inseparably tied to certain relational representations: we know at once that the falcon follows the dove. We interpret or understand the picture. The analysis of this course of understanding shows that isolating is the first partial function. The total picture will not be grasped equally well in all of its parts, but certain parts recede (for example, the clouds in the background) as compared with the others (the falcon, the dove). As a consequence of such graduated selection, separate parts are accented, others made secondary. Both procedures are included under the concept of differentiation, with which is allied a graduated recognition. The dove will be comprehended as such, whereas no recognition, or only a hazy one, is attached to the secondary objects. The activity of attention which directs acts of comprehension depends on the following factors:

- a. the intensity of the particular sensations called up by the object;
- b. the feeling-tone of the sensations;
- c. the assimilability of particular sensations into the latent representations of the observer;
- d. the excitability of the latent representations (ideas and images) of the observer.

Those sensations are assimilable which are suited to being attached to representations. Unclear lines and indefinite noises often go unnoticed, do not call up any recognitions, memories, or judgments. The significance of an object lies in the fact that it offers relational possibilities for images which are more important and especially accented with feeling. As for the capacity of latent images for being aroused, the following is to be noted: in every person observing aesthetically are stored away innumerable complexes of images; formerly they existed in actuality (that is, in consciousness), but in time they became completely latent (unconscious). Among these, the most important are the latent images

which recently have entered consciousness—most important because they play a large part in the choice of attention. The course of our thinking and the choice of attention depends largely upon the distribution of the ability of the latent images to be excited, in general and in particular, in the so-called “constellation,” which means an increase in the ability of latent representations to be excited, an increase which occurs, for instance, because a certain representation actually occurred shortly before. With isolation, which is an act of the analytical function, is combined “complexion,” the act of the synthetic function (*Zusammenfassung*: uniting, combining), and (as a third partial transaction in comprehension) the tying of relations. These are relations of the representational kind, but those which are situated in the object itself and given by the object itself, and therefore not those that present us products of an imaginative activity of the adjunctive or associative kind.

Later we shall look into the problems thus presented by *Ziehen*; but for the present, I am postponing discussion of the question of the events of formal comprehension in the narrowest sense—that is, of those acts of perception which lead to the comprehension of forms and of complexes having form, of harmony, symmetry, rhythm, of consonance and agreement, and insignia of place and time: to begin with, because perceptions of form and the entire problem of form demand a chapter of their own even in an aesthetics—that is, if they are to be adequately discussed; and then because these subjects are better located in sections on aesthetic objectivity. The question in this connection is that of subjective “complexion”-factors which have their source and foundation in certain objective orders—in the objective complexibility of the object (symmetrical, proportional, rhythmical good order).

Every perception, then, includes not only sensorial-sensational components and acts of formal comprehension which transform these components into perception, but also a series of factors making for an awareness of the object (the intentional reaching of the ego towards the object, thinking, recognizing, and other acts of subsumption, objectivizings, the adding of representations through associative and reproductive acts, the setting up of certain relations and connections); these last factors are stimulated by the object and are necessary to the understanding and interpretation of it. Perception always includes the comprehension and the interpretation by way of representations and acts of thought of those matters offered us sensuously; it is therefore a complicated form of psychic activity which includes, in addition to the sensorial, an intellectual

factor too, a factor which is made up of components of form and the synthesis of form (in the sense spoken of earlier), of representation, and of thought.

5. REPRESENTATIONS (IMAGES)

I conceive of this term in the narrower sense as meaning reproduced perceptions. If the psychic event of perception is to take place, it is basic that a peripheral (physical-physiological) stimulus cause it. If the contents of the perception are reproduced (that is, renewed in conformity with experience in the absence of the stimulus), that which we call representation (the image) in the narrower sense occurs.

In the wider sense, this term includes the objectifying events in psychic life in general, so that even the primary occurrences (perceptions) pass for representations. For the psychologists of Graz and those of other schools closely related to theirs (like Höfler,³⁵ for instance), sensations are perceptual representations of the simplest sensuous content. Stephen Witasek³⁶ has described the aesthetic consequences coming from such linguistic usage. First he says that an outer object (a painting, a statue) is not decisive for the effect of aesthetic feeling, but that the "representation" which this outer object has called up in the spectator is. Somewhat later he mentions the cooperation of the subjective factors which have the duty of shaping the sense-data into the complete image of the aesthetic object. Here too it is meant that the image of the aesthetic object is achieved by the act of comprehension which is perception. But I cannot accept this use of the concept. I think of representation as that image of an object of the outer world which appears in consciousness when the objective presence of the thing represented is lacking; it is therefore a reproduced perception and, indeed, one which is constantly modified (one that is faded, more deficient in particulars, though yet in other terms peculiarly enhanced), or a free combination of the components of perception.

Are the representations in the aesthetic procedure in any way different from those in extra-aesthetic ones? Yes: in terms of content because of a peculiar splendor which is the effect of certain intensified events, and in terms of form because of a certain vitality of their flow, the soaring lightness of their progress, and that similarity to feeling which has already been mentioned.

Volkelt³⁷ sees the peculiarity of aesthetic representations pri-

marily in the fact that in the aesthetic realm meaning-representation and intuition are in the kind of complete blend which does not occur in everyday existence. In the aesthetic procedure, the representation of meaning undergoes a transformation into feeling, a "thickening" and a "darkening." In this connection Volkelt made up the expression "feeling-immanent representations," or "representations whose content is feeling." Just as feeling in general always has its content in representations, so the different kinds of aesthetic feeling too ordinarily have about them contents of representation. These degrees of representation appearing in and with feeling are something quite different from so-called independent representations: that is, from those which take place in people experiencing them as if they had their own course. It is of course possible that feelings can be accompaniments. But in connection with the type of "feeling-immanent" representations, the representations reveal themselves to be within the feelings as their content. The power and dominion of feeling characteristic of the aesthetic state is possible only because the important images are presented, not in the form of clear and logically ordered concepts, but in a far-reaching similarity to feeling. We do not have the single image or representation as we do structures whose characteristics are carefully analyzed and inherently related in terms of logic; nor do we have series of representations as we do totalities in our consciousness that are purely classified and logically ordered; but we have them as complexes mysteriously compressed and uncrystallized in their organization. That which all representations in the aesthetic mode of behavior have in common is in opposition to representations which are in all parts precisely defined, clearly and sharply exhibited, and just as strictly tied together, and treated according to the scale of logic in the interests of learning.

The representational activity of the spectator which is extremely important for aesthetic experience can take on gradual differences, and among them one can distinguish several typical examples: 1. The spectator is content with the vividness of the meaningful representation. Here the representational activity is at a minimum and confines itself to a simple act of recognition; 2. the spectator goes beyond the mere meaningful representation and contributes supplementary representations. Here there occurs the associative (reproductive) or adjunctivizing activity of representation in which in turn there are two separate factors: a. the associated representations are in real and necessary connection with the object, are not only aroused and caused, but are actually de-

manded by it; b. the representations contributed are indeed caused by the object, but more in connection with its outer appearance than with its inner ground because they were set free by accident, so to speak, only on the basis of a constellation of private contingencies in the spectator. Thus associated representations come into being as do additional reveries, and they group themselves in the mode of decorative scrolls around aesthetic objects. Aesthetic experience in this way achieves a certain warmth and intimacy, although such associations playing around the object in this manner can mean a certain danger for the adequate enjoyment of art. Example 2a, on the contrary, is often realized in art, and indeed in art-works having a superfluity of representations (images). Some examples: The *Marseillaise* is a piece of music whose characteristically stimulating melody can be enjoyed even by people who do not recognize it as the musical national symbol of France. If the melody is used in a piece of program-music (either quoted or thematically developed), however, the composer requires that the hearer attach certain representations to it. The *Marseillaise* occurs often in Schumann's *Hermann und Dorothea*, where it is relieved by an intimate simple melody played by the strings. Here the hearer must supply the image from Goethe's epos of Dorothea as she flees from the district on the left bank of the Rhine before the revolutionary French so that she can find a new home at the side of the German young man called Hermann. In Tchaikovsky's patriotic festival overture, 1812, the *Marseillaise* after a thematic warfare is contrapuntally over-powered by the Russian national anthem. The hearer must recall Napoleon's journey to Russia and his defeat there. Yet these musical works could also please listeners who have no idea of the programs they are based on: these people would enjoy the pure musical forms of the compositions as absolute works of music only. In many pictures—say, the *Decius Mus* group by Rubens—the opposite is true: they remain unintelligible if one does not know the represented contents which are presupposed by them but which have not fully become form. In such cases, the artist takes into account the fact that the residue of content which is not revealed completely in the formation will be supplied by the spectator out of knowledge which he has achieved, no matter where. All historical paintings, if they are to be understood, presuppose historical knowledge which the observer must himself contribute because it could not come to full view in the picture. To supply associations by the addition of certain images actually required by the art-work is something basically different from the free-roaming

and arbitrary adding of reveries. Not a few critics would like to forbid the painter to tell stories: he is not a creator of fairy-tales and not a reporter; and the same people require that he confine himself to purely pictorial objects—that is, to objects having immanent contents in presentation which do not presuppose a knowledge which can be gathered from catalogs and lexicons. Nevertheless, such a prohibition throws out the baby with the bath water. Of course, the understanding which serves as a prerequisite to a complete aesthetic enjoyment of such pictures is possible in intellectual respects only on the basis of contributed knowledge; but in the end, every object presupposes some kind of knowledge. It is precisely the art-works of the highest cultural rank that can be thoroughly enjoyed only because one possesses a certain education and knowledge. Examples are *Faust* and *The Divine Comedy*, and Mann's *Magic Mountain* also. Sometimes what is necessary to the commentary on a piece of literature simply derives from the fact that a work of times long past presents situations which are no more. The comedies of Aristophanes ask for learned commentary today; but when they appeared, they were understood even by the Athenian mob. A similar situation holds for Tieck's literary comedies. Also, certain mediums of effect and sub-forms of the comic, such as allusion, parody, and travesty, produce no effect in the absence of certain kinds of information; for this effect the understanding and knowledge of precisely what is meant is an essential prerequisite. In allegory too a proper aesthetic effect is attached to the presence of certain knowledges. If a person wants really to interpret a statue of Justitia as a vengeful goddess of incorruptible justice posing as blind and as having no awe for persons, and not as a female shop-keeper dressed in antique clothes, he must know exactly what the thing is about. The art-works which have a superfluity of images are not, therefore, a special case, but only a pronounced super-illumination of a primary fact which one repeatedly encounters in the realm of aesthetics, the fact that for the comprehension of the object, certain representations or images are necessary.

The examples I have just given are those in which something new which is not given in the aesthetic object (or in its substrate) issues through associative representational activity, though this something is nevertheless really required and necessary if the object is to be understood. From these cases are distinguished others in which the added representations are not actually required and are not necessary to the understanding of the object, but which are an adjunctivizing, optional act of the spectator's. If I say of

a picture that a certain landscape looked this way on my vacation last summer or that I once bathed in a quite similar lake in the woods, what comes from my own inner recollection considerably enhances the pleasure as regards warmth and intimacy, but it does not belong to the act of properly comprehending this particular aesthetic object. Even the appearance of similar objects in remembered images does not belong to the absolutely necessary stock of acts in the aesthetic experience; in fact, this process hides a certain danger because it turns attention away from the perception of given objects and can lead towards a "deflection," a turning of attention away from the object and towards a series of representations only loosely related to it. When this occurs, much in the object and much of the genuine enjoyment of the art-work are of necessity missed. Anyone who when he hears music revels in a psychically unfixed frame of mind, in all kinds of lightly and easily flowing recollections centering on his own ego, is not aware of the many important features of the art-work because he has surrendered himself to matters not attached to it, and great parcels of it therefore fall into "eclipse" (opacity).

An intermediate thing between the representational activity which is actually demanded by the art-work and that which acts in a supplementary relation to it (that is, which plays around it) lies in the "filling-up of gaps" (*Lückenausfüllungen*) which is often necessary, especially in connection with ballads. The balladesque selection of things which have a feeling-effect often results in a very desultory composition which picks particular high points at random (an example is Annette Droste-Hülshoff's "*Kurt von Spiegel*"). The spontaneity of the imaginative activity of people enjoying art is greater in the so-called "arrangements of details" (*Ausgestaltungen*) which occur when a person imagines something in detail which remains indefinite in the object. Here too the effect is ambivalent. On the one hand, acts of this kind harbor the risk of digressing from the real object; on the other, they effectively enhance the contemplative activity of the individual enjoying them.

The furthest extreme of the activity of adjunctivizing representation³⁸ is reached with the appearance of independent reveries or "confictions" (*Konfktionen*), which go freely beyond what the aesthetic object presents. Here there is an especially great danger that the existing thing will fall short of that which is added arbitrarily. What is primarily threatened is the truly proper pleasure in art: The warmth and intensity of aesthetic experience can be aroused only through an individual's spontaneous appropriation of

what is given and by his mutual creativity with it. A pronounced ambivalence of effect appears in connection with the phenomenon of tension: because of the events presented, strong feeling-representations are aroused in connection with a broad course of action, and indeed such representations as are in sharp opposition to one another: as concerns a fortunate or unfortunate outcome of a fact or how well an opaque conflict can be solved (in a criminal or detective novel). There are readers who ask for no greater passion in a novel than suspense; but this kind of enjoyer of reading is not of the most mature or of the most profound type. As a matter of fact, suspense *can* work favorably because it strengthens interest, increases attention, enhances clarity, and makes empathy easy. But at its side is the danger that, as a result of "deflection," the pleasure one finds in the flowing narrative will recede behind such ideas of expectation. A person who anticipates something which is to come misses what is taking place in the present. Therefore it not infrequently happens that a too anxious reader skips entire chapters of a book so that he can discover as quickly as possible how everything ends. In such cases, suspense has slid away into a coarse material interest which has destroyed all of the higher aesthetic values.

Art-works often set the observer certain tasks which involve the adding of representations. To this class belong novels in which living persons appear under assumed names (*Schlüsselromane*) and also symbolistic literary works and paintings, like G. Hauptmann's "And Pippa Dances" and Klimt's paintings of scholars. What is meant by what is presented? it is asked; and it is asked because the work obviously does not mean itself, but points to a secret connection behind it and to "deeper significances." The pictures of the Expressionists which are far from reality and in which the image of reality is destroyed, its parts being strewn before the spectator in confused tumult—these too give such tasks to the adjunctivizing representational activity of the observer. In "*peinture pure*," in which painting seems to be color-music and to become an art of mood which has no relation to objects, certain relationships make the demands required by many pieces of music on the representational effort of the hearer. Absolute music can be enjoyed with a minimum of attachments to representation (image). But at the same time, there are tonal works, and not only those called program-music either, in which certain "confictions" are suggested. The representational images which in such cases arise when the listener hears the works concerned are called music-phantoms (*Musikphantome*).⁸⁹ Thus one sees that even the least object-related of the

arts, the art detached to the maximum from the reality of things—that is, music—does not absolutely renounce all claim to the representational activity of those who apprehend it.

The role of representations in the aesthetic state can hardly be over-emphasized. A disproportionate division of lines in which the lesser is excessively small becomes pleasant the moment a notion of a certain use is added (the idea that a sword and its handle, for example, are represented). The pleasure found in simple spatial forms is therefore largely determined by the representations attached to them. Hence, associatively-produced, feeling-filled representations can considerably transform not only our judgments about sizes, but also those about the components of sensation. Unusually sensitive (eidetic) people who smoke particular cigars think that their favorite kinds are far larger than they in fact are;⁴⁰ and to envious people who are always afraid of being discriminated against the portions of food served to others at table seem more select than their own. Pure sensations (those unrelated to any representations and unaffected by intellectual treatment), which are seldom met with in realms outside the aesthetic, hardly ever have any importance in aesthetic experience for the reason that they are aesthetically indifferent or irrelevant. So-called objects of pure sensation are therefore extreme border-line cases.

6. THE PRINCIPLE OF ASSOCIATION

The most famous statement by the father of modern aesthetics, Georg Theodor Fechner, is that aesthetic impression is determined not only by what is given to the senses in direct sensuous material, but also by the representations added associatively and reproductively: along with the direct or sensorial factor appears the indirect or associative one. It is true that, earlier, Locke,⁴¹ Hume,⁴² Oersted,⁴³ and Lotze⁴⁴ had paid attention to the role of associations. Thus Fechner's statement was not entirely new; nor is it unassailable. Yet this classically formulated principle is rightly attached to his name, and the quite feasible critique of this position will have to recognize that here is one of those fruitful one-sidednesses which science finds indispensable alongside unassailable but sterile truths.

Fechner's impressive examples⁴⁵ have become famous. If an orange pleases us, the stimulating aspect of its appearance lies chiefly in the pure gold of its color and its delightful form. But these make up only a small part of its effect; if this were not so, a yellow wooden ball would be just as pleasing. Thus the excellence

of the fruit depends not on form and color, but purely on the fact that we attach to the givenness of sensation and perception the meaning of "orange," a meaning which lies in the totality of what the fruit, in its relation to us, is and brings about. Only the form and the color are immediately present to the sense of sight; memory adds whatever else is there, brings it into the sensuous impression, and paints it with a mental color: in this way an indirect or associative impression combines with the peculiar or direct one. A person seeing an orange not only observes the round, yellow spot of it, but he views it, rather, with the mental eye as a thing of stimulating smell and refreshing taste. Out of remembrance of the good taste of oranges enjoyed earlier is composed the mental coloration with which the physically beautified one is glazed. In the wooden ball, on the contrary, one sees only dry wood and a mechanical product of a wood-turner. In both cases, the impression deriving from memory associates itself so directly with intuition and blends so integrally with it that it seems as if it itself were a constituent part of the intuition. Why are we more pleased by red cheeks on a young face than by pale ones? Surely the beauty of the red color makes a contribution; but it cannot be the only reason. For we are displeased by the same red on a nose or on a hand. Here the intrinsically pleasant impression of the color is overbalanced by a disagreeable aspect. A red nose reminds one of drunkenness, a red hand of washing clothes and scrubbing—all things with which we do not have or want to do and of which we do not want to be reminded. A red cheek, however, means health and life-in-bloom. The principle of association is not in any way valid merely for visible things. Even a name can become pleasant if its bearer is congenial to us, but unpleasant if he is not so. Long ago, the post-horn exercised a charm that had no relation to its immediate musical value; but now its charm is confined to that value because we no longer associate with its sound the idea of a flight to far-off places. Everything in our environment is therefore mentally characterized for us through a resultant of memories of everything which we have experienced relative to the thing or in alliance with it. These memories attach themselves directly to the appearance of the thing, as does the representation (or image) to the word by which it is indicated. "Form" and "color" are "visible" words which arbitrarily make the significance of the thing present for us. The language of visible things, like that of words, must be learned. We see a house; in fact, we see only a four-cornered spot. But in it we also see everything for which the house serves and which takes place in it, and

only these make a house of the spot. In connection with almost the same sensuous impression an entirely different total impression can occur because of painting with different mental colors—a total impression in which only a small sensuous difference is necessary for the causing of different connections. In the degree to which we are pleased or displeased by that which we remember of a thing, the memory too contributes an aspect of pleasure or displeasure to the aesthetic impression of the thing. We hold pleasure in the many things which result from earlier experiences to be an affair of their sensuous appearance; yet they are a matter of our mental and spiritual ingredients.

Although the associative factor can effectively gain ascendancy over the sensuous (as Fechner was able to show in his example of the phenomenon of thing-constancy), one should not overrate it either. If the orange had had a shrivelled, dirty grey-brown exterior, the attached ideas of taste and smell would not make it aesthetic (that is, pleasant for intuition). Many a person who knows how to value the taste of ripe medlars prefers by far the sight of a shining red heart-cherry.

At this point, we are already close to a critique of Fechner's assertions, which we want to carry on with a series of supplementary ideas. His thesis that for aesthetic impression there comes into view not only a sensuous-perceptual givenness, but also a complex of associatively produced representations which are released by the impression of the senses—this thesis means that aesthetic experience is not a matter of sensation, but one of perception in which all kinds of things are added to the simplest physical contents of sensation, the end being a collectivizing treatment of the sensorial raw materials supplied by sensation. In its intuited presence, every observed object is built for us upon sensations, which make up the, so to speak, material constituents of perception. These are more or less definitely "shaped," however, and must, in addition, be as though animated by the intellectual intention in the object concerned; otherwise they would be meaningless and non-significant elements of consciousness of a chaotic kind. Fechner himself sees this relationship: namely, that when the materials furnished by perception are governed by an intention, associated representations and reproductively produced knowledges derived from experience play decisive parts. On the occasion of a discussion with Herbart, Fechner chided him for stressing the direct factor primarily (perception) and for giving only a subordinate importance in the aesthetic state to apperception (the receiving of an impression

in the nexus of representations which took place hitherto), which cannot be separated from association. According to Fechner, the aesthetic object arises not only out of the directly given sense-impressions, but also out of the indirect elements which do not exist as something given, but which are contributed and added by us associatively and reproductively from out of our own mental possessions.

And now one raises the first objection to Fechner. This concerns not only the object of aesthetic experience, but every object of perception. Fechner's thesis is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of intuition (*Anschauung*). His sharp separation of sensorial-direct from associative-indirect factors is untenable. Fechner so presents the matter that it would seem as if there were an intuition which existed apart from our assistance, as if it were "given," so to speak. As a matter of fact, however, intuition, like every experience, is something which must be "made." Into that which is experienced in sensation there enter established and unnoticed constituents of the extra-sensorial kind, the results of theoretical acts, and only these make an intuition in the narrower sense out of the unorganized mass of sense-impressions. This intuition, this apperception, is always something active, something intentional, meaningful, something added by way of psychic handling and formative acts, to mere sense-affections. Yet the fact that from out of the total mass of the affections we grasp particular groups as separate objects—this is one result of the activity of these additional factors, is a synthetic act of consciousness. This active-teleological character of perception makes itself evident in countless everyday examples outside aesthetic experience. When we see a table, we involuntarily complete the fortuitously presented view into the correct physical image. Examples of so-called assimilation are relevant here. In connection with every perception, the sensorial elements just received achieve a blend with earlier perceptions, those materials of apperception existing in the ego. According to Wundt,⁴⁶ assimilation is a form of association observed particularly in connection with the shaping of intensive and spatial representations and completed by the process of fusion. It is the most clearly demonstrable, then, when single constituents of the product of assimilation are given by way of outer sensuous impressions, while others which are absent from the objective impression demonstrably stem from earlier representations. In all, what is "given" us in perception is decidedly a part of our knowledge. An example: I look at the middle section of a landscape in which a wood of autumn-

colored beech trees obscures the view of the top of a small hill. Suddenly the person I am with says, "There on top of the hill is a roe." Now I see it too; I see that a definitely-formed red-brown spot separates itself from the red-brown of the autumn woods; now I am able to make out a certain outline which I could not possibly see earlier. Nothing has changed in the objective components of the stimulus; but my knowledge has enabled me to perceive something not accessible to me before. One sees better what he knows. A novice in the use of the microscope sees very little in many of the slides; but as soon as he has been taught what matters, he does as a matter of fact see. It is well known that a person trained in art-history sees more in a picture than does a layman.

If every simple act of recognition, if every perceptual comprehension of an object, is something composed indissolubly of direct impressions and allied memories, then the same act prevails to an even greater extent if the object interests us and if we are occupied with it exhaustively. If one wished to eliminate everything which is added to the sensuous impression, intuition would evaporate into an abstraction such as is never met with in real experience. We can define "intuition" (*Anschauung*) in terms of every experience which offers itself directly. But that which comes from the treasures of our innermost selves also belongs to this immediacy as much as does that which sensation offers us.

The critique which E. Meumann⁴⁷ directs at Fechner begins from the same point of view. It is doubtful that the direct factor as such can really have any significance for the aesthetic impression. What are colors and forms of things to us if the representations by means of which they can be specifically interpreted are absent? One would do better, therefore, not to draw into consideration the outward impressions as such in terms of a direct factor divorced in a quite impossible way from the representations assimilated with them, but to speak of the relative significance or valence which the outwardly given can acquire in a unitary-impression as compared with the significance or valence of the representation.

Thus Fechner's sharp divorce, as seen from the stand-point of a totality-based theory of perception, cannot really be accepted. But perhaps Fechner was unconsciously led by a desire by means of this division to turn the attention of the aesthetician towards the fact that in aesthetic experience decisive parts are played not only by the factors of *αἰσθάνεσθαι*, but also by attached representations. In his day, such an indication was not at all superfluous. Kant⁴⁸ for example, had thought of associative factors only in connection with

dependent beauty so that he could give every credit to pure beauty. In this respect, Fechner's division is thoroughly deserving and does not lose its value if in its sharpened view it seems to prove too much and is something unnecessary.

On the other hand, this division proves too little, and therefore Meumann's second objection runs thus: Fechner has failed to indicate a principle by which aesthetic associations can be differentiated from extra-aesthetic and non-aesthetic ones; for in any perception one chooses, a direct and an associative constituent can be distinguished; but this is still not to say that all associations connected with each and every perception, to say nothing of all associations connected with the aesthetic contemplation of an object, also have significance for our judgments of beauty. And it is ultimately a mistake to conclude from Fechner's bi-partite antithesis that, having described the experience of sensations and of the associative addition of representations, one has completely described that part of aesthetic experience which involves an awareness of the object. Instead, between the perceptual "having" of sensuous impressions and the adding of associations coming from inside one, there is an act which is important for aesthetic experience and which one could call the formal or comprehension factor, in analogy with the appellation chosen by Fechner.

If we combine or synthesize lines into figures and tones into melodies, we are not combining representational contents which lie outside the sensations already given in the object (that is, which presuppose other sensations or representations than those actually given in the object), but only the sensations actually given as they are blended into a unity by way of the synthetic function (thus by way of one of the so-called intellectual functions). In this way, according to Ziehen,⁴⁹ we do indeed fashion a formal representation of form or a "complexion"-representation which is not of necessity provided by the sensations themselves (the "synopsis" of Kant), but this has nothing at all to do with the combining of representations funded in further ways. If a person separates out a theme from the composition he is hearing (for example, *g c c e*), this act means that these four tones comprise a unity and that this combination of tones is realized without any combining of representations whose sources are in another quarter: the sensations actually given satisfy the synthetic function as material for the act of uniting and therefore for the shaping of the form-image of the motif. To this extent, the working-out of sensations is purely formal. Not once is the recognition of the tones (the simplest

case of representational combining) necessary. Thus Fechner's two parts must be expanded to three because between the factor of sensation and the factor of representation is introduced a formal factor, or one of comprehension. This "between" must not of course be interpreted purely in terms of time; for comprehension superimposes itself on sensations and often ties itself to synchronous representational combinings also. Synthetic, analytic, and comparative (relating) functions belong to acts of comprehension.

7. THINKING (THE INTELLECTUAL ACTS)

Thinking is not identical with imagining (making representations), but is a peculiar activity which is accomplished with the contents of representational life (interpreted in the widest sense) as its materials. The organizing treatment of the contents of object-consciousness proceeds in terms of a setting up of relations through comparing or combining. Thinking differs from the making of images because of its abstract, unintuitive character. That which is neither perceptible nor representable is not intuitive; but one "knows" it nevertheless.⁵⁰ In thinking we intentionally turn towards certain features of reality. We think about certain states of fact and meaning which lie on other planes than that of intuition or perception. A full knowledge of reality appears only when the results of perception and representation are worked over in thought. Only through the unintuitive acts of thought do all intuitive contents of consciousness maintain their relation to objects, and thus are they comprehended or interpreted.

Consequently, the simplest acts of thought already exist in direct connection with every experience of perception, and in saying this, one has answered the question of the business of thought in the aesthetic state. Perceptions already have a certain conceptual content. In "objection" (that is, in the experience of the objective generally) Messer⁵¹ sees the most elementary of the acts of thought. Such an act of thought can therefore be taken for granted in all perceptions, and indeed it is due not only to the fact that in perceptions everything is perceived as "something" (usually an object), but also to the fact that these objects are defined as things, events, or conditions. We grasp these more definite "objections" in concepts. If experiences of explicit concepts are mostly absent from the countless everyday perceptions in one's familiar spheres of life, simple acts of thought surely are present and operative in connection with every act of knowledge, with every coordination of a meaning-represen-

tation with the impression of a thing. All of this plays a role also in the aesthetic mode of procedure, in which one frequently meets with the manipulation of universal representations which approach the concept (although not their images in the sense of examples of complicated abstraction) as well as with the activity of judging and coming to conclusions. Were these operations of thought eliminated on principle, the aesthetic pleasure found in each piece of literature (and not merely in the "thought-lyric") would be impossible, just as would any understanding of a work of art which has a superfluity of images. To the correct understanding of the contents of a work of art which is founded on things, there is often attached an interpretation of them based on produced knowledge. The producing of the required image-materials is an associative-reproductive act; the interpretation, the establishing of the necessary connections, is an intellectual event, an act of thought. Their dimensions are not always the same. For the interpretation of events shown in historical pictures the necessities are mostly inferences in terms of a correct understanding of the causal relationship of starting-point and consequents, and such understanding often becomes an indispensable prerequisite for the proper aesthetic pleasure.

Intellectual acts, which also occur as important structural aspects in the event of aesthetic experience, therefore take place alongside sensorial-perceptual and reproductive-representational ones. Thus they play a role which I have already partly discussed in connection with the comprehension-procedures of relating and organizing. The parts of the aesthetic object, insofar as it is form alone, are in a certain relationship to one another. This relationship to contents jointly shared is not given in the single representation itself, however, but is correctly understood only by way of a comparative judgment. Dessoir,⁵² following this view, says that in the heard sound, the *a* below middle *c*, there are many sorts of things, but not the fact that it is higher than the *a* flat below middle *c*. No one can look at the color green and see that it is not red; it is and remains green conclusively: the variation can be established mentally only through an act of comparing and relating. Relationships are built on absolute contents, and as facts of a different order they are distinguished from those absolute contents. These intellectual procedures are indispensable for the sense of form.

To the extent that the mental producing of such formal relations is set in motion by what one perceives, one will see in the work only the intellectual side of perception, and not real thinking. But boundaries fade away, and the relating function is something

different from association and production. Nor is it identical even with thinking. Still other constituents must be added to it if it is to be made into thinking in the full sense, thinking which, moreover (despite the fact that its incompletely developed preliminary forms cannot be eliminated), does not play a domineering role in the aesthetic procedure, although it has the possibility of being able to develop clear understanding. When I look at Leonardo's *Last Supper* and seek out and name the most important apostle, then the meaning-representations which appear voluntarily have dissolved into judgments for me—that is, into intellectual judgments. Here my intellectual activity helps me in the perceptual mastery of an aesthetic object. But these judgments are not absolutely necessary.

It is a different matter, however, when judgments are a direct part of the aesthetic object. When the object itself is made up in part of judgments, then judgment is just as constituent a part of the aesthetic state as are intuition and feeling.

Volkelt⁵³ speaks about judgments required by the object. They are to be found chiefly in pieces of literature. Every narrative proceeds in a series of judgments which follow one another. It therefore is a part of the aesthetic apprehension of a narrative for us to realize the judgments which the creative writer lays down in language. Indeed, even here—as in connection with all relations and all establishings of connections, in all logical acts exerted for the grasping of what is given in perception and representation—even here the emotionalizing that belongs among the characteristic features of the aesthetic state asserts itself. If the narrative is otherwise treated artistically, these judgments are not detached acts of thoughts, but are deflected into feeling and intuition; this kind of judgment, then, is realized in a blend of imagination and intuition and as an accompaniment to movements of the mind. But it still remains a judgment. The same is true of maxims in the drama which embrace general truths like "Man makes mistakes as long as he strives," "Of all goods, life is not the greatest one," and so forth.

Occasionally these kinds of judgment are absolutely necessary as supplementary constituents of the aesthetic state in connection with certain art-works, but they are never matters of first importance. Just as all logical-intellectual occurrences in the aesthetic procedure are stripped of their discursive character and given immediacy, so do all universal ideas and concepts as well as the relations between them in the form of judgments and conclusions become constituents in the aesthetic state as ancillaries to matters which take first place.

Stephen Witasek⁵⁴ has especially emphasized this. In aesthetic objects, there are, in the first place, objects of representation. Yet thought-objects (so-called objectives) too play a certain role, a discussion of which is important for the explanation of the part the logical factor plays in aesthetic experience. To understand the contents of a piece of literature, for example, one must think, to begin with, of the meanings of the sentences—that is, of objectives. Anyone who wants properly to understand a piece of literature must first grasp what he reads. The understanding is the grasping of objectives, however, because the sentences express judgments or assumptions. But the objectives with which literature, historical painting, and genre painting deal are not themselves aesthetic objects; they are only mediators of such objects; to a certain extent they are helping constructions, so to speak. The erection of this intellectual helping structure is important, therefore, for the grasping of a content presented in literature or in the plastic arts; but it is not the actual object of aesthetic pleasure. This lies in the feelings of sympathy and empathy which are aroused by the objectives. The central nature of the aesthetic state consists of feeling and, in addition, of the intuitive (perceptual) images which are the presuppositions for it. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that no other psychic data than images or feelings appear in the state of aesthetic enjoyment. There are judgments and assumptions and other intellectual functions besides. Even a mere glance at an art-object calls to life perceptual (that is, existential) judgment; then come the numerous thoughts based on recognition, thoughts which are attached to the things and events presented. But above all, even the objectification of the thing represented, the thinking about interrelations and unintuitive constituents, already requires a great many judgments and assumptions.

The fact that these intellectual functions are less central to and less characteristic of the aesthetic state than are looking and feeling does not mean that they are not present or necessary to the aesthetic mode of behavior. Servants too may be indispensable.

8. FEELING

A. A GENERAL CHARACTERIZATION OF AESTHETIC FEELING

In earlier statements, before I could consider embarking upon a systematic and continuous discussion, I often spoke about feeling and its role in the aesthetic state. This could not have been other-

wise because of the nature of things: even a person who is not disposed to make an absolute of feeling, in terms of either a theory of aesthetic elements or of a one-sided theory of emotionalism, will admit that feeling is a psychic function which is an especially decisive part of aesthetic experience, and, indeed, as long as it lasts. Thus we have to do, not merely with a result which appears at the end, with a final feeling-product, a "resulting (*resultierenden*) feeling," but with a function which is a constituent part of the aesthetic experience from the beginning and which by its dominance lends a definite stamp to the entire procedure and to the rest of the psychic functions sharing in it. This unqualified sovereignty of the emotional is revealed, not because feeling assimilates, so to speak, all of the remaining psychic functions which are a part of the aesthetic experience and presses its seal upon them, but because it furnishes us the bases for a genuine decision about pleasure or displeasure. If we delightedly experience something as beautiful, we do so, not on the basis of concepts, knowledge, insight, or rational supports and considerations, but on that of an elementary appeal to feelings. In its direct feeling-reaction lies the distinctive character of the aesthetic state. Without long deliberation we say yes or no and assume an emotional stance. Taste does not hand down its decisions according to any kind of rule or foundation in reason, but on the basis of an immediate feeling-reaction. The first sentence of the first paragraph of the text of the *Critique of Judgment* reads: "In order to discern whether a thing is beautiful or not, we bring the representation into relation, not to knowledge by way of an understanding of the object, but to the subject and to the subject's feeling of pleasure or displeasure by way of the creative imagination (which is probably tied to understanding)." The judgment of taste is therefore not a logical judgment of cognition, but a judgment of aesthetic feeling the ground of whose determination is completely subjective. Nothing in the object is designated by way of the relationship of the representation to the feeling, but what is expressed is only how the subject "feels as he is affected by the representation." And nothing but a one-sidedness which is correct in the abstract results when emotionalistic aestheticians of all times and all countries think of feeling as the true and central aesthetic function, as, for instance, when P. J. Proudhon⁵⁵ speaks of an "aesthetic faculty" and, attempting to make a definition, adds, "which is the faculty of feeling."

Yet emotional occurrences even when they predominate and are in great supply (as in love, ethical sympathy, and religious ex-

perience) are not something specifically aesthetic, but a general psychic function appearing in the most diverse degrees of vigor. Experiences in which one is sensible of conditions accompany all events in which one is conscious of object and cause, and even sensation has its "feeling-tone." In these terms, Charles Lalo,⁵⁶ speaking against the excesses of that emotionalism which would interpret the individuality of the aesthetic state in terms of feeling, notes that "Feeling is therefore everywhere . . . and since it is everywhere, it explains nothing." And in a later place, one may read that "because feeling is supposedly in all of our activities, it does not define any one of them." If a person can characterize the perceptions, representations, acts of thought, and drives which are parts of the aesthetic state according to their functional peculiarities so as to say that they are emotionalized, then feeling, if it is to be characterized according to its individuality in the aesthetic state, needs other designations. But which ones? How do emotional experiences of the aesthetic kind differ from those which are embedded in the non-aesthetic sort?

As concerns the first and most universal characteristic, we may say that aesthetic feelings as the opposite of the lower feelings of sensuous perception are higher mental ones, and indeed are objective feelings of the material kind, though functional feelings are not absent either. Besides these, there are feelings of semblance (in opposition to the serious feelings of practical life) and so-called feelings of representation or image (in opposition to those of thought and judgment). Finally, there are certain functional characteristics too. The antithesis of feelings of semblance to those serious ones of life goes back to von Hartmann.⁵⁷ What he meant by this is correct and makes good sense; but one must guard himself from an obvious error. The expression "*Scheingefühle*" (feelings of semblance), by which aesthetic feelings, as contrasted with the emotional experiences allied with practical situations, are supposed to be characterized, must not be understood as if the feelings were not full and real ones (that is, for instance, only as if they were the results of a reproduction of feeling, a mere idea of feeling). Rather, they too are full and genuine feelings; except that, as contrasted with the serious feelings of real life, they are related only to the illusionary and the apparent, with which alone we have to do in aesthetic experience. The certitude belonging to feelings from the semblance-character of the aesthetic world invests them with a characteristic ease (*Entlastung*) and softening, with the character of not-being-real (*Irrealisierung*), as compared with the burden of serious consequences. We follow a murder committed on the stage with feelings too, and with

thoroughly genuine and strong ones; but these are very different from the ones we experience in connection with analogous grave events. In these terms, Volkelt⁵⁸ says that "Feelings of semblance are aesthetic feelings insofar as a reduction of the sense of reality is apparent in them . . . , insofar as they relate, not to full reality, but to a world of semblance." Influenced by this character of semblance, aesthetic feelings undergo a certain diminution, to which is also attached a qualitative modification; but they remain genuine feelings just the same.

Anton Höfler⁵⁹ and especially the psychologists of the school of Graz who are closely connected with him (Meinong, Witasek) characterize the nature of aesthetic feelings according to their feeling-hypothesis and call them "representational feelings" (*Vorstellungsgefühle*). Aesthetic feelings are neither those of desire nor those of judgment. We can think that a picture is beautiful without desiring either the picture itself or the object in it; nor need we judge whether the thing portrayed or the event shown exists in fact or has taken place. If a picture is to appeal to us aesthetically, the perceptual representation of it, or the corresponding representation (image) in imagination, must already be a sufficient psychological prerequisite of the feeling of aesthetic pleasure.

Arguing in a similar way, Witasek undertakes to define aesthetic feeling and its limits as compared with extra-aesthetic experiences of the emotional kind. Pleasure or the lack of it is aroused by the object as such, not by its presence or by its non-presence. An act of thought and a fully realized judgment are not necessary constituents of the aesthetic experience; the representation is a sufficient prerequisite for the feeling.

If one has established that all aesthetic feelings are feelings of representation, has one also said that all representational feelings are aesthetic ones? To this question, one must answer first that only intuitive representations are of moment as prerequisites of feeling; but, still, in making this limitation one has not attained full equivalence or reversibility. For there are feelings which have intuitive (perceptual) representations as their presuppositions and which are still not aesthetic: these are sensuous feelings. The difference between the two classes of representational feelings is suggested by the fact that aesthetic feeling can be designated as feeling about a content and that sensuous feelings are about an act: the decisive matter for aesthetic feelings is particularly the content of the representation to which they are tied; for the sensuous feelings, by contrast, it is an act of sensing. Witasek's final characterization of aesthetic

feeling reads thus: "The aesthetic feelings of pleasure or displeasure are feelings of pleasure or displeasure when the intuitive representations act as their psychic presupposition, and, indeed, in such a way that it is their content especially which comes to the fore to arouse feeling and to determine it."

In making this definition, Witasek naturally cannot have meant that the functional feelings disregarded in his somewhat over-simplified analysis of the aesthetic situation play no role in aesthetic experience. Rather, such feelings are indeed thoroughly present and give the aesthetic state a characteristic coloration. Feelings of the easy success of the perceptual activity play a role with a fully vibrant vividness in all partial acts in one's experience of object- or situation-awareness, and there are other functional feelings which we shall consider again later. At this point, however, I am referring only to that "sense of feeling" (*Gefühlsgefühl*) which is ignited by the strong and powerful emotional claims in connection with aesthetic experience, to that characteristic blessedness of strong emotions which, in line with the central avenues of thought of Dubos,⁶⁰ has been defined as a "pleasure in the vividness of feeling" (*Lust an der Gefühlslebendigkeit*) and has been represented as the specific character of the aesthetic state. This self-enjoyment in one's own excitement and powerful emotions is found in ethical emotions only when a certain aestheticizing has become an integral part of them.

At the end of this section, I must still point out that emotional experiences in connection with the aesthetic mode of procedure are neither entirely homogeneous nor, in addition, quite simple, but that they are complicated and richly organized. People have tried to describe the totality of the emotional experience which is a component of the aesthetic state as "empathy" (*Einfühlung*). Though this attempt has failed, a fact which is very important for us has become apparent in the process. The phenomenon of empathy is not a pure emotional process, but a blending of feeling with viewing and striving. Here it becomes clear that for aesthetic feeling an especially close connection with acts of object-awareness is definitive. Thus aesthetic feeling is not to be claimed entirely as a purely conditional and reactive function.

Dessoir⁶¹ suggests something similar when he points out that aesthetic feeling is not a simple or sharply circumscribed one.

If we know it for what it really is—namely, as an extremely composed kind of state—then we may not rightly think of it primarily as a conditionality of the psyche (*Zuständlichkeit der*

Seele). Aesthetic feeling too has its objectivity. It signifies in particular the integral blending of the I with the thing, a blending called forth by the perceptual necessity ruling in the aesthetic object.

Yet all of these statements are not valid for all of the many kinds of experiences in the realm of things emotional which one encounters in connection with the aesthetic state.

B. THE DIVISION OF AESTHETIC FEELINGS

The feelings which take place in aesthetic experience are not by nature entirely the same, and there is no part of any definition which is valid in the same way for them all. To get to know the differences among particular kinds of feeling, let us begin with an example. If we cooperatively experience the performance of a drama, we have feelings of very different kinds and origins. Let us suppose that the play is Schönherr's *Glaube und Heimat*. We see the touching fate of the helpless farmers in the Alps; we sympathize with their complaints, their doubts, their courage, and all of the other emotional states with which the creative writer has invested his figures and which the actors represent through diction and action. In this case, we produce feelings which conform with those which, so to speak, are lived out before us in the forms of the work, feelings which therefore are objectively given in the art-work. The same is true when we see certain aesthetic objects in nature, when, for instance, we see a peacock being swaggeringly impressive in all of his brilliance. Here that something which we experience empathically is already intrinsically present, at least in characteristic tendencies, in the object. Thus we have described the first group of feelings which play a role in aesthetic experiences (with the exception of beauty of mood which is not connected with things). Because they are objectively funded and objectively "given" (or at least decisively and unequivocally aroused), they are called "objective feelings." But because it makes for error, the expression "sympathetic feelings," which one also hears, must be rejected.

To continue our analysis of the drama: one of the second group of emotional experiences which are fundamentally different from the first is given by those feelings which have come to life in us, the spectators, because of the events and the figures in the drama. I feel sympathy for the farmers, and I admire their deliberate, determined, uncompromising heroism. But these feelings are of an entirely different sort; they are not "lived out before" us by the figures

in the drama because these people do not admire or sympathize with themselves. Rather, sympathetic reactions occur in the spectator, who takes an inner position in terms of emotional experiences to the destinies shown in the drama. With these feelings, we sympathetically follow the events we cooperatively experience. We bring these feelings to the events, and they are active as they join with objective feelings. The emotional experiences of this second group have been called "participatory (or sympathetic) feelings" (*Teilnahmegeföhle*).

A third group of aesthetic feelings is shaped by means of the emotional phenomena with which we, so to say, "quit" or leave the total effect of the art-work. At the end of the drama, we feel ourselves emotionally aroused and elevated in a peculiar way; in the course of the drama, we were often transfixed in breathless tension and excitement, and occasional restful moments also occurred. At the end, we feel ourselves filled with an intensified sense of life, and we undergo a peculiar satisfaction of mind. After different harassments and distresses have been prevailed over, we have experienced aesthetic compensation and sublimation. Now we have the resulting feeling-product of the aesthetic experience as a whole. It is designated by the catch-word "feeling of the situation" (*Zustandsgeföhle*); by way of these feelings a third group of aesthetic feelings is brought about.

In the previous material, we have deliberately chosen an example which allows all three types of aesthetic feelings to be experienced purely by themselves and in clear separation from one another. Yet things do not always turn out so favorably. If I look at a landscape or a piece of decorative art, or if I hear pure (absolute) music, not all of these groups of emotional experiences occur. Here in large part is lacking the objective type of feeling, that feeling of content, which is attached to the material presented, although certain sympathetic feelings of the kind connected with content are not lacking. In place of clearly defined feelings for content, there appear all sorts of vague colorations of mood, as well as feelings which are connected with the form and with the manner of artistic treatment.

All feelings attaining effect in the aesthetic state stem in their living actuality from out of the spectator. But objective feelings are unequivocally pre-formed in the object. Anyone who wants to experience *Romeo and Juliet* properly must sympathetically reproduce the feeling of love as it fills both of the leading characters of the tragedy. But the feeling of participation and of subjective situation

are the personal feelings of the individual enjoying the work. Yet this tripartite division of aesthetic feelings (which I have adopted from Volkelt) is not complete. I mean that this division of the constituents of feeling found in aesthetic experience is made in terms only of one tendency; for this reason it requires supplementation through one of the other classifications derived from another aspect. Such supplementation is made possible by Max Dessoir's division of the aesthetic feelings into those of sense, form, and content.

By "feelings of sense" is meant the emotional tones accompanying the sensations experienced in the aesthetic state. At the lowest end, so to speak, there are certain general sensations and the general feelings attached to them. Such physical "resonances" play a role in many experiences of empathy, but that role must not by any means be over-rated. Therefore we must reject certain extreme views of the theorists of empathy who move general physical feelings to the outside: if the form of a room delights us vividly, we are supposed to feel changes in our breathing and in our sense of balance. A symmetrical jug awakens the comforting feeling of balance. Yet this kind of experience can nevertheless be observed in clear stamp only in certain types of artistic assessment and they become aesthetically relevant only in them. Sensations of the muscular sense also have a certain value as impressions, and they furnish a basis for the pleasure in perceived motions. In the realm of the higher senses, the nuances of feeling based on sense-impression are so important that any person who cannot entertain them suffers a loss in aesthetic pleasure, though of course the entire aesthetic impression does not stem from them. The sense-feelings allied with colors and sounds are considerably affected by the differences in personality. For persons who have a susceptibility to color, single colors are already stamped with qualities like warm, cold, rounded, attractive, cheerful, bold. Colors and their combinations, like tones and rhythms, can create moods directly; their swelling and waning or their violent clashes serve to express the psychic. What is experienced in such cases lies less in the sensations themselves than in that something in feeling which is added to them.

Dessoir says that the feelings of form are emotional experiences attached to the experience of form and caused by it. On the one hand, form is the totality of relations met with in the aesthetic object (such as harmony, proportion, rhythm); on the other, it is the absolute quantity (size of space, length of time, degree) in which the object presents itself. The sense of harmony, which is a model of the sense of form, does not take place because the pleasure-values

of two vivid colors are unified, but it adheres to a connection, a relationship, between the two separate colors which is perceived at the same time as they, but which is still differentiated from them. And only because of this do we have the right theoretically to separate the feeling of harmony from the feeling of sense; otherwise, the former would only be a complicated feeling of sense. The same holds true for sound. The presuppositions for the sense of form are certain intellectual acts by which we perceive the relationships to one another of tones in a melody and of lines in a figure. If a positive feeling of proportion is to take place, a spatial order through which the eye finds its way easily and surely is imperative. But this work of orientation is not identical with comfortable movements of the eyes, as people were formerly inclined to think it was. The details of the feelings of form which are evoked by symmetry, the simplest orders of form in space, rhythm, and meter, belong to the chapter on aesthetic objectivity. But just a brief word about the higher formal organizations and the feelings they produce: harmony of sounds weds with rhythm in a musical work, harmony of colors with proportion in painting. This combining process is called complication, and the feeling arising from it is a sense of complication (*Komplikationsgefühl*). Wherever the first two aspects are found united, the qualitative component furnishes variety and the rhythm a unity; and in the multiplicity of colors, the organization of space is the medium of combination. Closely related to these is the combining of rhythm and proportion to produce an impression of beautiful motions. When bodily poses of a pleasant kind follow one another rhythmically, we feel an aesthetic value which is closely related to those of ornaments and abstract musical forms. Such a series of movements pleases us even when they do not express states of mind (for instance, affects).

This fact leads us to feelings of content. A classical ballet is pleasant because it presents the human form in formally beautiful poses and in rhythmically ordered movements. A modern dance like that created by Isadora Duncan, the Wiesenthal sisters, or dancers of the tradition of Laban and Jacques-Dalcroze is pleasant because psychic impulses are convincingly expressed. In the first example, aesthetic pleasure depends on the feeling for form; in the second, on a new type of feeling which is based on the psychical content of aesthetic objects. Here we can call upon certain insights furnished us in our discussion of the role of representation. A small hand pleases us, not only as a narrowly elongated shape, but because it appears refined, unfit for hard work, and composed of a spirit

designed for a superior kind of life. Large protruding ears are unpleasant because they as it were claim an importance which does not belong to them. In terms of such feelings of content, we speak of a boldly carved nose and of a proud forehead because many of our objective experiences have crystallized themselves into laws or rules which we can apply to a particular example. The instinctive judgment of forms is always bound up with their significances. For contemplation of this kind, the perceived form is the natural sign of a psychic content. In the aesthetic impression, content-representations of fact and feeling of content are active, and, indeed, either in an inner blending with the form of the object or in a loose bond with it. Recognizing this fact, we are not yet done with feelings of sense and form: the color of hair may entrance us without our seeing an indication of youth or health in it. Ear and nose are judged as well or badly formed without respect to their size, and no psychic content is thereby attributed to them. But this is the case in an extremely great number of feelings of content which are bound to the certain characteristics of the object. In the aesthetic contemplation of spatial forms and of ornaments which takes place, not mechanically, but dynamically, forms become activities of the will and strivings. These activities are melted down into the images, but not as representations existing at the side of the images. Rhythm arouses the feeling of a violent pushing forward or of peace. But still feelings are able to dive more deeply into the particular thing, to become an experience, possibly, of a victorious bold attack or assault. But even in such cases of a more powerful particularity, "feeling of content" does not mean that as one perceives a rhythmical form there comes to his mind the representation of the attack of a savage horseman; it means, rather, that only an equivalent impulse is present in the events of consciousness.

At this point, we have already reached the problem of empathy, which will occupy us in the following section. A further division of aesthetic feelings (like that, for instance, between the feelings of aesthetic things and those of aesthetic functions) will be discussed in the section on aesthetic pleasure.

C. EMPATHY

a.¹ *Facts and Theories.* This concept,⁶² already often mentioned in this book, has played an increasing role in modern aesthetics since Herder and Romanticism, and especially since the time of R. Vischer.⁶³ Exhaustive critical discussion of this theory is necessary, therefore, because I do not subscribe to the theory at all or

because I do so only in a strictly qualified sense. Nevertheless, authoritative aestheticians like Lipps⁶⁴ and Volkelt have made empathy the central category in aesthetics and have defined the nature of the aesthetic things in terms of it: and just as a person is being logical if he is intellectually active (it is sometimes said) and ethical when he wills, strives, and acts, so he is behaving aesthetically when he acts in terms of empathy (*empfinden*: "feeling-into"). It has already been noted that this definition is in error because empathy is not a separate function in aesthetic experience, but can be found outside the aesthetic also (for instance, in the ethical state), and that it therefore represents only one type of "receptive activity" among those which are possible in aesthetic experience; it is not by any means the only mode of activity to be found there.

Empathy is a very complex functional category which includes intuition (perception), representation, rudimentary intellectual acts, latent associations and reproductions, as well as affects and drives (*Strebungen*), alongside and outside real feeling, or, rather, in the closest blending with it. Anyone who wants to embrace the aesthetic state entirely with the concept of empathy is trying precisely in this way to avoid the deficiencies and the partialities inherent in the definition of the aesthetic attitude which is confined exclusively to feeling. Empathy is not feeling simply, but it includes a *differentia specifica*.

This concept was created with reference to the real circumstances of aesthetic experience, but in the end it has pressed beyond them to become a term in popular psychology. Let us say we are reproaching a professor with his inability to have empathic feelings for his candidates who are taking an examination for a degree. This means that he is not able psychically to exchange places with these persons, that he cannot sympathetically realize their psychic excitement. Here the question is not only a state of feeling. Thus a widely disseminated general philosophical dictionary defines the practical, everyday meaning of empathy as the capacity for taking the place of others in the world of the imagination. That which conforms to feeling therefore approaches more the immediacy and lack of reflection with which this transplanting is accomplished, and we can draw near the usual aesthetic application of the idea thus: empathy is a direct discussion in terms of feeling between my "I" which observes and the object observed; it is not a logical understanding, not an intellectual-discursive interpretation, but a direct comprehension through feeling of what is expressed in a complex of objective appearances; in intuition it is already the feeling-full apprehension

of the meaning and of the (psychic) contents of a phenomenon. But I can achieve such an irrational understanding of an object which is presented to me only from out of myself. Empathy can occur only when the object, in the broad extent of that which is possible and of that which can be accomplished, exhibits a certain analogy with me or with the psychic condition within me. At the same time, the frames within experiences of aesthetic illusion and semblance are naturally far to span: even a normal and honest person can enter through feeling into the mental condition of a pathological criminal, into someone like the protagonist in Dostoevsky's *Crime and Punishment* or in *Macbeth*, for instance.

Empathy is, further, the interpretation of the phenomena of the external world by means of a behavior which is far more direct than is interpretation through understanding; it is an intuitive apperception, not, indeed, on the basis of purely emotional categories, but still of far-reaching emotionalized ones. It is a psychic process in which on the appearance of objective stimulation we directly fill the objects we contemplate with our own psychic states. These states stem not only from feelings and moods, however, but also from drives and representations made similar to feelings. Yet the representations are not bound to the impression of the objects in a purely associative way, but are laid into them. So direct is this lending kind of "carrying-into" (*Hineintragen*) that the feelings projected into the object, feelings which in fact come out of us and are our own property, seem to meet us from out of the contemplated object. Seeing a sharp rock, we feel and call it "defiant"; as it strives upwards, a high fir seems to be "proud"; the storm-tossed sea fumes in a "wild rebellion." As a matter of fact, a rock is not defiant, the fir growing according to natural law does not feel pride, and the sea is neither wild nor rebellious. All of these feelings are our own property, are the products of our own act of empathy. With these feelings we fill and animate a natural object which does not feel and whose outer appearance reveals certain similarities to certain states of our own. We can do nothing else than interpret the phenomena outside ourselves in terms of similarity to human states and in particular to our own (*ex analogia hominis, mei*). Nevertheless, it is at most only partial resemblance which calls up to us these interpretations through feeling.

Empathy is a psychic act in which an object which to begin with is a simple fact of observation is amalgamated with one's own emotional states into a unitarily experienced totality. The end and the result of every example of this kind of process is the blending

of sensuous intuition (perception) with mood, feeling, striving, affect, and passion. The object of empathy which at first was purely a physical, outer one, is made internal by the process of empathy; it is psychically assimilated and "introcepted" (*introzipiert*); it is incorporated into our possession of feeling; in this way it becomes an aesthetically meaningful bearer of life and mind. The objective stimuli can be very different: they run from the grasping of an actual, compellingly embodied psychic content to the arbitrary construction and correct application of delicate impulses, all intermediate degrees being possible. A person who feels youthful, flourishing life in the cold marble of the Apollo Belvedere, charming beauty and sweetness in the Venus de Milo, and a quiet grandeur and calm sublimity in the several statues of Hera and Athena—this person is only grasping a content which is expressed visibly in the art-work; one's own subjective activity is freer if a Doric temple seems to breathe austere sublimity and a baroque building a brilliant splendid life. The lyrical poets of nature seem to be even more arbitrary if a landscape becomes, for them, a psychic state. The psychic interpretation which Lenau's "Reed Songs" have given to the *Neusiedler* lake need not be shared by every spectator. In such cases, empathy means a decided "putting-into" (*Hinzutun*). All empathy is a matter of completing an objective "given" with a subjective something brought into it to make a total experience which goes beyond the objective substance which is present. The given, often found in the object only as a tendency, is interpreted in analogy with our inner existence. Contemplation, which is directed by the object and which works mentally with what is present, tells us only that the rock is very vertically pointed; but for empathy, that rock reaches defiantly into the air. In empathy we carry the defiance "lent into" (*leihend hinein*); we project it from out of our inner being into the natural object. In cases of fully developed empathy, there is a "laying into" (*Hineinverlegen*) of one's own ego and of its state into the objects (persons and things) of the outer world. Empathy lends a psyche to things and allows us to experience the psyches of other persons in terms of a mutual feeling (*nachfühlen*). As a result of this projection of feeling, dead inorganic things too appear to be living and animated. At the same time the symbolizing power of imagination does not require that the outward forms of objects remind us at all of the human configuration. Often mere tones and colors are so satisfying that a mood addresses us from out of them. According to Du Prel's⁶⁵ striking statements, the creative writer's delicacy of feeling can animate

natural objects even when they remind us only slightly of what is human. And according to Lotze,⁶⁶ no form is so cold and dry that our imagination does not know how to transplant itself into it sympathetically. This ability to lend our own contents of feeling by way of projection "into" lifeless and unanimated objects of the outer world is the purest case and the most persistent case of that apperceptive spontaneity which asserts itself in all acts of empathy, if not always to the same degree.

Because of spontaneity and activity as I have described them and because of the close factors of awareness of object and condition, it follows that association does not suffice as a psychological explanation of empathy. While Ziehen,⁶⁷ a consistent associational psychologist and aesthetician, thinks that he can always trace empathy back to the facts of association, Volkelt⁶⁸ is strongly opposed to any such endeavor.

As compared with empathy, association is somewhat more external. By "association" one means chiefly the raising up of ideas which are derived, not from our impression of the perceived object, but from knowledge coming from our earlier experiences. Association is a "joining-with" (*Hinzugesellung*) out of that psychic sphere which is looked upon as lying relatively on the outside; thus it is an antithesis to the state of comprehension brought about by the empathizing of an inner state into the intuited object. Empathy is more than a process by which the contents of consciousness follow one another. Besides, intuition in itself has the appearance of a feeling-content, and this content seems to advance to meet us out of the things contemplated. This "being-in-one-another" (*Ineinander*) cannot be understood in terms of association merely. Furthermore, the "plus" contained in empathy shows that feeling works itself into the intuition (perception), which is thereby changed internally. What takes place in this way is a unitary participation of feeling and intuiting. Through feeling I imagine myself into the intuition, and the function of viewing is at the same time accompanied by feeling; that which is felt comes into our consciousness from out of that which is looked at. Thus empathy becomes a blending interpreted as the intuitive unity of perception and feeling.⁶⁹ It presupposes association and yet is essentially more than association. Though one perceives only forms and colors in the aesthetic object, one still believes that he sees the expression of feeling in addition. Other aestheticians do not make sharp distinctions like these, but want to think of the type described by Volkelt only as a comparatively rare extreme example in representation of what seldom

occurs and then only at particular high points of aesthetic enjoyment, while, as an average case, the merely associative producing of emotionalized representations and reproductions of feeling is more frequently realized. Thus Dessoir⁷⁰ says that empathy is related to the experience of expression; in both cases there is a blending of a visible object with an invisible one. Empathy is something different from the having of certain representations and of the associative reproducing of them. To be sure, most of the time this is all there is. "Empathy understood as an unconfined mutual life of passion as I know it in the actor or in the statue takes places exclusively when I myself am in an extremely heightened mood."

Here the theory of empathy enters upon a basically controversial question which extends far beyond the aesthetic sphere and into the psychology of the feeling-life, the question, namely, of whether there really are reproductions of feeling. It is a psychological problem whether the reproduction of feeling is possible only in the manner of new experience and thus as a new activation or a renewed actualization of an emotional attitude; or whether there is a more representational (ideational) reproduction (images of feeling) here.⁷¹ Thus authoritative psychologists are inclined to ascribe the characteristic of actuality to feelings (as compared with sensations) and in this way to distinguish them from reproduced ones. The sensations (so it is said) occur in two ways: primary (actual) and secondary (reproduced). This difference cannot be established in connection with feelings because feelings are always primary (actual). Naturally, one can recall the feelings he has had earlier, but this can be a pure act of awareness of the object, and thus possibly a mere thinking about an earlier feeling. If, on the contrary, such a feeling is really reproduced, this can happen only in the form of a renewal; it returns to life in its primary form even though it is somewhat weakened. But this criterion of actuality as a characteristic feature of emotional experiences is not uncontested, and for other psychologists the concept of the reproduction of feelings remains valid. This dispute is also working its way into the theory of empathy. Its thorough-going adherents explain that only real feelings, specifically directly experienced actual states of the emotional sort, can be empathized. At least only then is the fully developed type of true empathy reached. But other aestheticians (and, indeed, even those who are also psychologists at the same time) take the view that empathy can occur too in a mere imagining of feeling.

Thus Witasek⁷² teaches that only intuited representations of feeling achieve a "melting down" (*Einschmelzung*) or a blending

into the contemplated object. According to him, empathy occurs as the subject intuitively imagines the psychic facts expressed in the object through his generally co-experiencing something in imagination and perceiving it inwardly, and binds the object of this intuitive representation with that of the outer perception of expressive objects by way of acceptance or judgment; so that the result is a completely presented complex object endowed with physical and psychic characteristics at the same time. "The combining of the one and the other perhaps achieves the character of a certain intuitivity through the perception of expressive physical characteristics or signs, through the intensive awareness of their inner coherence with the psychical, and through their automatic associative arousal of it." As for the feelings shared in this event, feelings which give it its name, "the subject thus in fact experiences within himself the psychic state expressed by the object (which, moreover, need in no way consist of feeling alone), even though he does so for the most part in imagination." Therefore, according to Witasek, empathy does not take place in real, actual feeling, but is in essence a representation (an imagining) of feeling. Thus he is markedly opposed to the notion of actuality in the empathy-theory, a view followed by Lipps,⁷³ Groos,⁷⁴ Külpe,⁷⁵ and others; and these men in turn oppose his theory.

If many aestheticians resist making the assumption that reproduced feelings play a role in empathy, they clearly do so because of a fear that the rights of the domineering feeling-character of the aesthetic state are thereby encroached upon. But this is not the case; for empathy is not identical with the aesthetic feeling-state, but is only one of its presuppositions. Even the participatory (sympathetic) feelings that are so essential remain primary and actual feelings in every case. The limitation to the reproductions of feeling and emotionalized representations could therefore occur only in the realm of objective feelings. And here there is a characteristic disparity of degree, whether the feelings offer themselves to me in full and actual form or, weakened and reproduced, in imagination. We are thus led to the subject of empathy in its kinds. First, however, a bit more about theories of empathy.

With his theory of inner imitation (or mimicry), K. Groos⁷⁶ pleads for a theory of empathy which lays special emphasis on inner spontaneity and activity.

Inner cooperative experience draws our entire personality over into the contemplated object and works so that our ego presses into the soul-less forms and floods them rapidly with its own warm life.

It sets the static form in motion, makes the rigid flow, and personifies what is impersonal. In this way, experience lends the character of subjective activity to aesthetic intuition, an activity the effect of which even the object clearly takes cognizance of: every aesthetically contemplated object points by means of a characteristic sign towards the fact that as such it has become conscious only through aesthetically sympathetic experience (*Miterleben*). Because of this empathic and inwardly imitative activity, the aesthetic attitude is more than a passive condition or more than a mere acceptance; instead, it proves to be an act of consciousness. In all empathy, for that reason, the mental contents which the sensuously given "expresses" or "signifies" are experienced by the person enjoying the work, not in the abstract mode (for example, by way of word-representations like "sad," "angry," and "striving upwards"), but in the concrete one. These mental contents (it is immaterial whether the object is "really" an animated one or one merely personified so) derive from the comprehending consciousness; the apprehender "feels" his own ego or the partial application of his own consciousness into the sensuously given, and thus lends to it the mental contents, which are then experienced as if they came from the object.

Empathy-theorists, as consistent aestheticians of content, proceed on the conviction that every aesthetic object presents a living thing; the psychic state, or, better yet, the psychic activity which occurs when we place ourselves into this psychic life, when we grasp the expressed form through feeling, is quite certainly empathy. These ideas are of most decisive importance in Lipps,⁷⁷ who has found the most logical and most extreme expressions for this kind of experiences in formulations like, "I feel myself striving in the pillar" (for instance, if one is contemplating a building).

According to him, the sensuous-formal in the aesthetic object is always the symbol of a content, of a psychic life expressed in the forms. Only through animation and spirit does the object become an aesthetic object, does it become a bearer of aesthetic values. Spatial forms, colors, and tones too are psychic contents insofar as they become paths to our own participation in psychic life. Thus, as they become psychic (not merely sensuous) contents and as they take on aesthetic value for us, they must arouse us to psychic action, and we must put into them this participation in psychic life. To begin with, spatial forms, colors, and tones are given by the outer world; for us they are happenings. To them our inner activity is as something opposed. Happenings or occurrences acquire a pleasant character insofar as with my apperception of them the nature of my

mind comes into its own—and lives a full life in them. That my mind expresses itself in what I do—that is, in acts not forced upon me—this is the basis of a pleasurable sensation, of a feeling of a value that is in me. A person has an elementary sense of pleasure in the free participation of his own self—that is, in activity; a person is delighted with his own qualities, his powers, his faculties. All feelings of one's own worth are a pleasure in the power, the wealth, and the inner freedom of one's own acts. Every feeling in which the worth of one's own personality is made known becomes a feeling of one's own value: the feeling of power, that of inner wealth, and so forth.

The feeling of one's own worth which comes from the ego is at first limited to one's own ego. To be viewed aesthetically, it must be objectivized. For aesthetic value is not the value I feel within myself, but that of an object different from me. Yet the feeling of one's own value is important for the determination of aesthetic value; for it is exactly what I find to be of real value in myself that I value in like fashion when I find it in others. Thus every activity is of value according to the proportion of power in it, its wealth, its inner unanimity with itself and with the entire personality. Acting, living one's life to the full, or every experience even, is of value to the extent that a powerful personality is expressed in it. Every true and affirmative life is an object of affirmative evaluation. All pleasure in beauty is an impression of life and of the potentialities of life present in the object. For us, the highest beauty is given in the shape of human beings. Where does the basis for this beauty lie? Clearly not in the mere forms. A human being is not beautiful for other human beings because of his form, but the forms are beautiful because they are the forms of human beings and are therefore bearers, for us, of human life. Only the outward aspects of "other" human beings are given us; but we complete the "inner" aspect in terms of the traits of our own personalities. The "other" is one's own personality imagined and, indeed, modified in terms of the outer appearance and the perceptible expressions of life; it is a duplicated and modified "I." The audible and visible expressions of life (sound, facial expressions, gestures) present the first approach to the constructing of an alien personality. The inner person becomes known the most directly through sound-affects. If a person hears a sound which is similar to that with which he himself "makes known" a certain movement of mind, he again finds the affect directly in sound. This "finding" is more than a mere process of co-imagining (*Mitvorstellen*). One does not merely acquire the idea

that the affect lies at the base of the sound, but he experiences this affect. This inner cooperative creating—when, for instance, one's joy occurs simultaneously with a heard joyful sound—is empathy. The same holds for expressive movements. When we perceive such movements (for instance, the way in which a person draws himself up when he feels pride), we immediately find manifest in them an inner state or condition. One sees a certain look and derives from it an expression of pride because one knows from out of his own self the impulse and the language of its gesture. In this seeing there lies more than intellectual understanding; in it lies empathy.

The perceived outer features with which another person must pass his life can give me pleasure or hurt me precisely as I approve or disapprove of them. To approve of the inner state of another person means, however, that I co-create it inwardly. This inner creation, which means that one's own existence acts freely, is empathy. Thus empathy is a condition of joy which one feels in the inner state of another person as found in his perceived expressive movements. The basis for this pleasure in expressive movements is a positive empathy which makes it possible for us to let our own natures assert themselves freely in others.

Volkelt in his aesthetic presents a very broad theory of empathy which he systematically pursues to its greatest particularity. But I shall quote only a little from him here since I intend to refer later to some of his ideas as they apply in other connections. The object of the outer world becomes an aesthetic object only because of psychic treatment, and the core of this treatment is defined as empathy. The aesthetic state moves constantly in an interrelation of intuition and feeling (inclusive of representations and aims), by means of which relationship intuition receives content, meaning, and expression. In other contexts, Volkelt had spoken of so-called objective feelings and had interpreted them as everything in a formed feeling-life that approaches one from out of the aesthetic object. These objective feelings are natural occurrences in us. Yet the subjective "having-of-them" (*Haben*) is a matter of secondary consideration; rather, they appear to us as the property, as the expression of the object one looks at. That is to say, we project them so constantly out of ourselves and into the contemplated object that the feelings removed from us meet us as expressions of the object seen. This binding of objective feelings with the intuition of the object is therefore empathy.

By the term empathy, O. Külpe means "the phase of the aesthetic situation which shapes the aesthetic object (even when it is

lifeless and possibly subhuman) into the expressive bearer of life and mind, of human capacities and qualities, situations, activities."

b.¹ Empathy: Its Kinds and Roots. I have already suggested that one finds it necessary to see within the complex function of empathy many ranks, kinds, and degrees. The most obvious division is that of the degree of participatory feeling, and in this sense one distinguishes simple from sympathetic empathy; of course there is no agreement about whether the first is true empathy or a matter of reproduction. When we glance at outer forms and motions, either there arise in us merely the representations of an inner life which is active in these forms, or we take on the inner conditions which we "lay into" all visible forms, not merely to imagine them, but really to experience them in terms of our inner lives. Simple empathy projects into the object only known or imagined psychic determinations; sympathetic or full empathy allows us to experience intimately the conditions or events, and to do so in a total and complete kind of actuality. According to Groos, all empathy is a matter of a life-lending mode of comprehension; but there is a characteristic difference in the way the spectator's state reveals itself in one's self-observation during the course of empathy. In the one case (which is defined as a "feeling unto" [*Zufühlung*] or personification), empathy seems more to be a quiet looking; in the second case (that of a "feeling with" or a "feeling in imitation of" [*Nachföhlung*], or an inner mutual experience), the mental state of the observer has the character of being carried along in a mutual excitement (*Mitgerissenwerden*). In the first case, the aesthetic object (a chord, a color) seems to be filled with psychic life without its giving the impression that we are in any kind of way a part of this life, which, as a matter of fact, is borrowed from us. When we observe a line or a tonal series at first ascending and then descending, we proceed in the same way; in the line a tension and a relaxing of strife take place. But if the intuition seizes us more vigorously, it seems to us as if we ourselves had actively created the strivings. Although all expression arises only out of our own minds, the inspirited form appears to us as a given whole and draws us sympathetically and with mutual striving into "its" feelings and drives. This same distinction was made when Volkelt separated unaccented empathy from subjectively accented sympathy.

In the first case, the empathized aesthetic feelings do not come to conscious being as if we experienced them: the subjective side of them remains unnoticed; that which we receive empathically appears to our consciousness only as the content of the object. Apart

from its condition of being blended with the seen object, the objective feeling simply is not present for our consciousness; in this case it occurs only as something removed from the inside, as something projected into the object. In other cases, that which we receive empathically also comes to our consciousness as does the experience of our own egos (*Ich-Erlebnis*), in the shape of a subjective mutual participation (*Mitbeteiligung*). Along with the transference to the outside of the feeling in the object, we experience the object as the vibration and motion of our own self-feeling. The transference outward is the chief matter. If this is absent, the aesthetic state is really not present; but if the subjective emphasis is absent, the aesthetic character is not frustrated. When that which is felt empathically occurs in reproduced feelings, empathy has its simple form; but when it possesses the character of a truly (that is, newly) actualized feeling, empathy easily takes on the character of a subjective participation in something (*Mitbeteiligung*). Lipps and Groos hold that the mere reproduction of feeling is aesthetically useless; only the kind of empathy consummated by way of subjective participation is truly aesthetic. Volkelt is opposed to this interpretation. There can be powerfully sympathetic and shared feelings even in the case of empathic unaccentedness: that which is not accented is related to objective feelings alone.

Another way of dividing empathy is also to be found in Volkelt; I refer to his distinction between genuine empathy and the kind based on the symbolism of mood or frame of mind.

The moods with which we fill the object in aesthetic contemplation are of course wholly human. We allow our human moods to flow either into human figures and motions or into subhuman or nonhuman structures and events. In the first case, that which is experienced empathically coincides with the perceived object. It is in keeping with the nature of human figures to be enlivened by human states of mind: this is the true empathy of moods. In the case of the second group, such a coincidence does not occur. There is a clear cleavage between that which is looked at and that which is experienced empathically. Now, in spite of this, it is possible to unify both sides by way of empathy only because human moods with which we animate subhuman creations can be taken in the metaphorical sense: here appears the symbolical empathy of mood. If the statues of Greek gods appear to us to be animated by a mood, then nothing symbolical is present. But when Lenau's lyric about the oak-forest indicates that the oaks roar morosely or that nature breathes sighs of death, then a symbolical empathy of mood does

occur. The same is true if the colors of Titian create an impression of an unruffled, blooming fulfillment of life, when gothic ornaments seem to me capriciously powerful, and when the lines of works created during the Renaissance seem to be easily and nobly flowing.

It is not only for the phenomenological analysis of the aesthetic state that simple empathy is distinguished from subjective empathy; this is true too for a psychological exposition of actual-genetic presuppositions. For the genesis of simple empathy, the efficacy of the laws of reproduction is decisive, especially the law of reproduction based on the similarity of the observed object with one's own nature or state, and thus on a kind of analogous intuitive deduction by the subject experiencing empathy. If the subjectively accented inner co-experience is to be present, it is necessary that inherent in the perceptions (and vivid images and thoughts too) there be a tendency towards realizing (*Realisierung*) the perceived events (possibly, movements), towards actualizing (*Aktualisierung*) the imagined or thought occurrences or movements. What is in effect here is the socio-psychological law of the "Ideo-real" whose best-known interpretation appears in the "ideomotor law" of Carpenter.⁷⁸ It indicates that the perception of any motion, and even of the vivid representation of it, awakens in us an impulse to carry out the same motion. Every representation of a motion contains an impulse towards the realization of its contents.

With the exact measuring-apparatuses of the psychological laboratory it has been experimentally established that when one perceives motions in the arm of another person, one's own arm has the impulse to make the same motion: in the muscles motoral representations produce an initial tension corresponding with those seen. When we see a circus-acrobat at work on his trapeze, we feel sensations of tension and motion in our bodies. Or, when we see a careless person walking in front of an automobile, we jerk ourselves back as we stand on the street and reflexively check our own motions. Every powerfully realized motion calls up in us kinaesthetic participatory sensations (homokinaesthesia) and motoral impulses (*Innervationen*): motions are glued on. We expand with that which expands. If we see a grinning face on a billboard, we feel an impulse towards analogous mimicking attitudes on our own faces. In the same way, we observe laughter, crying, and yawning, all having an effect on our instinctive tendency towards imitation, towards tendentious full participation with the object we perceive. The contagious power of certain expressive motions which have been

experienced by everyone is an example of the effect mentioned by Carpenter and of that readiness for reflexive imitation in which we find one of the roots of empathy.

Earlier psychology usually held that empathy depends on acts of assimilation. Through (simultaneous) assimilations we make something into our own; we change it into an ingredient of our own ego. Assimilation occurs because through the particular sensations of a new impression, certain sensations of an earlier representation are awakened which now for their part weave themselves into those which have called them up. The verticality of a fir-tree or of a rock awakes in us a representation of a proud and defiant spirit aspiring upward. The representations of human pride and defiance which one has met with earlier in life now in a very suggestive way give meaning to the expressions of the given conditions of nature which one meets. The use of the term "introjection" as devised by R. Avenarius⁷⁹ is another way of designating empathy as a psychological matter. By introjection one means the transfer of the subjective conditions of the "I," of its own life and animation, of its own feeling and willing, into and with the perceiving and the representing of things of the outer world. Introjection has a process of assimilation as its prerequisite; the perceiving of analogies with one's own psychophysical ego allows the instinctively produced subjectivity of the "I" to melt into a unity with the impression of the object, so that this unity now appears immediately (that is, without reasoning) as an "I"-kind of being or essence (*ein ichartiges Wesen*). Such introjections play a large role in the psychic lives of primitive peoples, in myths, in animal-fables, and also (for reasons still to be mentioned) in the aesthetic mode of procedure. It is only the name of introjection that is new, however; the fact has often been mentioned and described. Thus Hume⁸⁰ stressed that the human mind shows a great inclination to project itself into the objects of the outside world. The theory of "subreption" stemming from the aesthetic subjectivism of Kant can also be mentioned here: we say that certain things in nature are sublime. As a matter of fact, the sublimity is not in the things themselves, but only in our own minds insofar as we are aware of being superior to nature. Nevertheless, we make a transference (because in contemplation we remain entirely with the object and do not reflect on ourselves) by way of subreption to the object because of reason and its Idea of eternity; the result is a respectful admiration for the object by which we are led to that Idea, and we call sublime the object itself, rather than the mood it awakens in us.

It is possible, furthermore, to think of empathy as an objectifying (*Objection*) or objectivation of feeling. As "objection" (or objectivation), empathy is an experience of objectivity. Such objections do not occur in the realm of perceptions alone; feelings are also objectified. Thus landscapes can radiate human feelings; they appear to be sad or gay, just as we are so ourselves. Messer in this connection differentiates two types: first, the perceived object can be the kind that arouses certain feelings in us. But again in this case, the feelings aroused in the apprehender can radiate back, as it were, and lend a certain character to the object. Still, the initiative towards bringing into existence a certain kind of character in the object can clearly lie on the side of the ego. In the section on the apperception of personality, I shall discuss the question of a further source of empathy.

c.¹ *Towards a Critique of the Theory of Empathy.* A critique of this theory can be pursued from two points of view: 1. from the standpoint of the aesthetician who in a kind of an immanent critique, so to speak, has shown: that empathy is not the only functional principle to be met with in the aesthetic state, or that it is really not a characteristic aesthetic function; but that it can occur outside the aesthetic state also, a fact which then makes necessary an account of the *differentia specifica* which is characteristic of the special form of empathy in aesthetic appearance and aesthetic effect and which construes it in terms of its particular kind; 2. from the psychological-epistemological standpoint, a possible critique can point out that if the circumstance as found in empathy is properly construed, a kind of psychological chimera, an "un-function" (*un-Funktion*), is asserted which does not exist at all in the realities of psychic experience if they are described without prejudice. These are the objections which M. Scheler,⁸¹ Petermann,⁸² and Metzger⁸³ have brought against the theory of empathy. And a critique of this theory from the aesthetic point of view is that of K. S. Laurila.⁸⁴

It is not only in aesthetic contemplation that we encounter the empathizing of our own inwardness into objects existing outside ourselves; we do so also outside such contemplation in all perceptions whatsoever. "Empathy is therefore a universal psychic function of great significance. But it is not easy just for this reason to see how one could explain the specific nature of the aesthetic state and of art in terms of this universal psychic function." But the aestheticians of empathy have not done this either, and have not even attempted to do so. Their chief aim was to stress the basically important role of empathy in connection with all aesthetic con-

templation. But even if one supposes that it is in fact as essential a factor in the aesthetic state as is maintained, one still has not conclusively demonstrated that the character of the aesthetic state can be understood from this point of view. This is no more possible than it is to explain the nature of the aesthetic state in terms of apperception. And yet apperception is a far more important factor in aesthetic contemplation. "It is also logically impossible to make a speciality and a unique characteristic for aesthetic contemplation out of a universal psychic function, which empathy without a doubt is. To be sure, Lipps and Volkelt have maintained that aesthetic empathy has a special character by which it is differentiated from universal empathy." But neither they nor other theorists who believe in empathy have succeeded in showing what this special character is.

Volkelt has undertaken to do so, however, a fact which Laurila overlooks. He stresses that many psychic functions which also appear in extra-aesthetic states, but only as hints in incomplete and abbreviated forms, grow into full development and transparency in the aesthetic state, and that, consequently, between the aesthetic and the extra-aesthetic forms of empathy there is at least a difference of degree. According to Groos, empathy in extra-aesthetic states is always just a means to an end; through it one tries to arrive at the quickest possible and clearest possible understanding. In the aesthetic state, however, empathy is its own end and therefore develops in a different kind of way. These kinds of statements, correct as they are in the abstract, still do not always satisfy the critic of the principle. The *differentia specifica* of aesthetic, as contrasted with extra-aesthetic, empathy (pity, ethical sympathy, immediate understanding of mimicry and expressive movements) would be correctly and sufficiently accounted for only if one said that there is an act of empathy which is marked by all of those characteristic factors brought up in our examination of the nature of the aesthetic things.

A second objection within the critique of the principle of empathy treated from the aesthetic point of view would show the following: empathy is a distinctive process met with *de facto* in the aesthetic mode of procedure and distinguished there by certain peculiar traits; but it is not the only process by any means, and it is not therefore a characteristic functional aspect of the state. Moreover, it is not always in the work, but is often realized by way of other modes of behavior and can therefore not be claimed as the functional constitutive of the aesthetic behavior. Here I am op-

posing those aestheticians who want to make empathy the rule over and the single principle of the aesthetic state; I am objecting to empathetic singularism. Such a singularism is not supported by the facts which, rather, suggest an acceptance of many ultimate principles. As a matter of fact, we behave empathically in relation to numerous objects, but at the same time there are other objects in connection with which it would do real violence to the facts if we were to speak of empathy at all. Because the principle of empathy therefore proves inadequate as an explanation of the aesthetic state as a total fact, great importance has been attributed to the principle of contemplation⁸⁵ (in the narrower meaning of a formal pleasure independent of empathy), which is alongside and outside the process we are here discussing.

Simple ornaments like patterns in rows which have no markedly rising lines are enjoyed as pure form, but without one's inducing life into them through empathy. Certain musical combinations of tones also create pleasant effects in a purely formal way without calling upon our powers of empathy. To apply the principle of empathy to certain given conditions of symmetry, proportion, and harmony; to assume in regular arrangements a life which is composed and well balanced—to do this would be very extreme. There are objects and figures which address us in a purely formal way; they have no feeling- or life-contents at all and no psychic or emotional realizations. Thus one cannot use empathy to explain pleasure in certain mathematical proportions, nor that in unity in variety, nor that in consonances and chords of the harmonic kind. One may admit that the agreeableness of a particular color can in large part be determined by way of empathy. In this connection Meumann⁸⁶ refers to the known fact that most people feel a lively, exciting mood when they see a landscape through red glasses but that, should they look through blue ones, they feel in it a restful or even a depressed one. Why does a combination of red and green please most people whereas one of blue and green just as correspondingly displeases them? In these cases and in other analogous ones, quite elementary first causes of pleasure seem to be at work, causes which cannot be explained in terms of empathy. Meumann is therefore of the opinion that not all aesthetic pleasure depends on empathy and therefore that still other principles besides this one apply. Besides this qualification of the monarchical claim of the value of the principle of empathy, there is another, that empathy wherever it occurs is not the totality of the aesthetic process, but merely a part, a constituent part, of the activity of comprehension and

imagination which accompanies all aesthetic experience. Aesthetic formalists are opponents of the empathy-aestheticians, whose central thesis is based on aesthetic contents, and they energetically follow the view that formally marked arrangements in the spheres of space and time please us directly because of a certain legitimacy of the talents of human beings as psychophysical structures, such a projection of objective feelings as occurs in empathy not being necessary.

The reasons for which Dessoir criticizes the one-sidedness of empathic singularism are worthy of note. He does not doubt that empathy does indeed play a role within the broad province of things aesthetic, but there is still the question of whether every aesthetic pleasure consists of such happy feelings of sympathy as empathy brings about. In experimental investigation of avowed aesthetic states there are so many cases in which empathic sympathy does not occur that the aesthetic state as a whole cannot be based on it. Everyday experience teaches the same thing. Simple patterns and ornaments arouse pleasure without one's having to trace the pleasant regularities back to a life emanating from us. Among architectonic forms, the organic links, as it were, are in their essentials surely an object of aesthetic joy by way of a personifying comprehension. That which is peculiarly architectonic, however, the strict lawfulness of monumental forms, is in alien opposition to our ability to assume the feelings of something else. The image-language of the beautiful achieves its inexhaustible meaning precisely because it speaks like and yet otherwise than our mind. With respect to architectural-aesthetic experiences which are usually interpreted as empathic facts Dessoir reaches the following formulation: what in such structures is analogous to the experiences of the ego and is therefore subject to all corresponding individual dispositions is best designated as mood (state of mind). Gothic domes and rococo salons are expressive of moods because a certain totality of psychic life achieves expression in them. In such cases, we attribute moods to the subject and to the object; this mood does not coincide with the aesthetic. Making a decided thrust against the principle of empathy, Dessoir⁸⁷ then disavows the idea that feelings are transferred and also that intuitive feeling-representations take place. The real inner event occurs in another fashion. The appearance of an anthropomorphic animation, of a lending of and a feeling of oneself into something, comes from the use of the words by which we indicate the aesthetic objects and our own states. We are simply misled by words, therefore, when we imagine that we owe aesthetic

pleasure to the animation of the object. According to its nature, aesthetic pleasure has nothing to do with a blending or even with an exchange. These are only metaphors in aesthetics, figurative indications of a state of affairs which at heart is completely disparate. Many metaphorical formulations stem from our own limitations in the stuff of experience and language. A person who has no clear idea of tectonic relations finds that suitable words escape him, and he cannot designate the function of a particular part in any other way than by using the current everyday words for familiar activities (to carry, to oppress, to bear oneself proudly).

But above all Dessoir, without intending all too strictly to reject the principle of empathy, opposes the attempt to make it the sole monarch in aesthetics. To believe in a formula which explains everything is to be deluded; there are many principles, and each has its respective rights.

Th. A. Meyer⁸⁸ also makes the same assertion; he opposes aesthetic singularism from his own dualist position. Like the almost formless thing, a content-less form too can arouse aesthetic joy. Closed geometrical figures and physical relations in form like symmetry, simple proportion, and physical contrast owe their formal agreeableness chiefly to the law of perceptible intuitive organization which rules in them, not to an aesthetic object with a content, to life-content, which looks at us out of them. If a slight aesthetic agreeableness is aroused as one sees certain simple formal elements, the cause is in the agreeableness of the form, not in the life-content couched there. True, in a well-proportional rectangle which proves to be a box of cigars or the envelope of a letter, one can see the harmony of an evenly-flowing life, but who does this kind of thing usually? In comprehension through his eyes, the average spectator feels only something of the agreeableness of proportionality.

Alongside these restrictions on the principle of empathy there is the total discarding of it, as found in Paul Moos,⁸⁹ for instance. From his point of view—it is that of concrete idealism as advocated by E. von Hartmann—what is explained by the dogma of empathy is the exact reverse of relationships as they occur in fact. But to reject empathy entirely is to overshoot the mark and we need not discuss the matter.

A basic critique of the concept of empathy whose scope is fundamentally broader than the sphere of aesthetic concerns is undertaken by modern psychologists as they discuss the origin of our knowledge of psychical matters which are foreign to us. This critique is directed chiefly against Lipps, who was not only an

aesthetician, but also a psychologist, and who believed that with the principle of empathy he had produced a functional category which extends beyond psychological matters. Besides sensuous perception, which is related to the physical world, and inner perception, which is related to one's own experience, there is a third kind of perception which is empathy and which is the basis of our knowledge of egos not our own. This knowledge comes about through a characteristic mental act, a kind of transportation outward (*Hinausverlegung*) from out of my own ego into the being alien to it. In this experience which is shared (*Miterleben*) or which is imitative of other beings (*Nacherleben*) (through the consummation of which the alien ego comes into being for me), there is a quiet transfer of my own experience into the alien physical phenomenon which in this way becomes the bearer of an inner life for me. It is acts of empathy which construct the alien individual for me. The alien psychic individuality is taken from out of my own.

Scheler, who adopts the phenomenological point of view, is opposed to this theory. In the first place, his critique judges adversely the presupposition of empathy-theory, that the ultimate primary givenness of an alien being is only the appearance of the alien body. In opposition to this, his own affirmative basic thesis (he gets it by way of phenomenological analysis of the perception of phenomena foreign to us) runs thus: in the perception of that which is not oneself, there is given us directly as intuition a totality which is truly unitary and which is not divided primarily into the physical "I" and the psychic "I." When I see an angry person, I get at his anger in his gestures and deportment; "in these the anger has been encased for me; without the psychical which is given with them, they are not what they are. One is secondarily able conceptually and in fact to separate effects of anger and expressive images from each other; essentially and primarily, both to begin with are given in a characteristic existence-in-one-another [*ineinander*]." Scheler's opposition to the principle of empathy is ultimately in the service of a basic hypothesis in metaphysics. But even psychologists too have taken a stand against it.

Thus the existential psychology of Petermann, who timidly and unadmittedly follows the ontology of Nicolai Hartmann,⁹⁰ sketches a theory that our awareness of what is not our own is based on our dealings with others. The basic fact from which the question of the origin of our knowledge of psychical matters which are not our own is approached is not the component of the optical image of the alien being with its expressive traits and so forth, but the fact

that this alien person and our knowledge of him are in general constructed on the basis of their being brought together in peculiar and widely inclusive contextual relations whose character is defined by the existential-psychological ground-concept of a foundation on our familiar intercourse with people (*Umgangsfundiertheit*).

Metzger, in a very far-reaching critique, attempts to deprive the principle of empathy of its foundation in psychological fact. He attacks the assumption that we can know the mental states, aims, and characters of our contemporaries only through empathy because these matters do not lie in the realm of things we encounter. According to him, this too is basically false: the inner psychic conditions of people alien to us also lie quite within the realm of things we can meet. The same is true for the appearance of figures and so forth. The objects of perception as such are already characterized by way of a certain structural tension (dynamic structures); they already exist in the outer perception of geometrical figures and are self-rising attributes in patterns of perception, not, like the results of empathy, mere raw materials which must have originated from within the spectator and thus from outside the contemplated image. The feelings produced by a certain appearance belong to the figures as such. A theory of empathy "according to which the qualities of the forms of perceived things too are 'really' feelings of the spectator, those which he in some kind of way puts into these things, is probably not a pursuit of the theory of the form-quality of feeling, but . . . a clear reversion to an atomistic mode of contemplation." Form-qualities are not projections of the subjective inner states of the spectator into the thing outside himself which he perceives.

Metzger has presented a radical refutation of the idea of empathy. Were the psychological opinions pursued by Petermann and Metzger correct, empathy would have been shown not to be a psychological function at all; it would be a "non-function," and it would be impossible from now on to use it as a point of departure for a central concept of an aesthetic theory.

Yet things are not this way at all. The psychologists just mentioned start from largely unexplained theoretical constructions, and what they advance is more a postulate and a programmatic *Leitmotiv* of an original psychological mode of contemplation than a product of unbiased description and plain fact. We must first wait and see how this new heuristic-methodological aspect in the practice of psychological investigation proves itself before we can draw conclusions for aesthetics from it. For the present and until we

know the results, we shall have to profess a critically limited and moderated theory of empathy.

Let us recapitulate. Now as before, the concept of empathy is a central category in aesthetics. It must not, of course, be absolutized; nor must it be placed at the center of a singularistic (monistic) theory. It is no more satisfactory for a total definition of aesthetic relevance than for an absolute description of the aesthetic state. For: 1. there are genuine acts of empathy outside aesthetic states too; 2. there are examples in which a genuine aesthetic attitude occurs but which give no evidence of empathy. With the phenomenon of empathy, therefore, one has undeniably grasped an important fact of the aesthetic state, but not the only one by any means, and not even the one which authenticates aesthetic relevance. Very often the aesthetic state depends on acts of empathy (acts which themselves can in turn reveal different degrees of subjective ego-participation); but at the same time there is a pleasure in form which is based on intuitive (perceptual) satisfaction and which takes place in the absence of a projection-kind of lending of one's own emotional experiences to the object contemplated. Simple relations of form in spatial and temporal organizations can be enjoyed empathically, but they do not have to be. This is a matter of inter-individual type variations. Naturally, the contemplation of pleasant formal relations is mentally satisfying too and filled with feeling as a result; but this need not be empathy, because empathy occurs only when objective feelings are placed there by the spectator. Feelings of participation and of situation are present in the absence of empathy too, possibly on the basis of purely contemplative presuppositions. The reactive part of the experience of aesthetic feeling is independent of empathy. Therefore it appears that not everything in the aesthetic state which has emotional components can be spoken of as a feeling of empathy; nor can it occur because of that feeling. If the experiences of empathy which play a great role even in practical-ethical life are to retain their aesthetic stamp, they must be divorced from interest, they must be pure, and they must be illusionary. The boundary between empathy and formal pleasure (which many people wish to designate with the concept of contemplation, understood in the narrower sense) in all of its sharpness exists only for theoretical consideration, and not for the aesthetic state which is alive, a state which in connection with the contemplation of given forms can progress directly from the mere pleasure in form (which, however, can as such be thoroughly aesthetic) up to empathy. Then a heard rhythm will be enjoyed not merely as a marked and pleasingly

arranged pregnant form in time, but as an expressive bearer of decisiveness, of an urgency pressing forward, or of a cheerfully vibrant life.

d.¹ *Empathy and the Apperception of Personality.* A certain opposition has been brought to the concept of empathy, particularly with respect to the consistent interpretation that a contemplated object is to be filled with the inner life of human beings as it comes from out of us; the reason is that many persons in observing themselves cannot establish that anything of the kind happens, although they are ready to admit that when they are in the aesthetic state, the dead thing appears peculiarly alive and animated. It is merely that they cannot discover anything anthropomorphical or automorphical there. To account for such very common and indubitably correct results of introspection, I have tried to place a moderated interpretation, so to speak, of empathy alongside the consistent concept itself; for the modified idea I have suggested the expression "apperception of personality."⁹¹ By this, I mean that the contemplated pre-aesthetic object, in that it is changed through an act of aesthetic comprehension into an aesthetic object, undergoes a transformation into another mode of existence: it is transferred for and through aesthetic experience out of the form of the objective into the form of personal existence. This, as I have said, does still not have to mean that the aesthetic object becomes filled with human life and the psychic through empathy; but it means primarily merely that it is apperceived *sub specie personalitatis* under the category of person with the characteristic features constitutive for personal existence, that it is viewed as if a kind of personal mode of being belonged to it. In the aesthetic state, the categories of the form of personal existence are concentrated into an intuitively effective feeling-substance. The attributing of a form of personal being is a function not only of the objective characteristic traits, but also one of the standpoint of the viewer: what presents itself from a certain point of view as objective is "personal" for and from another point of view. The fruit-tree whose branches are sinking under the weight of fruit and the fir-tree rising in the air are facts for the gardener and the botanist; for the aesthetic contemplator, who has a different relation to the world, they are living organisms of a personal sort. The "carrying" of the fruit-tree and the "rising" of the fir (which in the impersonal view are simple attributes of things as they are given objectively) are experienced in the aesthetic procedure as if they were activities of personal existence, the spontaneous utterances of a personality, not attributes of a material thing. A certain

mountain is a givenness of fact which does not have its own significance—for the researcher; it is important only as a part of a geographical or geological continuity; but the aesthetic contemplation of a single mountain-peak is experienced as a characteristic image in terms of an individual personality. Therefore mountains in great part even carry very distinctive individual names (one thinks of the *Wilden Kaiser* in the Tyrol or of *Frau Hitt*) which they do not owe to science: for the purposes of science an abstract-impersonal geological term would be enough.

Apperception of personality is not identical with empathy, but it is in the closest relationship to it and is, so to speak, a lower, not completely developed degree of it. According to Ziehen, empathy is a suspending of the boundaries between the "I" of the subject doing the enjoying and the "not-I" (the contemplated object); this destruction or suspension of the boundaries can result because the "I" of the person enjoying art feels itself placed within the aesthetic object; or because an "I," a psyche, is really "laid into" the object. In the first case, Ziehen speaks of an egotistic, in the second of an animizing empathy. The first is what is ordinarily characterized as a full, subjectively accented or sympathetic empathy, by contrast with which the second is closer to pure apperception of personality.

In aesthetics up to the present (much to the detriment of clear understanding) apperception of personality has been identified directly with empathy. If we feel an active-spontaneous dynamism in the rocks "striving upwards," the result has usually been interpreted as an animizing-anthropomorphical act of empathy. I feel myself or a human ego (so it is said) *into* certain given things whose outward appearance points to certain analogies with human states; I animate non- or subhuman objects with concrete human mental states, feeling-states, drives, affects, and so forth. Certain inner states and the forms of their expression are known to me from out of myself and from out of my fellow human beings; in this concrete human form they are empathized into subhuman objects whose forms and movements in this way obtain the character of human manifestations.

Yet many persons decidedly object even to this contention. There are not a few observers who do indeed see a rectangle "standing" on a narrow base without their being led to an awareness of an analogy to human matters. For all that, neither have they experienced this figure as abstractly geometrical; they have felt it in some way, precisely in that of the apperception of an aesthetic personality. As has already been said, empathy and the apperception of

personality are not quite the same despite the close connection between them; and, indeed, the second is included in the animizing empathy of Ziehen, which is always anthropomorphic. To be sure, every anthropomorphic act of empathy is an apperception of personality (and, indeed, the model of it), but not every apperception of personality needs to ascend to an anthropomorphic empathy. When I attribute to a vertical line the dynamic tendency to strive upwards and interpret it in terms of personal categories of activity and motion towards an aim, no content of concrete human feeling need be alleged. True, the spatial category of uprightness as a personal dimension, upright stretching as a personal dynamism, is known in the first place as emanating from out of myself. The experiences of one's own person are naturally an especially marked example of one's perceiving certain personal categories; but it is still not true that these experiences, as they are frequently used, then consciously bring along the anthropomorphic and the automorphic character in a condition which is always unfaded. They remain the most effective categories of organic-living things even when their specifically human character is no longer in evidence. I can contemplate a landscape according to the categories of personal existence without its becoming a psychic state for me or a symbol of the human-spiritual. It is precisely thus that I experience the marked verticality of a tall fir: it has the aesthetic quality of a proud "striving upwards," but it does not require of me a recollection of a human striving upwards.

In my book on personalistic aesthetics, I have undertaken to prove further that within the aesthetic state there persist certain modes of procedure in the form of functional atavism, certain procedures which have been substituted for in other spheres of action, in the scientific and the practical, for instance, by means of the "more realistic" and thus by what is more pragmatic. To comprehend the things of this world *sub specie personalitatis* and *analogia hominis* is an obvious primitive procedure which reveals itself in powerful development at the beginnings of ontogenesis and phylogenesis. We know that a child hits the chair on which he has bumped himself; he punishes it because he imagines that intentional malice has been done. The child speaks in a quite artless way to dolls and animals because he assumes, according to the naïve personalism that is his, that they have psychic lives analogous to his own. The child also attributes his own impulses of will to the objects with which he has to do, and thus he interprets the events of his environment as the expressions of the will of the objects of the world

around him. Of all of the natural tendencies towards representation which are of moment for apperception, however, none has the same strength as the tendency which is repeatedly actualized through the movements of one's own body to experience impulses of the will.⁹² Thus recollection of experienced impulses of will is the easiest to awaken, and these recollections make up the prevailing mass of apperceptions which the child brings to every event to which his attention is turned. For the child, every perceived object has value as an animate being, and everything that he notices in the object he thinks of as an act of the will of the object. This animistic and anthropomorphic kind of interpretation is found also among primitive people. The plaint of the winds, the flowing of waters, lightning, thunder are thought to signify expressions of the will of visible or invisible nature. Jerusalem gives the name of "fundamental apperception" to the mode of apperception through which all events of the environment are explained as expressions of an independent will. He therefore has also indicated the epistemological root of empathy. It is clear that, for the work to be achieved in different spheres of civilization, such a naïve-personalistic mode of comprehension is a form of apperception which is manifestly unsuitable and which therefore can the most feasibly be cut off by more purposeful modes of behavior. But yet there is a realm in which the banned gods of Greece still can rule: the aesthetic. Here in the realm of semblance, of pure contemplation detached from the consequences of real seriousness and from practical duties, this mode of comprehension is able to supply us valuable results which are closed to other spheres.

9. THE ROLE OF THE WILL

Just as our discussion of feeling and its participation in the aesthetic attitude has had to be detailed, so what we have to say about the roles of striving and desiring, of wishing and willing, can be short and aphoristic. Both feeling and willing lie in the nature of things. Feelings belong to the psychic functions participating most in the aesthetic state. But experiences of the will can appear in this state only with characteristic limitations if that state is to be realized in its purity and completeness. If for our present considerations we take over from the theories of feeling a division between objective and reactive (1. participatory, 2. situative [*zuständliche*]) feelings; and if with what we have learned of the theory of empathy we combine the basic insights of our own theory of the contem-

plative-interestless character of aesthetic experience, then we can say the following as being founded on universal and fundamental principles: as objective experiences (that is, as material for the acts of empathy to which an observed object invites us), will-experiences of all kinds too are possible in the aesthetic state without their staining its purity. If in connection with the personality-apperception of lines, figures, spatial forms, and rhythmically organized series of tone, there seem to be activities of will, if we "feel into" them motions of strife, then experiences of will and striving do indeed play a decisive role. These empathized experiences of will are incomparably stronger as one looks at pictures which present tension-laden situations in history, as we read novels, and as we experience dramatic performances where powerful will-impulses are realized in an imitative fashion. The term "empathy" is not really pertinent because not only experiences of feeling, but also strivings, affects, pains, abrupt volitional experiences of the most varied kinds which blend with the intuitively contemplated object are of moment here. A spectator at a dramatic performance is therefore not only permitted, but actually required, to accomplish by imitation all acts of will as they are presented him by the actor portraying dramatic persons. Such acts of will as are necessary to the structure of the aesthetic-artistic object must be realized in experience by the persons enjoying the work; they do not disturb the aesthetic nature of the experience because they have not only the character of immanence (as it is confined to aesthetic-artistic objects), but also that of illusion and detachment from reality. By contrast, however, all desires like those which the spectator may direct towards a beautiful actress are absolutely forbidden because they take him away from the nature of aesthetic things. Thus we have said that the aesthetic state may not, as reactions of the spectator, include wishes and desires of the sober kind. Participatory desires are allowed under the assumption that they are decisively modified through the semblance-character of things aesthetic. Actual states of willing, striving, and wishing are banned or are possible only as tendencies below the threshold. How far and to what degree I may desire the beautiful object as such has already been shown.

That will-experiences can have a critical share in aesthetic experience within the framework of empathic occurrences, that the will therefore cooperates alongside perception and representation in the structure of the aesthetic object: this has been stressed by Dessoir.⁹³ "The formal issue of the actions of the will with its strivings and its restraints, its waxings and its wanings, is also found

in aesthetic pleasure; not, however, at all as a pure inner event which is only set into play by the object and then discharged according to its own rule, but as a process experienced with and in the object. It has a place on this side of empathy. It is the aesthetic object that is aimed at and held in check, which waxes and wanes, and this occurs on the basis of its structure. We may treat these formal determinations of the inner activity of the will as something objective because we are sure to experience the same state of mind in repeated perceptions of the object."

If within aesthetic experience aspects of the will are to be possible only with characteristic diminutions of intensity, then there is concern in terms of these limitations and exclusions only for the aesthetic experience as such and in its ideal purity, and not for the way works of art behave. For it is precisely the central thesis of the "General Science of Art" that our attitude towards art is not confined to its aesthetic side, but that it can include also ethical factors, intellectual factors, and so forth. And according to this view, an art-work can also be a problem of the will, not only for the creator, but also for the person who has an experience in conformity with it.⁹⁴

10. AESTHETIC PLEASURE

A. THE INDIVIDUALITY OF THE EXPERIENCE OF AESTHETIC PLEASURE

The aesthetic is one of the elementary values towards which humanity has turned in the course of its cultural development. Consequently, the aesthetic attitude is a live entering-into-relation with a value. And thus one has already indicated that a component of pleasure will appear in it; for pleasure is that tone of consciousness with which we reply to a value presented in one of our experiences. Pleasure is a subjective reaction of a positive kind to certain value-accented impressions of the outer world or to sensations of the organism which inform us that our present psychophysical being is in good health; it is, in short, the reflection in consciousness of the furtherance here and now of our existence interpreted in the widest sense. How are the effects of pleasure and feeling related to each other? According to the opinion of the theorists of pleasure and pain,⁹⁵ for whom feelings are in a one-dimensional series with pleasure and pain as poles, they are identical; for them, pleasure and pain are kinds of feeling; they are elementary qualities, or at least sustaining basic strata of elementary qualities. If the feelings

are to be defined as a group of psychic experiences in which the mind directly and as a whole takes a position with respect to its own happenings,⁹⁶ then the feelings of pleasure are a positive kind of an inner evaluation and attitude, and the feelings of pain are their opposites. On grounds to be discussed directly, there is no reason for the aesthetician to take sides as concerns the pleasure-and-pain theorists and their opponents. It should be mentioned, however, that precisely those aestheticians who have had impressive experiences in their own realm of fact and those psychologists who begin with the data of aesthetic feeling or who are interested in aesthetic feeling predominantly are the people who show an inclination to recognize, along with pluralistic theories, the multiplicity of the kinds of feelings and who accordingly make a separation between feelings and experiences of pleasure and pain. Volkelt⁹⁷ furnishes us an example. For him, pleasure is a certain formal accentuation in psychic events from which feelings can be distinguished, these feelings to be understood as the content-inspired excitements of the undivided ego. According to him, aesthetic pleasure is concerned, not with content-based movements of mind, affects, and so forth, but with an accentuation of positive feeling as such.

Aesthetic value differentiates itself as something entirely unique among human values; similarly, it must be admitted that the pleasure felt in aesthetic experience can be characterized as something individual by means of which it differentiates itself from pleasure in practical advancements and from pleasure in matters of ethical and intellectual value. We are concerned here with characterizing aesthetic pleasure by showing crucial *differentia specifica*. At the same time, we are concerned only with characterizing an individual total character as it results from the embeddedness of the aspect of pleasure in the context of aesthetic experience and as it grows out of it. If the intellectual direction of an experienced whole defines and makes precise its own partial aspects in terms of itself, then aesthetic pleasure too must be distinguished from the products of pleasure as they are experienced in the physical-material advancements of existence here and now, in products of ethical value, and so forth. Looking only at the elements of experience, one must, with Külpe,⁹⁸ arrive at the opinion that aesthetic pleasure and pain cannot be distinguished qualitatively from other pleasures and pains and that one cannot at once recognize whether they are aesthetic or not—and certainly not in terms of the aesthetic elements or by means of atomistic analysis. But even Külpe supposes he is able to

succeed in establishing the peculiar nature of the experience of aesthetic pleasure by ascending to definitions of the form of the procedure. And, indeed, he sees its peculiar nature as based on the fact that as a total reaction it fills the entire human being and that it therefore is not simply a partial content of sensibility; besides this, he begins as far back as the factor of origin. Thus aesthetic pleasure is differentiated in particular from the feelings of sensuous pleasure, which, however, are well able to enter it. A mark of sensuous feelings is that they are dependent on the intensity of the stimulus; but aesthetic feeling depends, not on stimulus, but on impression—on that, namely, which has come from the stimulus by way of contemplation through understanding and receptivity. To fix the boundaries between aesthetic pleasure and the remaining feelings of pleasure, one must draw on factors which result from the embeddedness of this pleasure in the context of contemplation.

First, however, there are certain matters of terminology which can carry on further suggestions already made and bring them to a conclusion. We have already become acquainted with certain frequently heard objections that the expression "pleasure" in its traditional sense seems hardly suited to characterize those peculiar and extreme intensifications of life in which we participate in the aesthetic state. We also know that this pleasure is not an unproblematical (that is, not uncomplicated) and unitary (homogeneous) one in any terms, but that, instead, moments of pronounced displeasure in many cases assert themselves in it—in, for instance, aesthetically basic forms like the pathetic and the tragic, as well as in works of certain artistic movements and style like the "Storm and Stress," Naturalism, and Expressionism, in which roughness, crass cynicism, atrocities, and grotesqueries of all kinds play very decisive roles. The positive total coloration of aesthetic experience has been characterized, not as pleasure, therefore, but (using a wider and less prejudicial expression) as an intensification of the sense of life and as a satisfaction of mind.⁹⁹

Similar arguments are also to be found in Dessoir¹⁰⁰ as he raises the question—though he is disposed not to give too much importance to the terminological problem—of whether aesthetic enjoyment, in conformity with tradition, should be designated as a pleasure:

Certainly it would be perfect folly for anyone to try to put tragic emotion on the same plane as a minor pleasure in a piece of candy; throughout the world even the agreeableness of simple symmetry is distinguished from ecstatic enjoyment of the pre-

lude to *Tristan*. Thus one could limit the use of the word 'pleasure' only to weaker and smaller impressions and, for the rest, speak of the experience of the value of an occurrence. Still in the end the other designation is admissible too—that is to say, if a person broadens the concept of pleasure so that it includes degrees and kinds and that the course of feeling which interests us is subordinated to it. The experience of an inner enrichment through surrender to a value which has become perceptual and through the heightened awareness of one's own existence—albeit not a pleasure strictly defined and stamped—remains pleasant in the deeper sense.

The effect of aesthetic delight—it begins at the very start of the aesthetic attitude and substantially outlasts the close of genuine contemplation—this effect has usually been explained by way of the concept of pleasure. That this concept does not suffice to characterize aesthetic experience as a whole has already been said. But for that reason it still remains valid as a sign of basic partial aspects. Every object which pleases one as beautiful in the widest sense induces a pleasurable sensation. By this we mean a positive reaction of an experiencing subject to an impression which in some way meets his demands and expectations, which fulfills them as enrichment and is therefore received with an inner assent. Pleasure is thus a "turning towards" (*Hinwendung*) in contemplation, an inner approval of and assent to an impression. Only something given in contemplation can ever give enjoyment, and, saying this, one has pointed out a certain affinity of this mode of reaction to aesthetic looking-experiences. Even a meaningful phenomenon which is primarily ethical can please one—a good deed, a good character, an intention; but the last two do so only insofar as they reveal themselves in a phenomenal action. Pleasure occurs when a person consentingly surrenders himself to a view, when he gladly tarries in contemplation because he feels himself addressed inwardly by the impression he has received. Pleasure is therefore nothing but a delightful feeling-effect on the occasion of an experience of hearing and seeing, in connection with which the pleasure is the symptom of the fact that the object presented and the condition of the spectator are in conformity with the demands of the subject (which demands need not be absolutely present in a clearly evident form). The relationship with the sense of pleasure is characteristic here: therefore, the presence of a feeling of pleasure is constitutive for every impression that is aesthetically positive.

An important part of the expressions of consciousness sharing in the aesthetic state is therefore more or less pleasure-accented. According to Volkelt,¹⁰¹ the aesthetic as such and in general resides in the harmonization of that which is human and in the suspension of all tensions; consequently, in terms of its fundamental nature it aims at the accentuation of pleasure which belongs to the worth of the aesthetic whole. In that it realizes aesthetic value within itself, our consciousness is changed into a frame of mind beneficial to it. For the aesthetic state the factor of the least final product of pleasure (a product beginning directly after blocking and disgusting experiences) is indispensable and essential. An aesthetic state which is without pleasant enhancements of life (which notion must not be interpreted superficially) would at the least not be a perfect or fully developed one. With respect to the characteristic participation of the factor of pleasure, the realm of aesthetic value is different from that of the ethical. One often realizes the value of conventional morality through painful resignation and through a painful doing of one's duty as one struggles between duty and inclination. If an act or an intention is to be considered good, it is completely irrelevant if pleasure falls to the share of anyone at all (the doer, the person concerned, or an unconcerned observer). Indeed, the ethical rigorism of Kant tends to bar pleasure from the realm of the ethical and to recognize as moral only those acts in which pleasure and inclination do not form the motives. The achievement of pleasure is not constitutive in the realm of truth either. A mathematical solution or a piece of historical knowledge can be correct and remain so even if no one finds pleasure in it.

But, in opposition to this, if one believes that pleasure is an essential aspect of aesthetic value and of the proper experience which is correlative to it, he must protect himself from two errors: 1. from the shallow hedonistic interpretation of the notion of pleasure thought of as untroubled delight or as shallow fun and mere amusement; 2. from a eudaemonistic (happiness-oriented) over-evaluation of the principle of pleasure which would make decisive in aesthetics this principle alone. The error mentioned under number 1 can be considered as being barred in terms of everything said so far about our subject. About point number 2, one could still say this: numerous aestheticians make the aspect of pleasure the *de facto* starting-point of their considerations; and not only because it is most useful for the purposes of investigation and presentation to start with pleasure as the matter nearest at hand and as the most evident side of aesthetic things, but also because in a more definitive and more

weighty sense the decisive aspect of the aesthetic state in its totality is to be sought in it. But more than anyone else, Volkelt¹⁰² has opposed this view; it is his conviction that matters are essentially otherwise.

Pleasure does not have the rank of an aesthetic principle, not to mention its being the sole one: in no case can the aesthetic state be confirmed and justified in terms of pleasure. Intrinsically, pleasure is not a value-factor; rather, it is only a phenomenon attendant on the value of an aesthetic whole. Only the human contents give value or withhold it from the accent of pleasure which accompanies that aesthetic whole. The pleasure is neither the ultimate motive which sends us into aesthetic enjoyment, therefore, nor the meaning and core of that which one longs to find in aesthetic behavior; rather, it is only an immediate and indeed necessary phenomenon of organic consequence, a phenomenon which is striven for naturally in the aesthetic procedure. The ultimate significance of the aesthetic state lies in certain subjectively valuable, humanly meaningful modes of behavior. In this connection one must, for the rest, distinguish between the aesthetic mode of contemplation and that of art-theory. Even if he is not hedonistically or eudaemonistically inclined, and thus does not see the winning of pleasure as the ultimate aim of the aesthetic procedure and that pleasure as the ultimate significance of aesthetic things—even so, the aesthetician will see pleasure as an essential component of the aesthetic state; for if this pleasure does not flow in any conceivable way into the satisfactions of mind and into a pleasantly intensified sense of life, then the state is imperfect, disordered, and not completely developed. In the enjoyment of art (that is, in the adequate experience of art-works), matters are not quite the same. For art is not entirely an aesthetic phenomenon, but is in the service of other values also. K. S. Laurila¹⁰³ is not entirely wrong, therefore, in opposing the view that the nature of art is to be found in pleasure. Often enough it happens that a work of art can be preponderantly pleasant as well as unpleasant. But it is wrong to broaden this rule from art-theory into a universal aesthetic one, as Laurila does, and to speak of an evanescent minor pleasant ingredient in the state of aesthetic feeling.

For the rest, many artists who theorize and writers on art closely connected with them detest not only any kind of hedonism, but every kind of thorough-going emotionalism too. These two "rejections" have a causative connection: the anti-hedonism of these people is mostly the result of their anti-emotionalistic attitude.

Ziegler¹⁰⁴ once called feeling the distinctive organ of beauty; but not a few artist-aestheticians are of the opposite opinion: that in the realm of art, feeling alone is not everything; indeed, for them the enjoyment of art through feeling¹⁰⁵ is a symbol of dilettantism and they see this sentimentalizing as a danger to that truly proper enjoyment of art which is based on genuine knowledge. The same is true even for music. "Musicians smile at the bliss of happiness felt by the public, which thinks it a sign of real understanding to be stirred by the moods affixed to the music." They themselves hear music with a greater coolness than do laymen.¹⁰⁶ Konrad Fiedler's¹⁰⁷ violent rejection of the pleasure-and-enjoyment theory and of aesthetics in general (which he too hastily and unscientifically identifies with this theory) is based on the notion that reactions which are completely subjective do not in any way do justice to the objective value of the work of art. No damage is done to the work of art if it arouses dislike. There is a difference here between the feeling-reaction which is objectively funded and aroused and one which is subjective. Yet that the taste of the far-reaching public is in fact uncultivated; that it is corrupted by the worthless in recreation; that it reacts negatively or improperly precisely to great art and accepts worthless art with great pleasure and with a corresponding approval at the same time as it denies the valuable and the original—this fact still does really not prove that pleasurable factors are not constitutive of the aesthetic state, even if pleasure is not a true indicator of the artistic value of the contemplated object. *Abusus non tollit usum* is true here as everywhere.

With all of this, it has not been demonstrated that a pleasure-product is indispensable for the aesthetic state. What, then, have we discovered (I am trying to wind up this discussion) about the peculiar character of aesthetic pleasure as compared with analogous experiences of another origin? We can answer this question satisfactorily by bringing together what has been said about the nature of the aesthetic things and applying it to our present subject. We can therefore confine ourselves to certain supplementations and amplifications. As concerns the getting of pleasure, there is a peculiar kind of experience which with respect to the form of the experienced whole is different from sensuous-material and other pleasure. The tone of pleasure in aesthetic experience is characterized by a certain intensity and depth in spite of an often limited quantity, by a far-reaching discharge, and, further, by a divorce from that material personality of ours which is vigorously in play in connection

with sensuous experiences of smell, taste, and touch; and, thus, more than anything else, by a certain ideal character and a characteristic freedom of mind.

Furthermore, we must hold fast to the fact that aesthetic pleasure is something various and many-shaped and that it absorbs its food from many quarters. Aesthetic pleasure is a positive emotional attitude growing out of feeling-full perception, a position in connection with which a resultant of pleasure comes into consideration in a psychic activity as such and also in the contents with which this feeling-saturated contemplation occupies itself. Earlier we distinguished aesthetic feelings of the material kind (of content, of things) from those of the formal (functional) kind. Because both kinds can bring pleasurable products to maturity, these material and functional types can also be differentiated within the sphere of the experience of aesthetic pleasure.

Among feelings of material pleasure we include: delight in the intuitively-given healthful and rich plenitude of life, in the unblemished and perfect being felt in the beautiful object, in the satisfying images effected by that being, and in the value of agreeability which is blended with sense and perception. The humanly meaningful contents offered us in aesthetic experience can broaden and complete our own natures, hold painful and difficult restraints in abeyance, and supplement deficiencies and gaps. The good-order-in-appearance of the aesthetic object can also be the starting-point for aesthetic pleasure. For Volkelt, alongside the pleasure in intuition which, penetrated with feeling, is a special kind of pleasure, there is that in the organization of the aesthetic object, in the compactness and the roundedness of the composition. This delight in humanly meaningful contents which have entirely become form and developed into convincing expression is embedded in a pleasure in discharge and in that free, relaxed, difficulty-free state of mind which is characteristic of aesthetic experience.

We achieve functional pleasure chiefly because the entire act of aesthetic comprehension (empathy as well as pleasure in form) is not only rich in results, but also takes place easily and without discomfort: the form of aesthetic objectivity seems to meet our comprehending mind half way. The world of aesthetic objectivity is a complexible pre-organized world. According to Kant, the prerequisite of aesthetic pleasure is a harmonious play of the powers of cognition (understanding and the imagination). People have sought a physiological basis for the elementary starting-point of pleasure in the fact that what is offered to us is in conformity with

our mental powers of comprehension, and that the comprehension-demands of the object can therefore be easily responded to. According to Bechterev,¹⁰⁸ a general tone of positive character is combined with advantageous influences of middling rank and with a correlative activity of such tension that the apparatus of the brain functions smoothly: the effort with which this work is bound can be perfectly in balance during the work itself because of the hypersensitivity of the arteries. A negative tone of general kind occurs under the opposite conditions: that is, when the apparatus itself cannot accomplish an equivalent of what is needed for its work. This is the case when difficult, complicated, and unfamiliar acts are expected of us. Even the vascular system takes a part. In this way, one can explain the shock of unfamiliarity which occurs when new works of a decidedly unusual tone, which because of their departure from tradition are at variance with things we are used to seeing and hearing, contradict our familiar (well-prepared and well-practiced) habits of thoughts, and place on us as spectators all kinds of demands which we cannot get mastery of or which we can master only with difficulty. All unfamiliar stimuli exercise an unfavorable influence on the condition of the vascular apparatus in that they arouse a clearly marked vascular tone which is tied with an unsatisfactory subjective condition or even with one of aversion.

We exercise aesthetic comprehension gladly and with a sense of freshness when we observe aesthetic objects to which we feel ourselves attached because they are familiar to us (though this familiarity must not mean complete habit and blunting) and because we are therefore captivated and agreeably occupied by them. The familiarity and the conformity necessary for this apply to form as well as to content, and, as a matter of fact, material and functional products of pleasure penetrate each other in ways that can for the most part hardly be cut apart. Often, to be sure, a subdividing which is richly instructive as concerns the structure of the total event is possible. Thus it is not unusual to discover that the contents are unpleasant and even torturous (especially in tragedy), but that, despite this, one nevertheless contemplates them aesthetically in full surrender. Here functional pleasures of experiencing and looking can balance and even outweigh the aspect of unpleasantness in the content, and in such cases they are of interest as the main source of aesthetic pleasure. Pleasure in the vividness of feeling is at work here, a vividness in which one would also like to see the primary cause of our "pleasure [*Vergnügen*] in tragic objects." This principle works in a far more general sense, however. One gladly lets

his imagination sweep through all high places and into deep ones and penetrate realms which are closed to our experiences in the spheres of practical, serious consequences. In such cases, the contents and the course of feeling-experience are equally pleasant. To pleasure in objective feelings and to the manner in which they are realized in experience is added also the pleasure in reactive (participatory and situative) feelings, which likewise can be subsumed under the comprehensive principle of pleasure in the vividness of feeling. All feelings asserting themselves within the aesthetic act are especially alive, fresh, and strong. The genesis and the course of these feelings have something powerful in them, and alongside them and at the same time there is also something easy and soaring.

Thus our powers of comprehension are brought into a harmonious state from the most disparate of sides and are called into pleasant play as a result of their easy success and their yield. We feel ourselves transported into a suitable and easily successful activity which is pleasant as such and because of the type of issue it is; also, because of the content of this activity we feel ourselves enriched in terms of value as human beings: all of this is realized in a realm which is divorced from the difficulties of material things as well as from the duties and the responsibilities of life in its seriousness; the result is a pleasurable discharge which is a chief characteristic of the aesthetic state. The total quality of aesthetic pleasure can be characterized comprehensively by the idea, "act of animation" (*Belebung*). Besides, there is a direct appeal to our inner sense (a fact to which Volkelt calls special attention). The fundamental stamp of the total worth of aesthetic totality is harmony. In its total quality, aesthetic pleasure is as something floating between the vital and the ideal; it gives us the stimulating as well as the tranquilizing animation of our selves. Thus I have also indicated that within the total experience of aesthetic pleasure the enjoyment of one's own sensitivity plays an important role. According to Lipps, aesthetic pleasure is mostly an objectified self-pleasure. We enjoy not only the aesthetic object, but also in a characteristically reduplicative way the feeling of our own worth as it comes to life in it, of our own selves as they are pleasantly affected by it.

The aesthetics of cultural anthropology has recently turned its attention towards this duality of pleasure in thing and in oneself, of pleasure in matter and in experience. The program of this aesthetics was sketched initially by E. Rothacker.^{108a} As subjectivizing increases, the aesthetic experience of pleasure can take on a characteristic over-pointedness. The chief accent then does not lie in

a surrender to the beautiful, which is a kind of renunciation of one's self within matters objective, "but in the subjective enjoyment of it. In the enjoyment of my own enrichment, of my happiness, of the immediate—for this, nature, beauty, human beings become only the means, the causes, the occasions of enjoyment." Someone who suddenly goes out into pure air from a stuffy room enjoys the experience of the objective purity of this air, his own subjective freedom from an atmospheric oppression, and his happiness in being able to breathe freely. In the change of accent which takes place when a center of gravity is so moved that we chiefly enjoy our own feelings, a removal for which the experience of the beautiful outwardly only gives the impulse—in this process Rothacker sees the augmentation of the experience of pleasure into a truly full phenomenon of enjoyment. This gives occasion for certain reflections on grounds still to be mentioned: For then enjoyment is no longer a surrender, but a self-pleasure; "the attention of the feeling sensibility is no longer directed outwardly, but towards my own apprehending organs; I enjoy my emotion, my contact with the object. I nevertheless remain in self-reflection, in inversion rather than in exversion; I remain within myself, I am shut up and caught up into myself, and this pleasure in myself can potentialize itself into the higher power of a pleasure in my own pleasure."

B. FUNCTIONAL DELIGHTS IN THE AESTHETIC STATE

Functional delights play a large role in the structure of aesthetic feeling-experience and are a decisive part of the pleasurable products of our aesthetic behavior.¹⁰⁹ We have already recognized this fact. Nevertheless, in our opinion one is devising a hasty and short-circuited solution to this problem if he tries to get hold of the specific individuality of aesthetic feeling by summarily defining it as a functional feeling and by believing that he has grasped the peculiar nature of aesthetic pleasure by defining it as a functional pleasure.

Functional pleasure has often been represented as the focal point of aesthetic pleasure; thus by Dubos¹¹⁰ with his theory (already frequently mentioned) of the liveliness of feeling. One of its most decided advocates in recent times is Jerusalem,¹¹¹ and we get to know this theory in its most highly developed form when we follow the statements of this philosopher.

The extreme stamp in which the idea of functional pleasure appears here makes a critique of its one-sidedness easy. In his argumentation, Jerusalem proceeds from general biological considera-

tions. All of the organs and functions which in the course of time have developed in the psychophysical organism of human beings want to be used. Looked at objectively, this is a stipulation for the preservation and development of the organism. The requirement that individual functions be used reflects itself in consciousness, and then there arises a series of subjective functional necessities. Every restraint on and every failure to cultivate a function which is indispensable to life is allied with unpleasantness, but the vigorous use of each respective function procures us pleasure. A functional pleasure of this kind is not tied to desires, but merely means a furtherance and enhancement of the entire process of life. Thus aesthetic enjoyment is a kind of functional pleasure: that is, a delight which comes from a use of different psychic functions coming into play during aesthetic contemplation: our sense-functions are agreeably employed, our imagination is stimulated, our thoughts and ideas as well as our feelings are engaged. Consequently, we divide functional pleasures into the sensorial, the imaginative, the intellectual, and the emotional kinds. But all of this is in relation to the contemplated object, and from this object the functional pleasure which is released receives its direction and coloration. According to Jerusalem, aesthetic pleasure is a special kind of functional pleasure which contemplation calls up.

Even sense-perceptions are often accompanied by elementary aesthetic feelings. In connection with certain combinations of colors, certain ornaments, and certain figures, the exercise of the function of seeing is particularly pleasant. We seek the springs of delight not in ourselves, however, but in the object which gives the occasion for this pleasant participation, and we call the object beautiful. The basis for aesthetic judgment is always only the functional pleasure really experienced, however, whereas the objectively existing attributes of the aesthetic object supply only mediating causes of the judgment. Proof is the fact of blunting: among hearing-perceptions there are at first simple tones, but then rhythmically-ordered series of tones bring about elementary aesthetic effects. But the pleasure to be found in melodies depends on the satisfying of higher functional needs. Rhythmical tonal series frequently animate us to make rhythmical movements, and therefore it is quite clear that it is functional pleasure which produces aesthetic pleasure. Thus elementary aesthetic feelings occur in a manner so that through the perceptions which we experience the requirements of our sensual functions are engaged in an agreeably and adequately intensive way.

Aesthetic pleasure has greater variety and is more richly de-

veloped, however, when not our senses alone, but our ideas and thoughts also are agreeably employed. A picture whose contents we understand and can interpret offers us a more powerful and more lasting pleasure than one we do not understand. In connection with works of literature, the aesthetically operative satisfaction of the functional needs of our intellects is especially in evidence. If we succeed in following the creative writer easily, if we understand what he means, a superior pleasure is provided us. As long as we are not capable of grasping the thoughts expressed in the art-work, the requirements of our intellectual functions are repressed. A better example than the one Jerusalem presents seems to me to be supplied by the functional intellectual pleasure we feel in connection with parodies and travesties of style when we are able to see which qualities of the ridiculed pattern of style and which artistic semblance-values in an art are being taken apart in a witty fashion. Related to the intellectual functional pleasure is that of the imagination, which Jerusalem describes quite inadequately, characterizing it, as he does, as a delight in our own imaginative activity—activity which is induced in us by way of a perceptual delineation of events and objects.

Above all, however, it is the satisfying of our emotional functional necessities which is pleasant. Feeling too is a basic function of consciousness demanding participation and use. If the contemplation of a natural object or of a work of art can arouse in us not only the kind of pleasure I have described up to the present, but an emotional kind besides, then it becomes the source of the richest aesthetic pleasure. The course of feelings aroused by means of the art-work, feelings to which we surrender ourselves without restraint and without regard for the reality around us—the experience of such pure human feelings as in everyday life seldom have the occasion for being participated in—produces a rich emotional functional pleasure, and in this is the center of aesthetic enjoyment. The most vigorous pleasure of this kind is attached to music because in it, by means of the sensuous perception of tones, feeling is aroused directly and without the intervention of the intellect.

Therefore, all aesthetic enjoyment, according to Jerusalem, is a kind of functional pleasure and is thus related to play: We use the term "beautiful" in the widest sense for everything that is able to induce our aesthetic functional pleasure.

Now for a critique of this theory. I have stressed the important role of functional pleasure myself; but we are still compelled to refuse to see it as the core of a singularistic theory of aesthetic pleasure and aesthetic feelings, or to approve of any attempt to do so. If

we merely broaden the concept of functional pleasure in a logically inadmissible way to include all feelings of semblance which are absolved from serious consequences, it is possible to throw aesthetic pleasure entirely out of gear. For, 1. there are functional pleasures outside the aesthetic state too; and 2. the aesthetic state is not confined to functional delight.

Jerusalem sees the first objection himself, and for this reason he is determined to devise a *differentia specifica* for the aesthetic type of functional pleasure. He says that it distinguishes itself outwardly from other kinds of functional pleasures (for instance, from play) because it is released through contemplation, but primarily because of its depth (that is, because it is capable more certainly of effects which enter into the innermost recesses of mind and heart). One must always stress the fact that the amount of pleasure and the depth of pleasure are not in any way necessarily conjoined. A piece of drollery in a low comedy and a trick-film in the movies (of the Mickey-Mouse type) can cause a great deal of noisy cheerfulness, but the depth of this effect is limited. Inversely, in an artful comedy like Grillparzer's "Woe to Him Who Lies" (*Weh' dem, der lügt*), a small quantity of pleasure may be of great human significance. Very strong functional delights which have a minimum of depth are satisfactory in everyday life. A factory-worker who has to carry on a single activity during the week and wants to see the most exciting game of football that he can on Sunday, senses that an elementary demand for functional pleasure is in operation, just as does a farmer who follows his plow on a working-day but who thinks about the brawl which is a part of his holy Sabbath. In both cases, the blood is unusually excited, the thinker is agitated, and the excitement he feels, being one of animation, is pleasant. Here belongs also the pleasure one finds in taking bold chances with life or health, or with wealth or great sums of money: betting, games of chance, automobile races, dangerous mountain tours, and so forth, as a result of the excitement they effect, cause great pleasure in terms of emotionally functional pleasure; and they are therefore sought for repeatedly, even in opposition to everything recommended by reason. There are forms of functional pleasure which have hardly anything to do with the aesthetic attitude at all. Yet there are all kinds of degrees of transition from the one to the other: gruesome scenes in wax-works, executions and exhumations, horrendous films in the movies, and frightful reports of real life always have great masses of spectators.

Utz,¹¹² going even further than we into a critique of functional

pleasure, does not allow it to be constitutive for the aesthetic state at all. If a person erroneously locates aesthetic pleasure entirely in a delight in powerful and moving experiences, he is transferring himself into the realm of the feeling of being psychically active. But functional feelings and delights can occur outside the aesthetic state also, and precisely wherever a powerful experience takes place the force of whose issue is not dammed up but can flow into experience without restraint. An untold number of productions in specialty-theaters, novels about criminals, melodramas, and chilling tragedies feed on this kind of delight which the large public passionately wants. Yet with these functional delights we are moving at best only on the outermost boundaries of aesthetically valuable acts. But this approach to the boundaries is not brought about through the functional feelings by themselves, for their being in evidence proves nothing about the presence of a mental character, aesthetic or non-aesthetic. Functional feelings do indeed enter into aesthetic contemplation and do play around, so to speak, with its pleasure; but they may not appear in too great a measure; and if they did, the aesthetic state would be replaced by something else. Then a surrender through feeling to the values of an impression would no longer be in the foreground, but delight in the perception of the plenitude of one's own experience would. Then *Faust* would be a magnificent piece of literature, not any longer because in it the deepest and most affecting fates are disclosed to feeling in sensuous appearance, but because occasion is given for our realizing the most powerful of functional delights, just as it is in the most suspenseful novels about criminals whose entire plan aims at such experience. Without a doubt, functional delights exercise their effect with special clarity precisely within the aesthetic state. This is because a powerfully and harmoniously flowing experience is present. Were this experience torn apart or chopped off, a marked functional unpleasantness would result. If it were somewhat scanty, functional desire would revolt against it; it would therefore make for a distasteful struggle with a boredom which would emerge and a desire for activity which would be unsatisfied. Pleasure in delightful looking and hearing, in freely vibrating rhythms of experience, is therefore important for aesthetic enjoyment; aesthetic objectivity counts upon it and even symbolizes it on the strength of its structure.

But (and now I shall end these arguments) functional feelings are not by any means the single pleasurable factor in the aesthetic experience. The products of pleasure which aesthetic objectivity effects for us, as well as those intensifications of life coming from

our surrender to the values of perfectly formed, humanly meaningful impressions, are not understood correctly in their entirety by the concept of functional delight. If a piece of literature produces the representations we desire, the contents of these representations too, and not merely the fact that they are objects of an easily achieved, stimulating, and alert activity of the understanding, are important for the resulting pleasure. Only by a far-reaching violence is it possible to trace that pleasure-resultant experienced with humanly significant contents in the shape of empathy back to intellectually, imaginatively, and emotionally functional pleasure. Pleasure in experienced contents as such is to be separated from the pleasure in the manner in which they are realized and experienced. The concept of functional pleasure is acceptable only, then, when it is limited to the formal in aesthetic experience. It would lose all defensible meaning if one were to own to the broadened meaning proposed by Jerusalem and interpret the delight in humanly significant values only as an emotional functional pleasure. Functional delights flow into the effect of aesthetic pleasure and enhance it, but do not determine it entirely; to characterize aesthetic pleasure, which is fed by many springs, by one of its parts—this will not do. If desirable representations deriving from one of the masterly humoresques of G. Keller or a high-flying literary phantasy in a romantic work delight me, then intellectual and imaginative functional pleasure is doubtless present in the work, but so is material pleasure in the contents presented as such, contents which through their discharge still do not become a functional pleasure, but remain a non-realized (*irrealisierte*), easily discharged material pleasure. Here too there is a clear separation between pleasure in the flow of feeling and pleasure in the contents which arouse the feeling. The possibility and necessity of this separation becomes especially evident where these two kinds of feeling occur simultaneously in the same experience. The tragic form effects materialized tortuous impressions, but even these emotions, harassing with respect to content, are functionally pleasant in their stimulating liveliness and in the depths they excite. Someone who encounters one of the gruesome sensations described above is materially and physically horrified, but even this gross horror will be experienced in a functional manner as an inordinate titillation.

II. TASTE

A. TASTE IN GENERAL (THE CONCEPT)

The word "taste" is a symbol for very different concepts which, for all their differences, are nevertheless not entirely unrelated. The *tertium comparationis* present here gives us important insights into the aesthetic phenomenon which is indicated by this expression.

The first and proper meaning is based on a physiological-psychological fact: the experiences of the chemical senses, of the sense of taste. (Earlier, it also included the sense of smell, as in turns of expression, for instance, like "not to be able to taste [*schmecken*] someone: that is, to smell him [I can't stand him]"). A certain sensorial disposition and function is meant which by way of the affecting of the taste-buds covering the tongue, the gums, and the epiglottis brings about elementary perceptions of sweet, sour, bitter, and so forth as soon as the chemical stimuli from substances in soluble form touch the peripheral organs of sense in question. Proceeding from the psychophysical function and disposition in the direction of the objective, one uses the word "taste" to define a kind of specific sense-effect corresponding to an object of the outside world. Thus, on the one side, food has taste, and on the other, the person tasting the food has it.

But it is not the primary, but rather the metaphorical, the aesthetic meaning of the word which concerns us here. According to this interpretation, one designates as taste the capacity for aesthetic experience and judgment, for making aesthetic evaluations. Thus, according to Kant, taste is the faculty of the judgment of the beautiful (of aesthetic objects). The meaning of the term is more concretely realized if it is interpreted as the spectator's readiness to be stimulated by the aesthetically valuable in a surer and more decisive way so that he has positive reactions, and by lesser aesthetic values to have negative ones (these are feeling-experiences with attached evaluative decisions). One means this when he says that a certain someone has taste; he means that taste is an especially precious state of aesthetic dispositions. But of course objection has been raised to the criterion of certainty I have introduced here. According to Betty Heimann,¹¹³ the naïve notion "to have taste" implies the possession of a sure, immediately pleasing aesthetic judgment. But she does not think it settled that the more the certainty with which taste functions, the better it is. Instead, untrained people are accustomed to judge the most quickly: for them, everything is beautiful

or ugly at once. But with increasing differentiation of taste, the ability to hit the mark and to be certain suffers: the more cultivated the taste, the more difficult will the decision be. Nevertheless, I believe that one can hold to the concept of certainty; for it covers not only the rapidity with which a decision is made, but also the accuracy of it. The certainty of a judgment depends on the laying down of accurate, just decisions. Such decisions are expected of people to whom taste is attributed.

The word "taste" (like the expressions "art," "style," and "character") is one of those ordinarily used always with a certain emphasis, with a value-meaning which is sub-intelligized. If one says that a created object is a work of art, he means high, true art; if he says that a certain person has "character" or that he is a "character," he is expressing the fact that the person has a nature which is fixed. And in the same way, just "taste" means "a good taste." To have taste means to be capable of aesthetic judgment. A man of taste as he judges matters that are aesthetically relevant will proceed in a manner properly intuitive, will not reject valuable phenomena, and will not be moved to positive feeling-reactions by works of lesser value. He does not put up with worthless stuff, and in clothes, ways of life, and so forth, will prefer things which are suitable to him and will know how to avoid what is discordant.

According to Köstlin,¹¹⁴ taste in the general sense means a person's individual susceptibility to pleasure and aversion and his natural inclination to find pleasure in this thing or that. In a more special sense it means the ability to make an accurate judgment about things that taste good and those that taste bad, as well as about things that are beautiful and those that are not beautiful. Such considerations in mind, one finds it clear that the two realizations of the meaning of the word are not unrelated as they exist side by side, but are connected by something they have in common, and this something is the evaluating feeling-reaction, the choosing and the preferring, the accepting and the rejecting. Therefore, taste is the capacity to experience, to enjoy, and to judge in the realm of the aesthetic matters, just as it is in the realm of the chemical sense; it is the ability to grasp value and to judge it. In all cases, to have taste means to be able to distinguish and differentiate. Anyone for whom everything tastes equally good has as little taste as does anyone for whom everything tastes equally bad.¹¹⁵ Jean Paul's little schoolmaster Wuz, who ate only his favorite dishes, is to be envied, but at any event he had no taste. Also, someone who feels equally happy or unhappy in any environment, to whom all beautiful things mean

equally much or equally little—this man has no taste. Only the person who from a multiplicity of impressions separates out certain ones and leaves others behind has taste. In this sense, one might add to our explanation of the concept of taste the definition of “differentiated state of pleasure” (*differenzierte Ansprechbarkeit*).

The best analysis of the concept of taste in the fullness of its application comes from B. Heimann, whose statements I shall follow for a time: the expression “taste” serves to assert something about a subject as well as something about an object. If one attributes taste to a subject, one has said first only that the subject has a certain class of sensations (bitter, sweet, and so forth). On this basic interpretation there immediately rises a broader one, however. Taste not only perceives sweetness or bitterness in food, but at the same time feels pleasure in connection with one sensation, displeasure in connection with another. The designation of “taste” extends to the feeling-result even more than to the sensation. One “has a taste for something” should read, “A person feels pleasure in it.” But the term goes even further beyond this interpretation. If a food affects our taste, we are attracted or repelled; within our being attracted or our being repelled there are desires and wants; we select and want that which appeals to our taste. In the figurative meaning of “subjective” taste there are three factors: the ability to be stimulated, an easy and powerful address to feelings, and decisive tendencies of inclination and desire. Not so simply has the transfer to objective taste been realized. People do indeed speak of tasteful things (that is, of such as give evidence of the taste of their creators), but we use the substantive “taste” in the subjective sense only: taste is an attribute of persons, not of things.

The development of this interpretation is interesting. Originally, the expressions “sight” (*Gesicht*) and “hearing” (*Gehör*) had two meanings in German, as did “taste” (*Geschmack*) also. Today we speak of the sight and hearing of people, but of the “appearance” or “look” (*Aussehen*) and tones of things. In this change of meaning, there is a valid attempt to separate the objective attributes of things from the subjective conceptions with which they are fused. Colors, form, and sound belong too perceptually to appearance as such for us not to have wanted to establish them as purely objective factors as such. But to do this was not necessary in connection with taste so long as it had only its strict meaning. That sugar is sweet only if a person tastes it is far more apparent to someone who is unsophisticated in understanding than that sugar is white only if a person looks at it.

The gradual separation of the subjective and the objective attributes originally included under the expression "taste" is explained by the change of meaning which took place in the metaphorical use of this word. At the time when the metaphorical meaning came into being (during Rationalism, around 1700), taste meant the faculty of sensation, a capacity of the understanding; particular importance was laid to the fact that taste mediates sensations; and feeling came to be little respected. At the present time, taste as a sense is thought in a two-fold respect to be more an objective matter than a disposition of willing and feeling. That vigorously salted food tastes salty is a judgment which is binding for everyone. But matters are different with respect to taste as feeling: whether a test of taste is delightful or not—here opinions divide. In sensation there is only one blindness (or bluntness) which is a deviation from the norm. A color-blind person does not see green as red, or red as green; he does not usually see these colors at all. But a perversion enters into feelings: that is, abnormal feelings are bound with normal sensations. (This statement by B. Heimann, who over-simplifies matters excessively, has primary validity only if a person slights the para-functions in the realm of sensations, bad effects like disorder of the senses of feeling, hearing, and smell, and so forth.)

Thus judgment about the feeling-accentuation of a sensation is not universally valid to the degree that the judgment of a sensation is.

The word "taste" was at first used with an emphasis on sensation, and then it moved on the path through feeling towards aspiration (*Strebigkeit*); thus a growing accentuation on subjective aspects was affixed to it. The second meaning of subjectivity too shows that this aspect constantly increased in importance. There is a correspondence between "subjective experience" and "the objective object." The sensation corresponds to the sense-datum; as the one is universally valid, the other is objectively given. Therefore, so long as taste means the same as the sensation of certain givennesses, just that much does an objectively establishable quality of the latter conform to it. Just as food has a sweet or sour taste, so furniture in a room has a taste that is gothic or Renaissance; the furniture is in the taste of the period concerned.

If an object is to arouse pleasure or aversion, it must be agreeable or disagreeable—that is, it must affect a healthy mind in a beneficial way or a harmful one. Here the correlative quality, the agreeableness or the disagreeableness, is already something much more indeterminate. Still, taste even in this sense is attributed to works of art.

Still more difficult is the transfer of the word "taste" to the ob-

ject in the third stage of subjective taste, which is that of taste as desire. The good taste of the object could allow this subjective taste to appear as a desire-value. Just as the sweet taste of sugar is derived from the sensation "sweet" and as the agreeableness of the taste of sugar from the acceptableness of the sensation of taste, so the desire-value of the sugar must result from its being desired in fact. The "subjective universality" of experience becomes the source of the "objective universality" of the experienced quality. Yet this procedure is inapplicable because a subjective universality (similarity in experience) hardly ever occurs. Thus, on the one hand, as the object as something more visible and more audible became too objective, too independent as compared with the act of apprehension, for us to be able to attribute taste to it or to locate its specific character only in terms of the way it is tasted; so, on the other hand, as the object of desire it is too subjective in addition.

The functions of the chemical sense have great biological significance. The living being is taught to take outer substances into his body. Consequently, there must be inherent in him a natural impulse towards these materials. If this impulse is not to wear out by use, the satisfaction must be accompanied by a feeling of pleasure. For its part, this feeling must be funded by way of a sensation, and this occurs by way of taste, which is a working-tool of life. The organism takes from the environment what it is able to assimilate. The chemical sense has the task of distinguishing what is useful for the living being from what is destructive; this it accomplishes with an approximate, if not with a full, certainty. In its transferred meaning, taste seems adequate as the instinct by means of which the psyche is led to admit and accept things fitting and beneficial to it and to reject those that are injurious. Taste is therefore the chemical sense in the realm of psychic-mental things—that is, the sense of the qualities in them. Taste brings about the connection of the individual with his world, but it also brings about the connections of the elements of the world in a coherence among themselves. How things mutually determine themselves, what complexes they make up—this too depends on taste, on personality, the latter of which, as much a prerequisite as a result of taste, is ultimately exchangeable with it in the end. Taste is the medium between a personality and the cosmos; through taste the personality adjusts itself to the cosmos. The matter of which our world is composed and its structure, both are the work of our personality, and we are that much more personalities as the two are intrinsically more unitary and as they are more closely connected. Choice is the primary ap-

plication of our minds in which our taste proves itself. The mind like the organism, makes immediate use of the things selected. Merely formative matter becomes as evident in intellectual form as does the physical in bodily form. Thus the effect of taste is primarily a choosing and secondarily a certain formation of the personality. But there are further matters to be noted: the totality of things assimilated from the outside locks itself into a unit of personality which is indeed more than merely this totality. Personality fulfills and develops itself in a multiplicity of creations; and taste streams forth from out of these creations also. A plan for a garden, a house, a work of art, all are more or less "tasteful" in the sense that a unitary and single-minded manifestation of taste in what has been presented pervades them. All acts in which taste proves itself are in essence acts of selection or of formation in which the formation is either that of oneself or of something not oneself.

The organic connection between the spheres of the extra-aesthetic and the aesthetic meaning of the concept of taste is mediated by the concept of value. Taste says yes and no; it accepts and rejects; it evaluates. It approves of that which has value for the individual, of that which is adequate to his organism. Taste is therefore the indicator of value; it selects what is beneficial and confirms it as something pleasing.

Taste as the basic unreflective power of making decisions and as the power of judgment in the realm of value combines not only the sensuous-agreeable and the aesthetic, but also the latter with the ethical. In the ethical too there are confirmations which are analogous in a far-reaching way to those of taste. If one is to find his way in the realm of action, insight into what is good and what is bad is not enough because it gives good and bad only as an endless duty; this duty is represented, thus understanding is increased, by means of a refined instinct for the noble and the ignoble, for measure for conscience. And therefore the training of the connoisseur and the thinking-work of the aesthete will not do for the critical judging and the begetting of the beautiful; to them must be added the instinct for the beautiful—that is, taste. If taste in a narrower sense of its transferred meaning is the mouthpiece of opinion for the valuable in intuitivity—that is, for beauty—then in a wider sense it is the organ for the valuable in general, and thus it includes measure and conscience too. Taste is the conscience of the aesthete just as conscience is the taste of a moral person. If we think of taste as the faculty of grasping differentiated value—of one's attributing priority to objects and arranging them in a series in the realm of

valuable experiences—then the direct (sensuous) and transferred (aesthetic and ethical) interpretations of this concept can be included under it too.

Earlier we spoke of a biological significance of taste; but this significance can also be understood for the sake of life in a fundamentally deepened spiritual (*geistig*) sense. Taste shows decided connections with what we call the sense of life. If one thinks of the sense of life as the active proving of the personality as it is turned towards experiencing and awarding value, then taste is in the service of a receptive as well as of a productive tendency. It organizes, first, the section of the world of value which the mind is able to enter into the spirit of, and then also the value which a person as a mental-spiritual being in a cultural-creative manner presents from out of himself. Indeed, this way of realizing the meaning of the concept of taste crosses over to the phenomenon which we call "style."

B. THE JUDGMENT OF TASTE

a.¹ Decisions of Taste and Aesthetic Judgment. In professional literature there is no absolute agreement about the concepts "judgment of taste" and "aesthetic judgment." Many aestheticians make them identical, but many others, again, keep them separate without being entirely clear about the defined limits of their realms of meaning. This justifies the detailed argument in which we shall begin with the concept of judgment. Logic interprets judgment as a certain intellectual function, an elementary kind of procedure in thought, by means of which two idea-contents or concepts are placed in relation to one another, so that a something is asserted or denied in terms of being or worth. Logical judgment is an active taking of a stand in the realm of knowledge, is a statement based on apprehension, is an act of object-awareness in which we respond to a relation by affirming its validity or by denying it. Insights are achieved, formulated, and presented in this way. As regards the linguistic-conceptual formulation of asserted relations of things and of meanings, judgments fall into the realm of competence of logic; in terms of their objective contents, however, they belong to the most disparate realms of knowledge and culture. Here I am speaking only of aesthetic judgments in which decisions are made about beauty (pleasure) and ugliness (unpleasantness).

Now, it is said that taste is the court of decision about an impression with respect to its beauty or its ugliness; every aesthetic judgment is therefore a judgment of taste. With every manifestation of taste, which always contains an assent or an inner rejection, a

yea-saying or a nay-saying, there is most closely tied the taking of a position in judgment. For this interpretation, which simply places the decision of taste within the aesthetic feeling-reaction, the expression "judgment of taste" is a pleonasm. Yet this concept has remained uncontested, probably because the authority of Kant supports it. On it Kant built his entire aesthetic, which is nothing other than a transcendental-philosophical critique of the judgment of taste. In the aesthetic procedure, we judge an object not because of what it is, but because of the way it affects our feelings. Therefore the judgment of taste is something entirely different from a judgment of understanding; it belongs, not to logical, but to aesthetic judgments, by which one means those judgments the basis of whose determination cannot be anything but subjective. It is not based on concepts; nor does it refer to the real existence of the object; but it only combines the quality of the object with the feeling of pleasure (or aversion). The feeling of pleasure which takes place in the aesthetic procedure is the experience of merely formal appropriateness when the subject's cognitive powers are in play in the presence of a representation through which an object is given. Pure aesthetic judgments are those which point to the beauty of an object or of its mode of representation; as formal aesthetic judgments, they are genuine judgments of taste. Thus if something is experienced as beautiful, if an object produces a positive value-experience, it is precisely this value-experience, this impression of beauty and of the pleasure flowing from it, that is derived from the judgment of taste, or, better, it is the judgment of taste itself. Beauty is not a quality of the object, and the judgment of taste as the experience of beauty is not a substantiation of an attribute grasped from out of the object concerned: such a judgment would be logical, and not aesthetic. Only those judgments are aesthetic which contain a relation merely of the representation of the object to the subject and certain *a priori* necessities of that subject. According to Kant, therefore, the judgment of taste is nothing but a feeling-reaction, accented by pleasure or aversion, to the impression of an object: thus it is not an act of subsumption or the like; consequently, it in any case is not anything expressly added to the aesthetic-experience; but it is the core of the aesthetic state itself. If an act of contemplation is pleasant because the surrender to appearance easily and pleasantly engages our powers of knowledge, then precisely this result is the judgment of taste. Every time we take a position in judgment which we call the judgment of taste and which is really a feeling-decision, which is a positive or negative appeal to our feel-

ing, concepts play only a subordinate role. It is not the objective existence of the object and its properties as grasped in the concept which alone are deciding factors; rather, it is the relations of the kind which have value between the character of the object and certain expectations and concerns of the evaluating subject. The subject submits himself exclusively neither to the demands of the objective existence of the object nor to the force of conceptual necessity; but his own inner requirements are allowed to speak. Thus he appears more free, more dependent on himself, and this is one reason he is thought of as "subjective." Here, therefore, there are far stronger intra- and inter-variations than in the judgment of objective knowledge. Judgments of taste are never objecto- or onto-centric judgments of attributes, but subjectively centered judgments of value in which there come decisively to the fore, not only the demands of the object, but also the personality of the individual doing the evaluating. A person who judges aesthetically is not under the force of necessities stemming from logic, concepts, or things, but only under the convincing influence of the intuitive necessity of physical objects tendered his contemplation and the requirements of his feeling-life. Judgment of taste is therefore nothing but a positive or negative pleasure-product, a feeling-decision to assent to or to reject, a decision which occurs during or at the end of the aesthetic contemplation.

There is nothing to oppose in this interpretation of the judgment of taste as met with in Kant, among others, and as legitimized by him. But it is incorrect to jumble the concepts of "the judgment of taste" and "aesthetic judgment" together, to see, as not infrequently happens, in the first of these two a superior aesthetic judgment and in every aesthetic judgment a judgment of taste. It has been stressed, by contrast, that both concepts designate very different circumstances and must therefore be strictly separated. For us, aesthetic judgments are not the decisions of taste and feeling-reactions, but judgments of knowledge embedded in the aesthetic state and decidedly modified by their embeddedness. There is no absence of judgment in aesthetic enjoyment and contemplation. When a spectator who is educated in art, highly cultivated, and familiar with the permanent reputations of artists and with critical positions, is in the presence of a complicated work of art, it never fails but that all kinds of judgment quite certainly flow into aesthetic contemplation. Technical particularities may be pondered, for example, stylistic relations to other works by the same master are set up, or a knowledge of art-history is activated—all of which occurs in

the form of more or less explicit judgments. Then in the end, the pleasant result will probably be expressed as a formulated judgment. People generally mistake this aesthetic judgment for the judgment of taste, which it is not; it is merely a logical judgment which in language has rendered clear a decision of feeling, converted it into concepts, in this way making it better known, and probably also (in further discussion) explained it in terms of principle and justification. Such a judgment presupposes a decision of taste, a taking of a position in terms of pleasure and pain; in itself it is not such a decision, but only the logical-linguistic explication of it. Strictly speaking, this kind of aesthetic judgment no longer appertains to real aesthetic behavior, at least not to its core. At this point, we are following the view advocated by a great many scholars that by aesthetic judgment a person means not a feeling-reaction, but acts of judgment occurring in the course of the aesthetic procedure and embedded in it, those acts on the one hand solidifying aesthetic impressions into concepts and on the other explaining it in concepts.

K. Groos¹¹⁶ differentiates aesthetic judgments understood in this way between, first, those of value and, second, those of understanding. Volkelt¹¹⁷ accepts this distinction. Value-judgments express the aesthetic value-product of the object which is being judged. This happens in such a way that one clothes his subjective pleasures (or aversions) in a judgment or in such a way that one awards to the object an aesthetic value which has a claim to being valid. Judgments of understanding, on the contrary, make elucidations about the contemplated object. The two kinds of judgment may come together: this happens, for instance, when a person says that in *The Parricide* shortly before the end, a new person irrelevant to the action is brought in without preparation. Saying this, one has explained, but at the same time brought a reproof. As a supplement to the proposal of Groos and Volkelt, one should say that the question connected with this intellectually formulated position often is about a something which is added to the true aesthetic state and which possibly works as something alien to it.

This leads us to the question of how aesthetic judgment is related to aesthetic contemplation and enjoyment. And one must first make a distinction between independent judgments and in-flowing ones. Often aesthetic judgment is directly taken to mean the closing or ending of aesthetic pleasure. When a person talks to his friends about a piece they have just seen in the theater, the judgments expressed are facts in themselves. But such critical discussion is possible only after the basically different moods and states of conscious-

ness in aesthetic enjoyment are over and done with. It is somewhat different if a person during the course of a play says to himself, "Just now a climax was reached," or something similar. These value-judgments do not really belong to aesthetic contemplation, but they do not disturb it either. They enter into the flow of pleasure without markedly interrupting it. Although they are expressions of reflection, these judgments do not push sensitive "looking" away from the center of consciousness, and they therefore are a quite feasible admixture to the aesthetic contemplation.

From among these judgments about the aesthetic object we must distinguish the objectively required ones which directly form a part of the aesthetic object. In literature, for example, the aesthetic object itself is in part made up of judgments: in this case, the realized judgments of the person enjoying the object aesthetically are as much a part of the aesthetic procedure as are intuition and feeling.

The tendency to interpolate aesthetic judgments is not the same in all spectators, or with all aesthetic objects. The inclination towards making aesthetic judgments grows as there is an increase in one's aesthetic training and awareness and as he finds it necessary to criticize, properly to interpret his impressions, and to exchange ideas. And as the object has difficulties or obscurities, conditions for the appearance of aesthetic judgments are encouraged; for then enjoyment is easily interrupted by inquiries, questions, and over-subtleties. If the art-work in a way that forces new emphases contradicts familiar values and ideals, then value-judgments are already aroused during the contemplation; it may be that contemplation starts out with a violent emotional denial. If with the increasing tendency towards criticism aesthetic judgments try to press their way into the enjoyment, troublesome disturbances in the aesthetic procedure may take place; but it is precisely because of these disturbances that certain advancements are possible, because through judgments the aesthetic state is given order, refinements, and acceptability. Knowledge about particular artistic refinements can enhance pleasure. Naturally, the assumption is that the admixture of judgment flows into pleasure in terms of feeling; and thus that it does not have the character of a deviation into conceptual knowledge.

As they are embedded in the aesthetic procedure, aesthetic judgments become like feelings; but this must not mislead us to suppose that something basically logical and therefore extra-aesthetic is present. These judgments by reason of their feeling-character are vitally different from judgments of taste. In the latter, one has to do with a direct turning towards the contemplated object in terms

of pleasure (*Angesprochensein*) (or with just as direct a turning away from it). Here there is nothing at work which could in any way be intellectualized; here there is no process of logic which depends on an intellectual handling of the contents of object-awareness. Rather, there is a quite immediate feeling-decision, one, indeed, into which all kinds of experiential knowledge under the decree of emotion and intuition also have entered.

"The apprehension of the object through taste is not effected by means of a representation, a knowledge, a reflection; nor need it be. Someone who has a pronounced taste reacts directly to the object presented him; he is directly attracted to it or repelled by it; he approves or disapproves of it without being able to think of a reason for his doing so or without his having to think why he does so. During the pleasure itself the connoisseur seldom thinks about the basis of his pleasure, which is always something extra-aesthetic. The artistic value of most works is secured for us without our knowing anything about their conditions or about the way in which our positive impressions, which are based entirely on the feeling set into motion by the inner life vibrating in the art-work, come to be. But this is not to exclude the fact that knowledge can exert a considerable influence on the function of taste. That which has proved to be healthy and wholesome arouses cheerful feelings too."

Heimann, who wrote the sentences just quoted, reports that as a child she found the juxtaposition of green and blue to be unpleasant. Only after she had often seen them together in nature (the blue of the corn-flower against the tender green of its stem) did she begin to see the charm of this combination. Here, clearly, practical experience that juxtapositions of certain colors in nature are usually thought to be beautiful induced her to look with fondness at color-combinations which at first she valued slightly but which she gradually even in the absence of such deliberations found to be delightful. These associations do not seem to exist only in the manner of representation, however; they do not seem always to stem only from reflection. There are many more associations besides these which are quite immediate and direct associations in feeling and sensation and which stem neither from familiarity nor from contacts in time or space, but which represent a direct apprehension of remote and causal connections. To perceive the canals of such subterraneously associative combinations is a task for depth-psychology. Here is one of the avenues by which psychoanalysis can be fruitful in research in the humanities.

Heimann is inclined to interpret the expression "judgment of

taste" primarily as a linguistically formulated statement about pleasure and pain; and, on the contrary, to accept the emotional attraction or repulsion only as a pre-form of the taste-judgment. She does not think of it, then, as only a positive or negative feeling-affection, as the affirmation of value or the denial of it, but, besides this, as something else and something more. According to her, one can speak about the judgment of taste in the full sense only when a feeling-impression is not only simply manifest, but also when it is confirmed and completely justified at the same time. The judgment of taste is therefore not merely an emotional attraction, the fact of appeal, but the formulation, the articulation of an experience of an aesthetic feeling-experience. For her the simplest and most fundamental form in which the experience of taste is usually made known linguistically is in sentences like, "That is beautiful (or ugly)." Such statements become judgment in part because the grounding of the assertion, the anchorage of the subjectivity, is in an objective lawfulness. The judgment of taste has the function of confirming the evaluations of taste. But there are two different types of confirmation, which work together in a true judgment of taste: explanation and justification. An exciting of taste, an experience of pleasure or aversion, is explained when it has shown itself to be the psychical effect of a real cause; it is justified as soon as an aspect necessary to the production of a value-object has been pointed out in it, an aspect which as such does not stand alone, but in correlation with all of the other aspects which make up that object.

Within that which we call decisions of taste, Heimann differentiates something two-pronged: 1. the immediate feeling-reaction which is completely pre-linguistic; 2. the linguistic formulation of the reaction with a statement of confirmation and justification. Only this second kind is a taste-"judgment," she thinks. The assertion of taste becomes a judgment through the confirmation of the assertion, through the anchoring of the subjectivity in an objective legality. Inversely, the judgment, the confirmation in terms of understanding, becomes the judgment of taste, or still is judgment of taste (critical examination), because of the vital, subjective factor which always remains in it.

Having reached the outer limits of the considerations necessary to the solving of the problems we have raised, we shall not follow them further but repeat the simpler distinction we have made: a series of grave errors is avoided if one separates two types of positions in judgment within aesthetic experience and then introduces

two different names for them: 1. the decision of taste; 2. aesthetic judgment. The former takes place in an elementary reaction of the feelings in terms of pleasure or pain as they are appealed to or not appealed to by the impression. What is here is a direct and hypological turning (that is, one that is below speech and precedes it) of feeling towards the aesthetically attractive object; it is the inner affirmation to a something intuitive and valuable, to an apparent plenitude of life become form. By the second—that is, by “aesthetic judgment”—on the contrary, we mean the conceptual-linguistic elucidation of the impressions which fall to our share in sensuous intuition and of the sum of knowledge “melted down” into the contemplation; this is on the one hand. On the other hand we mean the linguistic formulation of the immediate feeling-reaction which is independent of language and, finally, the confirmation and the justification of our feeling-decision which is involved in such a reaction.

b.¹ Towards a Structural Analysis of the Judgment of Taste.

Before we can go further into the central problem of taste (which is that of the profound differences among the decisions of different persons), certain preliminary questions must be answered. What makes the treatment of this important problem so difficult is that in connection with the judgment of taste (even in the narrower sense we have laid down) we are concerned with a very complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon. The differences among judgments of taste cannot be arranged as degrees and members of a one-dimensional series at either end of which are the poles of pleasure and pain; but there is an additional matter of a critical nature. Through a genuine experience of feeling, an art-work can be experienced in its high value, and still the pleasure can be lacking in warmth and intimacy, in a surrender to depth. There are really only a few musical people who do not have an affirmative relation to the art of Bach, but to whom, in spite of this, Mozart is much closer. They are quite capable in a genuine experience of recognizing the greatness of the fugues of the *Well-Tempered Clavier* or the meaningful profundity of the *Passion According to Saint Matthew* (I am not concerned here about judgments adopted from someone else or about empty evaluations or conventional approval); and yet the rational kind of counterpoint and the severe style of this musical architectonics can offer these people less than does the romantic expressivity of Beethoven in his later phase. E. T. A. Hoffmann¹¹⁸ was a man of the greatest musical ability, but he violently opposed constructivism in music and favored the Italian melodic art of the

aria. Or someone values *Figaro* as a greater musical work of art than the *Barber* and still in his heart can prefer Rossini. The same kind of thing can also be found in all of the other arts: a person who enjoys art and is capable of judgment thoroughly appreciates the artistic value of a product of a certain stylistic trend, but, in making a spontaneous choice in taste, prefers the type "opposing" this artistic tendency. The theoretical formula for this complicated state of affairs is not easy to find.

First of all, a difference of interpretation within the concept of taste must be pointed out. Kant conceived of taste in a very wide sense and meant by it really nothing other than an aptitude for aesthetic behavior which, as a necessity of its nature which cannot be relinquished, naturally includes an act of evaluation and culminates in such an act. The factor of a certain preference or rejection, of a choice based on special objects and their certain qualities, was not as yet included in it. This then would be a narrower meaning of the concept, which applies to the special tendency of this "faculty," the principle of choice lying at the base of the state of enjoyment and determining its decisions. Here one could speak of a more formal-functional factor and of a more material-substantial factor within taste, or of taste as a universal aptitude for universal aesthetic furnishings and for a special aim. The experience of aesthetic value is always possible wherever taste as an aptitude for furnishings is addressed positively; but it reaches the warmth of aesthetic experience with things conforming to our predilections only when certain feeling-claims are fulfilled in an especially adequate way.

Every aesthetic experience necessarily and characteristically harbors a feeling-reaction, but its intimacy, depth, warmth, and vividness can of course be different.

Heimann in a similar way explains the differences between the types of taste-experiences described above. She differentiates an empty one from a fulfilled-intensive one. In the first, there is a mere recognition of the worth that has split off, so to speak, from all of the functions of the living whole of the personality; in the other case, the decisions of taste are in a unitary coherence with the entire personality. According to Heimann, this splitting of values in two is a frequent occurrence: "For instance, someone may say: I know very well that Beethoven's *Ninth* is a noble artistic work and that the *Waltz of the Little Doll* is quite meaningless; but in spite of this, I prefer hearing the latter. Or: Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister* is indeed something of an immeasurably greater value than

a novel by Rudolf Herzog, but I find greater enjoyment in reading the latter than in reading the former. What then, is the 'taste' of this person: Beethoven and Goethe, or dolls and light reading?" It is far too easy to answer this question by saying that this person has a real and lively aesthetic relationship only with works of the lesser species. In actual aesthetic experience he is directly pleased only by these; and by himself he would never have arrived at an appraisal of a great work of art. Therefore he is able to speak of these great works with awe only because other people place them so high in the scale of values; at best, he is under the influence of suggestion. Yet the matter is not so simple as this. As Heimann is correct in stressing, there is, as a matter of fact, an original, a genuine grasping of values which for all that is not based on any relation to life, but takes place outside real life, so to speak. There are values to be grasped in quite adequate experiences which still do not bring the most secret side of one's inner personality into vibration, which consequently do not coerce us into feeling and do not influence action. As a matter of fact, a characteristic of the lower values as compared with the higher ones is that they are more easily assimilated.

In the ethical realm, there are similar phenomena. One may in his heart be convinced of the validity of a certain moral principle and still act contrary to his own better understanding (*video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor*). Or to stay with aesthetic matters: one may be amazed at the beauty of one woman and still give his aesthetic devotion (I am disregarding erotic undertones and factors of character) to another woman who in his view is less beautiful but who belongs to his favorite type (his "genre"). At this point, we are coming close to the ultimate secret of the structure of the personality of an individual.

The elementary mechanism of the judgment of taste in the formal-functional sense works universally in all people (with certain differential variations). In all cases, a position is taken with respect to value, a position based on and within a feeling-filled "looking"-experience which sticks to a pure impression meaningful in itself. Kant, who with his conception of the *sensus communis aestheticus* is under the influence of that dogma of the Enlightenment according to which there are native and fundamental similarities among all human beings, was of the opinion that the disinterest which is constitutive of the aesthetic attitude, the state of being independent of egotistical private connections, is enough to guarantee, on the basis of this state, the universality and universal validity of the pleasant judgments. The universal validity exists, however,

only for the formal and functional factor of the judgment of taste; but the material fulfillment and execution of this judgment, the goals of the choice of taste, the concrete attitude of taste, are products¹¹⁹ of the convergence of that *a priori*-functional factor with influences of the environment, of experience, of education, with the taste of the time and of the group, with the specific kind of vision of the epoch, and so forth. They are, therefore, points of considerable difference. Better said, there are convergence-products of two grades: the concrete natural tendency of every single person, his aesthetically functional type, is already the result of the convergence of the universal-*a priori* factor which belongs among the intrinsic constitutives of human existence with certain given conditions of education, with the earliest primitive experiences which has a "stamping" (*prägender*) force, with possibilities of definite evidence, and so forth. And if for a moment we take the position of developmental psychology so that we can observe genetically the universal-aesthetic *a priori* (the original aptitude for this certain state effected for single individuals by hereditary transmission vis-à-vis things of the world), it already shows itself to be a product of convergence. Quite definite experiences of countless generations were necessary if out of the vaguely undifferentiated period of the earliest stage in human development there could emerge differentially that attitude which we term aesthetic and which we place alongside other dispositional spheres of activity which are psychic-mental and which result in civilization. That which appears to be nativistic-*a priori* from the standpoint of later periods of development is itself in turn a product of evolution to be explained by way of convergence when it is observed genetically.

The formal-functional factor in taste is subject to the universal lawfulness of the aesthetic state; but universal laws have difficulty in accounting for the aspect of matter-content. The most universal of these laws is that of the antinomy of taste (so called by Vischer) which under certain circumstances can be satisfied in terms of opposites. A person prefers not only that which conforms to his nature, that which lies directly in his path, but also that which is quite different from him, the antithetical by which his own nature or being is completed: *Les extrêmes se touchent* (The extremes touch one another). Expression in terms of the homogeneous and completion in terms of contrast are marked tendency-principles of choice in material taste. This choice is governed by the demand that one find his own nature reflected in things, and one will choose that which suits himself; in other cases and situations, he will favor precisely

that which is as distant from his own nature as possible, that which is adequate in terms of all humanity, therefore, to complete the unconsciously sought-for human whole. An example of this is the poor dwarfish tailor in O. Ludwig's *Heiterethei*; he wanted only large things on and around himself: an impressive beard, a stately wife, and a gigantic dog. Such an interchange of extremes and of opposites in taste occurs among different persons as they verify their taste, and also in the verifications of single individuals at different times and in different moods. It is precisely persons feeling themselves especially attracted to the infrequent, to the bizarre, to "whims of nature," and making a cult of the uncommon and the peculiar who ever and again look for and find surcease of mind and satisfaction in the homely and the simple, in the uncomplicated and the natural. Here, then, is the point of departure for the effect of the law of polar tensions which, according to the teachings of humanistic anthropology, governs all cultural occurrences.

C. THE DIVERSITIES OF TASTE

a.¹ *The Subject in General.* Among the most impressive of facts in the sphere of the experience of aesthetic things is the realization that there are far-reaching diversities among verifications of taste of particular persons. There are not too many works of art which please all observers to the same extent. This is particularly true of aesthetic objects in nature. For one person, the sea seems the height of sublimity; for another, it is boring. If discrepancies in the judgments of taste often do not look to be as crude as they are in actual fact, it is because many people adopt in the shape of empty evaluations the judgments of others whom they consider to be authorities, and, disregarding their own experience, repeat the words of these others so that they themselves do not appear uncultured, narrow-minded, or unmodern. Many people whose real passion is jazz- or operetta-music go to hear *St. John's Passion* for social reasons; and after a performance, during which they have suffered the tortures of ennui, they hypocritically say that the work was wonderfully beautiful. And how many people put the literary classics in the front rows on their book-shelves, though their own contacts with Goethe and Schiller have been nil since they were forced to read these authors in high school or college? At the same time, they act as if *Faust* were their most precious reading. Or a modern painter prepares a complete exhibition of his works. Strictly speaking, he as a painter is passé and, in addition, he is an arrogant know-nothing who wants to raise his incompetence and incapacity into an artistic style.

But he is the protégé of people in the highest of places for the quite heteronomous reason that his "art" was out of favor in the preceding decade. There is a great influx of people; with the exception of certain snobs, people think that the show is horrible. But no one dares say so; most of them pretend to be enraptured, and thus is counterfeited a unanimity in the judgment of taste which does not as a matter of fact exist. Such a consensus coming to be for social, political, or for other reasons which are not related to aesthetic fact often falsifies the picture and ignores the discrepancies which cannot be traced entirely back to differences in the period, of cultural areas, of levels of education, of what pertains to national membership, and so forth. Two equally trained members of the same family can behave in entirely different ways about the same given thing. Thus one cannot argue away the fact that there are far-reaching differences in decisions and trends of the taste of particular cultural circles, nations, epochs, social and educational strata, or of separate individuals within these groups. This fact weighs so heavily that the most critical of consequences can be deduced from it. The enemies of aesthetics use it as an argument against the possibility that aesthetics can be a science. But even aestheticians who by virtue of their scientific work realize that an aesthetic is possible are persuaded by the fact that there are far-reaching and apparently quite incompatible differences in the judgment of taste to retreat into irrationalism and skepticism; they feel forced to deny that it is possible to set up universally valid standards or supra-individual criteria of value, or a normative aesthetic. Others, again, who start at this point allow themselves to be persuaded into all kinds of doubtful paths in an attempt, presumably, to argue away these differences of taste and to show them as in fact not existing. There are others, again, who attribute the existence of incompatible differences to the present time and who are nevertheless optimistic that things will be better in the future, since an aesthetic culture which constantly progresses is able to bring things to the point where differences in individual taste would cease to be a critical matter. According to Köstlin,¹²⁰ things might well reach the point where, as a result of the increasing universality of education, the one tendency in taste will include the other and acknowledge it. The more the one-sidedness of judgment in individual taste disappears, just that much sooner will we enjoy aesthetic judgments which have universal validity in prospect. The more the single individual broadens the range of his view, the more confidently can he express the judgment that this or that is "beautiful." In this sense, "beautiful"

is that which constitutes the object of pleasure in all men whose aesthetic sense is completely developed; what pleases the cultivated taste would therefore be called "beautiful." From this fact, Köstlin arrives at the statement that besides individual taste there is a universally valid one. The former is subjectively contingent only; the latter, by contrast, is objectively correct.

One cannot subscribe very much to efforts like Köstlin's or to the hopes upon which they are based. That all people can ever agree about any particular aesthetic decision and that there is hope for the settlement of differences in taste by means of the universal increase of aesthetic education: this is an uncertain assumption which is not consistent with life or with reality; it is an assumption which can be realized in small part only. And above all it is the sharp antithesis between subjective and objective taste which is basically in error. My own opinion about this baseless optimism goes thus: that the judgments of taste of most people often diverge widely is a fact which can not only be repeatedly established empirically, but it can also be philosophically deduced in terms of necessity and inevitability. For personality, which through creativity or enjoyment realizes itself in aesthetic verifications as a fruitful field of expression, is not merely any kind of exchangeable exemplar of the genus *homo sapiens*, but truly an individuality and therefore something of a peculiar kind.

As is the style of the creative artist, so is also the taste of the person enjoying the work: both are symbol and function of a personal structure in its totality. This taste moves as an aspect bringing about unity, as a constancy-factor and an invariant, throughout the variety of aesthetic-receptive confirmations—this, to be sure, only if there is really present a "man of taste" (which means a pronounced personal individuality) in the realm of experiences of aesthetic value, and not merely someone who, not making a choice or a judgment, is pleased or displeased equally by everything. Taste is the receptive counterpart of style; like style, it is an expression of the "personal note" of a personal individuality which has shaped itself as its inborn ability has converged with the influences of experience. As a style works itself out in creative formation, so taste manifests itself through evaluation and selection, in a "seeking-out" (*Aufsuchen*) or a "fleeing-from" (*Meiden*). And just as every original creative personality has his own style, so every person from out of his own experience, from out of his own relation to the things he has aesthetically judged, has his own taste. This preceding statement, which, to be sure, demands explanation and qualification

at decisive points, was attacked by earlier aesthetics. The idea was seen as an approval of individual free will and as a helpless admission that aesthetic judgments are disastrously fragmented into a chaos of individual impressions, the result being the impossibility of making statements in aesthetics that are universally binding. This kind of admission seemed to put the scientific character of aesthetics in question.

The fact that there are far-reaching differences among decisions in taste, a fact which practical experience cannot contest, now appears in an entirely different light, particularly as one recognizes that differences in the taste-tendencies of particular individuals are a fact of nature, a circumstance which cannot be anything otherwise and which no one can get around—or as one interprets such differences as a clouding of a normative and ideal taste which is essentially unitary and always the same, a clouding which should not be, which is unwarranted, and which therefore is to be explained away. The dogma of the Enlightenment that all mankind is originally and fundamentally the same had its effect on our field. People thought they could set up rules of good taste everywhere and they did not recognize taste-differences in terms of personal peculiarities, individual preferences, and individual disinclinations.

But for the modern aesthetician who has gone through schools of relativistic thought and who has assimilated the results of differential type-theory and of individual psychology—for him the matter is otherwise. Today we recognize that judgments of taste of necessity differ. But we do not intend for this reason to be persuaded to adopt irrationalism and skeptical relativism; nor are we at all of the opinion that nothing certain can be decided about the objects of aesthetics. It does not occur to us to surrender the scientific character of aesthetics, in particular the possibility, even in a certain sense limited, of a set of normatives. Therefore I see one of the most important tasks of the aesthetician to be a critical examination of decisions of taste, which look to the examination for their justification. The course of this critical over-view will put us in the position of deciding between warranted (sufficiently grounded, necessary, and essential) and unwarranted (ungrounded, inessential) differences in taste. If the latter can be disregarded and eliminated, one must adequately explain the former. The former too are not an impediment to the setting up of certain supra-individually valid propositions in aesthetics if one succeeds in understanding them in terms of the laws of the human psyche and in tracing them to differences in human beings' natural dispositions which always return, differences,

therefore, which are "typical." They must be recognized and justified, whereas the contingent differences which cannot be explained in the same measure are to be excluded as irrelevant. The unwarranted differences in taste cannot be used to prove that the supposed universal validity of certain assertions in the realm of aesthetics is not possible. No one who knows the subject doubts a statement in physics if one experiment just once contradicts it—as soon, that is, as it is shown that this denial of the statement can be traced back to disturbing influences which are inessential in nature. Such disturbing influences occur in great numbers in judgments of taste too; it is a valid procedure to recognize them for what they are and in this way to make them harmless.

Before we go on to our investigation, there are certain more general statements to be presented in connection with the monograph by Heimann. Taste interpreted as appeals to feelings, as preferences and aversions, reveals many differences among individuals; a "subjective universality" (similarity of experience) cannot be. The threshold at which taste begins lies at the point where real qualitative differences are sensed as differences in value; and thus where one thing is preferred to another, not because it is greater, but because it is otherwise. From this point on, development takes a double road. The unpracticed spectator notices only a few of the characteristics of things. If these delight him, the object is beautiful to him. But the further he progresses in his acquaintance with things, the more he becomes practiced and experienced in interpreting them and in examining them critically, just that much more do their qualities impress him as possible values, as points of connection for an evaluation of them. The more superior the taste, the more does it demand of the object. A person who makes no great demands aesthetically thinks every red-cheeked farm-girl is beautiful; but a trained taste is not so easily satisfied. The number of objects which can stand the scrutiny of a coddled taste gets smaller, but at the same time it is broadened without limit. For on the one side, the number of aesthetic categories to be considered increases, but, on the other at the same time, the number of objects appearing on the aesthetic horizon increases also. Instead of a small number of objects which display one and the same aesthetic type, there is now a group of objects that embody values of the most disparate kinds. The untrained person evaluates an object affirmatively only if a certain aesthetic requirement is fulfilled; but the trained one is more generous. The more cultivated the taste, just that much higher the demands he places on the specimen, but just

that much less does he favor one particular species of aesthetically valuable objects. While the trained person values every type of beauty, the untrained one rigidly sticks to a certain type and rejects all others.

Furthermore, it not infrequently happens that a layman has no delight in women whom the aesthetically trained view with pleasure. The one rejects them, not because they are not his "style," but because he finds in them something to take exception to. In terms of general agreeableness of form, it may be that the foot is too large (and so forth). The cause of this defective kind of judgment is that the layman is usually not able to grasp the entirety of an aesthetic object as such or for the evaluations of the particularities at hand to allow himself to surrender to the law which is in that totality. Inversely, he sees a part by itself or as something special, and at best tries to put together a totality out of these parts. He therefore asks that the details by themselves suit his taste, and he looks for, in the same woman, a large, slender form, and at the same time elegant and neat feet, and so forth. If these absurd demands are not satisfied, he finds fault. This defective judgment (which already shows us how to recognize an example of unwarranted differences in taste) is based, in the end, on the incapacity of the aesthetically untrained individual to grant that the different types have equal rights alongside one another.

But within high art, there undoubtedly are creators and works which have equal rights alongside one another: whether one decides for Mozart or Beethoven is actually a "matter of taste." But a more difficult problem is lodged in the fact that two apprehenders can express entirely different evaluations in the presence of the same work of art. Then it often happens that the two have grasped and evaluated something different in the same work. Though this question will be discussed in detail later, there are some preliminary things to be said here. The problem of taste belongs so much to that circle of questions surrounding aesthetics that from this point lines of relationship can be drawn to almost all of the remaining topics in aesthetics. This relationship is especially close to three problems.

1. To the "objectivity of the beautiful." If the beautiful were given as an objective quality of objects which had only to be perceived as are, say, the qualities "red" and "round," then the presence of differences within the realm of judgments of the beautiful would occur with far greater difficulty (if it could occur at all) than it does as a matter of fact. But the fact that certain differences in the

judgments of taste are unavoidable indicates that despite all of its objective funding the placing of aesthetic value is also really the work of a personality who understands it and who has his own value-requirements. Thus the fact of differences in taste is an important argument indeed, not for subjectivism, but rather for a correlativism in aesthetics. According to correlativism, objective and subjective factors are components taking equally characteristic shares when an aesthetic effect takes place.

2. To the questions surrounding aesthetic typology or differential aesthetics. If two equally trained and equally serious spectators in an acceptable aesthetic experience arrive at different judgments of taste about the same work of art, the conclusion necessarily follows that the structure of trends in taste (and so forth) must be something typologically differentiated (that there are many types of aesthetic judgment, value-attitudes, and value-requirements which are equally warranted).

3. To the problem of aesthetic norms to be analyzed in all of the discussions taking up this problem, the fact of differences in taste being their most important point of conflict (*Gegeninstanz*). To what extent do these necessary, real, and uneliminable differences within evaluations of taste in general permit a set of aesthetic norms?

There are two groups of differences in the judgment of taste. The one we call *intraindividual* variations, and this means those intraindividual differences coming to the fore in the aesthetic confirmations of one and the same person. The other we call *interindividual* variations, and these are the differences in the judgments of taste of different individuals.

b.¹ The Intraindividual Differences. It often happens that the same person behaves in different ways before the same work of art or before the same aesthetic object in nature as regards his aesthetic experiences of them and his decisions of taste as they grow out of those experiences. If by "the taste of a person" we mean invariants and constants, it is only a relative constant we intend; and, according to African Spir,¹²¹ the *principium identitatis* is difficult if it is to be applied to human personality. But in view of the intravariants in aesthetic judgments, I also insist that no legitimate argument in favor of aesthetic skepticism is to be seen here, and that, instead, this phenomenon of variations in the single person's judgments of taste too is quite understandable. That single persons in different stages of maturity and development make different judgments of taste, that they later reject what they earlier approved of (and also the reverse)—this is explained by the fact that human personality

is not something rigidly uniform, something fixed without change by its nativistic inheritance, but a multiple unity whose development does not always follow an unequivocal and single-minded line. Thus, in terms of natural tendency, taste can be described as the aptitude for aesthetic evaluation, but, at the same time, as something capable of development and growth, not a small role being played by the chance that aesthetic-artistic value-experiences will fall to our lot. Thus it happens that later in life we can no longer understand many of our earlier value-judgments. We outgrow a great deal in aesthetic and artistic respects which earlier gave us satisfaction. The system of aesthetic requirements which are important for us is not the same in all phases of the individual's development. Furthermore, a psychological type, which should never be thought of as something entirely homogeneous, allows for a certain breadth of elbow-room in aesthetic evaluations.

But now one could demur. Such differences in the evaluations in taste which have been a particular person's over a long period of time are understandable because there are categories adequate to an explanation of them: for instance, aesthetic education acquired throughout the course of life, increasing maturity, and so forth. But what happens if we cannot any longer understand how yesterday we could have fallen prey to arrant trash, that yesterday we handed down judgments of aesthetic worth of which we are ashamed today? Since that earlier time, have we really become so much more mature? Certainly not; but there are enough other explanations. I shall say more later about one of the explanatory categories that are possible here, that of an "embeddedness in a situation" (*Situationseinbettung*). There is, further, something like a psychic loosening-up (*Auflockerung*) (by means of wine, pleasant company, and so forth) in which much of what we would reject in more calm, more sober, and more critical situations seems quite passable. "Loosenings-up" of this kind can particularly often and clearly be identified in the A₂-types of Pfahler,¹²² the types of unfixed (flowing) contents, and in the S- and I₁-types closely related to them as interpreted by Jaensch.¹²³ These kinds of variations in aesthetic evaluation are actually characterological tests. The I₁-types even in matters aesthetic give in easily to mood, stimulation, and affection or feeling.¹²⁴ But people belonging to the A₁-, as well as the I₂- and I₃-types, guard their power of judgment, and do not give in so easily. In this connection, I can produce convincing examples from my own sub-experimental research. At a reading of poetry which a modern writer of lyrics prepared from his own works a

really beautiful and moving poem about a mother was presented at the very beginning, a poem which most of his hearers took as a favorable basis for the positive evaluation for the trash that followed; only a very few people are invulnerable to and immune from this eclipse of value. Whether a work of art is to arouse a real aesthetic experience in the spectator depends on the instantaneous understanding of it. Köstlin¹²⁵ is quite correct in saying that a person can be in a mood in which he does not want Shakespeare because he seems too bitter, or, inversely, because he is too cheerful. But a person can also be disposed against Shakespeare for purely aesthetic reasons if he has worked for a long time with Greek or related poetry and has therefore turned his taste in the direction of harmonic beauty of form. The concepts of habit (custom) and blunting are broader categories of explanation for such intraindividual variations. Here one is concerned with psychological facts that are rooted in the laws of feeling and apperception in their courses. Here antinomial tendencies are in effect. Habit traces back to the facilitation of apperception based on practice and preparation (*Bahnung*). That which has often been apperceived can be grasped easily and is therefore experienced with an accent of functional pleasure. But this goes only so far, and then there is a turning in the opposite direction. If the easiness of apperception goes too far, that is to say, if that which is presented is too familiar so that the charm of what is new and a captivating occupation of mind are completely absent, then, according to the psychic law of stimulus-fatigue, there follow an increase in blunting, a lack of impression, and therefore an unpleasant effect. The individual loses both attention and his receptivity for the impressions which remain the same. Blunting: this is the negative side of habit and custom. But habit has a positive side also. When something radically new occurs, it at first causes a shock of unfamiliarity; better known, it will become more familiar, more "comfortable," and therefore more pleasant; it takes on a "*Notat*" and a "*Fidential*."¹²⁶ Whether a new something is received with the shock of unfamiliarity or whether it possesses the charm of novelty naturally depends on the psychic training and preparation of the person who is grasping it, on how his habits of seeing and hearing relate to it. At this point there begin far-reaching differences of intraindividual and interindividual kinds. One's relation to a certain work of art has a history. When we first perceive it, a work of art can cause the unpleasant shock of unfamiliarity; after habit enters in and after a certain grinding down of the paths of apperception has taken place, it will be evaluated affirmatively

as pleasant; then even this work as it eventually becomes too familiar will be the object of a blunted experience, and it therefore works negatively at last. Thus there are tonal works which are intrinsically meaningful but which no longer give us a full experience because we have heard them too often. Every subscriber to the opera knows what a torture it can be to encounter for the tenth time an opera of the standard repertoire which he thought quite pleasant at first hearing.

The rapidity and the degree of familiarity and blunting depend on different factors of the subjective kind. Conservative minds (conservatism is a result of certain basic functions of a mental constitution; in the positive view, it is the result of the force of preservation; in the negative, it is a certain mental laziness and indolence), conservative minds hold fast to the old and only with difficulty become familiar with the new;¹²⁷ progressive minds and *novarum rerum cupidi* work in a contrary fashion. Naturally, the inner content and the profundity of works also play a decisive role. There are operas which are exhausted after three hearings; but there are others from which one can still derive something new after repeated listening. One may observe incidentally that the depth of content is not entirely dependent on the so-called profundity of the music. Thus Bach, Wagner, and Brahms have depth and profundity in this sense, but so do Mozart and Schubert.

Our relationships to the works of art and of nature are therefore not always the same. A work which at first was too difficult and too "noble" can be rendered accessible to enjoyment by increased familiarity and increased aesthetic training. The opposite too occurs frequently enough. A work that seems beautiful at our first and second perceptions of it becomes a matter of indifference to us if we have it with us hourly. The object has not changed; but our functional pleasure has become blunted, as Jerusalem indicates. Habit (and the blunting it causes) is valid chiefly as an intraindividual category; at the same time, however, it causes interindividual variations. Two people who are otherwise quite of the same mind exhibit exceptional differences as they evaluate a particular work; for the one, it is new, and the other has already had a great number of contacts with it or with works like it in style. And, further, habit and blunting are universal moving forces in art-development. They are applied by Bernheimer¹²⁸ as driving motives in all artistic development. Witasek¹²⁹ also credits them with an important role, though not with this critical one. According to him, habit, blunting, and delight in novelty are constituents of style-change. He finds the

reason for the appearance of habit and blunting in the universal laws of psychic life. An aptitude for aesthetic feeling does not always function in the same way, but shows variations in its capacity to work. If it did not, it would be a unique instance among psychic aptitudes as a whole. Everyone has had occasion to notice these variations in himself. For example, a person is not always in the mood for aesthetic pleasure. The aesthetic feeling-disposition, like all other psychic dispositions, succumbs to variations in ennui and revival, of exercise and blunting (familiarity with the beauty of a landscape or of a woman). And all of this within every single individual.

According to Diez,¹⁸⁰ habit and blunting belong to the determinations of the individual which cause unauthorized differences in taste, as well as oblique aesthetic judgments. Habit operates in a dual way. On the one hand, it produces requirements and requests; on the other, it blunts the requirements and produces ennui. Through a habit which causes blunting, aesthetic judgment can lose its sharpness and become unfair. When people were accustomed to crinolines, women seemed to be undressed when they wore smooth hanging dresses. People whose eyes were used to the saturated colors of painting as seen under the light of the atelier were unjust at first when they judged the confused color of the *plein-air* style. If a strict kind of simple aim has for a long time governed architecture and the profession of art in general, a demand for the decorative follows. If this demand is then satisfied profusely and extravagantly during a certain period, a desire for simple practicality again asserts itself.

Separate individuals do not develop these requirements with the same rapidity. Many spectators are already weary of forms and means to artistic expression which others judge favorably but not as too familiar. In the latter, the first forebodings of newly arriving kinds of language which modern minds will hail with joy trigger a shock of unfamiliarity.

To be influenced and determined by custom is one of the weaknesses in human nature which can hardly be avoided. The danger of custom lies, on the one hand, in its blinding one to the value of everything which is warranted likewise as different and new and, on the other, in its unduly blunting us against the aesthetic values which surround us all the time. Custom can put us under its bonds without our being aware that it does so. We think that our judgments are free and beyond influence, but, as a matter of fact, custom has been turbidly blended with them. Even a person who is on an

intellectually high plane is more the creature of custom than he himself is inclined to admit. A person who professes to have aesthetic culture must in any event exert himself to overcome the ambivalent darkenings of the aesthetic judgment emanating from custom and habit: to overcome the bias stemming from habit and custom against what is legitimately new, and also the blunting of that which is too familiar, of that which will no longer be experienced in that value-character which it once justly laid claim to.

c.¹ *The Interindividual Differences. a.² Unwarranted Differences in Taste.* One often discovers that absolutely incompetent people express judgments in condemnation of scientific theories and points of view for political and other heteronomous reasons. This has happened, for instance, in connection with the theory of physical relativity. Nevertheless, physicists advocating this theory have not had to feel either offended or refuted by such judgments, for a scientific theory and hypothesis can be criticized and refuted only by people on a mental level with it. An old sentence runs thus: *Contra principia negantem disputari non potest*. But still less can one argue with a person who does not really possess fundamental principles because of his inability to adopt the intellectual presuppositions on which the discussion must proceed. The ability properly to experience a value by persons doing the comprehending must be an essential part of a definition of value; one may possibly say: a certain given state has value insofar as it can be the object of a value-feeling in a person intellectually and emotionally capable of it.¹³¹ For people affected with a "moral insanity," moral values are not matters of question; nor do people who are ignorant and intellectually weak think that truth-values of the purest scientific research are matters of concern. People of this kind are not called upon to speak in connection with such kinds of decisions, and an analogous, if not an equally weighty, lack of judgment occurs in aesthetic and artistic realms also. I once saw a culturally limited person without glancing at his book of programs turn on the radio just as the first movement of a symphony by Bruckner began to be played. He listened for probably half a minute and then, with an expression of extreme displeasure, switched channels. If other radio-listeners had been questioned, he would without a doubt probably have found people who shared his feeling and who could present a solid phalanx of opinion against the countless number of people who admire symphonic music. Does aesthetics have to give recognition to such differences in taste as these? No, because

judgments of taste which are based on a crude lack of judgment and which, furthermore, spring from a lack of development and immaturity can without further discussion be excluded as irrelevant. Warranted or legitimate differences in judgments of taste are only those which go back to possible and permissible variations within the aesthetic state. Differences in taste upon which the opponents of aesthetics constantly rest their case materially shrivel to nothing as soon as one thinks of the following: aesthetics in what it asserts has to take into consideration only an ideal aesthetic state. This state must be proper, completely developed and realized, and pure (that is, free of all perverse and one-sided attitudes and of hetero-aesthetic and pseudo-aesthetic factors). We need not consider variations and inconsistencies in aesthetic judgment which are clearly based on false, immature, or inadequate attitudes. We need not have any concern either about the failures in judgment and the uncertainties in aesthetic judgment which stem from an inhibited, impure or semi-aesthetic procedure such as is found in great abundance in everyday life. Aesthetics is an ideal science which bases its assertions not on the empirically most frequently realized average state, but on the well-formed and the well-developed in every respect, no matter how seldom it is realized. According to Witasek, the subject's manner of reacting is not the decisive thing for aesthetics no matter in whatever difficult way or under whatever unfavorable circumstances his reaction is brought about; but it is that which results when the best means of presentation and a favorably disposed frame of mind come together. If one presupposes such maximally favorable conditions, a greater part of the contradictions within judgments of taste already slip away because these conditions act as a guarantee of a more uniform reaction of the subjects.

Just as one may disregard miscarriages of judgment which grow out of an undeveloped aesthetic state, so one may disregard judgments arising from an extra-aesthetic attitude and beclouded by intellectual, moral, and similar motives. When a person rejects a woman who everyone else thinks is beautiful because she does not fulfill his requirements as to character, intellect, and sex-appeal, his judgment has been distorted by extra-aesthetic motives and has been ruined in terms of its aesthetic character. For not a few spectators, staunchness of character compensates for defective power of literary formation; they therefore judge in quite positive terms many well-intentioned works by dilettantes which people capable of judgment are correct in rejecting. A religious person judges a holy picture to be beautiful when it disposes him for pious veneration.

tion and inspires him with devout thoughts. In Anzengruber's "*Sternsteinhof*," someone rejects a piece of religious plastic art as not being sacred because of the beauty of its form. Similar ways of thinking were determinative for Byzantine iconoclasts and also the creators and enjoyers of high-gothic sculpture. Moralism which is too strict may reject a picture because it reveals naked bodies. A mixing-in of extra-aesthetic aims often falsifies aesthetic judgment. The potential aesthetic value of a given object in nature and of a work of art is tied only to the proper aesthetic attitude; it remains closed to every other mode of contemplation. Anyone who views an art-work from the extra-aesthetic point of view must arrive at another kind of judgment than that which occurs to him when he is in the aesthetic state. What I have described is a situation which is very common in everyday life.

People have been right in saying that moralistic agreeability frequently urges itself into the object at hand in place of the aesthetic attitude, the layman being sufficiently compensated by the important subjects which stimulate the mind for a deficiency of the aesthetic qualities which should really adhere to and motivate the object; and thus he is led to call it, the work, beautiful though it should actually be called merely stimulating or meaningful. The chief reason for the astounding differences between the judgments of pictures as made by the artist and by the layman lies in the fact that the latter is often satisfied with the pleasant object in the presentation. He is satisfied if it tells him something interesting and if it is sympathetic or touching. He has only one requirement: that the presentation not disturb what is best achieved by a kind of fashioning which is technically skilled, smooth, and academic-conservative. But the connoisseur asks more of an art-work than that it should stimulate his own thought-activity; he asks that the contents of the picture always enter into the form and achieve an organic, convincing shape. The picture is judged in these terms, and it is clear that this kind of connoisseur's judgment takes place in a way which is different from the layman's.

Thus aesthetic judgment undergoes a kind of adulteration when extra-aesthetic factors are applied to it; and alongside this kind of falsification, there is another achieved by way of pseudo-aesthetic factors. Such factors occur when the work of art is apprehended in an attitude which indeed has the appearance of something aesthetic, but which in reality is not so at all.

According to Witasek, the statement, "This object is beautiful," can be misleading if it is not based on an aesthetic feeling suit-

able to it. The person concerned acts as if he had the aesthetic feeling, though in fact he is truly not aesthetically affected at all; he only believes himself to be so, possibly on the authority of others. Here there is a beauty which is merely deemed to be so, as compared with one that is really felt. Or the spectator indeed experiences a feeling in relation to the object, but the feeling, instead of being aesthetic, is ethical, and so forth. All of these different possibilities make up ever so many unauthorized, illegitimate, and therefore excludable instances in judgment, as compared with the cases which come into question only when aesthetic feeling is actualized as a matter of fact, and, indeed, as the causal effect of the representation of the object.

There is a question in connection with the evaluation of the judgment of taste as to whether an attitude can be found which, with respect to an art-work, is to be considered the only proper one; the answer relates to the function of the cultural level and aesthetic education of the contemplator. An entirely untrained person will rarely be able to draw aesthetic pleasure from the works of Bach, Stefan George, Klimt, and Rilke. Should he come in contact with them, he will find fault with them; for caution in judgment comes only with greater intellectual maturity. Such kinds of differences in taste do not have to be considered here. In matters of art, the taste of the crowd is not valid; only that of a few responsive people and connoisseurs is. Over and over again one sees that great masses of people react negatively precisely to significant works of art and look for aesthetic satisfaction in trivial objects, and, indeed, in those of lesser value. One would be reversing matters if he held the taste of the mass to be the norm and the judgment of a cultivated person to be irrelevant. In things of value, decisions are never made by a plurality of votes, but by the weight of the delivered opinions, and the greater weight belongs to those who come the closest (where there is a question of critical judgment of the artistic performances) to the intention of the creator.

But the gulf between the connoisseur and the layman is not unbridgeable. Witasek has been right to stress that a man of fine, trained taste exhibits nothing more than an embodiment of a higher power in universal aesthetic tendencies. Pleasure in a musical work of a strict style disappointing most people requires nothing of the hearer than what is presupposed by light music: that is, clear understanding of the tonal figures and empathy. In terms of kind, the same dispositions and modes of action are important in the one as in the other. It is only that pleasure in a superior work of art de-

mands more difficult acts of this kind, and especially schooled capacities and aptitudes are assumed. This schooling is lacking in the great mass of people, of course, but it is within the realm of possibility for every single person; it is only an intensification of the capabilities and participations already in everyday existence, a further development of them with a continuance of their direction. Refined taste cannot, therefore, be thought of as something foreign to universality; it is identical with psychologically normal subjective conditions of aesthetic enjoyment and is distinguished only by the fact that an aptitude which people possess in common exists in connection with it in an all-around and consistent cultivation.

A cultivated taste is valid, therefore, not as something abnormal, but as something authoritative. It is the crystallization-product of universally subjective conditions. Because cultivated taste is a universal taste of a kind more intensified and more developed all around, what alone matters is the cultivated taste, and not a raw uncultivated one. Thus people who are blind to aesthetic value cannot require us to adopt their point of view, or even to respect it, no matter how great in number they are.

A further cause of unwarranted differences in taste is the one-sided, perverse, and twisted points of view which should not be confused with uncultivated and immature ones. One often finds that significant artists, who certainly command cultivated taste and understanding, make the most peculiar judgments about the works of their contemporaries. This happens because of the one-sided point of view which is a function of their creative characters. They attribute high value only to what suggests their own style and violently reject everything else. This one-sidedness of artists is explicable, and even necessary. If they are to be able to create something significant, they must be convinced with a one-sided monomania of the unusual rightness of their own mode of creation. The attempt to understand everything, to approve equally of all other tendencies and aims, would damage the artist's impetus to work in his own way. Therefore artists are for the most part the poorest critics and are often astonishingly unjust to the works of others. Goethe's judgment of Kleist, and Schiller's relation to Bürger are well-known examples. Grillparzer, who understood music well, called Weber's *Euryanthe* horrible, and after hearing one of Beethoven's later symphonies, Weber himself said, "Now this great mind has become completely mad." For this reason, artists have a tendency in their taste-judgments to pay one-sided attention to the technical. Besides, creators for the most part are a generation

ahead of public taste, a fact which helps to explain the great differences between the judgments of artists and those of laymen of the same object. Also, in their theories artists often show a forced hyper-modernism from which come judgments and evaluations which one can quietly eliminate as partial and perverse. Examples of this kind are furnished by expressionistic program-periodicals like Pfemfert's *Action* (*Aktion*) and Herwarth Walden's journal, *Sturm*, which outlined a special artistic theory. In these appeared Marinetti's "*Manifesto of Futurism*" and the essay by Kurt Schwitters called "The Artist's Right to Self-Determination" ("*Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht des Künstlers*"). The oddity here manifest judges itself, and no one is in any way obliged to recognize in the resulting contradictions an argument against the possibility of super-individually valid judgments of taste. As for persons who are artistically receptive, enough eccentric and perverse points of view are found among them too. Persons like those who reject verse-drama and opera as being unnatural need not be taken seriously. Karl Köstlin says similarly that individual taste may deviate into a one-sided subjective taste or into the kind which is false and wrong-headed because of the person's incapacity for judging. He cannot differentiate between the beautiful and the unbeautiful, and he can actually find that the non-beautiful is beautiful. The reason for all of this is primarily lack of training which delights, not in healthy roughness and gay colors, as does the still healthy taste of the common people, but in crudenesses, coarsenesses, dazzling colors, shrill sounds, and also in the sensational, the far-fetched, the affected, and the pompous. Here are examples of the kind of lack of taste (*Ungeschmack*) which people call tastelessness and absurdity. A second cause is improper training—that is, a tendency according to which certain vital relations of form (like simplicity, measure, clarity, harmony, and serenity) are too simple and not highly flavored and stimulating enough.

The subjectivity which belongs to the creation of the aesthetic object and to the actualization of aesthetic worth and which, as a component of the very nature of the aesthetic objects, cannot be avoided—this subjectivity is the starting-point at which the many differences in understanding and representation begin. What we call differences in taste are often not primarily differences in evaluation and in feeling which have resulted, but differences in comprehension. For many individuals, even the pre-aesthetic basis of the aesthetic experience as founded on the same object is different. The direct factor of the aesthetic object can still count on far-

reaching agreement among most spectators¹³² (although there are characteristic differences even here), but the differences in connection with factors of comprehension and association are much greater. The formal working-up of the materials of sensation which constitutes the aesthetic object can, to begin with, differ fundamentally among various individuals. The simplest syntheses of form do indeed succeed in agreeing pretty much, but when higher acts of understanding are necessary, a considerable number of differences come into being.

Witasek has been instructive as well as conclusive about this matter. If the feelings with which different people react aesthetically to the same object are different, the reason can be that the representations themselves are different. Differences in the contents of presentations possibly are already conditioned by the functioning of the organs of sense (color-blindness, myopia, astigmatism). But they naturally have more room for play and are therefore of more significance where the representation of the aesthetic object takes place chiefly through the extended activity of the subject in that sense-data give only an outer impulse, and the shaping of forms, imagination, association, and the understanding have to produce the essentials. These subjective factors vary according to the individual's abilities, and for this reason the same object causes different representational experiences and, where there are presuppositions of feeling, it causes different aesthetic feelings too. It is not to everyone's interest to grasp the complicated tonal forms in a fugue of Bach; many people lack the musical training for this, the ability to hold the medley of tones apart and to combine it into the melody intended by the composer. Instead, they hear a confused tonal entanglement which has no pleasure for them, while the person who knows music is moved by the same piece. This of course is not an instance of a lack of rule in the aesthetic state. Within the same spheres of life and culture, the same representations in general arouse the same feeling-reactions. Aesthetic standards are based on this "normal" feeling-state. But even the impressions which many observers receive from the same work of art are really not the same. And most cases of aesthetic dissent can be explained, according to Witasek, precisely by the fact that the object in the representation is grasped in different ways, that it is formed differently in the subject's understanding and imaginative play and accordingly presents different presuppositions to the feelings. But as soon as it happens that the same basis for critical judgment—a representation that is essentially identical—is created in different spectators, a

greater part of the differences fall away. Even Meumann,¹³³ who believes that for an exhaustive contemplation, aesthetic judgment does not seem in any way to be as arbitrary as a superficial examination of the state of the case usually supposes—even Meumann refers to the fact that the individual spectator in different cases judges something different: sometimes more the contents of the art-work, sometimes more the relations of form, and sometimes the technique exclusively. Many remain with the immediate impression, whereas others make a transfer into the analyzed impression; here the analysis can be pushed to different lengths and can again become immediate to a greater or lesser degree. The judgment of the one person relies on particularities grasped from out of the art-work because they alone are intelligible and accessible to him; others, on the contrary, keep the total impression in mind. In the differentiated judgments of taste which are inevitable in such cases, both groups of persons have had something different in view.

A picture of a woman which reveals an ugly person in perfect plastic conception and representation is generally judged in quite opposite ways by experts and by laymen. The same is true when a painting presents a beautiful woman in a trashy-sweet style. Here the aesthetic judgment of separate individuals has very different supports. Certain people pay attention to the "matter" of a picture, the object supplied by nature, the beauty of the model; others judge the execution of the artist. Therefore not a few painters have disdained getting their effects by borrowing the naturally aesthetic qualities of the object they have used as a model. Schools of regional painters like those of Worpswede and Dachau intentionally paint objects which are lacking in charm so that they can be sure that all of the positive qualities of the effect they produce are their own. The same is true when actors prefer to play in pieces which are worthless as literature. The vogue among actors for plays like Brachvogel's *Narcissus* can be explained not only in terms of the leading parts in them, but probably even more by the fact that the actors can clearly credit all of the applause to their performance. In other cases, if they are honest, they must subtract from the totality a portion of the applause for the writer. Not all mimes, it is true, are prepared to do this, and many a mere tenor is only too eagerly inclined during the applause to forget that someone else wrote the music for him. In the meantime, the great public follows suit; neither ready for nor capable of critical distinctions, it constantly contaminates the value-results flowing from different sources. Thus, on the other hand, even mediocre performances by actors and singers please

it, if only because the role, the part, is sympathetic and grateful; for the public does not know enough to distinguish between the interpreter's performance and that of the creator. The failure at its first performance of Rossini's deathless masterpiece, the *Barber*, was possible only because the public could not distinguish between the intrinsic worth of the composer's work and certain insufficiencies in the performance. Thus is explained the great number of striking differences between the taste of the great public and that of the small band of people who understand art. For the connoisseur, not the role, but what the actor or singer is able to do with it, is "good" or "bad." Yet even the critics themselves have not always been able to rise to this separation of performances. Klabund once assembled the reviews of his *Kreidekreis* and made the discovery that the actress who represented the extremely sympathetic figure of Hai-tang never had a bad press, but that the actress who had to embody her malicious, scheming antagonist hardly ever had anything else.

We have already pointed out that everyone who meets a certain givenness aesthetically must necessarily arrive at another kind of judgment from those of persons evaluating it ethically or intellectually. Nietzsche, who considered an historical figure like Cesare Borgia aesthetically, was able to discover positive traits in it—something completely impossible for people who approach it in terms of ethical categories. The difference between aesthetic and non-aesthetic modes of contemplation appears especially clear, there and then, when the latter causes the spectator to perceive other aspects of the object than those coming from aesthetic effect. Meyer¹³⁴ gives convincing examples of this: a philologist studying the language of Goethe turns his attention to the grammatical and stylistic characteristics of Goethe's word-art, and therefore to the things which a person naïvely enjoying the lyrics of this poet seldom notices. Inversely, someone taking the philological position brackets off a good deal of what is of moment to a person having an aesthetic experience. Also, when non-aesthetic observation focuses on the same forms as does the aesthetic one, it will evaluate these forms in terms of other points of view. A person tired of walking is not in a mood for the charming meanderings of a street; rather, he is annoyed at having to go around Robin Hood's barn.

That the same given objects in the outer world can be the originals for very different aesthetic objects is true primarily because of the indirect or representational factor. But its role, despite its importance, is too unproblematical to require an especially thorough-

going discussion. Even when a person holds off all unwarranted and illegitimate private associations (that is, those not required by the object, or at least not based on it), plenty of differences are left. Moreover, the associative arranging of details is very often indispensable to a full and warm aesthetic experience. All spectators are not equally capable of these acts, and this is a further reason for differences among judgments of taste. Like the proper formal comprehension of complicated forms of art, the necessary associative and reproductive supplement in art too is dependent upon one's training-possession, his cultural level, and his imagination. That the aesthetic attitude changes with the extent of one's education and the plane of one's cultural accomplishment, that educated people's judgments of taste are supported by different associative factors and by a different selection of them than are those of untrained people: this fact belongs to the group of interindividual taste-differences which, though they cannot be eliminated, are unwarranted and irrelevant nevertheless.

Aesthetic judgment can easily be falsified through arbitrary and incalculable private associations. Two people see a most mediocre picture of a landscape. One person rejects it as a weak performance; but another is pleased. Yet closer analysis might show that this difference in judgment need not be an argument in favor of the asserted rulelessness in decisions in taste. For the picture pleases the second person, not because of its artistic execution, but for the sake of the object presented, an object which appeals to his sympathies because it is a summer residence in which he spent some pleasant weeks. What the spectator is completely unjustified in finding pleasing in the picture and what he has therefore evaluated in an aesthetically positive way is not its aesthetic values at all, but his own memories, the pleasure of recognition, and so forth.

That such private kinds of association should be eliminated from aesthetic judgment requires no proof. Yet there also are differences in judgments of taste which trace back to warranted, legitimate, and necessary associations. The presuppositions even for associations which are objectively demanded are not the same in every observer; besides, every art-work offers an abundance of permissible starting-points of attack for associations, and this gives occasion for more basic differences. On this basis there has been no dearth of attempts to take the idea that associations are indispensable and to wrest from it an argument for aesthetic skepticism with respect to decisions of taste. Such tendencies can be found in the work of the Scottish aesthetician Dugald Stewart,¹³⁵ who

attempted to trace aesthetic pleasure back to associations. We perceive a certain object as beautiful because it earlier provided us with a sensuous or intellectual pleasure. A fruit that once refreshed us will later, when there is no longer any question of our eating it, call up an impression of beauty. Moonlight exercises an aesthetically favorable effect when it causes us to think of a happy event which we experienced by moonlight—and the reverse. As a consequence of this associative contribution, the same object can seem sometimes as beautiful, sometimes as ugly, according to the kind of images it awakens in the mind of the spectator. Now we understand why our own judgments contradict themselves so abundantly and why the judgments of different people deviate from one another. But this conception of Stewart's excessively over-rates the role of association if aesthetic pleasure is supposed to be entirely based on it to the neglect of the direct factor. There is no complete freedom of association or even a complete arbitrariness of association for the spectator at all. Instead, the object exerts a certain force on him, certain associations actually being demanded objectively, others being suggested, and still others being entirely banned. Thus the proper experience of a tragedy, for example, excludes the influx of burlesque-comical associations. Adequate experience of a work of art is concerned with the production in the work of art of the objectified intention of the creator; and thus a chaotic and arbitrary roaming-about of associative activity is definitely to be restricted and a sharp divergence from the object avoided. Should such eventualities occur nonetheless, they should be disregarded as irrelevant.

The effect of an art-work is determined not merely by the associative endowments which become part of the impression, but also by the way it is embedded in a situation. Every judgment of taste refers not only to the specific pre-aesthetic object which is the same for all observers, but also to this object in that embeddedness which completely determines it. Thus judgment flows out of the total situation which is of a singular kind at any particular time, and this embeddedness can create of the same aesthetic-artistic given object something different for numerous spectators. Every personal situation is something which will never return in the same way and which therefore never can be fully comparable with any other situation of the same person or of other people. From here on, there are more refined avenues to the explanation of certain differences in taste than the theory of associative factors makes possible. The concrete aesthetic event is given shape in a certain way because of the personal situation of the individual undergoing the experience. In saying this,

we mean by "personal situation" what W. Stern¹³⁶ does, the interpenetration of those demands immediately present with the reactivity of the person and with his readiness for spontaneity. Here is the place for the most diverse of individual differences in judgments of taste.

The basic fact that the aesthetic object is not something given objectively complete, but that (if it is to come into being) it requires an act of comprehension—this fact permits one to speak of the plasticity (*Bildsamkeit*) of the world of the aesthetic object. Even the art-treasures of earlier times are not possessions whose value remains unchanged, since in the end they do not even preserve their objective appearance from alteration. Art-works, insofar as they are physical objects, undergo certain changes: darkenings in oil-paintings (Rembrandt's *Nightwatch* was not a night-piece originally), monochromatization induced by aging in plastic art which originally was multi-colored, and the like. The changes are more drastic when an art-work is merely in the course of being newly realized in performance, as in music. It is well known that practice in the performance of musical works has changed decidedly in the last 150 years. Solo-pianists and solo-violinists now follow precisely what is written and no longer arbitrarily change what they find by adding embellishments; tempi have become essentially faster, a fact which in part goes back to the technical improvement of instruments (the Bohemian flute, the valve-horn, the key-bugle, and others). But these changes are of hardly any weight as compared with changes in the aesthetic experiences which are based on them. The best example of this is the fact that tastes of entire periods differ most radically in the estimating of the artistic productions of earlier centuries. Today gothic and baroque works of art are generally held in exceedingly high esteem; in earlier centuries, they were violently rejected, just as the names provided those movements in style were originally indications of dissatisfaction and terms of abuse. Thus we are led to the philosophical idea which is important in art-history, the idea of the "plasticity of the past," about which I have expressed myself in other places and in some detail.¹³⁷

b.³ Warranted (Essential) Differences. Besides judgments of taste which are inessential and are therefore to be eliminated as illegitimate, there are those whose title cannot be denied, judgments which go back to permissible and characteristic variations and variables in the aesthetic state. Such confirmed differences are not to be excluded because they are anchored firmly in the elementary and constitutive traits of our humanity; thus grounded, they may not

be treated as if they were mistakes, aberrations, or accidents; furthermore, they are not completely irrational and chaotic, but are in a certain measure to be understood as typological and to be conceived of as lawful. In this connection there is a question, not so much of ideographic phenomena which a person must apprehend in their simple being (*So-Sein*), but, rather, of phenomena which can be grasped in approximate forms of nomothetic categories. One person who likes music raves about Verdi, another about Wagner; one epoch finds its most complete artistic fulfillment in the antique, while another definitely rejects it: Such differences (or the causes of them) are on a quite different plane from those based on constitutional types, temperament, age, and sex. An introverted person is pleased by things other than those which charm the extraverted; people with a taste for subjects consonant with the outer world often make decisions different from those of people who prefer the schizoid subjects of self-centered persons. Furthermore, a fact which can be observed again and again is that in terms of the laws of specific phases of life, puberty and post-puberty are adapted to certain basic forms in aesthetic creation and enjoyment; and it is an equally legitimate fact that this attitude changes decidedly a few years later: a "Storm and Stress" in terms of style and taste will later give way to a masculine maturity of style (classicism). Youth enjoys the excessive, the vividly exciting, the pathetic, but the sentimental too; maturity is more universal, more peaceful, more measured. A woman prefers a more gentle, a harmonic beauty; but a man expects the more powerful and the more energetic. Everyday people have a more vulgar taste than do the trained ones: they prefer the dazzling, the multi-colored, the multifarious, and the crass. In addition there are ethnic differences which, at least in part, are understandable in terms of laws of ethno-psychology.

There is one group of differences in taste which we must simply accept even though we cannot explain them in any other way than by resignedly tracing them to the individual personal structure which is behind them and whose expression and effect they are. But, on the other hand, the individual's irrationality must not be overestimated either; in any case, these individual structures and claims are not what alone is of moment or decisive. If they were, the astonishing consensus in our relations to great works of art, a consensus extending over time and space, over centuries and geographical distances, could not be explained. In spite of all individual differences, always and again epicures who apparently know how to bring their individual special requirements into accord with certain general or

universal necessities of human spirituality have been stirred by classical masterworks. For this also there is a satisfactory philosophical-psychological formula: the individual is not in a sense something occurring once, so that he is composed entirely of atypical components; more decisive by far is the place he shares in super-individual totalities. Entirely apart from simply the general traits of humanity which belong to every individual, there are traits also of a differential-typological kind. The individual belongs to a constitutional type, a type of character, of temperament, and so forth, just as he does to a nation or to a class of society and education, and all of these result in a certain unification (rationalization) of the irrational structures of individuals. The chief problems of this present sub-section will be discussed and answered not here, but only later in the section on differential-typological questions in aesthetics.* There I shall go into detail about what can be said about the ultimate sources and points of origin of certain characteristic and uneliminable differences in taste; but here, to avoid anticipating too much, I must be aphoristic.

That which is aesthetically valuable is recognized in a surprising multiplicity of phenomena. It is realized in an abundance of kinds, forms, and types which cannot be accessible to every individual in the same way. The beautiful is also distinguished from other values by way of kinds, forms, and types. There are basic forms of the beautiful, modifications of aesthetic objects; but there are no basic forms of the true and the good in the same way. Though the individual cannot possibly make free and independent decisions in the value-realms of the logical and the ethical, he can admit to certain phenomenal forms in the sphere of the beautiful while at the same time other forms can appeal to him less. The beautiful realizes itself in different basic forms, and every single one of them finds a public which on the basis of a certain affinity admits to it, while it does not value others to the same degree. Thus Meyer¹³⁸ mentions three fundamental species of the beautiful: power (*Kraft*), grace (*Anmut*), and overflowing life. What is beautiful is always a life enhanced according to a prevailing bent. Here lies one of the sources from which differences in artistic taste result. Certain persons look for beauty primarily in grace and charm, others in sublimity and nobility, and still others in the riches of exuberant life. And, consequently, the same object does not entirely satisfy the one lover of the arts or the one epoch, though for others it may pass

* See the survey of the contents of Volume II at the end of this book. (H.M.S.)

for true and perfect beauty. There is no doubt that in the realm of aesthetic objects one can find a series of laws about the elective affinities between the structures of certain observers and certain phenomenal forms which the research-medium of differential and individual psychology helps us discover. Here there truly are typical contexts and coordinations which are constant: thus a hasty flight into skepticism and irrationalism is as out of place as it can be, and the *ignoramus* is not an *ignorabimus* by far.

The constitutional-psychological type-groups as well as the cultural-sociological ones are not strictly delimited realms, but they mesh in many ways. Here there are adaptations and convergent developments in terms of assimilations. A person cannot convert an Eskimo to the ideal of beauty of classical Greek art, but neither should he imagine the difference present here to be too great. For a long time, the educated European has had close connection with east-Asiatic painting and graphics; inversely, the Japanese have "developed a taste" for western music; and the leading ideas about female beauty of the majority of the Japanese people are determined more and more by American films and their stars. Thus advances and developments move in the direction of balance and assimilation; the necessary and legitimate differences in taste therefore prove to be accessible to certain adaptations under the influence of aesthetic education and training. In earlier days, the differences were greater and the boundaries between individual cultures and nations more incisive. With the increasing equalization of civilizations, such divisions are in large part destroyed. Modern art has an international stamp, and modern drama has chiefly a European character.¹³⁹ In spite of everything, there remain certain differences of a national kind: there is a national taste as there is a national style. The art of romanic peoples (and the taste basic to it) tends towards the typical, towards clear and decisive formation and pure beauty; germanic taste, and analogous intentions in art are aimed at that which is characteristic.

These differences in aesthetic ideals and judgments of taste which have national, historical, and similar bases are clear and prove to be warranted if one brings the idea of development to bear. Aesthetic ideals are subject to a certain mutation; they are not always the same. Their growth is not chaos, an aimless confusion, however, but an improvement and higher development which are organic and teleological. In this connection there is the matter of the degree to which the artistic natural disposition of a people unfolds, of the working-out of the germ which makes up the artistic ability at-

tached to a certain national spirit. Here, according to Volkelt, a growing enrichment and broadening of artistic ideals takes place.

Differences in verifications of taste come clear as the idea of development is applied; to begin with, there are successive ones. It is clear from everything that has been said that different periods in time will not have exactly the same taste. But from this point of view it is also conceivable that differences take place at the same time, and thus those which occur side by side too are comprehensible. During the same time or period, many trends in art and taste can rule alongside one another, anything else being hardly possible within differentiated civilizations. Alongside long-lived species which have been nourished by tradition there are revolutionary and experimental movements pushing forward into new artistic departures. Let us say that there is a stage of development which is a vigorous after-effect, though basically it is already out of fashion, but that because of its great representatives, its honored traditions, and its pregnant durable forms, it still enjoys a certain respect. Alongside this there operates a second stream, a current more in keeping with the artistic intentions of the day, but one which still has not found its bed and which is approved of by only the more advanced minds. Thus it can be that two people who understand art, belong to the same country, and have the same degree of education can diverge in their tastes without our being able to reproach either of them with having bad taste and without our thinking that one-sidedness and perversity of taste are present; it is just that the one is a conservative in disposition, the other modern.

c.⁸ *De gustibus non est disputandum*. There is a familiar saying to the effect that there is no disputing tastes. There is no doubt that this saying is valid for the taste of the senses, though only with certain qualifications; but it is a controversial problem whether it is to be transferred to the aesthetic realm also. May "taste" (*gustus*) be taken in the metaphorical sense when one asserts that no contention about it is possible? Popular opinion shows a tendency to find this statement true even for aesthetic taste and its decisions. When two movie- or theater-goers are disposed to quarrel about the worth of a film or a play they have just seen, it often happens that the discussion is broken off with the words that in matters of taste every possible decision can claim to be equally right. Nevertheless, even popular opinion is not really satisfied with this statement; or at least it is not inclined to recognize all of its consequences. For experience shows, first, that repeatedly there is serious quarreling about aesthetic concerns even among people who hold to the view that there

can be no disputing taste. And then thinkers on an elementary level who use this phrase so easily still indirectly recognize the value of a certain super-individual regulative in taste when without hesitation they mention good and bad taste, as well as confused taste; thus they themselves in turn evaluate taste and its decisions. If everything here were really legitimate in the same way so that disputes would be aimless and hopeless, there would be no sense in making such differentiations as these.

As interpreted by scientific aesthetics, this sentence does not extend to taste in its transferred or metaphorical meaning; it is tenable only when "taste" means that sense which judges data of the sphere of sensuous agreeableness. There is no disputing these data, of course; for in this sphere it is impossible despite not infrequent agreements to achieve the unanimity which is basically necessary. But in the realm of decisions of the judgment of aesthetic taste, universal rules are possible, and it is for this reason that a dispute about matters of taste in the aesthetic sense ensues. It is here that the reasonable hope for unanimity exists.

The chief proponent of this view is Kant. Judgments about the agreeable are based on private feelings and confine themselves to the person doing the judging. To argue about what pleases the senses in perception for the purpose of proving that conflicting judgments are incorrect—this is madness. But as relates to the beautiful, matters are basically different. In judging a work of art, I cannot say that it is beautiful solely for myself. For I cannot call something beautiful at all if it pleases only me. Anyone who says that something is beautiful expects the same pleasure of others; people who judge otherwise are said not to have taste. Kant therefore allows everyone's "own taste" to be valid in the realm of sensuous taste only. If one wanted to say that every person has his own taste also in the realm of aesthetic value, one would mean that "There is no taste at all (that is, no aesthetic judgment) which could make legitimate demands on everyone else's assent." According to Kant, the beautiful is indeed a subjective affection of the mind of the spectator; yet because it arises on the basis of an aesthetic common sense, transcendental philosophy does not have to acknowledge interindividual differences of taste.

Kant distinguishes three meanings of the word "taste": 1. as an organic sense; 2. as "the faculty of judgment in consideration of the agreeable generally"; 3. as the faculty of the judgment of the beautiful. Chance and free will are the rule in decisions of the organic sense; by contrast, there are certain agreements between judg-

ing minds with respect to the second meaning. As concerns the agreeable, one occasionally finds that "in the judging of it one meets with a unanimity among men, in the light of which one says that certain people do not have taste and that others do." But this universality is something different from that which we meet in the aesthetic realm. The beautiful is the object of a universal pleasure, and aesthetic judgments of taste appear with a demand-character.

For modern aesthetics there is no doubt that Kant over-pointed the antithesis between decisions of sensuous taste and judgments of aesthetic taste. It is primarily the claim- and demand-character (which is supposed to belong as a characteristic to the third "taste" alone) which is not an unproblematical matter; the reason is that it need not be entirely absent even from judgments of sensuous taste. People not infrequently argue about the good taste of certain kinds of foods, wines, or cigars. If opportunity arises, a person who does not like fish or wild fowl will most certainly find himself to be the target of the most uncompromising propaganda on the part of devotees of these pleasures. Even here there are points of view and convictions which are energetically defended. Even in matters of sensuous taste, therefore, there is the attempt to see one's own judgment generally recognized as much as possible. In spite of this, one's mind is more easily pacified in disagreements about the sensuous-agreeable than in discussions about the aesthetically valuable. Moreover, anyone who defends his aesthetic judgment has in mind principally the object he has appraised; but in arguments about judgments of the sensuous taste, there is a question less about the fact itself than about the special condition of one's own expertness, any doubts about which one does not relish. Thus there remains the distinction that in the beautiful, the demand-character is funded in the object, but that in the agreeable, on the contrary, it is funded in the judge, and even here not in fundamental reaches.

Furthermore, the idea that in matters of sensuous taste absolute free will must govern has met with resistance. Opposing this assertion of Kant's, people have insisted that, instead, even here there are certain universal statements and regulatives. Thus attention has been called to the biological corrections of our judgments of sensuous taste, as a result of which certain foods which are too vigorously spiced are avoided for reasons of health (to be sure, also for gastronomical reasons because they make foods lose their natural taste: When everything tastes like garlic or paprika, a great many pleasant distinctions are lost).

To deny that there are characteristic differences between judg-

ments of sensuous taste and those of aesthetic taste will never occur to anyone; yet the lines of divergence should not be too sharply drawn. Above all, too great an importance must not be placed on the idea and fact of the universal validity of pleased judgments which are present without exception in the second case, but which have to be entirely absent from the first. For on the one hand, this idea and fact is not entirely missing from judgments of the agreeable, and on the other hand, it belongs to aesthetic judgment to only a limited extent. And saying this, we have reached a decisive admission: namely, that, despite all protests, the sentence "*de gustibus . . .*" has at least a limited importance, even in the aesthetic sphere, insofar, namely, as there are differences in aesthetic judgment of the kind that are intrinsic, basic, and not to be abrogated. Between persons of different aesthetic types and tendencies in taste a dispute the aim of which is agreement is often very difficult to carry on; indeed it is basically hopeless and impossible. For this reason such discussion is often not attempted in the first place.

The sentence which is the title of this section is valid, therefore, in the province of evaluation both of sensuous taste and of aesthetic taste, though with certain restrictions which are less important in the first instance and more important in the second. Yet this fact does not make the statement entirely inapplicable to critical judgments of the second group. There is an evaluation of evaluations, and where such a thing is present, a dispute about it must also be possible.

The sayings, "Taste cannot be disputed" and "Everyone to his own taste" cannot in any case, according to Heimann, be related to the taste-characteristic of selecting higher and lower values. One person prefers to eat pork, for example, another prefers veal, but everyone prefers fried meat to fried leather. If one of two lovers of music places Bach higher and the other Mozart, there can hardly be a decision of whether one is right and of who it is. But if a person prefers the music of "The Dream of the Waltz" to the *B Minor Mass* and *Don Giovanni*, we can positively say that the one is wrong if he quarrels about his judgment of taste with someone whose inclination is the reverse of his. If we consider, further, that there are higher and lower values, we are able to speak of a higher or lower taste, and to judge that a taste is better or worse.

Thus the sentence "*de gustibus . . .*" is half-way true also in the aesthetic sphere, namely, as regards members of one set of values. Here the irrationality of the individual and his taste can be realized to the full. But if taste is that by which an individual, despite the coming into power of universal laws, is distinguished from other

people, then just because of this fact there arise interesting connections between the two spheres to which the concept of taste is applied.

If one person prefers to eat apples and another pears, it cannot be said that one has better taste than the other. But we may counter that if one person prefers to see a painting by Rembrandt and another prefers one by Raphael and if one prefers Mozart and another Beethoven—*then* can one say that one person is right and the other not? Just as little. One can demand that the spectator disregard his bias in judgment and recognize the fact that the works of these artists present an absolute high point in art. Yet one can ask something corresponding even with respect to kinds of fruit. Though a person prefers to eat pears, he does not therefore think the apple is a less precious fruit. It can be said without thinking twice that a picture by Rembrandt, like a picture by Raphael, is superior to any bad work one selects. But just as a ripe Calville apple is more tasty than a wooden apple, so a carefully prepared dish is better than one the cook has burned. Even in the sphere of sensuous taste, therefore, there are a better and a worse, an objectivity of taste, and certain abiding rules and standards. Here too a primary insight of Aristotle's *Ethics* is in effect. The valuable is the unity of opposites, or the mean (*μεσότης*) between extremes that is not a dead point between them, but their living and organic balance. The "virtue" of food is the dialectically distinguished mean, exactly as is the virtue of a human being; it is equally distant from all extremes, from satiety (*υπερβολή*) and insufficiency (*ἐλλειψις*), from the too-much and the too-little spiced, fried, watered. Furthermore, a "good" food must be a unity of its different components of taste; one of these components must not assert itself over the others; just as the twenty-five spices in a bouillabaisse are mutually dissolved, so all ingredients must in a corresponding fashion set one another off.

One sees, therefore, that complete chaos is not the rule even in the realm of sensuous taste, but that, instead, there are certain established regulatives which result in a qualification of the statement "*de gustibus. . .*" Within the sphere of judgments of aesthetic taste, this qualification is present to an even greater degree. There are legitimate differences in taste-decisions only within the set of equal values in the judged objectivities: to quarrel about this is quite senseless. But where members of widely different series of values and ranks are in question, differences within the judgment of taste are unwarranted. Either unanimity must be possible, or the judgment of persons stubbornly professing to the lesser values must

be eliminated after the basis for this faulty kind of decision has been laid bare.

Because the quoted sentence was recognized as valid for both spheres (though qualified in different degrees) the spheres of decisions of sensuous taste and of the judgments of aesthetic taste draw more closely together, as Kant almost conceded. And when earlier aestheticians, along with Kant, admitted that judgments of sensuous taste fall terribly into fragments and disputed the possibility of universal principles in his area, but took for granted that in the judgment of aesthetic taste there are unity, necessity, and independently valid universal principles, they went too far on both counts. The cleavage between the two areas is not so great because even in the judgment of sensuous taste firm, universally binding foundations are not absolutely wanting; and the bases of aesthetic judgment are not so certain or so unproblematical as people were for a long time inclined to suppose.

This can be demonstrated in a more detailed fashion by way of two examples. In the novel *Die Halbschwester* (*The Half-Sister*) by Mungenast, a hotel-keeper in Lorraine is enraged because by mistake he has taken a swallow of white wine—this from a cask which a wine-dealer by mistake had substituted for a cask of red wine. Now, people from Lorraine do not drink white wine. "White wine is really not wine; it is as sour as saltpetre or it is petroleum. . . . Wine must be dark as blood and as sparkling as rubies, soft as to basic color and heavy of flow, effervescent with the smell of grapes and earth-deep as it slowly delivers up its abundance, full of spirit and character. Everyone abhors things squirty and frothy, tasty and aromatic."

One can only say to this that here is an erroneous judgment made by someone having a primitive taste. Without a doubt the taste which is able to appreciate both prime red wine and frothy white wine is a superior one. It is less one-sidedly specialized and therefore less blind to value of warranted quality. (In saying this, by the way, one has mentioned a universal principle of evaluation also for the verification of sensuous taste.) A trained taste in the realm of aesthetic things, meanwhile, admits every kind of beauty, but recognizes only a few examples among the many types as being superior and powerful in effect; an uncultivated taste (and therefore a one-sided one) restricts itself to a certain type and rejects everything else. The same is true for sensuous taste. Untrained people and people of limited experience can praise only a small number of familiar types. Foods which the farmer does not know he does not treasure,

and he therefore does not eat them. Much depends on familiarity in the taste of the senses too. The thing to which a person is accustomed pleases his taste—a fact especially apparent in people who, because of the poor environment of their parents, learned to like only a few foods and find all others to be tasteless. Hunger is not the only good cook; custom is one too.¹⁴⁰

Although these comparisons seem almost blasphemous, one needs to continue to hold to them, as the "*psychological aesthetics*" of R. Wallascheck has demonstrated. Such specialistic kinds of narrow preference as are mentioned here can be found in art-experience also, so that one has to call the people who espouse such preferences stupid, and their taste standardless, if not point-blank inferior. Here snobbishness is often added to matters esoteric and obscure. In Werfel's novel about Verdi, there is a German musician who calls Beethoven and Mozart the murderers of music and rejects all Italians. The ultimate composers in his opinion were Bach and Buxtehude. Such one-sidednesses are not justified. Meeting up with a person so stupid, one inevitably finds himself in a quarrel; for one cannot understand why he should not in drastic terms demonstrate the man's one-sidedness to him. But the prospects of success are indeed limited: probably one can open another's eyes only if he tries to do so often enough and with emphasis.

If one is to call a taste good, one demands of it breadth and many-sidedness in conjunction with depth and intimacy of experience, which are present all at once. Breadth and many-sidedness may not of course occur at the expense of warmth or certainty and decisiveness. And thus one already has a set of axiological categories which make possible the evaluation of the evidences of taste in particular individuals. Not only distorted and perverse, but also undeveloped, one-sided, and narrow tastes are decidedly inferior to a healthy taste for value and a fitness which, despite all training, is still genuine and many-sided. In this way one has also acquired a corrective for and a qualification of the sentence used as the title for this section as regards its full value for the realm of aesthetic things. There is a disputing about taste in certain cases because within the realm of aesthetic decisions of taste, there are a better and a worse, a proper and an improper; there are a right and a wrong. Certain standards of value remain valid, and therefore there is a possibility of justifying them through contention, particularly where there is a hope by opening someone's eyes and by propagating value through such understandings, to sharpen the psychic organs of

apperception in those who are blind to value and to bring about a unification of taste. A dispute about judgments of taste is impossible only where in the sphere of criticized objects and representatives of warranted types of taste on the side of experience there are equally legitimate members of a value-series on one level.

d.³ Towards a Conclusion to the Problem of Value in the Realm of Taste. Our considerations have revealed that repeatedly observed differences in decisions of taste have a peculiar kind of complicatedness and inner dialectic. One cannot simply say that these differences are illegitimate, that they are merely inadmissible aberrations of decisions which solely should occur only in a uniquely warranted normative taste, or that they are lapses in proper and correct judgments. But neither is one justified in adopting the view that in matters of taste everyone is right, that no one can question the judgment of another person, and that every judgment is warranted because it gives evidence of a value-experience, which, in terms of the demands of the individual personal structure of the contemplator, his aesthetic culture, and his state of development, either is present or is not present, is either strong or weak. For one person, this kind of value-experience is kindled by one kind of object; for another person, it is kindled by another; consequently, everything is equally permissible and possible. Thus we find ourselves face to face with the following antinomy: 1. judgments of taste show striking and subtle individual differences which not infrequently become completely incompatible and, indeed, which seem even to spring from a chaos based on free will and on an absence of rule within verifications of taste; 2. nevertheless, authoritative aestheticians say that there is a validity in decisions of taste which goes beyond the individual, that universally binding statements and norms are possible. And this is not a dogma *ex cathedra*, but the theoretical understanding of a compelling experience which everyone has had when his genuine and strong impression in the face of an art-work is contradicted by others. Everyone has experienced inwardly the strong certainty in feeling that he is entitled to see his own judgment of taste recognized as binding in a valid and super-individual way. Therefore he argues about it, wants to justify it and give reasons for it, and wants to convince people whose decisions are different from his. One has the experience endowed with the character of giving evidence that here a super-individual legality is at play, that there is an association with the universal; and if a person has to recognize that another person has another taste, he does not simply

take the fact for granted; he does not, so to speak, allow that other person to have another taste. Does not this powerful experience point to a true state of affairs?

I believe that, as a matter of fact, it does, and I believe that it is possible to resolve this antinomy and bring these apparently contradictory statements into agreement. I see the solution of the antinomy in this, that one should interpret the concept of super-individual value not in a universal, absolute, and unlimited sense, but in a differential, relative, and greatly qualified one. In this way is preserved the super-individual value, the value that is set above single instances, the demand-character, as it is coercively experienced, of aesthetic judgments of value; but, on the other hand, one also has found the beginning of recognition of the fact that certain uneliminable differences in decisions of taste are possible. That which does not belong to all spectators in a universal way, but which comes to larger groups in a quite comparable way, is differential.¹⁴¹ The differences repeatedly met with in decisions of aesthetic taste are therefore to be understood not as a result of an absolutely irrational disunion which cannot be mastered in theory, but, rather, essentially as a consequence of a typological differentiation among individuals which is necessary and which does not dispense with law. Despite all the multiplicity and variety, a certain unity is still in operation, and, at the same time, a possibility of a theoretical mastery is given—a fact which presents a decisive argument against aesthetic skepticism.

The fact that there can be argument about one section of the decisions of taste but not about others does not compel us to give up the super-individual validity of decisions of taste asserted by Kant and many others. But the claimed "universal validity" is to be interpreted only in a properly qualified sense. If it is so interpreted, then it can be brought into agreement with its opposite, the notion that every person enjoying art has his individual taste. The differential-psychological and differential-aesthetic point of view makes it possible for one to understand individual trends in taste as inflections of differential-typical groups of taste which in any case are not completely devoid of every kind of lawfulness. The super-individual validity of norms in taste must be interpreted in terms, not of an absolute, but rather of a relative universal validity; these norms are valid, not generally, but only differentially. Only by abandoning the absolutely universal validity of the principles of the judgment of taste and of aesthetic ideals can one successfully meet aesthetic skepticism, which would like to irrationalize and relativize all aesthetic evalua-

tion. In sharp contrast to the earlier point of view, which interceded for the universal validity of the principles of the judgment of taste, skepticism narrows evaluation to that of the particular and single individual. But our more moderate thesis is contrary to this principle and reads: every person does indeed have his own taste, though this taste is something not absolutely unique, but essentially an individual inflection of typical attitudes which are realized again and again. What is uniquely individual in all of the manifestations of a personality rises on the basis of the atypical nuances which make up precisely this personal peculiarity; the super-singular, which is present just as well, occurs because of and as a consequence of the differential and general traits of human nature which are present and are very powerful in the individual, of interindividual efforts towards simplification and systematizations (*Rationalisierungen*), and of participations in introspective cultivation (*Kultur*).

Thus one has already said that differences within judgments of taste as found in different individuals are not to be argued away or neglected, but are necessary and therefore something to be allowed for. In connection with decisions of taste there can be no thought of universal validity in the full sense, therefore; and consequently the sentences, "Everyone has his own taste" and "*de gustibus . . .*" are true for aesthetics also, even though with the extensive limitations that have been mentioned; but in spite of everything, this is no reason for a flight into skepticism and irrationalism. For (if I may repeat myself) there is not something chaotic or arbitrary or completely ruleless in differences and variations in the judgment of taste. Even the simplest practical knowledge of art-history shows that a definite disavowal of uniformity, agreement, and super-individual validity in judgments of taste can be argued away by the facts, just as can their opposites. Such agreements do occur in a considerable and to a demonstrable degree; they are far more significant and far more important than the differences which are not absent either. Indeed, agreement in judgments of taste is far more difficult for extreme skepticism and irrationalism to explain than are the differences themselves for anyone who has adopted our point of view. Why do certain works of art always find people in entirely different periods whom they can move deeply, so that they make an effect among other peoples of different social and cultural levels? How is it that there are art-works of the classical kind which are sure of their aesthetic value without respect to restrictions of time and nationality? The sculpture of the Greeks, their architecture, and also their tragedies, Shakespeare's dramas, Michelangelo's pictures and pieces

of sculpture, gothic churches and baroque show-places, the music of Bach, Handel, Mozart, and Beethoven, even east-Asiatic graphic art, and pictures from the Stone Age in the caverns of Altamira, and also certain aesthetic givennesses in nature (like the Alps and the Riviera)—all are continually new as objects of affirmative aesthetic valuations. This one fact suffices as a refutation of total skepticism in matters of taste. And even if there is no absolute unanimity in these cases, there are still very important and conclusive consensus-groups, broad communities of spectators of like mind, people who in convincing cases manifest complete agreement in their decisions in taste. These super-individual evaluations (which exist beyond a doubt) of certain bearers of aesthetic worth are an insoluble problem for extreme relativism; but for us the divergencies which occur in certain aesthetic judgments seem to be very clearly explicable indeed.

The uniqueness of personality as well as the "historicity" which belongs to it as a result of its cultural history—this causes a considerable number of individual differences in aesthetic evaluations; but, nevertheless, the possibilities of compromise, of interindividual efforts towards rationalization, are not absent. A person's value-world is not a point, but rather a more or less extensive range. Thus it is not true that separate individuals have preferences and value-preparations which come to a point; instead, one can always symbolize one's potentialities in taste-appeal with a relatively wide circle, by which one can express the fact that the scope of the individual overlaps with that of other persons and that certain laws govern this overlapping. These laws cannot of course be understood in such simple terms as they are by many aestheticians who champion empathy in terms of their own principle of sympathy. According to them, positive aesthetic experience must be possible only when something in some way homogeneous with or inwardly related to the personality of the spectator is under critical examination. Thus Segal¹⁴² suggests that no real empathy with tender and gentle figurations is possible for an active, competent man of action—and also the reverse. Such formulations unduly simplify complicated circumstances. Our sympathetic empathies and affirmative taste-decisions take place in terms of that antinomy of taste already often mentioned here, a taste which in all probability can be satisfied by entirely different things, and even by antithetical ones. We can evaluate positively not only that which harmonizes with our natures, but also that which is in opposition to them.

In connection with individual differences of taste, and indeed within them, there is no lack of certain typical features enabling us to classify taste-divergencies into type-groups set in relief in terms of the "that" and the "how" of their differentiations and intellectually to be mastered in this way. That every nuance in taste ultimately belongs to something representative, that, closely examined, it has validity for an entire group of enjoyers: this can be sensed at every art-exhibition and at every concert. The same work pleases many, displeases many, and leaves many indifferent—*nota bene*, for the same reasons and for the same aesthetic motives. Even the same associative errors appear repeatedly in connection with certain artworks.

That super-individual validation of decisions of taste occurs only in differential, and never in universal-absolute terms is not a reason for doubting the scientific character of aesthetics. We are not forced towards the scientific *ἐποχή* (withholding of judgment) in matters of taste, for the differences among personal structures, which are the ultimate reasons for differences in taste, prove in not insignificant measure to be accessible to scientific understanding. If, also, the unitary spectator-subject of general aesthetics proves to be a theoretical abstraction and a fictive subsidiary construction, there still remains an established point in knowledge: the point that powerful individual forms which are so effective in spiritual-cultural life are not absolutely irrational. Every person is indeed something that will not occur in such a way again, but, at the same time, he is also an intersection-point of separatenesses which are quite understandable psychologically because something typical belongs to them. Present is not a chaos of isolated singularities, but a number of type-groups and standpoints which are assumed again and again and which quite admit of mastery through reason. Just as there is a typology of style (that is, just as there are possibilities of classifying the most original of personal styles with others on the basis of an existing community and mutuality and on the ground of a subsumption of them under a common super-concept), a category of style, in exactly the same way there is a typology of taste the investigation of which is an important task for differential aesthetics. We stress: *differential* aesthetics; for such an investigation is not possible in terms of universality. If one admits to universality, he must limit himself to certain formal points of view and to the most general ones.

Having introduced the differential-typological point of view,

we have decidedly enlarged the stock of leading points of view which can be called upon to serve in the theoretical mastery of the differences in taste.

J. Lindworsky¹⁴³ advocates the view that in questions of taste an objective, aesthetic judgment is possible (that is, one which is valid for normal human beings). The many-faceted variations in aesthetic judgment originate in these ways: 1. from the different momentary states of individuals; 2. from the different degrees of receptivity to the intuitive contents; 3. from unequal ability to discover relations in the objects; 4. from the greater or lesser number of points of view from which the art-work is contemplated; 5. from the differences in what in the object is grasped by the eye: the totality or single traits or qualities, the same or different traits or qualities. The more spectators are alike at the points here mentioned, the more unanimous will be the resulting judgment of taste.

This enumeration of the circumstances which can result in differences in judgments of taste is not complete; for the typological differences among natural tendencies of individual spectators (as they belong, say, to the participant-type or to the onlooker-type)¹⁴⁴ are present alongside and above the indicated viewpoints as not being contained in them all together. The typological-differential factor therefore opens up the view to a series of further causes for variations in taste. One primary task of differential aesthetics is to trace differences in judgment back to inter-individual differences of the permanent type, and to explain them in this way; and then to get intellectual-legal mastery of them by combining them into constantly recurring types. As is well known, aesthetics distinguishes itself from psychology in that it gives currency to the axiological point of view. It concerns itself with estimating aesthetic evaluations, judgments of taste themselves, and, in these terms, with distinguishing from one another good and bad taste, mature and immature taste, and trained and crude taste. Thus one can say point-blank that certain mis-evaluations in aesthetic matters are errors. But errors too have their laws, and science does not have to avoid them since they are not something merely fortuitous, arbitrary, and irrational. A few words more about this methodological problem: it is a fact that people of undeveloped taste have a full value-experience only in connection with certain overwhelming sensations, whereas they are not usually moved by delicate and differentiated objects which are on a far higher plane artistically. The aesthetician will have to establish these facts to the extent that he argues psychologically in a purely descriptive fashion. But to the extent that he

is (which he also must be) an axiologist, he will not be satisfied with the demonstration which is descriptive and has no concern with value; he will not simply accept the psychological facts constituent to the case, but will unhesitatingly describe primitive taste-reactions as aesthetically inferior. Beyond this, he will see in this a state or condition which is accessible to change and betterment: that primitive taste makes decisions in a certain way and in no other need not continue to be true because there can be improvement and a sharpening of the psychic organs necessary to aesthetic enjoyment.

The typological-constitutional differences in personality-structures, like the social and cultural ones, bring about different extremes in taste-valuation. Yet upon closer examination these prove to be far less incisive than superficial examination seems to show. Very often there are only slightly graduated variations. The predilection for and the attunement to certain artistic values does not as a rule bring along a blindness to the values of everything else and does not therefore exclude a positive (though less intimate and pleasurable) experience even of such aesthetic-artistic values which are not entirely adequate to their type or not in affinity with their nature. Finally, the differences caused by different personal structures which are lawful and typical (thus not only those belonging to different cultural levels) do not have to continue in their path always and forever. Rather, even here there are approximations and adjustments in the course of an aesthetic education.

It is characteristic of the ultimate significance of aesthetic matters and of art that the individual living out his particular character to the full proves himself as he specifically sets value on things and apprehends it. Here as nowhere else does the particular and the individual have the possibility of evaluation and of confirmation. In these terms, Litt¹⁴⁵ remarks that art is the sphere of culture in which people the most willingly renounce and, indeed, absolutely reject guidance from universal rules. It is consistent with this idea that aesthetics should have been that part of the philosophical discipline which was the earliest not only to give room to the principle of individuality, but also to break a path for it. In the realm of ethical relevancy the characteristic impetus of the individual and the differential-typological, which is uneliminable in aesthetic receptions and artistic creations, plays a markedly lesser role. Of course, ethical types are not entirely wanting;¹⁴⁶ Shaftesbury, for example, advocated the ideal of the harmonically adjusted character according to the model of the ancient *kalokagathia*; Kant, on the

contrary, allowed validity to the character of pugnacity as a pre-supposition for moral action. But these are differences in the sphere of theoretical moral-philosophical interpretation more than in that of the practical-moral behavior; in relation to the latter, the individual types must prove to be greatly similar if they are not to lack moral value. To be sure, in the realm of the aesthetic-artistic matters too the individual will do well to become in the highest degree a participant in the highest range of value-experiences, as far as possible in the course of cultural participation to broaden his "I" in its position as a point and to bring it into contact with the evaluation-standpoints of other individuals. And if this expansion of the ego occurs through introception, through a genuine making the value one's own, then that which approaches us from the outside has lost its alien character for our egos.¹⁴⁷ Then the individual is able also to find something beautiful in a genuine value-experience which was not accessible to him at first, and he can do so without effort, without the use of force, by organically broadening the sphere of those things which are accessible to his own value-experience. And it is precisely this which is the task and tendency of an aesthetic upbringing, which, through fruitful encounter and contact with the value- and culture-realm of aesthetic objects, represents at once an education in aesthetic values in their richest possible abundance and a development of the personality.

FOUR | THE AESTHETIC OBJECT

1. THE AESTHETIC OBJECT IN GENERAL

A. THE AESTHETIC AND THE PHYSICAL OBJECT

I have already mentioned many matters connected with the group of questions now to be considered in detail, the reason being that one cannot entirely avoid anticipating. It is impossible to treat of certain subjects central to aesthetics without touching slightly upon the problems of aesthetic objectivity. To begin with, therefore, I shall recapitulate what has been learned so far.

The most important of the insights already achieved is that the aesthetic object is not identical with the object of the outer world upon which it is founded: The aesthetic object (and thus that which brings about an effect designated as aesthetic) is never simply the object of the outside world as it exists in the realms of physics and the physical, but only the impression it produces in the understanding of the apprehender. Therefore one cannot frequently or insistently enough make the following distinction, which is equally important in theory of cognition, ontology, aesthetics, and art-philosophy: that which we call the aesthetic object is on a plane of existence entirely different from that of an object in the real business of life or of an act of knowledge. If someone with alert eyes and senses sees a group of spring-green larch trees on a meadow in the mountains, or a race-horse, his concern is not with any four ex-

amples he could choose of the species *abies larix* or an individual belonging to the species *equus caballus*. Seeing these objects, one aesthetically perceives something other than does the botanist or the veterinary surgeon.

People have repeatedly sought new ways of pointing out this basic state of affairs: the aesthetic object erects itself on the physical-material object funding it; one sees beyond or through the physical datum, as it were, to something lying behind it which is the meaning of the phenomenon; the forms and colors of the object are merely indications by which one senses an interior life within it. According to this and similar formulations, the comprehending subject performs a very essential act as the real pre-aesthetic substrate is transformed into the "ideal" aesthetic object. When this act and the contribution of the observer are lacking, the greatest work of art remains a block of marble, a confused and shapeless canvas, a meaningless salad of words and tones in which there is no significance. This becomes especially clear if we again refer to the fugal experiences of a musical listener and of an unmusical one. In both instances the physical-acoustical tonal forms are the same, but the perceived aesthetic objects are in the highest degree different. One person actually hears the fugue in terms of its artful architectonics. The other, not capable of achieving the acts of comprehension which are necessary, hears only a confused chaos of tone; he is not therefore capable of entering into the mode of existence of the aesthetic objectivity. But even if an inattentive or insensitive viewer does not "see" the beauty of the woods in autumn or that of an assortment of colors (although, not being blind, he notices the optical data upon which it is based), he does not penetrate a level of existence which first and foremost makes up the realm of spiritual existence of aesthetic objects; this is to say, it is not possible for him to accomplish certain acts of observation. The beautiful is evident only for the proper experience. The aesthetic object potentially present in the object of nature and intended by the creator of the art-work can be grasped only by the spectator who is capable of the adequate aesthetic attitude—that is, of the correct attitude towards the work or object which is contemplated.

The fact that an aesthetic object and an object in reality are not identical is evident also from certain ontological discussions of Nicolai Hartmann.¹ "The discus-thrower placed within the walls of a museum can obviously not do his throwing in the room; the throwing is done in another space which is seen co-temporally with the artistic seeing. Even the motion is unreal, and the space in which it takes place is also non-real. Indeed, the animation and the humanity

of the discus-thrower are themselves absolutely unreal. They exist not for themselves, but only 'for' the person who is looking insofar as he observes artistically. There is a life which is beheld throughout (and always in contrast to) the lifeless stiffness of the formed stone. It 'appears' in the plastic form without counterfeiting reality. In all respects, it is only a life-in-appearance. And yet it is just this life-in-appearance which is the really vital point in a piece of sculpture; and only insofar as it 'appears' in the form stiff in itself can the work be called an art-work. It is a background-layer which appears to be the real content of the work in the real foreground. The structure has two planes. The material shape of the stone has an existence here and now independent of the spectator. But motion and life can have existence here and now only 'for' a mind which understands artistically; they have existence, not on their own, but for the sake of that mind."

What Hartmann has in mind primarily is an artistic-ontological problem. It concerns the definition of the plane of existence of the genuinely artistic object in contrast to the mode of existence of the material object which funds the artistic one. Yet what has thus been stated can easily be applied to our subject also if we equate the mode of existence of the artistic object with that of the aesthetic object.

This is our opportunity to correct a formulation which one frequently hears and which I have used because it is informative and meaningful, though it is valid only at the first approach to our subject. This is the view (of which Volkelt² is one of the chief spokesmen) that aesthetically effective objects are indeed parts of the outer world, but that their aesthetic attributes do not belong to them as givennesses of the outer world. That which is aesthetically effective in them first springs out of the soil of a perceiving, comprehending, and feeling sensibility. The aesthetic object, whether it belongs to nature or to art, comes into being in its aesthetic particularity only by reason of the perception, the feeling, and the imagination of the subject who grasps it. "The external object as such is never an aesthetic object. In all cases what is beyond individual experience (the trans-subjective) is aesthetically a blank."

If one adopts the elementary position in the theory of knowledge, one can reply that it is not only aesthetic objects which come to be for us on the basis of a comprehending sensibility alone; for all of the given conditions of the world do so. We know the world only through our senses; the world is given us in the first place only as a complex of experiences of sensation and perception. The world is my representation. Even a person with a realistic bias cannot get

around this thesis of Schopenhauer's, though in other respects he may be convinced that the images of the physical objects of the outer world which are mediated for us by the organs of sense are exact copies of what really exists and are therefore not *toto genere* kinds of symbolical allusion to something quite different from them. In terms of cognition-theory, all acts of awareness of the object, even sensations, are "subjective" insofar as they occur only as the contents of the consciousness of a subject, and not as something in real existence independent of that consciousness.³ What is meant when aesthetic objects are said to be subjective is that they require an act of comprehension on the individual's part which is superior to that demanded by objects of perception of everyday practicality.

Thus Windelband⁴ uses aesthetic experience to describe an act that is valid and binding for theoretical consciousness also. It is generally true that consciousness begets its objects itself and from the elements met with in reality fashions its own world. This basic relationship is clear in ethical and aesthetic consciousness to such a degree that it is almost self-evident; but it is valid also for theoretical consciousness, which does not simply have to delineate a world independent of itself, as naïve realism asserts it must. In any case, this subjectivity belongs to the aesthetic object in special measure. A given condition of the outer world changes into an aesthetic object only as it is observed under a certain aspect, as a certain act of understanding is consummated in connection with it. Intrinsically, the aesthetically effective object is not a given condition of material reality, but a fact of psychic experience. Thus the idea that the aesthetic object occurs on the soil of consciousness requires this additional supplementation: it does so not merely by way of comprehension only (coloristic, acoustical, and other qualities of the object also come thus to be), but also through relations with the value-requirements of the individual and certain of his psychic necessities and concerns which go far beyond pure perception. If we view the characteristics of a real object for the purpose of taking a practical position towards it, then the seen object is simply identical with the real one (here we have a realistic fiction which is entertained by every naïve observer). Impression and object clearly coincide. But things are fundamentally different when we evaluate the object. The value-object (that is, the complex of the values of the object as grasped by the eye) remains essentially on the side of the evaluator, immanent to his intention; it is co-conditioned by the subject's value-requirements and his readiness for the experience; it is always therefore something beyond and outside the real object.⁵

Beauty is not a real attribute of an object, as is its color or any other sense-quality, although these too in their simple existence come to be only on the ground of a comprehending consciousness and are co-formed by way of the psycho-physical character of the human being. (Locke⁶ therefore in his theory of knowledge speaks of secondary qualities which are not copies of objects, but merely modes of effect.) Rather, beauty is something outside the object, beyond the senses, non-objective. No doubt the external object with its qualities is not only not a matter of indifference for that aesthetic effect, but something in the highest degree decisive. Everywhere an object of nature or of art touches us aesthetically, the corresponding external thing is the determinant ground of the aesthetic effect. But it is only the ground and prerequisite—nothing more. The aesthetic characteristics themselves do not belong to it. The aesthetic object coincides, not with the analogous real object which is indeed its bearer, but only with the fact that a certain act of understanding and experience falls to the share of the pre-aesthetic substrate by way of a spectator. In the kind and trend of this understanding, the object naturally plays a decisive part. The psychic activity of the spectator which continues the pre-aesthetic substrate according to its own direction on into the aesthetic object must be stimulated by and based upon an extra-aesthetic object and its nature. An object must be present which guides the psychic activity of the comprehender into certain paths. The pre-aesthetic substrate is only a go-between for an agent of, the aesthetic object, therefore, that object on which rises the aesthetic value-experience, the pleasant or unpleasant affect. Therefore, what is critical for the feeling-result is not primarily the outer object, but the impression, the representation, which is awakened in the spectator by the picture, the statue, and so forth.

B. AESTHETIC OBJECTIVISM, SUBJECTIVISM, AND CORRELATIVISM

These three terms stand for three possible positions repeatedly adopted in professional literature when the roles of subjective and objective factors are being estimated. It is clear from what has gone before that I myself reject both extreme positions of subjectivism and objectivism and want to put a mediated theory in their place. These two points of view can claim the privileges only of partial truths, complete truth resulting only when one brings the partially correct and valid insights they represent into a unified whole and achieves a corresponding correction of their one-sidednesses.

Subjectivism erroneously locates what is essential in matters

aesthetic in the comprehending consciousness and the experience of the individual. According to this notion, the aesthetic object has only a psycho-subjective existence; the pre-aesthetic substrate alone is objectively given, its incitements being pitted against the subject with a far-reaching freedom. The aesthetically valuable is a product of the comprehending mind whose productive act is the vital thing. From this one sees that nothing of this world is excluded from creating an effect of beauty, a proper attitude and receptivity on the part of the spectator being assumed. But on the other hand, there is nothing which is, so to speak, compelled inevitably to call up an aesthetic effect in all spectators and under all circumstances. Every object can work aesthetically; none need do so. One and the same object can please an individual when he is in a receptive mood, but can be a matter of indifference or even of displeasure to him when he is in another state of mind. The conclusion seems inevitable, therefore, that only the subject and its actual condition is decisive and that, alongside these, what arises because of the object carries far less weight.

But things are not this way, as critical consideration of the central thesis of subjectivism can easily show. The object plays a decisive role even in the cases just mentioned. If an object which otherwise has left me indifferent does please me when I am in a certain mood, my momentary mood has enabled me to perceive certain characteristics in the object and to give individual attention to those which have usually eluded me. Or the complex object because of the qualities of certain of its parts has been able to exercise an effect on me because in my temporary state of mind I have achieved the ability to isolate the values of these parts. But even in this case stimulation and invitation have come from the object. It is always necessary that objective and subjective conditions act as an ensemble in which each of the factors is primary and maintains its superiority.

According to the view of subjectivism, that is beautiful which pleases. But everything possible may please because this pleasing depends, not on the object and its attributes, but on the subject and its receptivity. Therefore the entire world is beautiful. Trains of thought like these are found repeatedly in P. Häberlin,⁷ who follows a consistent subjectivism.

Here is the thesis of the unobjectivity of the beautiful, which is in analogy with extreme epistemological idealism. The essential in the impression of beauty occurs because of the state of the observer, which creates beauty in the first place. Beauty is therefore not an objective quality. Hence there is no object to which beauty belongs

in the sense that it adheres to the object as an attribute. There is only an experience of beauty, and it is hopeless to say of what the beauty consists in what we find beautiful. To be sure, experienced beauty always clings to an object of certain objective characteristics. But the object as object is not beauty; nor does it have beauty because it has this or that quality. The object is always merely the object which accompanies the experience of beauty; it is only the occasion which enables us to discover beauty. Its characteristic is merely the possibility that we who are susceptible to beauty can really experience it. In real experience, of course, beauty is never separated from objectivity, but it is just as little attached to a particular objectivity or condition. Whether or not one can discover beauty in an object does not depend on the objective quality of the object, but on us as we are placed in relation to the object constituted in this way or that, as we see it, as it engages us a great deal or little as an object (as having an intent or aim); and this depends not on its objective nature, but on our temporary deportment, on the prevalence of, or the retreat to the background of, this or that purposeful directedness (*Gerichtetheit*). The more strongly we are biased in the direction of purpose or intent in a particular instance, just so much less are we capable of discovering beauty. Every object can be beautiful; every characteristic of any kind of object can disclose beauty. It all depends merely on whether it says something adequate to our receptivity.

But there has been serious objection to this extreme subjectivism, which includes among aesthetic objects all things so that the comprehending subject can be addressed, and this objection has been couched in terms of objectivism, the central thesis of which runs thus: in the sphere of aesthetics, as in all value-spheres, there are objective givennesses which have a demand-character, which by way of their objective organization and character force or suggest a certain way in which they can be grasped. Comprehension is tied to certain tendencies of the object. Beauty is not something depending on the experience of the observer, but an objective characteristic of the thing. The object-theory of Meinong⁸ approximates these assertions in their extremeness: beauty clings to the object which is independent of us and its qualities; it approaches us from the outside, is given, not given up, to us. We need only take pains to hold at a distance everything that is disturbing. For numerous reasons it can adequately be shown that conditions of pronounced aesthetic dignity have no effect on many individual observers and that the question of super-individual evaluation of these aesthetically valuable givennesses

therefore is not in question. This aesthetic objectivity in many a way proves to be the counterpart of naïve realism. Everything that is decisive is in the things whose being and nature are independent of the comprehending sensibility.

For persons schooled in a critical theory of knowledge the extremes of subjectivism and objectivism are equally unacceptable solutions of the central problem in aesthetics. The question of whether the understanding and attitude of the perceiver or the objective characteristic of the concerned object is first in importance when beauty comes to be is like the familiar, meaningless, but vexing question of whose act is more essential in the creating of a child, that of a man or that of a woman. Because both are absolutely necessary, neither partner can be foregone. In the same way with respect to aesthetic value one can only ask this question: since the proportion of the participation of subjective and objective factors can vary, what in a particular instance occurs because of the objective one and what because of that of attitude? An aesthetic value-experience comes into being only when a suitable object works on a receptive mind—that is, on one capable of and disposed towards the proper (adequate) psychic act. The aesthetic impression is therefore not a spontaneous, free, and arbitrary act of the psyche, but an act objectively caused. What objective characteristics and objective qualities must govern a pre-aesthetic substrate if it is to bring beauty about? This very difficult question can be answered only after very searching discussion. Many authoritative aestheticians take a position near the intermediate one which I advocate even if they lean more towards one of the two extremes.

Thus Külpe⁹ once said that aesthetic objects are brought about in the first place not by the particular nature of the objects, nor by any way in which they are grasped, but only by a specific state of receptivity on our part. But this does not mean that there is no dependence on the qualities of the object; graceful drapery will not seem shapeless even to a "non-aesthetic" person. Aesthetic effects can be explained in terms of objective characteristics too, but they achieve aesthetic meaning only under the presupposition of a receptive attitude. Ziehen,¹⁰ who also takes an essentially psychological attitude, stresses that representations in the end owe their aesthetic character to stimuli; the object, the stimulus, must have a certain nature if it is to call up aesthetically effective sensations and representations. If an aesthetically efficacious "bringing together" ("*Komplexion*") is to be made possible for the apprehender, the object

must exhibit certain characteristics which one can include under the term of "complexibility."

This mediated view, which is also mine, could be designated as correlativism,¹¹ a technical word taken from cognition-theory. Certain circumstances have meaning only within a mutual relationship. Just as the cognizing subject and the cognized object are correlates for the epistemological position just mentioned, so in the same way the attributes of the aesthetic object and the contemplative act of the subject who grasps them are correlates in aesthetic correlativism. And these correlates exist only by way of and for each other: the aesthetic result comes into being only through their jointly combined efforts. The aesthetic object occurs and is realized only on the basis of treatment by a consciousness, but this act is led and determined by the attributes of the object. Thus M. Beck¹² says that the aesthetic phenomenon cannot be explained merely as a phenomenon of consciousness devoid of objective existence; nor is it completely independent of the cosmic, psychic, and historical position of the observer.

One-sided solutions in terms of objectivism and subjectivism are possible in connection with all of the fundamental problems of aesthetics; at the same time, however, there is also an adjustment in the direction of correlativism. Let us look at two examples, the first one being the problem of form. According to objectivism, in the outer physical world there are already the forms and the things formed which in stimuli make their effect upon the observer. But according to subjectivism, forms occur because of a "production" on the part of the contemplating individual, a "production" in which there is a genuine act of producing form. Our own theory, which is based on the epistemological foundation of critical realism, admits that forms are not perceived and not received simply as something absolutely ready-made, but that, as they take place, they do indicate a process of production. But one must not suppose that even this productive attitude is a free and arbitrarily creative one. The fact is that, instead, the qualitative impetuses in real things are intrinsically determinant components which in fashioning forms cooperate with the acts of the subject. As the contemplator generates the forms, he is objectively guided; "otherwise, phenomenal forms would appear to be the free production of the psyche, and therefore subjective ingredients."¹³

Our second example is the problem of empathy. Subjectivist theory teaches that a psychic life, a feeling-content, is put into the

viewed object by way of a spontaneous act of projection and lending, and often with a minimum of stimulation and invitation from the object. For objectivism, empathy takes place in an apprehension through feeling of a palpable feeling-content already revealed and present in the perceived object. But for correlativism, empathy is a direct fusion of the objective and the subjective-conditional, of the impression of the object and the feeling of the spectator, both factors being equally important, though the apportionment of their accents need not always be the same. Empathy is not the apprehending of an expressive content existing ready-made in the absence of our own ingredients; neither is it our free creation of such a content; but it is a spontaneous act of assimilative receiving. Thus one must repeatedly stress that the person with all of his individuality is an intrinsic part of the building of the world of aesthetic objects. The aesthetic object always realizes itself in a personal experience alone, but this experience is bound to the invitational character of the world of things, which by reason of their objective character carry within themselves a certain potential of aesthetic significance. Certain formal givennesses which, as compared with some others, are felt to be especially pleasant prove themselves in some way distinguished from the purely objective ones. A luminous color is more pleasant than a dull unsaturated one, a consonant chord more than a dissonance, a concisely "good form" better than an insignificant and bad one; and in all of these thorough-going preferences, there are, besides certain conditions in the structure of the comprehending psyche, also objective organizations which are components in the creating of this badge of dignity. The saturated and rich color expresses more decisively and more easily the quality of gaiety than does the color made up of a mixture of shades ranging from black to white. A major third in contrast to a diminished second, and a perfect fifth in contrast to a seventh, are formally distinctive—that is, in terms of the physical-acoustical. The complexity of the simpler numerical relations of vibrations surely does not want for its share in the aesthetic pleasurable of harmonic intervals—that is, as an objective presupposition, not as an experience of a consciousness. A regular corner as compared with an irregular one, or a right angle as compared with one of 86 or 93 degrees, has a heightened badge of dignity, even from the purely geometrical point of view. Joining K. Koffka,¹⁴ Köhler,¹⁵ and Wertheimer,¹⁶ I have expressed myself about the objective insignia of good forms in another place.¹⁷

The fact that a person's indisputable spontaneity has a creative

share in the constituents of his personal world must not force us into the subjectivistic notion that each aesthetic object exists only at the discretion of the individual; the explanation must be made in terms of the basic thesis of correlativism. And this thesis is nothing other than the application of the personalistic convergence-theory of W. Stern¹⁸ to certain problems in aesthetics.

Earlier aestheticians attempted to classify the relationship of inner and outer factors into orders of degree and value; but the theory of convergence tries to push for a qualitative understanding of this relationship. This becomes clear above all through an analysis of the two basic forms of a person's acts: reaction and spontaneous action. Even when a person reacts, he does not passively surrender and abandon himself to the surrounding world, but puts his own being into the reaction and hits upon a spontaneous selection of the stimuli to which he reacts. And when he acts spontaneously, he is not an autocratic creator in terms of the fulness of his own power, but he is bound to and governed by the material on which his act sets to work. This is true also for aesthetic things. But it is not at all practicable to draw the problems of aesthetics entirely over into psychology. The basic given condition of aesthetics and the starting-point for any analysis is therefore that existentially total component which shows the closest fusion of the contribution of the world and the appropriation of the subject. The aesthetic object exists only in this fusion of and through the cooperative working of objectively given conditions and a psychic act which through their interpenetration arrive at a new totality. To ask, therefore, whether the aesthetic object is something given objectively or something psychically engendered is to set up a false formulation of the question, which should instead read thus: what in the aesthetic object is objectively given and what occurs because of the psychic act of comprehension?

One can discover approximations of aesthetic convergism and correlativism in many aestheticians. To be sure, there are considerable differences in the consistency with which it is followed. Very often a modest subjectivism declares itself within correlativism. Thus in Külpe one reads that in terms of the programmatic assertions of correlativism as just cited nothing is either beautiful or ugly in itself, but only the state of receptivity makes it so. The state which creates beauty is contemplation: the world becomes beautiful as we approach it contemplatively. But in the face of such statements, one is forced to raise the question of what causes us to adopt the character of a spectator; what is it that calls up in us a readiness

for and an inclination towards contemplation? Is it not certain traits of the object, and is this object for its part not something which shares in the producing of this creative frame of mind? Aesthetics must depend greatly upon the assertion of the particular traits of the object which are capable of exerting this effect, and it must not take its work in this connection so lightly as Karl Groos¹⁹ perhaps does.

According to him, it is the psychic activity which brings beauty about, and the object has to meet only one negative condition: it must not disturb beauty. It is not necessary, therefore, for one to prescribe for the object positive stipulations as to the content by which the aesthetic effect could be explained. Rather, one can limit the total of the assertions about the object to a negative determination that objects may not in any way make the aesthetic state an impossibility by arousing any kind of extra-aesthetic interest. One may not say, therefore, that only the object which is the most typical possible representative of its type can exercise aesthetic effect, whereas the others, these objects lacking positive characteristics, are not present for aesthetic contemplation. Instead, an object is barred from having some kind of aesthetic effect only when it makes impossible the ideal play of inner imitation. If the object is made in such a way that it arouses in us fear, aversion, or moral indignation, it cannot cause an aesthetic effect, no matter how many formally pleasant traits it has.

But one can critically reply thus: we ourselves have admitted to the single aesthetic condition which Groos allows and thus have placed it at the very beginning as a *conditio sine qua non*. Besides this, however, there must be positive attributes in the objects by means of which the aesthetic attitude of the spectator is aroused and by which it is led towards certain value-results. It is our task in what follows to define these objective factors and attributes, or at least the most important of them.

C. A SURVEY OF AESTHETICALLY BASIC OBJECTS

Because the most different of things can please one, it is difficult to name the objective characteristics upon which aesthetic effect depends and then to enumerate and classify aesthetically effective objects. The task cannot be carried out fully and completely. For what is there which during aesthetic contemplation cannot arouse our pleasure and joy? The human figure and its movements, the human countenance and its expressive acts (smiling, for instance), many members of the animal world and most of those of the plant world,

and, too, constituent parts and formations of inorganic nature: minerals and mountains, footpaths and landscapes, the sea, the sky with its cloud-formations, twilight and the starry host; and, besides, an abundance of givennesses from the realm of civilization and, finally, the entire realm of art. One could continue for some time in listing thus without ever exhausting the province of the objects which bring beauty about. Thus it is not absolutely unbelievable that one should repeatedly read statements in which doubts are raised about the possibility of an objective definition of aesthetic matters in terms of the two tasks given here: on the possibility of enumerating and classifying aesthetically effective objects and then of specifying those characteristics upon which the impression of beauty depends. This in mind, Häberlin says that one can indeed experience what beauty is, but that one cannot describe it; and that for this reason all definitions in aesthetics which are taken to be objective seem as a matter of course to have a tragi-comic character. And one finds Külpe saying that there is no object in nature or art which a mind which is susceptible to beauty is not able to value and that therefore one dare not delimit aesthetics according to a certain type of objects.

Our view is the opposite of this: that despite all of the difficulties (which we have taken full account of), there is no reason for our avoiding judgment. For if the aesthetic thing comes into being when an intuiting subject and an observed object come to an "encounter" in terms of a certain attitude and if we know the structure of this attitude and this state, the result of which is that the world of outer objects attains aesthetic relevance and valueableness, it must be possible also to determine the second unknown: to say something, therefore, about the objective conditions of the effect of beauty, to organize the world of aesthetic objects in some way, and to bring to the fore out of plenitude and multiplicity certain principles of unity and organization which are not at first visible. Such attempts have been made from different starting-points and with different expectations of success.

Thus an attempt has sometimes been made for the purpose of aesthetics to make full use of the most universal of possible principles for the classification of the given conditions of the world: to pass in review the given conditions of the inorganic, then of subhuman-organic nature in their aesthetic effectiveness, and then to ascend to human beings and the civilized world.

Tendencies in this direction are to be found, for instance, in the works of Vischer,²⁰ R. Prölss,²¹ and many others; but one should

mention Schopenhauer²² primarily, who derives his system of the arts (and his division of aesthetic objects) through an ascension from the lowest degrees of the objectification of the will to the highest. In all things, Ideas are manifest, and in these Ideas the will of the world objectifies itself. The lowest Ideas, the fundamental bass tones of nature, as it were, assert themselves in the realm of the inorganic: weight, motionlessness, cohesion, fluidity, and so forth operate in geological and geomorphological spheres, in mountains and rocks, in sea and ocean. These Ideas find artistic formation in architecture and in "the beautiful art of conducting water." There follows a continuation to the objects and conditions of the world of plants and animals (and realizations of them in certain arts), and finally to the human sphere as the highest objectification of the world as will. All aesthetic-artistic objectivity finds its crown in music, which no longer portrays Ideas, no longer imitates things of the world, but directly expresses the world's innermost being.

Such a patterning of the things of the world in terms of the beauty they produce is a possible, but quite involved process, which, in addition, as seen from the position of aesthetics, has the design of a heteronomous system as its base.

It is more commendable to proceed from the effect-factors constitutive of aesthetic objects themselves and to make them into principles of classification. Thus one can assert, for instance, that every aesthetically effective object is spatial (colors, figural forms on a plane, two- or three-dimensional figures), or temporal (tone, melody, rhythm), or verbal (that is, an aesthetic effect brought about by way of language). This arrangement of the world of aesthetic objects, which is as exhaustive as it is systematic, will be properly and fully treated in what follows. Finally, there is a procedure which through the analysis of the complex objective substrate of aesthetic experience achieves certain typical constants and certain invariably recurring basic forms of an objective kind. In this way, one arrives at a scale of the representative types of aesthetic objectivity to which complex effect-objects can be reduced and which a person can therefore call basic aesthetic objects.

The task of dividing aesthetic objects according to primary types as if prepared under a microscope has been successfully tackled by Stephen Witasek.²³ He thinks of basic aesthetic objects as those whose aesthetic qualities do not prove to be the sum of the aesthetic qualities of the components of the object: these qualities adhere to the object as a whole and are lost if it is dissected. As bearers of

aesthetic qualities, objects simple in themselves are *eo ipso* aesthetically basic objects. The classified totality of aesthetically basic objects gives us a survey of the variety of aesthetic happenings. This scale of aesthetically basic objects appears thus: 1. simple objects of sense; 2. forms; 3. standard or normal objects (objects of the value beauty); 4. those of expression and mood (objects of inner beauty). We shall adopt this classification and discuss its constituent parts in detail.

Our task will be to achieve the most precise statements possible about the objective characteristics and the attributes of aesthetic objects by means of which we are stimulated to enter the aesthetic state and on which the impression of beauty, as interpreted in the wider sense, of the object depends. For a long time this task was not taken hold of with the necessary urgency; instead, it was done in passing; the result could be nothing but a series of formal and general definitions. I do not want to underrate such statements as knowledge; but anyone who asks for information about the objective characteristics on the basis of which an object of the outer world is beautiful expects statements which are more concrete than definition because here there is unity in the manifold. In this way, one comes just a little bit closer to the beautiful effect of a particular object.

Lotze²⁴ has taken a striking stand with respect to the critical deficiency which is apparent here. In one of the Platonic dialogues, Socrates asks for a definition of the moral from one of the people he is conversing with. This person does not fail "to present individual modes of action which seem moral to him; but Socrates is not successful in making him understand that he wants to hear, not examples of the moral, but the general significance which we assign to the particular act we call moral. He would have been served quite differently if he had asked German aesthetics what is beautiful. It would probably have responded with a general definition of beauty and explained what superiority and what reputation we attribute to any phenomenon we call beautiful. But Euthyphron would not have been satisfied: up to now German aesthetics has said little about which phenomena or objects we find beautiful or by what formal and specific characteristics the objects which have a just title to that distinction manifest themselves. To be sure, German aesthetics sets up certain requirements which must be satisfied by everything that is supposed to be beautiful; but these requirements still move in so abstract a fashion in speculative con-

nections between aspects of the Idea that the perceptual form in which the real fulfillment of the Idea ultimately smiles at us in beauty is not derived from these aspects at all."

In view of the performance of even the most modern kinds of aesthetics, Lotze's mocking reproof is not entirely inapplicable even now; indeed, because of the results of psychological aesthetics, which in general divests itself of objective definitions, this reproof could be intensely sharpened. In what follows I shall attempt to fill up at least some of the lacunae he objects to.

2. THE SPHERE OF AESTHETIC OBJECTIVITY

A. SIMPLE OBJECTS OF SENSE

We have said that pure objects of sense are possible at best as outside limits in the sphere of aesthetic objects. Now we are asking if simple objects of sense are actually capable of aesthetic effect or if, instead, their effect is not limited to the agreeable.

According to *Gestalt*-aesthetics, as I have termed it (that of A. Höfler,²⁵ for instance), aesthetic valuableness begins only with formal organizations; the distinctive mark of the aesthetic thing is the presence of qualities of form. Things which are additively combined, which are additive aggregates, cannot be aesthetically relevant any more than can isolated simple elements. The boundary-line between pre-aesthetic (sensuous) and aesthetic basic feelings can be determined through the introduction of the criterion of form. The feeblest tug of beauty in a sensuous content indicates that qualities of form are present. Aesthetic feelings start where a funded content (a quality of form) is added to funding contents. In other places Höfler does not go so far as to award aesthetic relevance only to forms: even simple tones and colors can exercise an aesthetic effect. Of course something else must be added to the sensuous pleasure, which works only in terms of the agreeable. When we begin to find beauty even in individual uniform colors and tones, we do so not because the sensations are quite simple, but only because they exhibit some kinds of relationships or formal determinations (even if it were only those of "purity") which on their part alone confirm a first, primitive phenomenon of genuine aesthetic pleasure.

This is essentially the definition of Kant, who in this connection again depends on early 18th-century trains of thought. In delimiting the lowest classes of basic aesthetic objects from agreeable ones, he appeals to unity in multiplicity (which is a criterion of form). Only

that which brings this unity about is adjudged to have aesthetic significance; what underlies this unity is attributed to the value-sphere of the sensuous-agreeable. How do simple colors and tones operate? May one call their effect beautiful? Or are they merely agreeable?

Kant answers these questions thus: "A mere color (for example, the green of a lawn) or a mere tone (as compared with sounds or a noise) like, say, that of a violin is said by most people to be beautiful in itself, although of course both seem at bottom to have only the material for representations (namely, sensation) and therefore deserve to be called only agreeable. But one must at the same time note that the sensations of color as well as those of tone are validly entitled to be judged as beautiful only insofar as both are pure; this is a designation which already concerns form and also the only one which can be communicated about these representations with certainty. . . . If one agrees with Euler that colors are vibrations (pulses) of the ether which are isochronous, just as are the tones which move the air in sound, and that . . . the mind perceives not only through sensation their effect on the enlivenment of the organ, but also by reflection the regular play of impressions (therefore form in the binding together of different representations)—then colors and tones would be not mere sensations, but already formal determinations of the unity of a variety of sensations; thus in themselves they could be counted among beauties. Purity, however, in its simple kind of sensation means that the uniformity of sensations is not disturbed or interrupted by any foreign sensation and that purity therefore belongs only to form, for the reason that one can abstract concerning the quality of the kind of sensation (one can abstract whether it represents a color or a tone and which color or tone it is). Therefore all simple colors, insofar as they are pure, can be considered beautiful."

According to Kant, a higher formal organization therefore occurs even in simple colors and tones. They work not only upon the organs of sense, but as vibrations of ether and air they make possible for the mind the experience of the regular play of impressions; thus they are not mere sensations, but carriers of the formal determination of unity within a manifold.

Such trains of thought have been long-lived. They are found also in the formal aesthetics of Herbert and Zimmermann. That which is aesthetically relevant must always be a relation; what is absolutely simple is aesthetically of no moment. Aesthetic significance lies in the "togetherness" (*"Zusammen"*) of the formal elements which in their unification become something different from

what they are when each exists by itself in isolation. Nothing which is simple can be aesthetically pleasant or unpleasant.

Today this old controversial question seems decided because it is admitted that there is a possibility of aesthetic effect in simple optical and acoustical objects of sense. Therefore E. Elster²⁶ attacks Kant's separation of the beautiful and the sensuous-agreeable and declares for a beauty of simple sensations, a sensuous beauty. He is of the opinion that single sensations can have a typical pleasurable nature which is in harmony with our feeling and which can therefore be called beautiful. Witasek too finally thinks that an aesthetic dignity is possible in the realm of our experiences of simple colors and tones. They bring about not only impressions of agreeability, but also a pronounced aesthetic enjoyment. A shining color of the spectrum positively gives an impression of beauty. Here empathy-factors occasionally play a role, but not as a rule, and even that mere looking at such colors from which empathy is absent is able to cause aesthetic enjoyment.

Nevertheless, I believe that precisely in this factor which Witasek ignores there lies a possible answer to the question of whether simple objects of sensation are able to operate aesthetically and of when they do so. Our answer reads thus: simple objects of sensation operate aesthetically if they are perceived in terms of form and of a specific mode of aesthetic procedure which we call the apperception of personality. A simple object of sense is so perceived when it succeeds in arranging itself in a higher apperceptive context and in being built into a structure of intellectual connection by means of which it achieves a new and individual effect. Simple objects of sensation in the aesthetically favored higher sense are able to operate aesthetically if they are not grasped in their simple and direct sense-existence as impersonal physical (optical and acoustical) data, but if for our experience they become bearers, manifestations, and symbols of personal qualities. Saturated colors and the pure sounds which alone are able positively to please us (everything dull, mixed, doubtful, turbid, and dissonant here requires legitimization at the hands of the structural law of a higher form) operate, then, as if they were the definite and the clear expressions of the life of some one personality. The simple sensuous datum becomes something different and loftier in aesthetic contemplation. As a simple sensuous fact, a color is agreeable, but as a substrate of an apperception of a personality or of an act of empathy, it is beautiful. Whenever color and sound work beautifully as the expression and the symbol of a vigorous life speaking out decisively, the effect goes beyond a mere

passive affection of the senses. Mental interest is aroused by purity, freshness, clarity, or the satisfying power of full-bodied light, or by the soft blending of scents—all of which one receives with a clear value-accent as an effect of a pleasing sense of life. That the humanizing tendency of empathy has to do with the isolated color as an expression of moods is indicated not only by the metaphorical relationships with which the separate colors are overlaid, but also by the far-driven mood-symbolism which for a long time has been allied with colors. Synaesthesia and *audition colorée* also work together so as to release single colors and sounds from their isolation, to build them into apperceptive form, and to make them into analogues of personality. In connection with the sound-colors of single sounds we perceive quite definite determinations of feeling which are well adapted to delivering up analogues of human states of mind. From out of the sound-color of a prolonged tone of the oboe one hears austere chastity or naïve childishness and in the veiled tone of the English horn melancholy and resignation, whereas in the rounded tones of the clarinet there speaks a fulness of that which is warmly flowing and sensuously voluptuous. The held tone of the trumpet at the beginning of the *Rienzi* overture has something heroic; the horn-tones with which Weber's *Oberon* begins contain a mild feeling of intimacy which is rich in sentiment. In neither of these is a sound an isolated datum of sense, and certainly it is not an impersonal physical given thing, but an aesthetic expression of mood and a symbol of feeling (or, better, a symptom of feeling). That we are not alone in thinking thus can be seen from the attempts, not satisfactory enough in this respect, to describe the sound-colors of individual instruments, attempts such as are found in Berlioz' *Theory of Instrumentation*²⁷ and among numerous poets (like Tieck, for example) who transferred the decisive mood-values of tone-colors into the sphere of the linguistic; and, finally, from the frequently repeated attempts of the musician to utilize fully the isolated tones of instruments for particular effects, in which connection the tone-colors have to make their effect as such, and therefore not as components of a harmonic or melodic form which is superior to them.

Nor is there a lack of supporting documents in the literature of music-theory. Discussing the impressionistic music of pure sound-color and of Arnold Schönberg's sound-color melodies, Arnold Schering²⁸ once asked himself whether and how this kind of music is to be justified as something aesthetic since its effect can primarily be only a stimulation of the nerves. His answer reads that "It is con-

ceivable that properly gifted persons might have the ability to organize such 'sensations' into a circle of conscious psychic and mental experiences and in this way to throw a hoop of unity and clarity around them. At that moment they have become the elements of artistic expression."

Here we also find the notion of a form-producing act of perception, not to mention differential-aesthetic considerations. Persons who are visually or auditorily gifted have a more intimate relation to colors and tones than do other types of people. The former are capable of powerful aesthetic experiences in the presence of colors and tones, whereas the latter are affected only in a feeble aesthetic way or only in terms of the agreeable.

Such effects are achieved, then, in connection with simple colors, particularly when they are saturated, bright, pure, clear, and fresh and when they express their gay character decisively. Tones and (even more) sounds are aesthetically pleasant when they are removed from the extreme poles of the highest of the high ones and the lowest of the low ones, when they are presented clearly, decisively, and uniformly, and, above all, when the color of their tone is a delightful one. Colors and sounds which have qualities different from those just mentioned are aesthetically pleasurable, not because of the optical or acoustical conditions that are given, but because of superior factors, probably certain formal requirements, associatively produced normative representations, certain expression- and mood-values, and, above all, character.

I shall now in anticipation mention briefly a merely ostensibly sound argument (which I must treat again later) against this view. Just as there have been attempts to trace aesthetic valuableness in connection with colors back to a criterion of form and relation (like purity), so it has been argued that in the sphere of the other of the higher senses what alone is aesthetically in question is not tones, but sounds; and sounds are not simple basic acoustical givennesses, but composed things bound together by way of a formal organization. They are not divisible; they are blends of different acoustical sensations; they are complexes, therefore, and this physically determinable complex quality of theirs must be the cause of their pleasurableness. Sounds with certain sound-colors are pleasant; they result from the quantity and quality of the over-tones going into and blended into the sound concerned. Here too, therefore, the pleasure does not refer to something absolutely simple, but must presuppose a certain complex quality (and thus the character of form).

Here I need only point to the fact that simple objects of sense

in the acoustical sphere can indeed be defined physically as sounds (and therefore as something composed and complex), but that psychologically and experientially they are something quite simple: their composed or compounded nature, though in fact present, is not in evidence. Even in a normal case overtones are not grasped in terms of their specific quality, their specific pitch (to be hearable, they require one of Helmholtz's resonators); the hearer is not normally sensible of them; their effect for acoustical experience is limited to the way they modify the keynote on the far side of the qualitative aspect of its pitch: they give it a certain sound-color. When we hear a single tone, we are not conscious of the number of its vibrations, and certainly not of those of the aliquot tones at all. It is not feasible, therefore, to explain the effect of simple objects of acoustical sensation in terms of a factor of form which is projected into them and which depends on theoretical analysis; they cannot be thus eliminated from the sphere of independent basic phenomena.

But one must hold to the notion that the effect even of objects of sensation is not exhausted by the merely physical; for what is aesthetic is only erected on the sensuous effects occurring in the vital spheres.

B. FORMS

A single color (regardless of the fixed spatial limits of the object in which it appears) or a single tone is a simple object of sense. The juxtaposition of two colors and their resulting relationship, and the consonance of two sounds intoned at the same time—these are not simple objects of sense any longer, but belong to a higher class of aesthetically basic objects, those of forms. In the same way geometrical figures like the circle, the ellipse, the polygon, and indeed every two- or three-dimensional figuration which is delimited and precise, and all series of tones, rhythmical arrangements, and so forth—all come into the periphery of original aesthetically basic objects.

When aestheticians speak of "form," they endow this concept (in contrast with the way it is used in pre-scientific application) with a double amplification: 1. it acknowledges not only spatial forms, but also temporal ones (metrical forms in literature and melodic, harmonic, and rhythmical forms in music); 2. it enriches the concept of form with the special meaning it has received in modern psychology. Forms are meaningful entirities of the "super-summative" type—that is, the kind which are more than the sum of their component parts and, in contrast to a summation, are peculiar and origi-

nal unified forms which are precise in meaning, definite as to outline, complete, and organized. Form is therefore the characteristic agreement of a multiplicity of formally partial values on the basis of a meaningful system of relationships. Forms are structures in space and time governed by self-supporting (independent) qualities-as-totalities;²⁹ thus they are qualities which do not belong entirely to the constituent parts of which they are made. Forms are more or less structured throughout, more or less determinant wholes and processes-as-wholes with multifariously very concrete attributes-as-wholes, with an inner legality, characteristic tendencies-as-a-whole, conditionalities-as-a-whole,³⁰ for their parts. Form is not something absolutely simple, but it includes the cooperation of the parts (super-structural aspects), this cooperation not being anything one wishes, however, but something resulting in terms of a figuration which is unified, set in relief, and precise in meaning. The opposite of form is, on the one hand, an aggregate, a lack of connection which is meaningless, accidental, and put together at random (a heap of things); and, on the other, an amorphous chaos of the blurred kind. Form is what fulfills both of the criteria memorably worked out by Ehrenfels: ³¹ 1. the criterion of super-summation (the whole is more than the parts of which it consists); 2. the criterion of transposability (the form continues even when the separate elements change, but only so long as the system of relations governing them remains the same. Thus a person can transpose a melody from C major to C sharp major: every single tone is changed, but the melody as an individual form in tone remains in existence).

From these points Witasek ³² acquired his definition of forms as a second independent class of aesthetically basic objects. I shall follow him for some time but attempt to keep away from certain of the narrownesses and one-sidednesses which derive from the school to which he belongs, that of production-theory.

The beauty of a painting, of an ornament, or of a piece of music cannot be understood as the sum of the aesthetic qualities of the simple objects of sensation that are included in them. The beauty of a painting does not consist of the beauty of the separate colors. If a person were to reduce it to these, almost all of its beauty in so far-reaching a dissection of the object would disappear; thus it is clear that in this kind of dissection very important aesthetically basic objects would have to be passed over.

An aesthetic valuableness already belongs to the simplest complexes made up of objects of sensation, a valuableness which goes beyond the significance of these objects of sensation and indeed (as

viewed for itself) is actually independent of them. A pure major triad is very beautiful, but even a slight displacement by a few vibrations of one of its tones can make it unbearable, although the altered tone by itself sounds just as good as does the one in the pure triad. In the two complexes the aesthetic qualities of the separate components are alike, though they greatly change the complex itself. Thus these complexes are aesthetically basic objects.

The aesthetically elementary nature of this kind of complex objects is especially apparent when aesthetic qualities appear only in them while the corresponding simple thing dispenses with them entirely. For space and time this is undoubtedly true. The individual point in space or time is aesthetically indifferent; complexes made up of these points—that is, spatial and temporal forms (ornaments, rhythms)—are of a manifest aesthetic dignity.

That a complex object exhibits aesthetic characteristics which are not identical with those of its component parts or those of the sum of the parts can be shown by indicating that it too is something other than the mere collection or summation of these component parts—that it is a new object going beyond them. It is precisely this original quality of a formal complex which is the cause and bearer of certain new effects and aesthetic attributes.

The point concerning us here is only that forms as contrasted with simple objects of sensation constitute an original class of aesthetically basic objects, a class which is marked by original aesthetic qualities and effect-factors. Moreover, an original aesthetic principle, specifically that of form, here asserts itself. If one defines forms as an independent class of aesthetically basic objects, he must be clear that he has brought together very different matters indeed—that is, that objects of very different degrees of organization (with respect to degrees of complexity) are united into one group. This class of objects extends from the interval to the opera, from the motif made up of two tones (the main theme of the First Movement of Beethoven's *Fifth Symphony*, for instance) to an entire symphony, from the single line of verse to the epic, from the rectangle and the prism to structures in architecture and the handicrafts. Therefore there are lower and higher (more complex) forms: if the first are built upon the elements of kinds of existence preceding the making of form, then the latter grow out of the components which themselves are forms already and which therefore do not prove any longer to be anything simple. Thus every building, for instance, and also every façade and portal is a higher form, and so by the same token is every movement of a symphony. All objects—the higher as well

as the lower ones—are placed under the law of form, a law which is essentially identical with a certain sector of objective aesthetic lawfulness.

C. OBJECTS CONFORMING TO A NORM

At first glance, it seems as if there could be no more classes of aesthetically basic objects besides those mentioned so far. For every object which is aesthetically effective is either a simple object of sensation or a form; the latter class in particular extends from the simplest to the most complex and most complicated structures. But if I say that an object is a form, I have grasped only one side of its characteristic organization, the formal one in view of which every aesthetic object which is not a simple object of sensation is *de facto* a form. But saying this one has not apprehended or described what is the deciding factor of aesthetic effectiveness in all cases, for in many of them aesthetic objects “are” still something else as regards content; they belong to a group of things in actuality (or, as representations, make reference to these things) and bring the law of their type into expression. On this basis, one could divide aesthetic objects into the “thing” kind and the kind not related to things. To the first group belong all objects of nature and representations of them; to the second belong all free mental creations which are unconnected with reality (for instance, musical chords and melodies, free ornamental lines of decoration, and the forms and objects of architecture and handicrafts). The aesthetic objects of the second group obey formal laws only. A chord must be pure and harmonic; a figure must be precise, clear, completable. The objects of the “thing” type, on the other hand, obey still other laws besides that of form and therefore appear to be something lying outside the group of aesthetically basic objects called forms. Thus one may contrast the aesthetic effect of a free and abstract geometrized line of decoration (that is, of something not representing a thing really existing) with the effect exercised on us by a fruit, a flower, a tree, an animal, or a human face. In the latter case something very decisive is added to that which is endowed with form, and this is precisely the fact that a certain fruit or flower, a representative of a certain family of animals, or the face or figure of a human being is in question. Such things given in real life are not judged in terms of the principles of abstract formal shapes and do not operate on the same basis as do such shapes; but they exercise their effect and undergo their evaluation on the basis of norms which are included among the laws applying to their species and to the potentialities of their species. For us, an orange is not simply a sphere,

and we do not reproach it for being imperfect because as a sphere it only approximates the shape of a sphere. Peaches please us with their dull, veiled colors which would be highly unpleasant in other fruits on which they are not the rule of the species. The shape of a human being is not judged according to the abstractly formal designations of the lines it presents, but precisely in terms of the fact of whether the form corresponds to the ideal and standard notions of male and female. Forms which are specifically female (delicacy and curve of line) would not become a man despite their formal distinctiveness. If matters were otherwise, an unusually fat man would have to be more agreeable than a well-built and muscular one: The former exhibits more delicate, better harmonized forms than does the normal man; besides, the former's round stomach has a form which is geometrically distinctive, but which is not really experienced with pleasure because in this case it applies to something else. And it is exactly this "something else" which must still further be clarified and which gives us the right to add an original and special class of aesthetically basic objects. Figurations not derived from reality, like abstract geometrical structures, for instance, work as forms only and from the start are under the requisitions of laws of form. A circle which, being imperfectly drawn, reveals all kinds of outward bendings in baylike form, an ornamental line which is askew in a wobbly fashion and, being imprecise, irregular, and unclear, lacks clarity and energy, a chord which is out of tune—in these there are other characteristic deficiencies, as is true also when a horse has a large belly or a sway back and is therefore not able to realize the standards deriving from the principle of the type which is "horse-ness." One does not say that a poorly drawn circle transgresses a law of type, or, indeed, a law of precisely this geometrical figure; nor do we say that a fifth that is out of tune offends against the acoustical-musical requirements with which a person approaches this interval. Here there are in operation only the general formal principles of precision, decisiveness, proportionality, regularity, and so forth, while the type-norms, the ideal prototypes and models, retreat to the background as standards for aesthetic experience and evaluation. Even someone who is not concerned about whether a fourth or a third is in question can feel pleasure in the harmony of an interval; and a person who does not know the least bit about the formulas and laws of the lemniscate and the asteroid ascertained in analytical geometry, as well as of all epicycloids and hypocycloids, who does not know what a certain curve is about and what it must be about—this person can properly perceive and in enjoyment esti-

mate an ornamental line of decoration in which such given conditions occur, and indeed without his having to approach them with certain anticipations and demands. But we approach the perceived given conditions in connection with people and animals, flowers and fruits, with very concrete requirements. A circle obeys simple principles of form and is perceived with enjoyment on the basis of those principles; no part is played by an appeal, no matter how direct, to the existence-as-a-circle of this figure or to the ideas of the norms as they emanate from this figure; there is no place in intuition to make a comparison with the ideal of a circle. Circumstances are completely and fundamentally different in connection with the impression caused by an object belonging to the second group. Not only are the weighty laws of form which assert themselves here more complex and more irrational in a specific way, but all kinds of other effective forces enter into aesthetic experience as constitutive factors. One primary force is our previous experiences with the same or similar objects which have been crystallized into regulative anticipations and have been brought forward by way of association. In connection with objects of the first group, the direct and perceptual factor is at a maximum, while in those of the second the associative factor takes on decisive importance besides.

According to Witasek, an object can have aesthetic qualities which do not occur for reasons of form. Therefore there must be something concealed in the object which is aesthetically effective without its being form absolutely. The plant and animal world hides a rich treasure of varied beauty. To be sure, much of it belongs to the first two classes of aesthetically basic objects: as, for example, do tropical vegetation in the splendor of its coloration, many kinds of many flowers and leaves in their delightful geometrical forms, southern birds with their colorful feathers, the limestone shell of the radiolaria, certain serpents with the designs of their bodies, and many others. But the beauty of the plant and animal world is still not yet exhausted, for the chief element is still missing. Thus the beauty of a horse does indeed depend chiefly upon its form. But it does not occur because of the form absolutely and as such. The representation of the horse's body is a form-representation; but if it were to depend on this "geometrical" form, so to speak, and on nothing else, only a limited aesthetic value could be awarded it, a value which, moreover, would receive no real change if the line of the back swung up instead of down; yet such a line would in fact be fatal to the beauty of the horse. Thus it follows that the shape of a well-built horse has particular aesthetic qualities not as

form in the abstract, but only as the form of a horse—which means, as a normally developed form of qualities in terms of a certain generic type. It depends more, then, upon what kind of object the form belongs to than upon how it is made up. A birch tree is beautiful when it reaches upward easily, tenderly, and pliantly, the beauty of an oak, on the other hand, demands knotty branches and a solid structure.

But examples are not supplied us by the sphere of living things alone. The leaning tower of Pisa is of a lesser artistic value, not, for example, because the rhomboid which it describes as one sees it in profile falls short of the beauty of a rectangle, but because it is not proper for a tower to be leaning. Its appearance displeases because its form is unsuitable for a tower. As a whole, it is an aesthetically basic object and its aesthetic qualities do indeed depend on its form—not on the form as such, but only as regards its unsuitability. The aim too, the determination, of the object is important for the experience of its beauty.

Thus one can see that the relation of conformity to the species or to the norm to which the respective object belongs is the vital matter, and is that which makes it suitable for being an original aesthetically basic object. As such, it exhibits aesthetic attributes which plainly go beyond those of its own form. Conformity with norm (*normgemäss*) is thus to be added as an original and special class of basic aesthetic objects possibly because it can be shown that still another kind of beauty belongs to many objects besides the generally subordinated and unnoticed aesthetic attributes which belong to them by virtue of their form. This other beauty does not reduce itself to the form or its parts, but manifestly is in a real relation to that in the object which conforms with its type or norm.

When we spoke about laws of form we had to refer to outstanding laws of formal beauty and to what had been said about them. We can similarly dispatch the principles growing out of the conformity to the norm only by a review of the laws of the beauty of content like conformity to the Idea, the realization of the laws of the genus, and so forth.

D. THE EXPRESSIVE AND THE STIMMUNGSVOLLE

In the previous section I have mentioned matters which we got to know under other aspects in our discussions of the associative factor; and references to matters already known will appear in the arguments to come. The series of aesthetically basic objects is clearly still not exhausted by the classes named up to now; for there are aesthetic

effects which interest us neither as simple objects of sensation nor as forms; nor do they occur because the object conforms to its species and is adequate to the norm. Undoubtedly, a human face marked by sorrow and an imitation of it (I am thinking of Rembrandt's *Self Portrait* of his last period) can produce a profound aesthetic effect. But to what can one trace back its moving impression? Clearly only to a limited extent to the purely sensuous effects of coloring and not much more to purely formal ones; and even its conformity to a norm and to the laws of its species has as good as no share at all, for here the individual violently offends against the species. The same is true of a picture like Ruysdael's *Jewish Graveyard* or Böcklin's *Isle of the Dead*. Here the aesthetically powerful factor is strikingly suggested by the name used for this kind of art-work. People call them "mood-pictures" (*Stimmungsbilder*) and in so doing refer to a kind of aesthetic objectivity which has not been included under the kinds so far enumerated.

The form of the objects produced (and so forth) is only the bearer, so to speak, of something novel by way of which the objects achieve a beauty which does not belong to them simply as forms and which occurs to no greater extent because of their conformity to the norm of these forms. This novelty by which a broader group of basic aesthetic objects is affirmed is the psychic expression which we apprehend by means of empathy in the forms of the objects produced. In the human countenance and body (it does not matter if they occur in real life or in an artistic representation) a principal factor of aesthetic effect is the healthy formation which conforms with the species, a full development in terms of the ideal norm; but it is not the only factor by any means. Aesthetic effect is not in every case evoked by a conformity to the norm and the species; and indeed aesthetic effect frequently can be traced back to a tendency towards an effect which is the opposite in significance. Since the time of Socrates, we have known that not everything is made in terms of a beauty conformable to type or form interpreted as measure and number, but that a full effect of beauty comes to be only where there is psychic expression, where facial features and the bodily gestures reflect and reveal the life of the mind and the spirit. We know of an epoch in Greek plastic art in which the quite normal faces which are faultless in form and which conform to type reveal a mask-like rigid, peculiarly empty, and expressionless smile (the pediment-figure of Athena in the Sixth Century temple consecrated to her is an example, as is the statue of the Attic youth ascribed to the sculptors Krition and Nesiostes, a statue which also shows much of this

"*Aegimetic ductus*"). In sculptures of the high classical period an entirely new beauty asserted itself because the facial lineaments which were given individual nuances, and a freely moving bearing became an expression of deep psychic life. In its realistic characteristics the grief-stricken face of an old man who has lived a full life can deviate widely from the ideal norm of its species, and the same is true of the face of Falstaff, the cheerful glutton. But it is precisely because they deviate from the norm that both of them achieve an entirely novel potentiality of effect. As a result of the absence of all content of deeper psychic expression, a face perfect in form and perfect in its conformity to its species can create a less interesting effect than one which, having far less beauty of form and conformity to species, seems to be transfigured, deepened, and ennobled because of a psychic expression which is of human import. For this reason, art of the high classical periods as it represented human beings attempted to combine the correctness of genus and beauty of figure with the psychic expression of the psychic; and it is precisely in this synthesis that there lies one of the legal arguments for the distinctive value which falls to the share of these periods in art.

But when human beings are presented without such expressive contents, one senses a serious deficiency. Schopenhauer³⁸ gives entirely original tasks to the two branches of the art of painting which have to do with the representation of human beings as compared with the painting of landscapes and animals—the seizing and formation of psychic expression. In the painting of animals, the characteristic is completely at one with the beautiful; the most characteristic of lions is also the most beautiful, for animals have a species-character and not an individual one. But in the representation of human beings the species-character separates itself from the individual character: the one is called beauty, the other expression. But Schopenhauer errs when he sees expression as possible only in the human sphere. Modern theory of empathy as a whole and the theory of the apperception of aesthetic personality as I have pronounced it teach otherwise. Even a landscape is a psychic state for us, and the single tree or cliff is the carrier of or an informant about states of mind or moods which remind us of those of human things, or at least fall into a form of personal existence. The same is true of works of art not related to things (*undingliche Künste*, so-called). A symphony by Beethoven says something about titanic strife, a romanico or early gothic building something about stern nobility, a baroque castle about cheerful festive life, and the fittings of a rococo salon about exuberant sensuality and a sense of life which is playfully trifling.

Witasek says something like this. Even where there is no concern with the representation of the human, as in architectural structures, he thinks the highest goal is forms which realize expression and mood, a goal for which the artists often unconsciously strives. For it is not only living objects, those endowed with psychic qualities, which can participate as peculiar bearers of aesthetic qualities. The character of the gothic is something other than that of the Renaissance, and the nature of this difference is expression. The mood-factor of many landscapes, which are the more real for being painted, is often the single root of their deeply penetrating aesthetic effect. And what makes us ready to find pleasure in a musical work of art is not only the tonal forms as such, but also the expression and the mood-content hidden in them. The tonal forms are the bearers of the expression; the expression is probably not sensuously perceivable alongside them, but is to be seized only in and with them. But expression is not identical with tonal images, and therefore neither is the form as such identical with the expressive form, which has its own aesthetic qualities, certain of them being independent of the others.

The highest and most intense pleasures are rooted in expression and states of mind. The psychic life revealed in the work of art offers itself to us in the shape of forms imbued with mood and expressiveness. Therefore expression and "*Stimmung*," as the most important manifestations of an "inner beauty," prove to be independent and original aesthetically basic objects.

E. PROBLEMATICAL OBJECTS (OBJECTIVES, THOUGHT-AESTHETIC OBJECTS)

Now to raise the question of whether I have exhausted the entire realm of aesthetically basic objects. At first it seems as if I had not. What if a musical work of art with a program tries to depict an event, as, for example, Beethoven's Opus 91, "Wellington's Victory," depicts the Battle of Vittoria? Or if a genre-picture or an historical one presents an everyday event or an historical one? What if a skilful narrator interestingly reports an event? And where does all epic and dramatic literature belong, in which accounts are constantly being given of events and destinies, occurrences and happenings of the most diverse kinds? Are not such events and situations in these cases to be rated as a peculiar and original class of basically aesthetic objects? At first glance, something original may seem *de facto* to be produced, and there is only the question of whether this apparently new class retains its originality even under the ana-

lytical scrutiny of systematizers who are capable of, and under the necessity of, carrying on inspection in terms of categories: I mean persons who are frequently able to establish an identity of nature lurking behind considerable differences in appearance. Here too the *Leitmotiv* of research must be the principle of economy. *Principia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate*. Original classes of aesthetic objectivity may not be fixed if exhaustive consideration shows that what is understood by them could be subsumed under one of the groups already named.

In terms of similar considerations, Witasek is at first actually inclined to take for granted such an original class for the phenomena described, although he finally decides not to consider them an original class of independent basic aesthetic objects. (Following the school of Graz, he calls them "objectives.") He proceeds from the idea that many productions in painting do not reveal everything intended in those things which they unfold, exhibit immediately, or allow one to see; but that they are so directed that the spectator thinks something more in addition. Genre-pictures and historical and allegorical representations must be understood; one must know the context of the happenings shown in them if he is to evaluate them completely. It is not enough to see the light, the colors, and the shadows or to take in merely the forms, even though these are combined with the beauty of their type and their expression. A person must know what they mean and understand the situation represented.

When this understanding is absent, the aesthetic effectiveness that is present is not completely realized. The content of such a painting cannot be grasped only in terms of representation; it also requires the cooperation of judgment in addition. Such thought-objects as judgment-objects (objectives) are separate from objects of representation. The content of allegorical or historical pictures therefore consists not only of objects of representation (as is common in the plastic arts), but also of the objectives. But it is literature above all which chiefly has to do with objectives, for the material it works with, language, is organized primarily for the communication of objectives. To grasp the contents of a piece of literature, one must think, to begin with, of the meanings of sentences. Alongside these meanings, intuitive representation is of less importance. Even someone who is not able to put persons, localities, and situations plastically in his mind's eye can read with enjoyment—if he only understands what he reads. But the understanding is the comprehending of objectives. Now, because the objectives as constituents of the contents of literary works call up the aesthetic attitude

and because all other aesthetic objects can be understood as objects of representation, the objectives themselves seem to make up a genuine class of aesthetically basic objects.

But closer examination does not confirm this assumption. The objectives are not themselves aesthetic objects, but only the means to them. An aesthetic object is that on which aesthetic delight (or the lack of it) is erected; it is the object of pleasure or displeasure. Now, such kinds of feeling are not directed at objectives; for the objectives are neither beautiful nor ugly; they are only the mediators of beauty, those things which incite one to feelings of empathy or sympathy. For feelings are the main thing, and therefore aesthetic enjoyment in the objectives is based on objects of the same kind as is enjoyment in expression and "*Stimmung*," on feelings of empathy and sympathy.

One can agree with the view that objectives are not a real class of aesthetically basic objects, but only certain means to the arousal of expression and *Stimmung* (mood). But one must be constantly aware of the fact that objectives are very important because they are powerful, and by nature peculiar, mediators of the values of expression and mood—mediators which must be considered without question in a chapter on aesthetic objectivity even though discussion about them chiefly belongs to a special aesthetics of art, in particular that of poetics.

Thought-aesthetics is closely related to the objectives as objects of judgment; nevertheless, the problem of applying them as a genuine class of aesthetically basic objects is a totally different one. I have already spoken of thought-aesthetics; but the problem must be taken up once more here.

I shall begin with an example. Two people are standing in front of a bridge. The one is an educated layman who is ignorant of technical matters. The other is a construction-engineer. What pleases the one in the bridge is its slender and boldly curving form in which the support for a roadway stretches over a ravine; the naïve observer therefore enjoys the form of the bridge. But the expert enjoys the surprisingly bold solution here realized of a difficult problem of stasis and technology even more than he does this intuitive-direct object of perception;³⁴ here enjoyment of something which is thought-aesthetic is added as an associative supplement to the impression of form. The same is true when a scholar feels that a certain solution to a mathematical problem is especially skilful, surprisingly simple, and delightful at the same time. That such experiences are possible cannot be doubted: The books that have been written about the

beauty of mathematics, the expressions of immediate pleasure which have been made by competent judges of the beauty of elegant constructions in technical spheres³⁵—these are convincing vouchers that at least the makers of such works (who, however, always speak in the name of a group of like-minded people) have had such thought-aesthetical experiences. There is only the question, however, of whether such kinds of experiences can appeal to us in a purely aesthetic way; and also whether they trace back to a special class of aesthetically basic objects. To the first question is related our doubt, already expressed, that it is hardly ever possible with certainty to draw exact boundary-lines between an aestheticized, but at its core still logical, functional pleasure and the genuine aesthetically pleasurable product. For an answer to the second question one needs an exhaustive discussion of thought-aesthetic matters. We shall continue by following the treatise by Roretz³⁶ which I have already frequently mentioned.

Hutcheson³⁷ long ago established a special "beauty of theorems" which is distinguished by "a nature pretty different from the former kinds of beauty." For the arousal of such unintuitive experiences of an aesthetic nature, a "surprise," and "unexpected novelty" and "a unity of particulars in the general theory" are needed. It seems to him that another example is given "when one theory contains a great multitude of corollaries easily deducible from it," as can be seen in certain propositions of Euclid and in Newton's law of gravitation, "from which innumerable effects do flow." When we achieve a series of disjointed insights in the sphere of geometry, our state of mind is easily different from a quasi-aesthetic satisfaction which occurs as soon as we "can discover some sort of unity or reduce them [the "incoherent observations"] to some general canon." If, for instance, we see a cylinder with a sphere drawn in, and in the latter a cone, we do not at first sense any kind of aesthetic pleasure, which however appears as soon as we attain the theoretical insight that the volumes are related as are 3:2:1. In this connection Hutcheson stresses the directness ("immediate pleasure") of such aesthetic-theoretical experience, which he takes great pains to separate from the genuine intellectual activity which is parallel to it. Our joy in scientific insights "may be called a kind of sensation; since it necessarily accompanies the discovery of any proposition and is distinct from bare knowledge itself, whereas the knowledge is uniformly the same." Such trains of thoughts were also expressed in later times, but differently. Thus John Dewey thinks that it is possible that chemical formulas can exert a quasi-aesthetic charm on especially

gifted individuals: "I suppose that even equations composed of chemical symbols may under certain circumstances . . . have for some persons a poetic value."

Roretz' opinions may be listed in five statements. He held that:

1. There is an original and fundamentally different kind of aesthetic objectivity in the given conditions proper to such experiences, an objectivity in connection with which certain factors seen earlier as necessary constitutives of aesthetic existence either disappear completely or retreat decisively. Roretz means the sensual factor, the sensuously immediate given condition, the form-endowed, "*évidente perfection*."
2. This kind of aesthetic excitement can be experienced in the mental reception (and treatment) of certain abstract thought-structures or of those in which, though they are physically accessible circumstances, the visualized presentation as such appears aesthetically indifferent.
3. What the taking up of experiences in the aesthetic sphere occurring in this way justifies is, on the one hand, the accentuation of pleasure hereby emerging (which is just as far removed from the vital spheres as from the practical-intellectual) and, on the other, the peculiar structural form which has its correspondence only in the aesthetic.
4. One must always hold to the fact that the theoretical valuableness, and thus the validity and the conceptual self-verification, are not the deciding matter, but that only the joy in the structural matter is.
5. The effect of this thought-aesthetic appearance is realized in a dual manner: in the first instance, that which is significant in the structure of greater coherences (alongside its ideal factual content) is experienced with pleasure; in the second instance, the experience is realized in such a way that, above all, a certain dynamism aesthetically or quasi-aesthetically attains a joyful awareness.

The two chief forms of the thought-aesthetic (which are the intellectual-meaningful and the intellectual-dynamic) can come to expression in the most diverse spheres of intellectual life; the spheres from which Roretz takes his examples enjoy special respect: philosophy, mathematics, strategy, and chess. As for philosophy, it can easily be shown that even in the most abstract, purely philosophical trains of thought which are unrelated to fact there sometimes flashes something which may be called aesthetic or which at least has close connections with aesthetic experience. Proof is furnished us by the finely sensitive interpretation in a passage in Hegel's *Philosophy of History* ³⁸ in which the role of the individual in the historical process is described. The reader raises his eyes from the page with a satisfying feeling of the deepest understanding of the significance of what

is ostensibly merely individual in historical happenings. And this understanding has a manifest aesthetic note. Even in abstract philosophical works, the aesthetic is not merely an outer ornament to philosophical thinking, but a phenomenon at least occasionally coming in all clarity and independence from out of the course of thought itself.

The thought-aesthetic aspect of mathematics is of the highest significance. It has often been confirmed that there is a quite genuine aesthetic experience (and thus one not merely called so in the metaphorical sense) in the sphere of mathematical thought or in the formation of mathematical concepts. Bearing this in mind, F. Auerbach³⁹ says that "As for beauty of outer form and of inner content, many formulas in mathematics can be on a par with a poem." And speaking of the brachistochrone, Leibniz⁴⁰ said that its attraction for him was its beauty. Often this pure aesthetic comprehension and evaluation of mathematical thought-behavior is brought close to an artistically-philosophically pleasant form. Thus, for example, in the words in which Ch. Méray celebrates the mathematician Gauss: "In reading the memoirs of Gauss, do we not in the details again find ourselves suddenly in the splendid arabesques interlaced by the inexhaustible imagination of the artists of the Orient; in the harmony of one of these marvellous temples which the architects of Pericles raised to the Hellenic divinities?" It is not easy to say how the boundary between this thought-aesthetic function in mathematical understanding and speculation and regular aesthetic matters is to be fixed. Wherever traces of the intuitive are present, it is really not too difficult to cross over to the familiar kind of aesthetics, as one can in connection with the hexagram of Pascal, for instance, or the "*pentagramma myrificum*" of Gauss. Still, the purely intuitive agreeableness which is pretty limited to begin with in the figure of Pascal gets its true accent through the purely intellectual aspect revealed by a certain law that governs here: namely, that the point of intersection of the three pairs of opposing sides must always lie on a straight line. The so-called logarithmic spiral demonstrates this better. Here the aesthetic agreeableness which one senses (or can sense) when he sees the curves depends almost exclusively upon the intellect; for in and by itself this wild and defiantly rising line represents hardly any aesthetic worth and is inferior as compared with the spatial-direct effect of the usual sine-line. But as soon as a person knows the basic peculiarity of this curve (namely, that the vectors of the radius ascend in geometrical progression since the tangents always create the same angle with them), as soon as a person knows

this, the curve takes on not only intelligibility, but beauty too. Then one very clearly notices an aesthetic click.

Roretz then produces certain other examples of mathematical given states whose coordinated sets of experiences have thoroughly aesthetic structures "for persons so to speak constitutionally skilled in them"; he then turns towards strategy and chess-problems, where, according to his view, aesthetic effects are also possible, but naturally only for the spectator who can play chess. For a long time theorists of chess have been developing axiological categories to characterize kinds of play, categories which indicate an aesthetic yield for the spectator.

This detailed review has been necessary because nothing of less weight is under debate than the exceedingly important fundamental question of whether thought-aesthetic things are to be looked upon as a real class of aesthetically basic objects. According to everything said so far, our answer cannot be anything other than this: As is true of objectives, so is it true of the given objects in the realm of which thought-aesthetics is composed. Both concern quite individual, interesting, and fruitful means of aesthetic experiences which, however, themselves must in turn (as it seems to me on the whole) be subsumed under the categories of expression and mood; experiences of form too seem to play a role in this connection. When Roretz mentions the series of experiences which the qualified spectator has in the face of the "fourieristic developments," and compares them with the structures of certain symphonic musical compositions and the way they are grasped in experience, he is indicating analogies. But the person to whom the solution of specific mathematical, strategic, and technical-constructive problems seems skilful, facile, elegant, brilliant, surprisingly fruitful, original, and so forth, has had occasion for certain feelings of empathy. In this connection it is worthy of note that it was only abstract trains of thought and conditions which normally are far from the aesthetic which called up such experiences for him; and this is possible only on the grounds of certain special presuppositions. Therefore the thought-aesthetic is not an original class of aesthetically basic objects, but subordinates itself to class 4 (objects of expression and mood). Only for the qualified observer is it the bearer of the values of expression and mood and a mediator of a real inner beauty.

F. THE AESTHETICS OF SPACE

a.¹ Preliminary Remarks: The term "the aesthetics of space" was impressed on my mind by Lipps.⁴¹ He dedicated a special work

to the circle of problems included under it, and he treated it in detail in both volumes of his aesthetic. By the aesthetics of space he means the theoretical consideration of beautiful effects which come from lines as carriers of motions and forces and, further, from surface (plane) forms and bodies; he interprets these in terms of an aesthetic mechanics and a theory of empathy. But I conceive of the concept of the aesthetics of space somewhat more broadly in that I include colors also, and therefore all of the means of aesthetic effect which (as given in the intuitive form of space) are grasped by one's eyes. The subjects of this section are, therefore: 1. colors; 2. surface (plane) forms and figures (outlines, contours, two-dimensional formations); 3. spatial formations in the narrowest sense of stereometric structures, of three-dimensional bodies.

The special questions of these three spheres of fact will be discussed separately; at present we shall show in a quite general way that certain fundamental problems penetrate all of the objective realms I have mentioned. All given objects which are relevant to spatial aesthetics are either real-objective in that they show the relations of things, objective meaning, and imitations of objects, or they are abstract-unreal and mean nothing but themselves because they do not refer to an object in actuality, are in no kind of copying or indicative relationship to it. The colors used in the art of decoration appear in room-carpets and dress-materials; with respect to aesthetic worth, they are something other than the colors of flowers, fruits, and animals as they actually exist in nature or as they are artistically presented in still-lives and landscapes and in pictures of flowers and animals. The figure of a human being is under aesthetic laws different from those governing ornamental decorative lines unrelated to things or having geometrical form. A figure drawn on a piece of paper may represent, reproduce, or suggest a dove, a rabbit, or a human face without the representation's being identical with the thing. But a circular line drawn on a piece of paper is a circle, not a representation of one. Alongside the concrete forms of nature are geometrical forms in which, as they approach us directly, the shapes of natural things are not reproduced. In contrast to reproduced shapes are freely created abstract forms in which a general principle of nature or an effect of universal mechanical forces manifests itself and is brought into pure intuition.⁴² The same is true of the sphere of physical-spatial given states.

A second prevailingly fundamental division depends on whether spatially-aesthetically given states in isolation or a grouping of them as such is present, whether they have to work alone or in an em-

beddedness in something else. Thus a color produces an entirely different effect if it is allied with another one than it does by itself alone; a harmony of colors is something different from the placing of two individual colors alongside each other. The effect is further different if the color appears in isolation and if it appears as part of the structure of an ordered totality; if it is a color unconnected with an object or if it is on the surface of a concrete object,⁴³ where as a rule it does not occur for itself alone, but in combination with others.

The same is true of forms. A certain rectangle or cylindrical shape operates differently as it is perceived by itself, differently when it is experienced as a member of a superior whole from which it primarily derives its concrete meaning as form: say, when the rectangle appears as an opening for a window and the cylinder as a pillar.

Finally, one must reflect on the following: one and the same spatial-aesthetic given state or condition can operate differently, depending on whether the pure and direct factor in sensation and perception is in the foreground or whether associatively produced representations play a decisive role. Thus many persons with pleasure perceive green as the color of a flourishing landscape in spring, whereas, they prefer other colors as pure coloristic qualities. We shall turn our attention chiefly to the first factor in the effect of the givennesses of aesthetic space and as far as possible eliminate everything associative. We shall not be completely successful in doing this because mood-effects in colors and the empathy-product in certain spatial forms are to a great extent determined by unconscious (latent) ideas whose presence and effect can never be accounted for with absolute clarity.

*b.¹ Colors.*⁴⁴ In discussing colors we shall begin with the proviso just mentioned. As concerns isolated individual colors, one must remark first that almost every color can be pleasant in terms of certain associations of use and so forth, of certain embeddednesses in form and other presuppositions. A speck of color which is quite disagreeable may be legitimized formally as a shadow in a painting; the brighter pale red which is proper in edible veal and therefore satisfactory too would be a bad sign in beef, in which it would be repulsive.⁴⁵ As we are occupied with the direct effect of individual colors, we shall initially hold such and further associations at a distance. Looking at the colors of the spectrum in their order or seeing the small index of colors by Ostwald, one finds that all colors as they appear in a properly strong light and in saturation are perceived

with a considerable accent of pleasure, which, however, is not the same in all cases. Instead, certain colors are clearly preferable. Which ones arouse a heightened enjoyment, and why do they? But first the facts. The results of many experiments confirm the experience which every aesthetician achieves introspectively if he carefully examines for himself the Ostwaldian atlas of colors; certain gradations of red are especially pleasing, but greenish yellow, indecisive blue-red, and violet, are far less so. Among the principal pure colors of the spectrum, red takes the first place without argument; then follow blue, yellow, green, and, in last place, violet. The preference for red is confirmed by practice in art and handicrafts also, especially in those of primitive times. One can explain this in terms of associative factors (red reminds one of fire, warmth, ripe fruit, the welcome view of the blood of animals of prey and of slain enemies); but it must be noted that such an explanation, for a series of reasons yet to be discussed, is not adequate. More natural is an explanation in terms of sense-physiology to which Ziehen⁴⁶ in fact makes reference.

Red is a color of dissimulation and, in contrast to green and blue, which are colors of assimilation, is distinguished by a relatively great luminosity. (By dissimulation one means the decomposition of the substance of vision; by assimilation one means the rebuilding of it. The eye is more profoundly engaged, therefore, in the experience with red.) A result of the greater ability of red to excite is the fact that the sensation of red is particularly intensive and vigorously draws attention to itself. Now, in primitive stages of civilization mostly positive feeling-tones were tied to the intensive sensation which excites attention, and for this fact the acoustical art of primitive peoples, who essentially found joy in noise, also serves as an example. Because red is more penetrating than all other colors, it already became the color *κατ' ἐξοχήν* (kat exochēn) in early times. This physiological explanation can be generalized beyond the fact of the color red. Theodor A. Meyer,⁴⁷ for instance, does so. Physical seeing-events take place when the nerves of sight are stimulated by rays of light which are thrown from the contemplated object onto the retina of the eye. When colored surfaces (which are as we see things) set our nerves of sight into an agreeable excitement (one that is powerful, but still effortless), sensuous agreeability is present. As the colors having strong luminous power exert a powerful attraction out of and among the individual colors, that which has the most luminous power—that is, red—will be favored. The taking in of such colors gives our eyes (that is, to the nerves of sight) the natural,

intense stimulus for which we ask. Here to begin with is physical comfortableness, which, however, is able to become the point of departure for higher effects in terms of beauty of form.

These facts from physiological optics are undoubtedly important and offer us a pertinent explanation for the cases in question. But one must not be so misled, as frequently happened in earlier periods, as to press beyond what is proper, to what is not related to basic causes; for the eye is not everything which is concerned in a seeing-event. As regards aesthetic results, the peripheral happenings in the retina are of less importance than that central one in the center of sensation in the cortex. "We do not really see with our eyes. They only mediate the act of seeing."⁴⁸ Physiological theory therefore requires a supplement through psychological argumentation, which, to be sure, must not proceed, as has often happened, precipitantly and in a short-circuited fashion, so that the special pleasure one has in a specific color is explained on the basis of its feeling-tone. What do I mean? If one defines the feeling-tone of a color as the pleasure it produces, then nothing is really explained; for the thing which must be made plausible is exactly why red and why yellow arouse precisely the pleasure they do, and why red produces a deeper pleasurable effect than does violet. If one were to interpret feeling-tone as the mood-value of color (the fiery passionate of red, the energetic and powerful one of orange, the cool reserve of blue, and so forth), then the problem to be explained is replaced by a far more complicated one. For it will not do to make the matter so simple as to represent this mood-value as the outcome of a secondary kind of analogizing, of associative completion, and, finally, of an inclination towards linguistic metaphorism. The mood-value of a color is not identical with the secondary feeling-products which depend on associative-reproductive factors.

Sterzinger⁴⁹ too resists tracing enjoyment in specific colors back to such feeling-impressions. Surely these feeling-impressions do operate in conjunction with the colors in an aesthetic impression, but the aesthetic impression does not trace back to them alone. For Sterzinger (this testimony by an observer who, schooled and competent equally well in art and psychology, is very scrupulous as a judge is important), the agreeableness of pure colors is hidden not in feeling-impressions, but in the color-impressions themselves. Aesthetic impression lies in amazingly luminous, deep (*satt*), and pure red and in a blue that is equally deep. It is true that the former seems brighter and the latter darker and that in this fact there are tendencies towards complication of feeling; but one need not have them. In

connection with the feeling-impressions mentioned, as they occur in colors and also in tones, there is no question at all, according to Stumpf,⁵⁰ of real feelings, but of so-called feeling-perceptions.

One must mention once more a notion which is especially important in the present connection: I mean the idea (and the optical phenomenon upon which it is based) of saturation (*Sättigung*). We call those colors saturated which assert their gay character in its purity; they therefore contain none of the values ranging from black to white; they are without light (*leukotrope*) or dark (*melanotrope*) modifications. Of isolated colors it is valid to say that saturated ones are more pleasant than the unsaturated ones and that brilliant and luminous ones are preferable to those which are dull and dirty. When Dessoir says that discrete shades are preferable to dazzling ones and adds that very strong colors have something vulgar while gay ones are barbaric, he seems to me to speak less as an unprejudiced enjoyer than as a person of the most refined upbringing in art, if not as a completely decadent aesthete; moreover, he may have in mind less the conditions in connection with isolated, not copied, colors than with those of the optics of painting. For the latter these assertions are indeed as they ought to be. We have no more desire for a picture made up of loud colors of the spectrum, and even less for one composed of loud complementary two-toned colors, than we do for a symphony made up only of triads and dominant seventh chords. True, soft gradations of tints tending towards white have their delicate charms (as does sky-blue, for example), but in general saturated colors are liked still better. Speaking so, one has said nothing against the enormous diversification of our coloristic cosmos through the crossing of gay color-tones with the values ranging from black to white. Many colors come into existence only in this fashion (brown, for instance), which is a modification of orange in the direction of darkness and which comes to be through a weakening of the luminosity of this color. But—to say this once more—saturation is a factor of critical significance for pleasure in connection with isolated colors which are not copied (represented). Why?

Saturated colors assert their gay character fully, luminously, purely, and with a certain emphasis, and thus they make comprehension easy, just as the basic colors and the definite color-mixtures too are preferred to all indefinite ones. Thus there is something like a coloristic-optical functional pleasure. Strong saturation lays powerful claim to the peripheral organ of sense, and the clear definite stamp of the character of the color makes comprehension and recognition easy, the distinctiveness which is a result of the positive feeling-tone

of the impression being therefore increased. Unequivocal precision leads to a preference for saturated colors as well as for pure (unmixed) ones or for those which are blended in terms of certain degrees of optical labeling and precise proportions. Everything that is indecisive, half-way, irresolute, and indistinct is unpleasant also in this realm. The saturated colors are preferred because they bring about a more intense stimulation of the nerves of the eyes than do the unsaturated ones. Beyond this, they arouse a mental enjoyment. In this way they reach up to genuine beauty of form.⁵¹

And now something in greater detail about the values and the qualitative feeling-tones of individual colors, a subject already mentioned but not fully discussed. In Goethe's *Farbenlehre* (*Treatise on Color*) there is a chapter which will subsequently be of special value to us because it concerns the "sensuous-ethical effect of colors." Yellow is said to be cheerful, lively, gently stimulating, warm, and comfortable. Orange (red-yellow) is more energetic, more powerful, more domineering, full of warmth and bliss; in yellowish red this impression increases to an intolerable violence. Blue contains a genuine opposition between stimulation and stability. It has something empty, cold, sad. A reddish blue does not animate, but makes one restless; it effects a yearning for quiet, as orange does for activity; lilac is lively without being gay, bluish red increases unrest, red is grave and splendid, full of majesty and grandeur, and so forth.

Before going into these complicated categories of color-ethics and the characters of the colors declared there, I must refer to related, but simpler determinations which are present when colors are spoken of as "warm" or "cold." Yellow and red in all of their nuances are designated as warm, while green and blue in all of their tint-gradations are called cold. The expression "simpler" does not of course mean that the explanation could be easier (instead, it is uncertain and debatable), but that it concerns relatively uncomplicated phenomena in which, moreover, the anthropomorphic character does not so vigorously come forward. If certain colors are called bright and cheerful, others dark, gloomy, and pinched, then the feeling-impressions have their roots in the coloristic qualities themselves: that is to say, in that factor of specific luminosity which is inseparably bound with the colors. Luminosity decreases from yellow to red and reaches its weakest degree in violet; with these the characters of the cheerful or of the sad can also be associated. And now we must ask whether the feeling-impressions of warmth and coldness too are based on the physical-physiological contents of optical-coloristic qualities. This would be possible for the "warmth" and

"chilliness" of colors; it is a physical fact "that the red end of the spectrum passes over to rays of warmth and that for this reason red can have a warm effect."⁵² But other explanations are possible and have been brought forward: perhaps the question is one of very primary, still undifferentiated influences of a primitive class which are of atavistic importance in aesthetic experience. The fact is that coloristic-aesthetic qualities of warmth and coldness are not identical with the caloric qualities of physics and that, as a matter of fact, they can be in direct opposition to them. An electric bulb produces less warmth than does a gas burner (*Auerbrenner*) which is equally bright; yet the reddish light of a carbon filament lamp is said to be warm, whereas the greenish yellow of a gaslight is said to be cold, although it is further distant from the technical-physical ideal of "cold light" than is the electrical one. In connection with such associations there occurs a very elementary analogizing in which experience plays a small role, or none at all. Certain colors appeal to us as warm and others as cold because of their striking analogies to emotional affections which fall to our lot through our experiences in connection with two different spheres of meaning. Certain colors in their effective feeling-tone have an often very extraordinary similarity to the feeling-tone of certain experiences of moderate temperatures. But if, through the stimulation of one sense, sensations of another kind too are aroused at the same time, if a color is similar to an impression of temperature, synaesthesia is present, a secondary sensation which derives from the similarity of feeling-effects.

The more one slides from definite and clearly objectified sensations (such as are felt, for instance, when one sees things and their surface colors) into a state of primitive-undifferentiated sensibility in which the subjective and the objective are not clearly distinguished, just that much more do the sensation-contents of the different senses approach sense-modalities.⁵³ In this way, an undifferentiatedness and a coherence of sense-modalities are evident to the degree that we slide away from "objection" (as understood by N. Ach⁵⁴ and A. Messer) into vital-physical feeling of the subjective kind. Therefore even designations like warm and cold, light and dark, are feasible in different sense-modalities. This fact supports the physiological theory of the calculus of secondary sensations which was set up by Bleuler,⁵⁵ a theory which attempts to explain the secondary sensations as well as the sensations themselves. For this purpose we must assume that our brain replies to a stimulus of sense not with a single sensation, but with several that are specifically different. With this, one does not have to imagine that the different sensations

take place in such a way that the stimuli coming from each center of sense are directed towards the other sense-centers. The regularity of the corresponding binding makes this improbable; it is more probable that "a general condition of brain substance responds to stimuli with their different qualities as they are conducted from the individual sense-organs. But now and then only one of them is in the foreground, and indeed a different one for every realm of sense, whereas the remaining ones retreat to the background and come to consciousness as secondary sensations or not at all."

Experience with colors goes one fundamental step further if the colors signify expressions of the moods of human beings, if an experience is manifestly felt to be analogous to states of mind, and if certain colors are called cheerful, exciting, energetic, passionate, insolent, familiar, charming; or sad, depressing, tedious, languid, and so forth. This way of attributing qualitative nuances to the feeling-tone of certain colors emerged early. Hence Pliny⁵⁶ distinguished *colores floridi* from *colores austeri*, thereby contrasting luxuriant and severe colors. Similarly, Goethe spoke of colors on a plus and a minus side. The first agree with an "agile, lively, driving" sensation, the latter with a "restless, tender, and yearning one." Here belongs the notion of A. Schmarsow⁵⁷ that red and yellow are colors that spring forward and that blue is one that retires. The basis of such connections lies in experiences which go back to the differences of the degrees with which individual colors make their impressions. It is self-evident that certain interindividual differences are here, but that the agreements are far more numerous and more striking than the differences. No one has ever yet called a loud yellowish red languid, tedious, and depressing. Besides, certain variations in the evaluations made of individual colors can very often be explained by the associative factors with which they are intermixed. When Cohn's⁵⁸ subjects made known their clear disinclination for yellow and were thus in opposition to the responses of the subjects of Major⁵⁹ and Baker,⁶⁰ associations could have been in operation which transformed it into the color of envy.⁶¹ Undoubtedly such associations have powerfully influenced the pleasure with which yellow is evaluated, at least in our civilization; in east-Asiatic culture, however, where such associations are lacking, yellow is especially esteemed. Such associations are important, but they are not decisive. Their role is very differently judged by different theorists.

Ziehen⁶² concedes a considerable effective value to them. His subjects went very far in giving qualitative nuances to the feeling-accent of individual colors, ascribing to a certain red, for in-

stance, "a burning, ruthless passion" or giving violet the designation of "very sad." Ziehen is inclined to draw upon representational associations to explain such experiences. Therefore, for example, it seems completely plausible to him that as a result of an association with heaven, the sensation of blue should be bound with a sense of the illimitable, the far off, and the greatly desired. Müller-Freienfels⁶³ grants to associative-representational factors an even greater part. If light and rich (saturated) colors please us, then it is primarily sensorial factors which are decisive. All intensive, but not overly strong stimuli are felt pleasantly. But reproductive-associative stimuli enter into the purely sensorial ones. The mood of cheerfulness is allied with clear brightness. Light and cheerfulness, darkness and seriousness are among the most fixed of associated pairs. From the fact that this is a matter of mere association, not of an inner *a priori* relationship, it follows that this phenomenon, widely spread but not universally so, can easily be crossed with other associations. When people mourn in white clothes, and when the moon now and then is felt to be dead and feeble and the silver of its light to be "pale" (as meaning something sad and melancholy), an associative "crossing over" (*Durchkreuzung*) has taken place. In the same way one can trace a cultivated taste which prefers muted colors back to associated aspects. A saturated (deep dark) color, because it is loved primarily by primitive and aesthetically untrained persons, takes on associations with the rustic, the raw, the dazzling, and the common, so that people of refined and distinguished taste turn away from it. The avoiding of saturated colors in men's clothes today is probably connected with their coming from England, where gentlemen's styles forbid everything that is loud and striking. The reproductive factors which accompany the evaluation of colors have in part so sovereign a universality that they seem really to be bound with the color-stimulus, and not merely to be radiated from it. Such a general association is the conceiving of red and yellow as warm and that of blue and green as cold colors. Müller-Freienfels finds the basis for this in the fact that warm color-tones appear in sunlight and thus in connection with warmth, whereas cold colors are the colors of shade. In a landscape filled with sunshine, therefore, all yellow and red tones are strengthened, but a dull blue dominates in the shadows.

Other psychologists and aestheticians do not concur with this over-straining of a very superficially treated association principle. According to Külpe,⁶⁴ the character of color appears to be the highest mode of its aesthetic effect, to be an objective and invariable objectification of a mood. The associational hints are entirely dif-

ferent from this mood: for instance, the reminder of a picture or impressions like gold-brown, light silver, copper-red. Theodor A. Meyer⁶⁵ in a still more far-reaching critical way limits the value of the principle of association as a means of explanation, though he does not reject it entirely.

Scholars have tried to derive the mood-values of colors from the character of the objects in which they are especially abundant and impressive. Thus it has been that red is the color of an up-welling life because it is the color of blood and of the heat of a burning fire. Nevertheless, if this were true and if the memory of heat of the fire were to influence the mood of the color decisively, white would have to be the most incandescent color, because it is white that appears when fire has reached its maximal heat. It is better, therefore, to assume that the psychic-mental significance of colors depends on the different kinds of excitement which the color induces in us. Red and yellow excite us and for this reason are warm to us; blue and black make us calm and are therefore sensed as cold; and so it follows that red as, for us, the warmest color becomes the color of a life flourishing passionately and, in extension, the symbol of splendor, power, and fervent passion. Naturally, all kinds of recollections can accompany such kinds of experiences. Often thoughts of blood are cooperative determinants of red, and the fact that our bodies grow white and pale when we are paralyzed with sudden terror or with anxious fear is important as concerns the color grey. Green, which is at the median point between an exciting yellow and a cool blue, may also seem to have a comforting coolness because nature as it constantly repeats itself shines in cool green. The unequivocal character of colors in their animation may be injured by the play of associations which may enter in. The color-mood of green changes as one feels himself reminded of meadows and woods or of poisonous snakes; and yellow achieves a different mood-tone if we think of the yellow of the sun or of the color on the face of a person feeling envy.

It must be admitted, then, that associative-reproductive factors play a role and in many cases contribute more or less abundantly when mood-values and feeling-tones come into being in color, but that they are not decisive or authoritative alone because, to look at the other side, there are examples in which an intelligible and powerful mood-value appears quite directly and without any demonstrable associations. Sterzinger,⁶⁶ considering this fact, admits to differentiation in terms of time: first comes the direct sensorial impression and then (eventually) the mood-effect in the color which appears in the

form of an "enlargement (extension) of feeling" (*Gefühlserweiterung*). Joy in mere color is so strong, he thinks, "that it predominates at the beginning and for a long period of time." Only with the search for extensions of this impression do there appear easy agreements with feeling, such, for instance, as are described in Goethe's *Farbenlehre*. But one must be firm in insisting, in opposition to this view, that the mood-value of a color is not something that is merely added to its "true" and direct sensuous effect and could thus be absent; nor is it something that could stand next to it as a foreign and unexpected matter acting as any kind of product of association one likes. Instead, the mood, the characteristically shaded feeling-tone, is already included in the impression of the color and is therefore a direct something in experience, a product of a kind of aesthetic experience of colors in terms of apperception of personality and empathy. In aesthetic contemplation, color is differently experienced from what it is, say, in the factual-scientific thought of the physicist or in the practical one of the house-painter or the grocer. For aesthetic contemplation, the color is thus something having life, cheerfulness, energy, passion, whereas in the impersonal contemplation of the physicist, it is only an optical phenomenon graduated in terms of luminosity, saturation, and color-tone. If the ambition of the scientist is directed towards a numerical grasp of the objects (definitions), so in the aesthetic state color-tone, clear brightness, and saturation are under personal signs in analogy with a living being. Color becomes the bearer of the psychic magic of a mood which makes up its content. Whenever single qualities of sense in their individuality summon the attention of the apprehender to a spectator's state of surrender, there comes to hand that kind of aesthetic effect for which the sensuously given is the carrier expressive of life and mind. The state of surrender to intuition causes in the contemplator a characteristic loosening up of feeling which suggests an emotional interpretation of reality, and, indeed, one which is quite primitive and immediate, experiences and knowledges not having to be associatively produced. In these terms, phenomena of light and color exert an especially powerful impulse towards vivification. This impulse is aroused by the influences exercised on our minds by light and color, effects by which a basic component of personal experience comes into play. Such an ethical mood-effect of colors is always present (though, to be sure, pronounced to a greater or lesser extent) when we share in the appearance of a color, and it is present at our first glance. What is lacking or what can appear only at the end is merely the linguistic metaphor, the designation, which, at most very

figuratively, names the characteristic mood-effects of colors in analogy with an aspect of human feeling and mood or with an habitual trait of character.

The most definite and the most impressive formulation of this state of affairs is to be found in a chapter in Lipps' *Aesthetics*⁶⁷ devoted to "Empathy in Colors." A color becomes an aesthetic object only as it is more than color, as it is something intrinsically alive, something submerged in a state of mind. If I call shining and rich colors powerful, the "power" of the color is the power of my comprehension, my apperceptive doing, my empathy; but it is not that of a comprehension arbitrarily expended by me. Instead, it is the force which the color "by virtue of its quality—namely, that which I designate by the predicates 'shining' and 'rich'—lays claim to. . . . The force or power of the color is thus the force of my striving, but of a striving 'belonging' to its particular quality (that is, bound to it immediately, given immediately in and with it)." The power of a "powerful" color is the quality of the color insofar as there is a powerful impulse in this quality for me to apperceive, insofar as I feel myself invited to such an expenditure of inner power in the experience of color and its quality. Besides this power and its individuality, there is a particular mood or state of mind belonging to every color. Such moods—say, when yellow appeals to me as being cheerful and easy-going—are the experienced total conditions of my person. This mood which I empathize into the color is therefore something added to the color and yet at the same time bound to it in the greatest intimacy; it is something born out of the sensuous impression, something hovering over it. At the same time, this atmosphere of color-moods is not based on associations from experience; rather, the mood belongs to the color in a much more immediate way than would be conceivable if it came from such associations (if, for instance, red would be the color of blood or of the flame of a fire). It belongs to color in the way in which a mood belongs to every rhythm. Every experience which has a certain stimulating character has the tendency to "rhythmize" the psyche in a corresponding way. The experience creates a corresponding psychic resonance. It sets those modes of inner experience in tune with its own character of excitement. Each color-sensation is a peculiar inner excitement which has the ability to awaken related excitements in the manner of resonance. This already reveals the simple fact that deep colors remind one of deep tones.

Now we shall consider the aesthetic effect which results as colors are placed together. The combination-value of a color is some-

thing other than its effect by itself alone. Two colors each of which is agreeable separately can cause an effect like a box on the ear when they are placed alongside each other; and, inversely, two colors neither of which is agreeable by itself can take on a powerful attractiveness if they are juxtaposed. There are colors which harmonize: that is, combining them brings about a relationship which with intuitive necessity guarantees pleasure. Where the opposite is true, optical dissonance is created. One's question therefore reads: which colors are well-matched and which color-combinations are therefore aesthetically delightful? And then: what is the basis of this harmony and of the agreeableness that depends on it? First of all, the facts which have been ascertained through the numerous observations and experiments of Cohn, Barber, Chown, Baker, Kirschmann, Ziehen, Meumann, Allesch, and others: ⁶⁸ such decided contrasts as yellow and blue, red and green, or red and blue are agreeable; but in general the indecisive contrasts of the median intervals of color like sea green and yellow-green are not so. Still, if the large intervals are marked by apparent agreeableness, so are the small ones; they claim a coloristic badge of office. Thus, combining a basic color with one of its light or dark modifications, for instance, pleases us, as does a rich blue of the spectrum combined with a dark deep blue, and red of the spectrum with rose-colored pink. I clearly remember a color-experience which once gave me sheer happiness when I looked at a bed of flowers the inner circle of which was made up of rose tulips and the outer one of red ones. As concerns pleasant large intervals and decided contrasts, people have for a long time thought that there is a particular pleasure belonging to combinations of complementary colors—therefore of those which are opposite each other in the circle of colors and which, being blended, produce white or grey; combinations of this kind are so universally and so pervadingly preferred that many theorists would like to ascribe to them a universal human "*a prioristic*" badge of character. It is well known that Goethe was of this opinion; of the experimental results of recent times those of J. Cohn seem to speak in favor of this thesis: he found that of color-combinations those of complementary colors were preferred to other combinations. To be sure, more recent experimental investigations (those, for instance, of Baker) have furnished the most noteworthy modifications of this view. The most agreeable combinations are not those of two complementary colors, but those of colors of somewhat lesser differences in quality. For example, the completely complementary contrast of red and sea green is less agreeable than the nearly complementary contrast of

red and green. Thus in the researches of Allesch⁶⁹ the dual tone-color of red and sea green received only 57.5% of the judgments of agreeableness. Also, according to the experiments of Ziehen, the combination of red and green or red and blue is preferred to the completely complementary combinations. Despite this, Ziehen is inclined not to revise the statement that complementary colors *ceteris paribus* produce a particularly agreeable combination inasmuch as deviations from this principle can easily be explained.

According to Ziehen, the complementary relationship enjoys a primary distinction; if the combining of somewhat more closely related colors is preferred in differentiated civilizations, this is "because it provides, instead of a large surplus of pleasure, a refined pleasurable sensation." Dessoir thinks similarly; he over-points the criticisms of the ratios of complementarity by saying that "purely complementary colors are seldom pleasant when they are juxtaposed. To them we prefer pairs of colors of smaller qualitative differences." The juxtaposition of complementary colors easily has a sober and hard character, for effects of after-image and contrast can appear in a damaging way. From his one-sided pictorial-optical point of view (which has already been described), Ziehen, contrary to trustworthy experimental results, is inclined to award to the complementary relationship a certain lack of pleasure, the basis for which he sees thus: on the one side, the complementary color is not independent enough of the first color; on the other, it is not bound to it by any relationship of unity. For this reason, it is a far distant and not complementary color which harmonizes as an independent quantity with a given one. Thus the combination of red and dark blue owes its middling agreeableness to the fact that their contrast is not a physiologically coercive one, as is true when the eye, which is fatigued by a color, overlays the environs with the complementary color.

That pure and complete complementarity frequently retreats in agreeableness behind the merely approximate is based, according to Helmholtz,⁷⁰ on the fact that with obviously complementary colors the second does not assert itself adequately as an independent element, a defect which is eliminated through a slight softening, like that of blue-green to green. Böcklin⁷¹ follows a similar view.

Yet even if relations of complete complementarity do not exhibit the maximum of agreeableness, it is certain that agreeableness does occur in connection with large and decided contrasts, whereas more moderate contrasts lack pleasantness because they are unimpressive and indecisive. Small intervals and narrow contrasts do

please, not as contrasts, however, but rather as inflections, as bluntings, as variants and differentiations of a basic color. If the neighbor-colors of yellow and green, and blue and green produce an unfortunate effect when they are placed next to each other, two different yellows or reds or blues have a quite favorable effect. The juxtaposition of different degrees of luminosity of the same color (for instance, light red, red, and dark red) is agreeable, just as is the combination of two next-related colors which in Ostwald's 24-part circle of colors have the distance of 2. Hence, according to Sterzinger, triads especially with the interval of 2 are strikingly pleasurable; and these color-forms are marked by a certain transposability. The basis of the harmonizing of two shades of a single color-quality or of two closely related colors, it has been urged, is that these colors, being either the setting off in light or a gradation of nuances of a basic color with which they are by nature identical, have thus not worked as different colors. Along with Brücke,⁷² who has tried to show that small, but overly-marked differences in color please the eye, Müller-Freienfels⁷³ has stressed that these small intervals are not to be considered as combinations in the true sense, but that a uniform, but merely varied apperception is present. In similar fashion, Lipps⁷⁴ points to his law of differentiation and differentiating subordination: two shades of yellow are all the more in harmony as that which is common to the two colors—the yellow chroma—operates as the identical ground-coloration which in the two colors seems differentiated, or determined according to different tendencies. Combinations of a basic (ground) color with neighboring mixed color are better to the extent that the common color steps forward as an identical basic color and the two colors are clearly separate nevertheless.

Now we have arrived at a discussion of why juxtapositions of colors are agreeable. The reasons have severally been called physiological and psychological, and these in turn have undergone different interpretations: autonomous aesthetic ones (for instance, by tracing the agreeableness back to the principle of unity in multiplicity) and ethical-metaphysical ones, in which there is appeal to the fundamental striving for totality. In answering the question of which more common factors the preference for strongly contrasting (complementary) color-combinations traces back to and finds its explanation in, Chevreul⁷⁵ and others have indicated that such combinings give mutual reinforcement to the colors in their saturation—something which has a particular aesthetic virtue as its result. The psychophysical facts are well known. If one looks at a bluish-green circle

on a red background, the red is much more saturated (richer) within the sphere of the circle, just as is the green in proximity to the red background. One actually has the impression that both colors are lighted up at the boundaries. Such an increase of depth and richness can be explained as an increase in the unequivocal recognizability and impressiveness of the color in question. When stronger emphasis has been placed on physiological explanation, it has been said that the aesthetic effect of complementarity depends on the fact that in the cooperation of two complementary colors dissimulation and assimilation (that is, decomposition and reconstruction) in the seeing-substance are actually in balance. The decomposition of the yellow-blue substance through the influence of yellow, for example, is probably compensated for by the reconstruction of the same substance of sight which occurs as a consequence of the influence of blue. The aesthetic consequences of these correct physiological observations are nevertheless questionable, for it is not certain that really positive feeling-results are dependent on such compensations, particularly if these have to take place between spatially separated nerve-elements. Wundt⁷⁶ supposes that the contrast between the two colors reaches its maximum in their complementarity and enhances the effect of the feeling-tone of each of the two colors in an aesthetically favorable way. According to Ziehen's view, there may, besides this contrast, also be a peculiar complexibility in the relation of the two complementary colors "insofar as through the appearance of simultaneous and successive contrasts the combination of complementary colors has become familiar and is adequate to our expectations or our physiological disposition."

The naïve confidence of earlier aesthetics that as it stressed the relationship of physiological signs it had also supplied the explanation for the aesthetic state of affairs attached to it—this confidence asserts itself in Müller-Freienfels,⁷⁷ who attempts to derive the pleasure in the combining of complementary colors from the chemical events in the retina and from the demand for completion and totality which is satisfied by it. The law of totality quoted as favored for the explanation of the present subject goes back to Goethe's *Farbenlehre*. In terms of this principle the demand has been set up that the colors of a picture must be of such an assortment that if they were blended a neutral grey would result.⁷⁸

An attempt through psychological interpretation to save this totality-theory, at first understood and originating in physiological theory, is to be found in Theodor A. Meyer. According to him, the bases for the pleasantness of certain color-combinations lie in good

part on the other side of sensuous agreeability. They satisfy form-requirements of the higher sort; they meet that demand of our mind for uniformity and clarity of understanding, as well as for multiplicity of idea. Degrees of luminosity of the same color which are juxtaposed and also the colors of small intervals as they are juxtaposed make it possible for one comfortably to see them together as a unity. Complementary colors and what is closely related to them allow a particularly easy and sure discrimination of colors and therefore favor the clear perception of their color-character. They mutually enhance their color-type and urge it on intensively, but at the same time precisely through contrast are bound together and made one. Thus there are effects here which depend, not primarily on a pleasant stimulation of the nerves of sight, but on the satisfaction of high requirements of form. But if complementary colors and the triadic juxtaposition of three basic colors or of the three blended colors of the first order (violet, orange, green) delight us through an especially agreeable harmony, then this harmony in the colors clearly differentiated can trace back only to physiological bases. In the complementary colors are always included the three primary colors, which are also made one in the triad. Thus these groupings of colors encompass the entire circle of colors and meet in the most direct way possible the predisposition of our eyes which causes us to look for totality in color-sensation. For our nerves of sight these groupings make up the most complete and most intensive, and at the same time the most pleasant of stimuli. But to the extent that they beget the feeling of harmony they give occasion for the perceiving of colors not merely as sensuously agreeable stimuli, but as unity too. The higher form-impulse of unity here rests on a physiological base.

But Lipps decisively rejects the physiological theory of the pleasantness of complementary contrasts.

In the section on "The Agreeableness of Large Contrasts" he says that the tracing of mentioned combinations back to physiological contrasts of colors is an "explanation to be rejected": the explanation holds that complementary colors, when they work upon adjoining parts of the retina make themselves mutually more brilliant than if each of these colors were seen by itself alone. This physiological intensification is supposed to be the reason for the pleasantness resulting from the placing of two colors next to each other. But, according to Lipps, this clearly does not apply. For if it did, the juxtaposition of two colors would always have to be agreeable if both have a certain luminosity. This not being the case, however, we must compensate for the physiological theory with a psy-

chological one. The feeling of pleasure one has in a certain combination of colors—of blue and yellow, for example—lies in the fact that the sensation of yellow and that of blue come together. The sensations must enter the mind in a certain relation to each other. This happens because the sense-events have something in common which at the same time is differentiated. Thus the most favorable case for a pleasurable sensation occurs when objects are in contrast to one another and at the same time have a common element which differentiates itself precisely within this contrast. The principle of the differentiation of something held in common is the supreme principle of pleasurable sensation. It is evident that yellow and blue are in contrast. But they also have something in common, and this to begin with lies first in the fact that in both cases one finds a bright color, and then in the fact of the peculiarity of the feeling-experience one has when he sees both colors at the same time and when the immediate feeling of an inner relation in the two colors takes place. As with the consonance of tones, a person considering a harmony of colors has the feeling of accord or harmonizing which is based on the fact that in the sensations of consonant tones there is to be found a common element that comes to the fore when the two tones are combined. Physiological theory had asserted that pleasure caused by a combination of blue and green takes place because the colors reciprocally enhance each other; as they are juxtaposed, the blue becomes bluer and the yellow more yellow; this would mean a qualitative separation of the colors. As a matter of fact, such a thing does occur in sensation, but not in our feeling, for which these two colors as they are juxtaposed are not further separated from each other, but seem brought more closely together, bound together by something they have in common; they are therefore made one. "In this combination, yellow is no longer the clear, gay, easy-going, and at the same time somewhat impudent yellow; blue is no longer the quiet, serious blue; but both unite in a joyous seriousness which is 'yellow-and-blue'; face to face with the totality made up of both, I have a feeling of uniformity; I sense and am struck by an identical mode of being which nevertheless includes a complete antithesis at the same time."

To this the following could be added: like the single color, a combination of colors too is the expression of peculiar moods. For my total experience the agreeable combining of colors is a unitary mode of a far-reaching participation in inner life and at the same time a way of differentiating that participation according to qualitatively opposed tendencies. And here Lipps appeals to a universal

principle of psychic totality or of an antithesis which is internally complementary, to a requirement of the psyche that it enjoy itself to the full as a totality or as a unity in just this antithetical kind of participation. In each separate individual there is a yearning through sympathetic experience to supplement the one-sided manner in which he carries on his own life with an opposite mode of being here and now and of personal activity. This means not the suspension of what is one's own, but its completion, and thus the unifying in an original unitary way of the antithesis felt.⁷⁹ According to Lipps, this law of totality or of the completion of the unitary personality by way of antithesis is the most serious reason for the agreeableness of beautiful combinations of color.

Many of these descriptions of experience can be called correct despite their hazardous and hard-pressed metaphorical character.⁸⁰ Still I do not believe that it is necessary to reverse the physiological facts, as Lipps does.⁸¹ Naturally it is true that colors are in physical contrast, and one cannot dispute the value of this explanation. It is only when it is represented as a literal explanation which is adequate on its own that it should be rejected. But if one succeeds in finding a path and a bridge from physiological-optical phenomena to corresponding psychic experiences—to transform the physiological categories, so to speak, into psychological ones—then no objection can be raised. In any case, the fact is that a certain complexibility (a mark of distinction in perception) belongs to a complete or approximate contrast of complements, that the matter in question here is a form-relationship which is decisive, pronounced, and therefore easy and functionally pleasant in perception, and that complementary colors enhance each other and for just this reason are felt to be harmonic (that is, homogeneous and in some way directed towards each other).

Furthermore, the assertion that a genuine experience of color-harmonies is possible only if the aesthetic attitude has reached a certain degree of maturity and development carries weight. In ontologically and phylogenetically primitive stages of development the "isolating" manner of comprehension outweighs the "complexive" one on the basis of which genuine experiences of color are possible to begin with and which therefore is the one which alone is proper for experience of coloristic form. Children and savages who are still not mature enough to understand coloristic forms sense separately each of the two colors which are in a color-juxtaposition and later add up the evaluations. They say to themselves that yellow is beautiful and that so is green; therefore they are pleased by a

combination of the two colors which anyone who can really feel them "together" finds to be unpleasant. This difference between a merely isolating and a more complexive mode of perception seems to be traced back to if one sees, first, primitive times and people as favoring the complete contrast of complements because of their preference for dazzling colors and juxtapositions of glaring colors, and, then, more differentiated epochs, which alone are capable of truly seeing form, as preferring the more approximate and thus the modified contrast. Thus Wundt⁸² says that to represent complementary contrast as the most agreeable relation of color, one begins with the color-contrast which, when stared at intently, is effective in its own simultaneous form at its most pure and which at the same time least distorts the individual effects of the colors. Here the chief emphasis is on the strongest accent of every single color and, as a consequence, also of its feeling-tone. Nevertheless, when one finds the highest degree of pleasurable effect not in a complementary relation, but in the juxtaposition of colors lying less far from one another, the combination as such, and relatively independently of the feeling-tones of separate colors which are present, determines the aesthetic feeling, which, according to Wundt, only here appeals to us in the genuine sense as a feeling of harmony. In this case the sense of color-harmony is a total feeling into which the color-feelings enter as harmony-feelings which we may not for this reason think of as a mere adding up of the separate color-feelings.

Sterzinger in his discussion of the "Visual Forms of Color-Harmonies" too proceeds from similar considerations. Primitive or archaic art shows that, to begin with, joy in the beauty of individual colors was the reason for their being used. But then the regular alternation between red and blue as is found, for example, in the clothes of females, on ancient Attic friezes shows that a color-combination was chosen for the purpose of increasing pleasure in color and that the combination was not at the same time being singled out. Colors which were simply liked were placed next to one another. This was a duality of color in the sense that two beautiful things give more pleasure than does only one; in the psychological view this does not go beyond a summation (an "add-sum") by addition (*Undsumme*). Color-combinations can be called really harmonious only when the desired pleasant stimulus springs directly from the cooperation of the two colors.

Among these combinations, Sterzinger distinguishes four groups. The first is realized where pleasure in a color-combination traces back to objective connections or laws between colors. Here belong

cases of physiological color-contrasts, of complementary relationships, and of many others. The second group of color-harmonies Sterzinger calls harmony on the basis of a feeling-tone which the colors have in common. A pure blue and a white harmonize into the feeling-tone which is cheerful and clear, red and black into one which is exotic. In the third group of color-harmonies, the harmonic impression goes back to the coloristic trend determined by a leading color. A characteristic example of this is possibly the brown-violet which predominates in Feuerbach's picture, "Roman Mother with Children." In the fourth group are combined the cases in which air and the lights of the atmosphere make up the unifying and harmonizing medium. These typical and quite frequent cases of color-harmonies do not yet exhaust the total of all color-forms. There are combinations of colors which call up in the apprehender an original feeling-tone which does not belong to either of the two colors. According to Sterzinger, this must be a feeling-tone which traces back to a new color-form occurring by way of juxtaposition. But now our discussion has left behind the concerns of elementary aesthetics and color-psychology and entered those of the optics of painting, which is a very complicated subject. For our purposes, it is enough to stress the fact that these form-effects are possible only in apprehenders who have the capacity for coloristic experiences of the highest order, an order which consequently exhibits pronounced excellence in coloristic form.

Let me briefly say something additional about the higher principles of form as regards color-combinations. Up to now, I have spoken chiefly about colors of two tones. But there are also those of three tones (triads or triple combinations) which have their special laws. It has been said that as a principle of such combinations, the relationship of the first and second colors may not be closer than that between the second and third or than that between first and third: Otherwise one of the colors would appear as entirely too powerful and the other two would have to be seen as a pair.⁸³

I must also mention briefly the noteworthy result of the experiments of Meumann⁸⁴ that even unpleasant combinations of two colors can work propitiously when a properly selected color is placed between them on a narrow ribbon (an intervening color). Furthermore, there is the matter of the influence of the spatial form and dimension in which isolated colors and color-combinations are presented. Even unpleasant combinations become agreeable if a person uncovers one to make the other smaller. Stripes on the edgings and pipings on clothes where the large surfaces are differently colored

are therefore under quite different conditions of effect than are surfaces of different colors which are of equal size.

The basic aesthetic effects of isolated colors and of color-combinations can be modified by certain transforming factors and can even be put off their courses. These factors are the higher formal demands, familiarity and blunting, statements by authorities, ideas of what is normal, and other associative aspects (practical aims, use), and, above all, the aspect of copying. A color embedded in thing-relationships and in the requirements of objects operates in a fashion entirely different from that of one which is not copied and not objective. The most luminous and most saturated color of the spectrum is not delightful when it is where it does not belong: in a naturalistic picture, for instance, which works with muddy, dreary, and dirty colors. I still remember the vivid displeasure I received from a canary-yellow swallow I saw on an embroidered "God Bless Our Home." One could not object to the yellow itself; the color was beyond reproach; but in this place it was unpleasant because it contradicted the idea of what is normal: swallows are never yellow. Colors too must be true to nature unless the painter has not known how he can make plausible his antinaturalistic formation-bent as regards color. Certain colors which make a marked impression in a woman's dress would be impossible in a man's suit. The color-combination yellow and green is intrinsically disagreeable in effect, but the rich yellow of a tea-rose in relation to the dark chlorophyll of its leaf makes a thoroughly agreeable impression. In the same way, such combinations as appear in heraldic armorial bearings and national colors are under quite special conditions of effect because of the laws of familiarity and association.

What about objective (that is, copied) colors and color-values in a context of form which represents things? To begin with, they are under original and peculiar conditions-as-a-whole. If the colors are those of things, if they appear in objects of nature (or in copies of them), "then the object in its aesthetic effect concurs with that which the colors would effect by themselves, the object to which they belong (that is, the life-context in which they belong)." ⁸⁵ The colors are the sharers of a certain law in concrete form and life by whose structures they are co-determined. And thus the significance which the colors would achieve by themselves disappears in favor of a significance they take on as bearers of a certain conditioned life in things. If it convincingly achieves the coloristic appearances of an actual state of affairs, the color which is intrinsically most unpleasant can in a picture become pleasant for a

person who has a realistic attitude. To make a true-to-life reproduction of the color-impression of a mound of hay one must use a dull grey-green which occurs in the blending of green and red, and this poor color is more agreeable in the context of a realistic landscape than the most luminous green of the spectrum could be. The Expressionist Franz Marc has painted luminous blue horses and radiantly yellow cows, and primitive people represented a leopard with two red and two white legs; in both cases the relation of the colors to reality was sacrificed to the intrinsic ornamental effect of color, but in each case the charm of finding reality in the color was given up. How a painter must begin if with the colors he uses he is to achieve a high degree of truth to reality; whether he is to paint with "local" colors or in the impressionistic manner with "fictitious" colors; whether he should draw the colors in a dispersed or a pointillistic-divisionistic way and give up the mixture desired by the retina of the on-looker: these are questions which are of less concern to general aesthetics than to the special theory of the art of painting.

Associations and familiarity, practical experiences with things, and ideas of the norm which grow out of such experiences: all play a decisive role in connection with the colors of things. The dirty grey of elephants and donkeys is not intrinsically an agreeable color; in spite of this, one accepts it without a feeling of displeasure. If they are not to bring about a marked shock of unfamiliarity, colors which are repeatedly met with in specific objects and which consequently are felt as if they have to be and as if they must belong where they are—these need not be improved by the painter. Thus bad colors can be justified objectively, as, conversely, colors which are excellent in themselves can undergo devaluation in objects. The colored patches on the buttocks of many kinds of apes, the baboon, and the mandrill, seem repulsive to us despite the beauty of their blueness and redness. The intrinsic effect of a color comes again into play only where one and the same object can have a number of colors, as is true of roses, in which white, pink, light and dark red, and yellow can enter into the normal idea of this flower. In such cases those colors are pleasant which would be pleasant independently also, say, as are colors of the spectrum.

In what has gone before, I have repeatedly given close attention to the relations between colors and tones for the purpose of their mutual illumination. Such indications, as for instance those found in the concept of color-"harmony," may be applied linguistically and at first approach also as if scientifically proven; but in the

end one must give close attention to the metaphorism here present if it is not to destroy its own explanatory value and cause confusion by way of hard-driving analogy. But above all one must not forget that, despite certain agreements between them, there is no inner connection between perceptions of tone and color. By revealing what their elements are, G. Révész^{85a} has shown what it is that is constitutive of the perception of tone and lacking in the sphere of optical apprehension.

Tones sounding together or in succession result in tonal forms which manifest themselves primarily as chords and intervals. These tonal forms are fixed, constant, transposable relations of tone to which certain mathematical and acoustical laws correspond and which can be organized into a rational system. In connection with colors such structures can be identified as approximations at most; to speak even of forms is possible here only in the wider sense. Another difference lies in the fact that two or more colors blend into one color, whereas tones presented at the same time do not do this. Through blending, a color takes place which lies between two colors, a color in which the components can no longer be found. But if a person sounds two or more tones at the same time, he perceives not a blended tone, but two or more sounds, and thus a tonal structure of a complex character. Although sounds occurring together create musical unities, tones (with the exception of the octave) do not blend in the full sense as do optical things; single tones can be heard more or less clearly from out of their totality. Red and yellow produce orange as an unanalyzable oneness; two tones, on the other hand, create an analyzable dual sound. Only in the exception of pathological cases does a so-called binaural blend take place. Phenomena of consonance and dissonance are related in a full and proper sense exclusively to the musical-acoustical realm. Color-harmony, so-called, is an aesthetic experience which has only certain analogies with perceptual harmony in the realm of music. A further difference between the optical and the acoustical is evident in the way the sensation-systems of both senses are built. The tonal system is characterized, among other things, by the limiting of tonal qualities to the octave. Every tone in this periodic system has the same system-forming significance, and for this reason the octave-system can be erected on any tone at all as its base. No single tone is able to capture a particular place for itself in the series of tones; any tone one selects can be either the beginning or the end-point of the tonal series, and it can just as easily be the middle member of it. In contrast with this is the psychologically

funded system of colors as determined by the so-called primary or basic colors, from whose combination the rest of the color-qualities are derived. Thus the primary colors take a particular position in the phenomenal color-system; they are as it were the vertical points and the corner pillars which support the entire system of colors and arrange among themselves the colors got by way of blending. Just as in the series of colors there is complete lack of analogy with the phenomenon of the octave, so in the tonal series there is a complete lack of any kind of analogue with the natural primary colors. In the tonal series there are no designated points which could validly be the ground-pillars of the tonal system. The normal tone a^1 is selected in a way that is quite arbitrary. Finally, one must point out that color-impressions as components of spatial structures have the function of shaping space, whereas tones have no such function. Perceptible space is built up exclusively of optical and haptic-tactile elements.^{85b}

It is with respect to this last problem that interpretations do indeed divide. Many music aestheticians think that the analogies between the musical-acoustical and the spatial spheres are so fundamental that they believe themselves compelled to abide by them. Expressions derived from the sphere of space are used constantly. One speaks of "tectonic" organization, "colorful" harmony, "the concealing of the outline," and so forth. Thus the expression "tonal space" is also used not only in a metaphorical and unliteral sense, but, instead, quite directly to indicate a deeper fundamental unity with the space of seeing and touching. Even when it seems clear that the word "space" interpreted in its proper way must mean the important matter belonging to the sphere of the optical, the tactile, and the sense of bodily motion, the use of the expression "tonal space" seems not only permitted by many theorists, but even to be illuminative for certain relationships under investigation. From this sense of space which asserts itself in the shaping of "tonal space," W. Riezler tries to derive certain basic concepts and ultimate categorical possibilities for the mastery of fundamental musical problems. And H. Friedmann goes even further when he grants optical and haptic qualities to musical space also: In music an optical-morphological space runs alongside a haptic-dynamic one. The ability of sound to increase and swell goes back to the former, and the construction of motifs is effected by the latter. For listeners of music, ideas of space occur, to begin with, on the basis of the sensation of the difference between "higher" and "lower." Purely musically, the idea of "pitch" becomes spatial in effect according to

two tendencies: In melody it is horizontal (a series of tones of different pitch sounding in succession), and in harmony it is vertical (tones of different pitches occurring simultaneously). M. Schneider, attempting to go beyond these characteristics lying, so to speak, on the same plane, points to a "hearing in spatial depth" (*Raum-tiefen hören*) in music, an acoustical counterpart to perspective, a representation of depth, a hearing in depth in terms of another level, a distinguishing of a near and a far, the sensation of sounds occurring behind one another—not only as a mere echo, but as a representation of foreground and background.^{85c}

These connections are really fruitful for the aesthetic experiencing of optical and acoustical qualities, which is indeed something basically different from the analytical-abstractive contemplation of the physicist and the psychologist. To show them is to describe something very important in the complex state of affairs which is aesthetic experience.

c.¹ *Surface Forms (Linear Structures, Figures)*. Let us begin this section with a discussion of abstract-nonobjective pure geometrical lines and figural surface forms (that is, those not imitative or suggestive of things) which are understood as lines only and of two-dimensional forms of the abstract kind "in which it is not the forms of natural objects as they meet us directly that are reproduced."⁸⁶ In opposition to reproduced objects it is freely created forms with which we have to do here. These forms work through the character which is theirs alone and through a vigorous play of power present in them for personality-apperception and empathy; thus they are not experienced as signs of perceptible things. One must say a bit more about the problem created by this clear division, which is a violent one no doubt, and, at least at one's point of departure, must be kept in mind for theoretical-didactic reasons if investigation and presentation are to be facilitated.

The most elementary of the givenesses to be mentioned in this context is the line. It is not very easy to decide whether simple straight lines which are not a part of any formal relation are able to exercise an aesthetic effect. The pleasantness of one of them is at any rate so weak that it can hardly cross the threshold of indifference. Still, approximations of aesthetic effect are reached when the straight line fulfills the principle of form (yet to be discussed) of decisiveness and terseness (*Prägnanz*), when it is drawn clean and clear and satisfies the requirements of a personal statics and dynamics, when, clearly upright, or restfully horizontal, or in certain oblique positions, it appears to contain vigorous movement and therefore

expresses a certain empathic play of power. Lipps considers straight lines an example of regular forms which are beautiful because of their regularity: A circumference has a favorable aesthetic effect by virtue of the proportional varying of its over-all direction: similarly, the straight line has this by virtue of the sameness of direction. The fact that lines which do not, like an outline, reproduce concrete objective phenomena in imitations which allude to or are true to them, and which are not even amalgamated with the labeled forms of geometrical surface-figures (circles, ellipses, triangles, squares, and so forth) are capable of a certain aesthetic effect—this is demonstrated by the Hogarthian beautiful line, by certain curves as they play a role in architecture and handicraft-work and also in bridge-building and other engineering constructions.

As was just indicated, the English painter Hogarth⁸⁷ concerned himself with questions of the aesthetic effect of linear structures and thus of the beauty of lines. He believed he had discovered a beautiful line which has to achieve the highest reaches of agreeableness. This is the curved ("waving") line in the form of the S which takes the harmoniously mean position between a curve which is too shallow and one which is too decisive. Among modern aestheticians who have viewed this problem from a more basic point of view, I should like to mention Ziehen. He believes that the sensation-factor of steadiness found in the spatial-optical realm is the reason for the agreeableness of certain curves, though he has to admit that aesthetic preferences in this realm cannot (as yet) be explained sufficiently on the basis of the principle of steadiness and mathematical law.

Generally, small leap-like changes of the measurement of the bend of a curve are negatively accented as to feeling, while sudden vigorous changes—namely, the so-called "apexes" of analytical geometry and differential calculus—are allied quite readily to a positive feeling-tone, particularly in connection with a symmetrical arrangement. Worthy of further mention is the agreeableness of curves which have a so-called turning-point; here belong most S-formed curves. The steady change from the concave curve, for example, to a convex one could be of significance. But in no case can mathematical law alone be seen as an indispensable and sufficient condition for aesthetic agreeableness. The equation for the hyperbola and the parabola is just as simple as that for the ellipsis, but yet the accentuation of aesthetic feeling of the first two retreats far behind that of the last one. Nor is the uncompactness of the parabola and the hyperbola the reason; for a difference in feeling-tone still con-

tinues to exist when we compare the hyperbola or hyperbelast with a half-ellipse or a semicircle. On the other hand, there are many curves having many more complicated formulas which have a markedly positive aesthetic accent: thus the one half of a hyperbola (lemniscate) with the formula $(x^2 + y^2)^2 = a^2(x^2 - y^2)$, the *folium cartesii*: $x^3 + y^3 - 3axy = 0$, and the astroid often realized in ornamentation: $x = a \cos^2 t$, $y = d \sin^3 t$.

The basic notion that the aesthetic agreeableness of curves cannot be derived from their mathematical law is important. A comparison of the effects of sine-lines, cycloids, and epicycloids (including, possibly, the cardioid when it passes as the formation of the heart) teaches this; but so do experiments which show that an increase in geometrical regularity does not necessarily mean an increase in positive aesthetic effect. What causes the beautiful impression of a line is not its geometrical regularity, but its conformity to law, so that it can be grasped in terms of an aesthetic-personal mechanics and dynamics. To make this clear, Lipps presents a simple experiment.

For the evident agreeableness of the wavy line, one could point to the equality between each upward curve and every other upward curve, and between each downward curve with every other one; and to the symmetry of upward and downward curves and the symmetry of each upward and downward curve in itself. But one can add to these elements of geometrical regularity. One can give each upward and each downward curve the form of a semicircle; thus he can allow them to alternate as open semicircles into one another downward and upward. Now a new element of the same kind has been added to the already existing elements having geometrical regularity, and this is the constant curving of each of the semicircles. But the result aesthetically speaking is a completely impossible line. It is aesthetically impossible because it is mechanically impossible. The motion in each of the semicircles, once it is begun, goes uniformly onward (that is, the semicircle completes itself as a circle). Moreover, such a motion cannot intrinsically change by itself over into a curve going in an opposite direction. On the other hand, the wavy line does have a uniform mechanical legitimacy: a motion progressing rectilinearly is tied with an elastic oscillation in the added perpendicular direction. In every case the motion upwards has an elastic opposition with itself which at a point brings the motion upwards to a standstill and from then on causes a similar motion downwards. Thus we see that a uniformly mechanical law which seems to produce a line makes it agreeable even if the result

of this mechanical legality is not geometrically regular, but actually suspends geometrical regularity. Inversely, geometrical regularity is unpleasant if it denies mechanical law, which is the decisive factor. Geometrical regularity has aesthetic meaning insofar as it expresses mechanical law.

By opposing geometrical and aesthetic (mechanical) space-experiences Lipps throws all of his discussions of spatial aesthetics out of gear. Carrying further his train of thought, I have indicated that linear forms (figural ones on a plane and stereometric physical ones too) are experienced in a fundamentally different way in aesthetic contemplation than in that of geometry. Geometrical and aesthetic modes of contemplation of linear and other structures are in sharp contrast to one another; the one is impersonal, as is in keeping with things, and quantitative; the other is an apperceptive (empathizing) of personality and is qualitative. Even the seeing-event as such is something basically other in terms of its physiological-optical and psychological side than the mechanical registering of an image of the outer world by a photographic plate. As the opposite of the apparatus of a photographer, the field of human sight is not a passive juxtaposition merely "taken up" (*aufgenommen*), but a field of active power which orders and evaluates the sight-impression in a thoroughly individual manner. It is important for the aesthetic experience of linear and other such forms that aesthetic perspective not be identical with the geometrical one. We shall begin with an example of a practice which already reaches beyond a pure aesthetics of line, but which, to be sure, is of fundamental significance even for it.

An architect working on the aesthetics of bridge-building⁸⁸ has published a picture of an iron bridge whose outer appearance does not please him. Taken from too close, the picture of the bridge shows unnatural distortions. The author makes the following remarks about it: "People will probably object that the picture was taken from a position quite unfavorable to the total appearance. But one can give only a qualified significance to this objection. As a matter of fact, the bridge does look this way, and a good structure must be artistically satisfying as it is seen from any point of view." This notion is incorrect, as one construction-engineer who is concerned with the interests of iron-constructors emphatically points out. The human eye sees differently than does the objectivity of the photograph; the physiological seeing-event, to begin with, but, even more, the aesthetic seeing-event which depends on it, is to be distinguished from the optical work of the camera. The bridge would thus have

been seen in a distorted fashion only (as is the case in the picture) when a person consciously began to measure it with his eyes. "Otherwise something is blended with our seeing which escapes the camera: namely, the sense of the true relationship of size based on our experience. If someone extends his hand to us from the very closest position possible, we do not really sense it as larger than his head despite what the photograph or mensuration would reveal this relationship to be, but always as smaller, in conformity with the *de facto* relationship. A person ten meters away from us on the street does not appear half as large as a person of the same size who is only five meters away. One senses them as being of equal size. Only when the distances are greatly different does perspective operate immediately, but always in strict diminution. . . . One can place two similar objects, two books, for instance, in such a way that the smaller is nearer to us and the larger further off. Everyone seeing them directly will immediately confirm that the book further off is the larger despite its smaller appearance in perspective. On a photograph or even on the focussing screen of the camera, this relationship is not confirmed. There the nearer book seems larger without question. . . . Every photographer has felt disappointment at discovering that the object further off, a tower or a mountain which looks very majestic to the unconfined view, seems quite small on his plate. With our free eyes we always exaggerate the apparent size of objects at a distance because we always feel something of their true size. For this reason even the objects contemplated with unconfined eyes are far less distorted in perspective than they are on a photograph when they are taken from the same position." 89

I have intentionally let this technician speak in detail because he approaches a problem without a theoretical prepossession. This is a problem which the psychologist knows well, that of the constancy of things. By this one means a state of affairs which are also very important for the aesthetics of line, that of the comparative similarity of the subjective perception of things seen under changing objective conditions, such as distance, illumination, and so forth. It is absolutely not true that the size of an object given only in intuition decreases for us to the same extent as it goes farther away as does the size of its picture in the retina; instead, we see the thing (at least within a certain sphere which we call orthoscopic) as of the same size. Geometrical and aesthetic perspectives (and the physiological-optical one too) do not coincide, for the imperfect optical apparatus of our eye sees the spatial shaping of the outer

world differently from what geometry as it presents it claims to do.

"Seen space—that is, space as it is seen in fact—is not equivalent to so-called true, Euclidian space. If we are given the task of placing in a dark room two rows of small flames so that they run exactly parallel and thus make an alley, and then of looking at our work by daylight and from another standpoint, we will see that we have placed the flames, not in two separately straight lines, but in two curves which turn convexly towards the median. If a painter or artist in representing nature does not hold to things as he sees them, but, instead, as he knows they are and as they must be presented according to the rules of perspective, his pictures or his drawings will not have the highest degree of naturalness, but will seem to be outlined."⁹⁰ There are plenty of examples in Dutch interior-pieces.

The unconscious coercive transposition, which is shown in the experiment just mentioned, of making straight lines into slightly curved ones, suggests the conjecture that such curved lines have a certain physiological distinction in preference to the straight ones. There follows the further question of whether the preference for the curved line over the straight ones extends also to a certain aesthetic character which could be explained in functional terms. As a matter of fact, Meyer has said yes to this question, and his theory goes thus:

The seeing-event by which we grasp linear structures takes place, among other things, as the eye moves from one point of the contemplated object to another. Because we see clearly only that which we take in at the point of vision of our eyes, we are under the necessity of bringing one point after another into the focus of vision and in this way traversing the object with the eye. This activity of perception is pleasant when the paths which the object leads the eye to traverse require an easily realized motion of it. The eye glides along the lines presented by the object. In doing so it brings along its natural disposition of the motion-apparatus, "so that a line rambling between two points is more comfortably followed than is a shorter straight line or a sharply disjointed zig-zagging one. In this respect the eye is under the same stipulations as are the motions of our bodies—for example, the movements of our arms which are more comfortable when they describe a swinging line than a straight or a disjointed motion. The only exceptions are horizontals and verticals; yet they are the most easily traversed if one moves his head freely from the left to right and from above downward, or the reverse."

Dessoir recognizes the physiological fact considered here, but vigorously denies the aesthetic consequences of it.

To traverse the stretch between two points, the eye does not choose the shortest way, but describes a slightly bent curved line. On this fact Dessoir bases the proposition that such curved lines wherever they appear constantly in art and nature are marked by a particularly pleasant sensation because they conform to the naturally unforced movement of the eye. For the same reason it is clear that we do not see long, especially horizontal, lines as entirely straight. A horizontal which lies above the point of vision appears to be slightly bent towards the bottom; if it on the whole lies below the point of vision, it seems to be slightly rising. This one notices the most readily when the lines of the façade of a house are made prominent by illumination; then the optical impression of curving is so strong that even the knowledge that the lines are straight cannot prevail against it. Yet the aesthetic preference for curved lines cannot be derived from this fact. If it were, straight lines would have to be avoided in large objects and would be used only in small ones. In fact, architecture prefers to make use of long straight lines, and curves are used in ceramics. Thus such optical illusions like these can be of no influence on pleasure. The formal beauty of outlines does not let itself be known by reason of the natural motion of the eye. Rectangular joints, which are supposed to run completely counter to the wanderings of spontaneous vision, can operate agreeably on a large as well as on a small scale.

I myself should not have been so completely confident and definite as Dessoir in making these rejections. For it is still certain that in very significant architectural works of great monumentality straight lines are avoided and replaced by curved ones so that linear rigidity is taken away from a building. The curvatures of the Parthenon are the most famous examples of this. In numerous baroque buildings there is something similar, and the *Bankvereinsgebäude* in Vienna is a modern example of this practice.

If Theodor A. Meyer intercedes for the aesthetic preference of curved lines over straight ones and Dessoir thinks they are equal in value, Müller-Freienfels⁹¹ decides for the superiority of straight lines, to be sure for somewhat different reasons, and, besides, only for the kind of attitude which he contrasts as pure perception (contemplation) with the empathic (reactive) state.

The forms which pure perception meets are under the dominance of a certain tendency in composition: the reduction of the motif to the greatest possible unity. This simplification takes place

in, among other things, a reduction of rounded forms to those of straight lines. Those impressions are the most highly valued which effect a maximum of experience with a minimum of psychic effort. Therein lies the charm of the structuring of a plane surface by means of a few simple lines. And to this principle is attached the preference for straight lines over curved ones. Even if some curved lines (circles, semicircles, and so forth) too are no more difficult to apperceive than triangles and squares (Müller-Freienfels seems not to have known the pervading opinion of physiologists that they are far easier to grasp), a greater number of curved lines would not be so easily used in the structuring of surfaces. Straight lines can be brought into clear and simple relations which help the mind perceive them as a unity. In contract to this, the kind of aesthetic apperception called empathy appears more in connection with curved lines. Here the compensatory principle of paralleleity is not so much required as is usual for perception. This kind of experience has, instead of a preference for a right angle, an inclination towards pliant curves.

Making this aside into the typological, Müller-Freienfels settles his problem as superficially as he does it hastily. One can "feel himself" into angular and broken lines too, and pure intuition is accomplished more easily with curved lines. The typological problem lies in this: apart from the mode of aesthetic apperception, there are different degrees of excellence of contour and line on the one hand and of the removal of contours and the abolishing of outlines through the dissolving and the denying of them by color- and light-values on the other; these types appear in connection with the creators of art as well as with people who enjoy it, and Wölfflin⁹² has referred to them with his duality of basic concepts, the "linear" and the "painterly." In a chapter * about differential aesthetics⁹³ I shall speak in some detail about this distinction, which, as seen in terms of the results of modern psychology of types, goes back to the factors of our natural human tendencies and temperament which are our innermost secrets.

The aesthetic preference for curved lines can hardly be explained satisfactorily by an appeal to the role of easily successful eye-movements as one finds pleasure in seeing. I believe that easiness, comfortableness, and, along with these, agreeableness of eye-movements are only of little importance in the aesthetic enjoyment of linear structures and figural structures on a plane. Dessoir rejects the idea even more vigorously.

* A subject promised for discussion in Volume II. (H.M.S.)

From architectural works we require an organization of space in which the eye finds its way easily and surely. But this work of orientation as the eye carries it out is not identical with comfortable-ness of eye-movements. If it were, every vertical line would be uglier than a horizontal one, and a right-angled perpendicular must be considerably far behind a wavy line in aesthetic value. But this is not the case, and it therefore seems well for us from the very first to disregard the effort of the movements of the eye. Moreover, the contemplator seldom follows a line point by point. Thus the beginning of such eye-movements as they make contact with objects could be located in the calculus of elementary aesthetics at most, which removes this question from the physiological sphere to the psychological one. Then the question concerns, not eye-movements as they are realized, but impulses towards attentiveness or towards perceptual activity.

If we set up as the first problem of an aesthetics of independent lines the question of how isolated lines are able to operate by themselves (thus not only without any interpretive associations, but also without their being embedded in the context of a form superior to them), the natural result is a quite violent theoretical abstraction. In aesthetic experience as it actually occurs, associative supplements are hardly ever entirely absent, and even less frequently does one come across linear givenesses which are not embedded in the context of a higher form. Nevertheless, it seems methodologically important at least briefly to indicate that it is possible for linear structures to create an effect in isolation (just as Ziehen in his experimental study of sections of lines and so forth induced his subjects to disregard all associations and embeddedness in structures), although naturally it is possible from the start to keep the discussion of linear aesthetics closer to life just because of the respective roles of association and embeddedness in forms.

We find this kind of thing in a section by Sterzinger on the aesthetics of the line. That a mere glance at lines can arouse pleasure is shown by the abundant use which is made of them as ornaments in the applied arts of architecture and handicrafts and in the composition of pictures. Anyone allowing his glance to rest on the façade of the cathedral in Ferrara finds it clear that the many rounded and pointed arches as well as the many straight columns are created for the purpose of ornament. The impression of the many straight and bent lines thrusts itself forward so much that the chief part of the total effect exercised by the façade on the observer comes from them. One can see the accumulated effect of straight lines especially

well in gothic churches. How beautiful, furthermore, is a well-wrought curve in a piece of furniture. Present-day art, which shows a certain inclination to bring isolated aesthetic factors into their own, creates tables, cupboards, and chairs which are quite plain and have no accessories; only a few spectators are able to avoid the effect which occurs as the lines are given full importance in this way.

Like colors, lines too have a mood-value which is never entirely absent from aesthetic contemplation even though it does not always stand out clearly. Lines rise and fall, they strive from one point to another, they expand and contract; in short, they are laden with latent activity and dynamism for aesthetic experience; they carry motions and forces which they do not have in scientific (say, geometrical) contemplation. The round arch-forms of the Renaissance as well as of all stylistic forms of the classically perfect style have something which is restful, compact, and satisfying, whereas the pointed arches of the gothic style and all of the vertical lines "striving" steeply upwards in the manner of infinity and endlessness seem to pierce with a never-satisfied longing into the transcendent.⁹⁴ Naturally, statements like these are metaphorical. But it is precisely in connection with the facts of aesthetic experience that they lose their figurative, unliteral character and turn into exceptionally acceptable designations: for aesthetic perception in which that which is spatially rigid is interpreted as having motion and life, lines have a peculiar dynamism which does not adhere to them in extra-aesthetic experience. Besides this, there is something basically different here from those associative contributions which can be present but which can also just as well be absent. What can be varied here is purely the degrees and the amounts of this living quality; but for the apperception of aesthetic personality, the line in all cases is the bearer of life, power, and motion. If empathy is to be accessible, abstract linear and figural structures in no way have to remind us directly of human-organic forms. For the aesthetic experience there is at least a vague deposit of dynamism and activity in abstract forms and in those depending on geometrical understanding; there works in them a peculiar intimate living quality which makes them aesthetically significant for us. Lipps too thinks it wrong to derive their aesthetic meaning from the mere comparison of spatial forms with the shapes of the human body. In Konrad Lange's statements about architectural forms,⁹⁵ there is an involuntary reducing to the absurd of the theory that isolated lines and figures remind us of the human-organic. But we shall break off our discussion because what Lipps has said in his several works about space-aesthetics and

in the two volumes of his *Aesthetics* about the mood-value and the feeling-effect of linear and figural structures can hardly be added to, not to say superseded. I shall therefore merely allude to his expositions and the basically more cautious and more general interpretation which I have given to the justifiable core of Lipps' work in my *Personalistic Aesthetics*.

It is only in exceptional cases that lines appear in isolation. Normally, they are continued into parts of figural forms, or they appear in association with other lines. Individual aesthetic effects adjoin such line-connections; as one speaks of color-harmony, so he also speaks about the relations or proportions of two or more lines which are said to be in harmony. That such form-experiences with linear givennesses appear decisively, that direct comparisons of proportion are carried out with great exactitude, that the sensitivity for proportions is more refined than measurement by the eye: these things have been shown experimentally by K. Bühler.⁹⁶ We shall next proceed with the scholar to whom we owe the most fundamental sort of investigation of color-harmony; we also have a work from him about the harmony of forms, a work which must be taken as a chapter of a comprehensive treatment of spatial harmony.⁹⁷

Among the forms which extend in one direction Ostwald distinguishes lines, braids, and ribbons; as a second category of the aesthetics of forms are *Massnahmen*, as he calls them (moving [*Schiebung*], twisting [*Drehung*], reflection [*Spiegelung*]), by means of which legally composed forms arise out of the givennesses of simple forms (formal elements). By moving (*Schiebung*) Ostwald means the form-principle of repetition and the forms and harmonic modes of proportional and symmetrical organization produced by this means. Twisting (*Drehung*) brings to the fore a new aspect of form, the angle. Simple lines dispose themselves according to different degrees of legitimacy as straightness, circularity, fixed lines, lines with a thrust (*Stoss*), with a sudden turn (*Knick*), with sudden transitions. Lines with a thrust are those with inconstant changes of direction. Wavy lines are an example of repeated forms as they take place through "moving." The best-known form of broken waves is the meandering pattern. Through the uniting of several lines into a linear whole there arises the form of plaits (*Flechten*), so called. Forms are called "ribbons" (*Bänder*) when they are developed in length, have a certain breadth, and are set with surface-patterns. Through the three form-producing *Massnahmen* and through combinations and variations of them (the change-

able moving and the reflecting of angles) there results a great multiplicity of forms.

Important for the aesthetic experience of form-harmony is the fact that a maximum of geometrical regularity does not carry a high degree of aesthetic satisfaction. If a certain formal unit repeats itself with absolute precision for a period of time, the result is hard, rigid, and lifeless. A marked intensification in aesthetic effect takes place as the forms are relaxed: that is, when there is brought into the repetition a certain though still somewhat legitimate alteration.

Where such repeated forms are extended in one direction, they merely fill a stripe. If one transfers them to a plane, then these stripes must be repeated legally, say, by "moving." Thus one arrives at unbounded patterns, whereas "twisting" and "reflection" can create finite (bounded) forms only. Nets are a significant kind of such forms. They come about when over a single band of lines there is laid a second at an angle; basic forms produced in this way are knots and meshes. Many a pretty pattern in which there is concealed a considerable number of laws is produced by square-cornered twistings and reflections. The great multiplicity of patterns is built on the following possibilities: the selection of the net, the selection of the closed form deriving from meshes (closed forms are those which fill the plane without leaving empty spaces), choices of line, the choice of the number of lines, the choice of the law of repetition, of reflection, and twisting, by which the legitimate distortion of the pattern creates further attractive changes.

Here too there is a general insight the full significance of which can be revealed only through a discussion of the laws of formal beauty but which must be mentioned now. A net made up of horizontal and vertical lines which are equal and arranged in equals is aesthetically almost indifferent. But something else is true if some changes are brought into it and multiplicity is produced: for instance, if a line is more tightly drawn at regular intervals or ingeniously slung lines are used instead of simple straight ones. A greater number of legalities works more pleasantly and seems more harmonious than a smaller number of them. It is the law of unity in multiplicity and that of multiplicity in unity which assert themselves here. Whenever one can see too easily through to the heart of the cohesion and structure of a certain complex form, the form becomes tiresome and uninteresting. Instead, only such combinations of lines are harmonically pleasant which take the correct median

position between simple plainness which is immediately monotonous and complicated difficulty.

Analogous patterns can be used for bounded planes as for the unbounded ones if the boundaries of the planes are not especially striking to the eye. Unbounded patterns, furthermore, can be used as an underground against which the essential ornamental forms can be laid. But further consideration would go beyond the problem of the harmony of lines.

When I discuss the principle of formal beauty, I shall speak in more detail about further questions which are central to the harmony of line (the most agreeable division of distances, linear organization, proportional and symmetrical organization, isodynamics and isobarism, the balancing of parts in linear compositions).

Now we shall turn towards the consideration of figural plane-forms, about which now and then I have already said some things in anticipation. The phenomenon which transfers us from line-combinations to plane figures is the angle. K. Bühler,⁹⁸ who has turned his attention not only to the curves of lines, linear proportions, and so forth, but also to angles as characteristic kinds of elementary form-impressions, was able to show that we are less sensitive to changes in angles than we are to changes in proportion. Nevertheless, the aesthetic value of the angle is not meagre; when one meets up with certain angle-structures, the apperception of personality and empathy give the decisive vote, for which reason angles have been used from the most ancient of times as ornamental motifs and as means of decoration for plane surfaces. When certain angles are called acute and obtuse or "right," something is meant of a personal dynamism and its qualities, under the sign of which we experience and judge them aesthetically. Certain angles work with advantage apart from associative complements and apart from all gains from experience because of an elementary legality of form which we carry in us as our fundamental possession. In the aesthetic experience of angles, too, emphatically to separate the intrinsic effect working directly as form from the feeling-values depending on association and empathy is hardly anything more than a forcibly cracking-open of a kind of experience which is more closely tied together on the basis of unity than it is torn apart on the basis of a duality. Sterzinger speaks of a feeling-value when the acute angle has something striving, importunate, hard, and unbalanced for our aesthetic experience; and when the right angle has something settled, solid, and sure; when the obtuse one is restful, protecting, balanced. In connection with values of the more associative kind he sees the

acute angle as piercing, the obtuse going downward as oppressive, and the right angle as stiff. It is possible that in such experiences personal practical knowledges do play a role, but this is not always definitely the case. In these terms, modern psychology (as I believe) has made a successful attempt to explain the formal distinction of a certain angle (above all, the right one) in terms of nativistic factors.⁹⁹ The experiments of the *Gestalt*-psychologists show clearly that phenomenally there is no angle either of 85 degrees or of 95 degrees, but that instead of these there are right ones that are too small or too large. Not even in the realm of angle-figuration can every geometrically possible figure one wants be phenomenally realized.

Phenomenal structures are distinctive structures. But what is the source of the label of the right angle? Not experience, which does present us with right angles continually, to be sure, and in great abundance; "but experience as the stock contents of things lived *de facto*, not as a kind of receptivity to sense stimuli. For a right angle is only in rare cases reflected as such on the retina in the frontal parallel fashion in which it appears; in all others cases its projection on the retina is oblique. Thus in an overwhelming number of cases the stimuli by themselves suggest crooked angles—although there are many objects composed of right angles. The fact that we see right angles too, every so often, does not explain that the right angle is phenomenally and functionally distinctive; but the second assertion explains the first. The frequent experience of the right angle depends on its label, not the reverse. . . . The fact that experience also works along in terms of aptitude for form cannot in any way be denied; only this experience is not an accidental appearance of any structure at all (so that, for instance, if it should happen that some period would ordinarily employ in all of its buildings and objects of use angles of 100 degrees in place of the distinction of the right angle, it would have merely that of a blunted one), but it is a confirmation of a natural reaction in and for itself of the optical system."

It is natural that aesthetic experiences of pure and abstract angle-diagrams should seldom occur; more frequent are the effects of such structures in relation to the features of the human body, to the organization of forms of things presented in architecture, to the symbolic language used in architecture and the handicrafts. Similarly, modern expressive dance employs structures of formally beautiful angles in the positions and motions realized by dancers. That there is a quite conscious artistic intention here derives clearly

from the fact that Laban¹⁰⁰ dovetails the living bodies of his students into the frame of a polyhedron (for instance, that of an icosahedron), and thus the carriage, the head, the torso, and the extremities must be gathered in so as to harmonize with the angle of incidence of the geometrical body. Mark well, however: this must not be slavishly done, for frequently the result of slavishness is an impression of stiffness: one often finds that it is just the angle (which, for instance, is created by the upper and lower arm together) which makes a certain gesture so agreeable. For this reason, therefore, the noble gesture of defense made by an actor representing the prison-keeper in Calderon's "Life is a Dream" (*Leben ein Traum*) once made a great impression on me. In striking cases like those just reported, the role of angle-figuration and its contribution to aesthetic experience can be determined from within by way of analysis. Meanwhile, the overwhelming majority of cases is unanalyzable and denies that any theory can crack them open, but the aesthetic effect of angle-aspects remaining below the threshold is strong nevertheless.

If the two members of an angle are connected by a line, a simple geometrical figure comes into being: the triangle, by which has been achieved a representative of the group, now to be examined more closely, of spatial-aesthetic givennesses; that is, of surface-figural structures of the abstract geometrical type. From the aesthetic point of view one can divide geometrical figures into those whose laws of form are constant and those whose laws of form are variable. Circles, squares, equal-sided hexagons and octagons can vary only in size, and their formal law remains always the same; ellipses, however, rectangles, and so forth, can look thin or thick, lengthened out or compressed, and in the triangle even an increase in regularity is possible: an equal-sided (equal-angled) triangle is more regular than one with unlike sides and angles. A person who draws a geometrical figure makes it out of regularly arranged or curved lines and angles; nevertheless, the figure once it is completed does not operate as a sum of such elements, but precisely as a form which, as concerns the parts of which it is built, governs a possibility of effect that is original with it and suitable only to it. If the line has something dependent and incomplete, and the angle something set-off, then the impression proper to figures is one of completeness, of something closed within itself and stable, of something bound well together, of the substantial and the independent. In connection with figures of the first group, aesthetic agreeableness depends merely on the avoidance of extreme proportions; but in connection

with figures of the second on the fact that their portions are good. Not every rectangle is pleasant, but only those whose sides are in a certain relation to each other, as in that called the Golden Section. Nor do all geometrical figures please us in the same way. Many are far too rational and simple; others which add more variety to the self-evident unity produce a happier effect. Thus for many perceivers an ellipse of certain proportions is more pleasant than a circle, a hexagon more than a square, a so-called six-point (*Sechsort*) better than the equilateral triangles which form it. But are geometrical figures really able to arouse an aesthetically pleasant sensation? The question is not undisputed: Kant, for instance, says no. Such figures produce, not an aesthetic, but only a rational pleasure. If a person attributes beauty to geometrically regular forms (the circle, the square), he is wrong; for appropriateness devoid of concept is constitutive for the impression of beauty, and one does not find this beauty precisely in connection with structures which are mere presentations of certain concepts.

"One hardly thinks it necessary for a person of taste to find more satisfaction in a circular form than in a scrawling sketch, more in an equal-sided and equal-angled square than in an oblique angle which is unequal as to sides and seemingly mutilated; for only a general understanding belongs to this result, and not taste at all." But an impression of beauty takes place only when the contemplated object summons us to a free and unconfined suitable entertainment of our mental powers. And where such a free play of the powers of mind must be maintained, all regularities which might seem forced should be avoided. "Everything stiff and regular (which approaches mathematical regularity) has something inimical to taste, so that it does not allow entertainment in the contemplation of it to continue for long, but, inasmuch as it is not knowledge expressly or does not have practical aim as its intention, it causes ennui. The opposite takes place when the power of imagination can play naturally and appropriately in a new way for us each time; then one does not become weary of looking at it." At this point Kant turns towards the assertion of the Englishman Marsden, who said that when one is on a voyage of discovery, the wild beauty of tropical virgin forests becomes wearisome and that only the regular avenues of pepper-gardens offer us much attraction. He would have had to stay (says Kant) in such a garden for only one day "to perceive that when his mind because of the regularity has shifted into a disposition for the orderliness which it requires everywhere, the object no longer supports it; instead, it puts a tedious restraint upon his

imagination; whereas the . . . nature which is not under the subjection of the restraints of artistic rules can give constant nourishment to his taste."

Today we think differently: The empathy-aestheticians, for whom abstract geometrical figurations are expressive bearers of an individual life, primarily stress the pleasantness of such forms. But even the aestheticians who recognize that there is a contemplative experience of form alongside empathy are of the opinion that such forms bring about not only a pleasure of the rational function, but also a real aesthetic satisfaction which is demonstrated chiefly by their frequent use as ornamental forms and decorative motives. Theodor A. Meyer synthesizes the two opinions.

Undoubtedly, the form-power of the line is strong enough to lock together a number of lines into an abstract form which is powerfully impressive and compact. Such structures are regular geometrical figures and the objectless abstract forms of decorative art. Circles, square, and so forth are distinguished by the perspicuity and the impressionability of their contour-lines and by the immediacy with which the legitimacy of their union springs to mind. If formal beauty depended only on a perfect unity and clarity of symbolic language, one would have to consider geometrical structures as perfect examples of the beauty of optical form. But—and now Kant's argument comes into its own—to agreeable form belongs not only unity and clarity, but multiplicity also. The structures in which unity is overwhelmingly developed and too much regulated, however, lack precisely that multiplicity. "Unity does not allow that free multiplicity without which there is no freedom of invention and therefore no art either. The rigid law of mathematical form denies free room for the play of the artist's imagination. Art begins initially with the free creations of decorative art and architecture which in the regularity of the progress of their lines remind one of the geometrical and approximate it, but which stave off a strict subjection to the geometrical schema. It is not in the circle, but in the rich variety of excellent waving lines and linear structures that abstract beauty through variety, clarity, and compactness reaches its highest development."

I believe that nothing much stands in the way of a conclusive solution of this problem. Geometrical figures presented in isolation are able to operate quite aesthetically, but their effect in any event is not very great. As a matter of fact, only in exceptional cases does one have occasion for such experiences outside the laboratory. When these figures appear as ornamental forms, they are at most within

the context of a higher form: in symmetrical arrangements, in all kinds of inflections, penetrations, and combinations, embedded in formal organizations of the higher sort, attached to colors, and so forth. Two aesthetic laws assert themselves in this connection: harmonically proportional order and the autonomous legality of combined forms. In a few words Dessoir has indicated what this means: the simplest example of the influence of a combination is the putting of a circle within a square. If the circle is within the square, the figure is far more pleasing than if the square is inscribed in the circle. The inscribed square, namely, has a stiff effect because of the obtrusive straight lines which come forward and because the enclosing circle is felt to be not stable enough; in the other case the sharp corners of the square are to a certain extent blunted for the act of comprehension. In all circumstances each of the two parts influences the other and by means of different arrangements of space creates a particular aesthetic feeling. The same is also true for the combining of a circle with an encircled or inscribed triangle. Even with geometrical figures there is something like an orthoscopic law and one of conformity to type. The difference between the sides of a rectangle must not be so trifling that the figure looks like a square which has not been realized; but neither must that difference be so large that the figure operates like a structure formed like a ribbon or band. In the same way an ellipse must be an ellipse, and not an ellipse that has not been realized or an agreeable surface-image lenticularly formed.

Such requirements as these are valid only for the comparatively isolated figure: the moment it appears in an ornamental or architectonic context it comes under a great many new laws which can hardly be mastered theoretically. Thus an overly slender or, on the other hand, an almost quadratic rectangle can be more pleasant as an opening for a window in the structure of a building than can one conforming to the law of the Golden Section which would be more satisfactory if it were presented in isolation. The whole quite certainly determines the part, and the part gets its effect from the lawfulness of the whole which is the superior organization. Geometrical figures are pleasing essentially because of their complexity, but this can be abandoned immediately for the sake of a higher effect. A gothic dome which seen from the front looks like a pointed isosceles triangle can achieve agreeability if the two sides are slightly sloped (for this the church in *Falk-am-See*, otherwise a modest provincial gothic work, serves as an extremely happy example); the result is that mathematical comprehension becomes incom-

parably more complicated. In the second volume of Lipps' *Ästhetik* these matters are expressed in such unexcelled detail as concerns sculpture and architecture that one need only mention that fact here.

d.¹ *Spatial Forms (Bodies)*. Now we shall consider solid geometrical (stereometric) structures, spatial forms having corporeality. To be sure, we shall in discussing them be able to use much of what we said in the previous section: for sphere, cube, prism, cone, pyramid, and cylinder impress themselves on the retina as a surface—thus as circle, square, triangle, rectangle. Yet something specifically original belongs to corporeality as a spatial experience. First we shall dispose of the capacity for seeing spatial depth, in connection with which we can be spared the question (that is, its answer), still argued about today in physiology and psychology, of how this apperception of space takes place, whether the cooperation of the senses of sight and touch is critical, and whether the perception of the third dimension is to be explained in empirical or nativistic terms. A physical structure, optimal conditions of illumination and perception being assumed, is experienced as something fundamentally different from the surface figure which makes up its profile. For the theoretical understanding of the effect of physical structures, we can make use unchanged of only one basic law which has already been frequently mentioned, that of the agreeableness of surface-figural forms: the more complexible the spatial figure and the simpler its mathematical formula, just that much more does the beauty-result become tedious, at least in a presentation which is not isolated. As a form for a house, a cube is less pleasant than a prism; therefore even the "cube-houses," even the buildings of the "machine culture of homes" (*Wohnmaschinenkultur*) of the followers of Le Corbusier, rarely are cubes. A cylinder marked as a solid geometrical one would as a rule be an aesthetically intolerable column: contraction and tapering, bulging (entasis) and slight conical tapering-off create structures which are mathematically less simple, but aesthetically much more powerful. Here too, increased variety heightens aesthetic interest. Maximal geometrical regularity frequently has an effect of rigidity, hardness, and lifelessness; as is often true, the aesthetic effect is the result of a dialectical tension between the maintaining and the loosening up of geometrical regularity. The effect is fortunate if the creator of such structures has known how to respect geometrical law in its essential basic characteristics and yet ingeniously to soften it in a certain way. The streamlining of certain machines made for rapid motion (automobiles, motor-boats, locomotives, airplanes) is more agreeable

than are the forms of many other solid geometrical structures of a simpler formula: this is true in terms of a convincing aesthetic mechanism. Such physical forms operate pliantly; they seem to guarantee the easiest and most friction-free penetration of restraining mediums like water and air.

Handicrafts, the useful arts, and architecture often have to do with cubes, prisms, spheres, and so forth, and of course with different inflections, variations, penetrations, and combinations of abstract stereometric structures of pure formation. They please us through their harmonic dimensions and measurements, as well as through the life which is inwardly expressed in them, a life which is not something separate from the proportionality of their power of utterance, but something present in and with it.

In connection with the aesthetic comprehension of space one is concerned with an optical experience which in a far-reaching way is saturated with tactile-haptic and motoral-kinaesthetic factors. Meyer is right, but not entirely so, when he says of events of perception which are relevant here that one needs only his eyes to grasp nature and art; for the eyes vicariously take the place of the sense of touch, which remains outside the aesthetic observation of normal people even though we are assured by different persons that there is a special fascination in touching statues.

"But the sense of touch dwells in the eyes. In children the image of the corporeality of things and of their space-filling three dimensionality takes place only to the extent that the eye supports experiences of the sense of touch. The movement of a look follows the hand that touches, and the movements of the eye interlace themselves with experiences of the sense of touch. For adults the remembrances of these experiences are part of these experiences, and our sense of touch secretly cooperates. Thus if the sense of touch is properly stimulated by a contemplated object and if it can without difficulty be set in motion by powerful modulations, there occurs a functional pleasure which is tied in with all powerful but still unconfined activity."

Here the cooperation of motoral-kinaesthetic factors has been disregarded. It is upon these factors that modern theoretical psychology places great weight. According to Stöhr,¹⁰¹ kinaesthetic factors take a decisive part in the interpretation of physiological seeing-space, and there is an intimate association between the sense of contact, the reaction of motion, and optical representation. According to Hartmann,^{101a} the image coming from the outside is only an invitation to us to organize it and to imitate it through

inner motility. Only by this means do we arrive at observation of two- or three-dimensional space, which is conditioned not only in purely optical, but also in motoral terms. Müller-Freienfels¹⁰² has described the consequences of this doctrine for aesthetics and the psychology of art: for him, reactive motoral factors have a particular importance for the apperception of space.

"As is well known, purely sensorial observation of space is two-dimensional. People born blind who have undergone eye-operations are at first not able to see the third dimension along with the others: they see only surfaces. It is true that they can differentiate round objects from longish ones; they cannot however recognize as three-dimensional those bodies which are known to them by way of the experience of touch. Thus objective space is in subjective terms not a 'seeing-space' (*Sehraum*), but a 'space through which one proceeds' (*Gehraum*)."¹⁰³ The control of space by motoral means and the impressive kinaesthetic sensations affixed to it are of decided importance also for the empathy-experiences which normal persons have with abstract spatial structures.

The solidly geometrical structures of the kind mentioned here are typed spatial structures, clear, typical examples of spatial formation. Just as the geometrician, when he seizes them in calculations, must reduce the complicated figurations of reality to such labeled spatial forms, so a great many artists and entire periods have repeatedly tried to reduce the confused plenty of the organic forms of reality to the sphere, the cone, the cube, the prism, and the cylinder. One finds this kind of attempt to realize a cubistic program in Dürer and Cezanne and with consistent persistency and unflinching radicalism in the followers of *peinture* and *sculpture pure*. Although the physical forms just named are not completely divorced from the reality of nature, they are so seldom connected with it that they must be thought of, not as organic-empirical forms, but purely as intellectually produced ones such as one meets only in artifacts. The attempt through stylization in terms purely of mentally-produced space to refashion those forms of nature as they ought to be, forms of nature which one encounters and which are "given," has been called "abstraction" since the time of Worringner,¹⁰³ who expressed himself about the artistic intention behind this attempt in this way:

"The impetus towards abstraction is the result of a great inner disquiet in human beings caused by the confused plenty of the phenomena of the outside world. Those who have a certain type of talent—entire regions, cultural groups, and whole epochs belong

to them—cannot achieve a successful pantheistic relation of trust with the phenomena of the outer world, but must draw back into themselves so that with abstract creations they can erect an opposite kind of world which offers them shelter, a world which has as little as possible in common with the empirical forms of things. The result of this great inner disquiet is that those who belong to this type see the benefit to be expected of art not as a faithful imitation of forms offered by reality, but as a remolding of reality in terms of abstract law. The maximal possibility of benefit asked for in art does not depend on one's sinking into things of the outer world so that one is able to enjoy himself there, but on his taking the individual thing in its arbitrariness and its ostensible contingency in order to make it eternal through an approach to abstract forms and in this way to discover a point of rest in the flow of appearances." In this way, one achieves abstract legal forms which are unique and most superior for the perception, forms "in which a human being, in view of the monstrous confusion of images of the outside world, can find repose."

In these statements in any case, this much is correct: geometrically abstract physical structures as compared with the three-dimensional concrete forms of things are objects of a peculiar enjoyment. To be sure, they can also be objects of an empathic comprehension; thus they are accessible not merely to an attitude which is the complete opposite of empathy.

Besides the proportion of the measurements, one enjoys in solid geometrical bodies also the clear boundaries which are decisively a part of the complexity of the basic law of form. As a gravestone, a prism of granite of suitable dimensions and a well-polished marble obelisk is a more fortunate thing than is a block of stone which is chaotic of outline. Because of its decisive and clear boundaries, an object so bounded is clearly and complexibly distinguishable from other things in space and is made into an easily perceivable spatial unit. Geometrical bodies are true examples of such precise units of space the contemplation of which has a certain pleasure of the apperceptive function in its train.

Boundaries which have non-essential or arbitrary lines are aesthetically indifferent or even devoid of value. "The boundary of a shapeless stone that has many confused corners, projections, and recesses is wanting in the formal charm of aesthetical uniformity. The beauty-value of the boundary begins only when bounded surfaces or lines are themselves unified. The more they are approximate forms built according to a unity salient to the eyes and the more

they resemble . . . regular geometrical structures or make comprehension easy through proportion, contrast, or rhythmical organization, just that much more do they suit the requirements of form." 104

Only in an exceptional way are abstract geometrical bodies the objects of an aesthetic experience which is directed towards them exclusively, and when they are such objects, the pleasure they arouse is at most very limited; as a rule their aesthetic significance is that of partial figures in larger contexts in architectonics and handicrafts. But here they are able to become vivid and very telling members of a formal organism. The diversity of effects found in such an organism is properly described if one says, possibly of a column, that the compactness of its boundary, the cylindric form, and an upward striving all operate together to make themselves into a unified member of a structural whole.

It is clear that with respect to geometrical bodies of the kind mentioned aesthetic experience depends not only on the relations, the proportions of their measurements, but also on their absolute size. A four-sided pyramid of the size used as a model in geometry lessons is aesthetically indifferent; but exactly the same structure having the measurements of the Pyramid of Cheops (a base of 226 meters, a height of 137 meters) creates a powerful, grandiose, and noble effect.

To close this discussion of stereometric structures, I must say a bit more about the aesthetic experience of space. A person who lives in a room moves about on the floor of a prism; a person who finds himself at the intersection of the nave and transept of a church which is topped by a cupola is standing on the sole of a prism which continues in a rotation-figure whose basic line is a parabola. Such spatial forms (or, instead, one's being in them) are answered with characteristic experience-reactions which take place and are operative even when one is not able to account for them and is not, above all, able to bring them to conceptual clarity and linguistic formulation. The master-builders of the Romanesque and Gothic epochs knew the secret (as, moreover, did Baroque architects later) of creating inner rooms which psychically, so to speak, force those who walk in them to their knees. Whenever I enter the *Kaiser-room* of the *Klosterneuburg*, I have a powerful feeling of space which could be suggested in the following way: here I can expand myself contentedly and reach into space without hindrance, "cling to it," so to speak (which extends to impulses in the direction of analogous physical movements); here I can breathe freely and

without constraint. All of this flows from a spatial experience into a peculiarly intensified sense of life. Such an effect do high, wide interior rooms of a quality approaching the cubistic have on me, whereas the hexahedron (cube) itself does not work so favorably. We find "cabinets" such as were built in the period between 1870 and 1910 to be quite horrible: long, narrow intestines of impossible proportions. Breadth and length must not differ too much: the Golden Section is a minimal proportion; 4:5 is more satisfactory than 3:5.

In any case, space is something aesthetically of great considerableness, something vivid and dynamic, something to a high degree summoning us to empathy. Lipps¹⁰⁵ says words relevant to this point: as a whole and in all of its parts, the space enclosed by the walls of a building is alive; it is neither a physical, nor merely a geometrical, but, instead, an aesthetic body; it pours forth its life freely, boldly, and opalescently; it actively spreads itself out and actively ties itself together.

As the arts of representation reproduce the forms of nature, so the so-called space-arts create their forms out of themselves and shape space into free organizations. "But as the representational arts reproduce the forms of actuality, not for their own sakes, but for the sake of the life which is in them, so the space-arts also aim at the life that lies in the forms they freely create. The space which they fashion is not geometrical, but filled with life. Because they shape space, they also shape the life of space. They do this to the extent that from out of space they seize from within the universal forces of space or the universal mechanical forces and activities, and in particular spatial forms bring their free self-realization into direct intuition."¹⁰⁶ To go further into this subject would be to enter upon a special aesthetics of the space-arts.

At this point we shall leave our discussion of pure and abstract forms and structures of linear, surface-figural, and corporeal kinds so that we may turn towards natural forms and forms of reality which signify concrete things; but here we must confine ourselves to the copying (*Nachbildung*) of these forms through human activity. To begin with, I must say that the boundaries between the two groups of forms cannot be drawn with such clarity and definiteness as one would at first like to suppose. Between the pure forms which mean nothing but themselves and the forms which, resembling things, signify objects of reality (delineate them or suggest them) there is not a sharp, but a quite moderate opposition. This moderateness is provided for, among other things, by the func-

tion of stylization, so-called. A person who draws and realizes a certain givenness in nature as his model—let us say a branch of vine or ivy—can in a dual fashion come to terms artistically with it: realistically by trying in a way that is true to reality to reproduce the form in its existence and in its effect as an impression; and in a stylized fashion by transferring the law of geometrical regular forms to it, so that he deduces laws of universal motion from it and brings them into an intelligible and clear intuition. Stylized treatment is the opposite of naturalistic imitation; it is the creative presentation of precise good forms in terms of aptitudes which lie in our psyches and for which the forms of nature offer the most intense stimuli. Much in primitive ornamentation that looks abstract and geometrical in conception was derived from models from nature and was supposed to signify them. Thus an isosceles triangle standing on a point symbolized the modesty-kerchief used by women, a certain wavy line means a snake, a zig-zag motive meant the bird on a frigate the position of whose wing in the act of flying is reproduced.¹⁰⁷ In such cases the primitive observer did not find that a certain meaning was attached to the respective form merely on the basis of associatively produced knowledge; but that this form had arisen on the basis of an inner artistic intention which, to be sure, was not strong enough to overcome certain imperfections in technique and to quiet certain autonomous trends in form. Thus if the opposition between pure geometrical-abstract intellectual forms on the one side, and the concrete natural forms signifying objects and true reality on the other, is extremely relative as regards origin, and is to be limited to a difference of degree, one can still allow validity to it in the phenomenological respect, at least as a simplifying but useful working hypothesis by means of which the two different poles of artistic intention are indicated.

Furthermore, there are imperceptible crossings-over between these two groups of forms. In the exhibition of the "*Salon d'automne*" to be seen in Vienna in the summer of 1946 one could observe quite realistic figures of animals in which the sculptor had presented only the indispensable amount of stylization which, besides, served to make the impression of reality clear: possibly the length of the lion was somewhat increased so that the impression of something catlike pliantly slinking here and there could be made all the more conclusively characteristic of the experience. Another piece of animal-sculpture went a decided step further towards approximating pure and abstract forms, but allowed the organic-objective to be recognizable still. It showed a pouter pigeon swelling itself: neck and

breast had become spheres, and in other ways also the parts of the bird through hard-pressed stylization approached solid geometrical structures, and had even gone directly over into them. The complete autonomy of pure forms freed of all thing-significance was reached, then, with two plastic structures by Henri Hamm which carried the title "*Forme bois*." What operated here in an aesthetically positive fashion was, beyond the clear complexibility of pure corporeal forms, the charm of the material whose beautiful grain was effectively set off.

Nevertheless, such crossings-over do not set aside the fact that the poles of these form-groups can neatly enough be divided from one another. There are surface-figural and corporeal structures which are recognized immediately as forms signifying things, as more or less free imitations of actual things. Absolute precision in imitation is neither possible nor necessary. Just as each perception and cognition come to be only because we impose a certain categorical mental law on the circumstances of reality, so a mastery of reality by means of drawing can be achieved only by means of a simplifying and rendering clearly the utterance-power of natural forms as we comprehend and reproduce them. The line itself therefore already does a certain violence to natural phenomena, which hardly ever show themselves in clear lines, but for the most part in tinted spots, in nuances of color and luminosity. If the concept is a product of economy in thought, then the line is a product of economy in seeing. In both cases one finds an element of organization which a person must call to his service if he is to master reality through perception, and indeed through perception which is mental as well as intuitive. As the concept is a product of an abstraction imposing order on things, so the line, too, which we "see into" the design of reality in order to effect clear outlines in things and intelligible orders within the contemplated section of reality, is the product of a subjective organizing and simplifying modes of operation in the realm of things visible and intuitable.

Forms which suggest things and imitate them, and figural structures—all of these which present circumstances believably and seize them with conviction and which, furthermore, are marked by an easy style, by the clarity, the decisiveness and the terseness of their lines and of the contours they present—all such forms are pleasant. A drawing rich in particularities and exactly reproducing shadings of color and half-tones can please us as can also the kind of sketch commonly found in caricature, an ingenious and powerful spirited sketch which with a few bold and arbitrary strokes

simplifies a real state of affairs. The aesthetic values belonging to the representation are joined to those belonging to natural forms. For this reason, many a form can be pleasant as imitation which, for whatever reason, is unpleasant in objective reality or which will not allow an aesthetic attitude to occur. No more about this subject can be said here, for what one would say would have to coincide with what will be discussed in other contexts.

G. THE AESTHETICS OF TIME

a.¹ Preamble. According to Kant,¹⁰⁸ time and space are the elementary "forms of pure intuition" which belong to the experiencing subject as their origin. Like the forms of thought, the categories, they are *a priori* possessions of the human mind by way of which a mastery of reality through the understanding which is mediated for us by the senses first becomes possible. Aesthetics can take over the expression "elementary forms of intuition" and the systematically exhaustive classification of everything operating aesthetically to which it has a claim—that is, if the expression may also serve for the broadening of the concept "intuition" as it was adopted earlier, the intended result of which was not only apprehension by the eye, but also that by the ear and that by the mind which understands language. Space and time are the basic spheres of the appearances of objects which have beauty; that which is to exercise such an effect must present itself as a spatial form for the eye, as something taking place in acoustically filled time for the ear, or as a series of linguistic structures for the mind which grasps language. Combinations of the spatial and the temporal too are possible; they appear for aesthetic pleasure in the dance, in mimicry, in pantomime, and in the cinema when moving, living forms of bodies in their changing postures and gestures and their own expressive movements are produced; or in the foaming of a mountain stream and the eternally changing formations in the fluctuation of the seething waves of the sea as one contemplates them with pleasure. The aesthetic effects which take place in these forms of intuition are associated with one of the two higher senses or with the linguistically sophisticated intelligence.

Now, people have objected that the classifying of things which have a beautiful effect (and also of the arts) according to this point of view is inadequate because a clear division cannot be effected in this way. In aesthetic perception, spatial extensions often become matters of time; the simultaneous becomes successive, the coexistent is relaxed to become the successive; the structure continuing in static

spatiality becomes a history in time. For this reason, suspicion has been raised, amongst other things, about the concepts of spatial co-existence and temporal succession as useful for dividing the arts in their variety which were supported by the authority of Lessing,¹⁰⁹ among others. When one goes through a hall of columns, the spatial organization of proportion changes itself into a temporal organization of rhythm. Empathy is able to make a most vigorously moving succession of aspiring forces out of the stable coexistence of an architectural work, and, inversely, arts which are pronouncedly those of time, like music and poetry, can in aesthetic experience have the characteristics of a spatial structure.

On the basis of the spatial-temporal transformation (whose significance for aesthetics I have estimated in another place¹¹⁰) and elementary processes of synaesthesia, we feel the high tones of the piccolo to be sharp, the tones of the trombone and the tuba to be voluminous, massive, and heavy: thus qualities of time are felt to be spatial. In the same way a direction for execution like "broad" to be found in a certain place of a score seems to us quite meaningful. Aesthetic time is not a pure time of a firm, "punctual," unexpandable succession, of an uninterrupted flow, but one permeated with spatial elements of stable being in which there is a *nunc stans*. The concepts of psychological present time and of apperceptive preservation must be called to service for the theoretical mastery of this fundamental circumstance of aesthetic experience. It is on such experiences that the aesthetic enjoyment of rhyme, alliteration, and assonance, the so-called repetitive figures, word-play, and so forth, depends; they have a certain metachronical element, an element superior to time, and even music owes its effect to the fact that in it there is not only a pure temporal *γίγνεσθαι* but also a spatial *γεγονός*, as Riemann¹¹¹ has pointed out. This matter requires further exposition. When a person reads a sonnet silently or when he hears it read aloud and comes to the fourth line in the first quatrain, he still hears in his inner ear the a-rhyme which long since has died out, so that, when it appears again after the b-rhyme, he can feel the a-rhyme in terms of a relation of anticipation to fulfillment. And everyone who enjoys a novel or a drama must at every moment have in mind the entire course of events whose verbal communication is past so that he can understand and judge the new aspect of conflict which has just appeared. Someone who wants properly to enjoy the resolution of a dissonance in a piece of music must, after the consonance has already appeared, still have in his ear and in his memory the dissonance

which has died out; the psychic fact of psychic present time which has its importance in the realm of the musical-acoustical is the most weighty objection to the atonal theory of a functionless system of chords. Chords can never occur alongside one another without being related; on the basis of the metachronological factor of acoustical present time, a connection between them always results, and therefore the purely parallel organization of simultaneous sounds which are not harmonically related proves to be problematical. In the same way the proper experience of a fugue is possible only if the different themes remain alive in memory even after they have died out some time before. All of this is correct, surely: the event of apperception of personality and of empathy transforms the spatial-stable existence of a gothic dome, of the Laocoön group, of the pictures *Decius Mus*, into an event of motion (one "filled-out" in temporal succession), just as, conversely, the apperception of works in the time-arts realizes a stable continuation which seems to be taken from beyond time. Moreover, it is true that, in general, spatial things and temporal ones are not completely divorced in aesthetic experience. If I look at a picture and an effect is really to take place, I must be able to dwell in contemplation for a time. Tachistoscopic experiments of the contemplation of pictures teach us that a complete state of enjoyment cannot be attached to short exposures. We admit all of this, but I cannot see how our theory is affected in any way—the notion that the essence of certain aesthetic-artistic objectivities lies in space or in time and is founded on co-existence or succession. If all of the tones of a symphony were sounded at the same time, no musical art-work would result, just as all of the nuances and spots of color in a picture would not furnish us with a picture if they were presented in succession. In one instance, an impression depends on coexistence, in another, on succession; and in the second case, therefore, the temporal is shown to be dominant and constitutive, but in the first it is the spatial, although a certain crossing-over between the areas cannot be denied.

The matter remains thus: there is a series of aesthetic objects and means to artistic effect which because of the traits constitutive of their being are rooted in space (thus everything that affects the eyes, the arts of representation, architecture, and handicrafts), and there are others for whom occurrence in a temporal succession is decisive (those arts of the muses which affect the ear or the natural inclination for languages). As in the section on the aesthetics of space we limited ourselves to the basic and fundamental components of representational arts, so we shall content ourselves here with

a treatment of the elements of music. The union of spatial and temporal means as they occur in dance, mimicry, and so forth will not be discussed further here because they are a problem primarily for art-theory. The aesthetics of words, which, with respect to classification in terms of the pure forms of intuition, could be ascribed altogether to the time-arts and to time-aesthetics, will for special reasons have a section of its own.

b.¹ Single Tones (Sounds). We have already decided the question of whether single sounds can operate aesthetically. Now we must ask something further. To which sounds does an aesthetically positive effect adhere? In general, one can say at the moment only that all tones and sounds of the extremes of volume and pitch have an unfavorable effect: that is, those also in which breadth and frequency of vibration approach extremes. That which lies in between—particularly within the acoustical sphere which the human ear prefers—is able to work favorably. Besides, it must be remarked that the acoustical extremes of pitch of the musical instruments used in the orchestra are never reached and thus that the instruments in the totality of the volume of sound which is at their disposal are able to operate propitiously insofar as great effort and violence are not needed in the production of single tones. This is true, for example, of the *c*⁵ of the small flute, which can emit only a *fortissimo* and which therefore sounds unbearably shrill and piercing. But the flute-like tones of the violin of almost the same pitch can be quite agreeable if they are produced by a player who is properly skilled. The sub-*contra* tones of the *contra-bassoon* and the *bass tuba* are also capable of a positive effect. What causes the agreeableness (or disagreeableness) of a single sound is primarily sound-color. In this respect, every tone which is in like manner removed from a lack of overtones and an over-abundance of them can have a positive effect, the agreeable mean having a considerable breadth. There is an orthoscopic realm for every instrument in which its sound-color is agreeable—that is, stretches in which the instrument sounds especially delightful because it can realize its own individuality well and powerfully. Thus the lowest tones of the trumpet are bad because they are rough and inconstant; the middle position of the flute is irksome although the tones constituting it are characteristic and on the modern flute even good. But in every case the flute realizes its peculiar character in its high tones, which are somewhat brilliant and glittering, whereas the blown instruments with a pierced tongue made of a reed (oboes, the English horn, bassoons) have high tones that are somewhat laborious, painful,

doleful, tortured, and strained. With the exception of the flute, whose tones, because of the poverty of its overtones, have a much less pronounced sound-color than do those of other instruments, the tones of the middle position understood in the broadest terms are in all instruments the best. It is not only that the tones of single instruments which are removed from the outer extremes are orthoscopically agreeable; but the middle position is the deposit of that special aesthetic agreeableness the reasons and the explanation for which different theories have been put forth.

Sterzinger¹¹² is of the opinion that the tones at the extremes of audibility do not have a true or accurate sound. This depends, among other things, upon the touching of other psychic chords, which happens the most vigorously in connection with tones of the median range. In surrendering oneself to such a sound, one arrives in an especially easy and rich manner at all kinds of complications of feeling and idea (*Vorstellung*). The musical superiority of tones in the middle positions can be parallel to other such distinctively middle positions, just as the Weber-Fechner law is valid only for the mean intensities of stimuli. "In the middle we have the genuine territory of tones, of tones to which our hearing-system is primarily adapted." Other explanations have been attempted by Brentano¹¹³ and Mach.¹¹⁴ The former makes a distinction within sensations of tone between a saturated element and, alongside it, two unsaturated elements which must be comparable to gradations of optical luminosity, and for this reason he speaks of tonal blackness and tonal whiteness. The one belongs to deep, the other to high tones. At their side is also a saturated element which he sets alongside the character of gayness in the realm of color. Thus a tone in the middle position corresponds to a pure saturated color, whereas an increase in melanotropy comes with depth of tones and an increase in acoustical leucotropy comes with high ones. E. Mach sets the poles of dullness and brightness in opposition to each other and finds a place of delightful compromise between them. According to him, one can accept it as a fact that in the middle section of the series of tones perceptible to human beings there is a distinctive area where the unity of these two elements evokes an impression of an agreeable richness; tones at the lower end, on the other hand, impress one as hollow and empty, those at the higher end as thin.

For civilized people, in any case, sound-color is the most important aspect to which the aesthetic agreeableness of single sounds can be due. By contrast, the strength of the tone, the result of amplitude, or of the beat-lengths of sound-waves, dispenses far

less pleasure. With savages and children it is quite otherwise. They are delighted by noise and by the powerful demands made upon their hearing by it. Even for many people who belong to the less educated classes among highly civilized people, music is the more beautiful as it is louder. Therefore there would be less place for the Philharmonic orchestra in a beer-garden than there is for a brass band. Loudness of tone is more important in such cases than is differentiation of sound. Obviously, even music of advanced civilizations does not disclaim tonal power; one thinks of the triple-*forte* tutti of the gigantic orchestra in Berlioz (who has been described as a composer who concentrates on tonal power), in Strauss, in Mahler, and many others. Certain orchestral instruments like the large and small drums, cymbals, triangles, and so forth serve, besides rhythmical purposes, merely those of producing noise; and it cannot be denied that a kind of orchestral excess that raises goose-flesh in many a hearer has its own peculiar charm. But alongside it something different and incomparably more essential is present, whereas among savages tonal power is what their music is about and of. So, for instance, in the singing of certain Indian tribes in North America, the melodic as we understand it exists only in its sorry beginnings; its entire structure depends on different degrees of loudness and softness, and one could therefore venture the paradox that in these cases differentiation of tonal strength is the element creating "melody."¹¹⁵ In this connection Müller-Freienfels¹¹⁶ points to the hunger for stimulation which the ear, like every other organ, has and which is satisfied the most surely by the making of and the listening to certain kinds of noise. The satisfying of the basic desire for dynamics and intensity of sound is itself in turn capable of various differentiations. An impression can be intensified if one draws on relative effects besides absolute ones, if there are soft places alongside loud ones. In this way, uniformity and tedious blunting are avoided. Moreover, absolutely exquisite effects can be produced by a gradual *crescendo* or *decrescendo* of tones, whereas the earlier terrace-dynamics, still prevailing in Bach and Mozart, which placed simple *forte* and simple *piano* abruptly alongside each other, meant a simpler way of satisfying the desire for differentiated intensities of tone. When Hermann Hesse in his "Glass Bead Game" (*Glasperlenspiel*) disclaims the shading of tonal power as a musical ideal, he is nothing but a snob flirting with primitivism. Even the pitch of tone which depends on the wavelengths and numbers of vibrations of the longitudinal vibrations which produce sound can hardly be thought of as a source of

pleasure when it is in isolation; it becomes so only when it is part of a succession of tones, and it is the most important basis of all melody-building. Only this much can be said here with certainty: that deep (low) tones as a result of certain elementary synaesthetic processes embody something dark, dull, and sad, and that the high ones have something cheerful and bright which invests them with a certain greater agreeableness. This leads to the matter of tonal volume, which embraces the sense-impression deriving from wave-lengths. The investigations by Katz¹¹⁷ have made it at least probable that the sense-organs of the skin are appealed to by sound-waves to some degree, even though to a weak one. One can suppose that the wave-lengths make their full effect in impressions of breadth, voluminousness, bluntness or thinness, sharpness, and piercingness; vibration-frequencies make their effect as heavy, dark, deep, restful, or as bright and high. One can consider it certain, then, that music is not at all experienced by the ear alone, and that therefore even for the deaf the enjoyment of music is not entirely a closed matter; Helen Keller, who is deaf and dumb, and the Swiss Sutermeister, who is completely deaf, are examples for us.^{117a} The purely sensuous effect of music depends only in one part on the rhythmically ordered mass of sound, but in another part on vibratory or vasomotoral effects. When someone says that music so seizes and deeply affects us and that it impels people to make rhythmical movements, he must, according to G. Révész, be taken far more literally than was earlier thought. There is a direct effect of strong vibrations on our vasomotoral system which up to a certain point determines the movements of our minds. Not only the deaf, but also people who hear normally are deeply affected by vibrations. One can trace to these vibratory sensations the powerful effect of a work for the full organ, of a mighty chorus in a room which has good resonance, and of the very exciting effect of *fortissimo* passages played by a large orchestra in which metal instruments in particular play a part. Composers count upon these effects: hence the custom of creating a powerful conclusion by placing at the end of the work dynamic, vigorously pronounced chords. But one cannot see anything in these vibrational sensations which is essential to or constitutive of the effect of music.

Thus sound-color is the most important source of the pleasure one finds in the single sound. How this is to be understood—how the acoustical effects designated metaphorically as having tone color come to be: this has already been worked out. A tone in the psycho-

logical view (that is, as an experience of a sensation of tone) comes to be because an acoustical givenness (the vibration of a body, of a string, of the column of air in a pipe, and then of the air surrounding each) meets the peripheral organ of sense (the ear) and, being conveyed to the sphere of hearing, works on the cerebrum and then on the psyche. If we disregard noise, which acquires aesthetic relevance only under certain expressive conditions, then the most elementary case it is possible to give is that of simple tones (that is, those which result from the simple series of vibrations or regular pendulum-like oscillations of a part of the sounding body and of the surrounding medium of air). But it is only laboratory-aesthetics which has to do with simple tones; it is not music; what in music appear as basic givennesses are sounds already, products of the blending of a greater or lesser number of simple tones.

When a person hits a key on the piano, the string concerned vibrates not only as whole, but also synchronously in its halves, thirds, fourths, and so forth.¹¹⁸ All of these sets of vibrations correspond with tones which become successively higher, but weaker at the same time. These tones are to one another in simple vibration-proportions, namely 1:2:3:4. Suppose that middle *c* were struck; the tones resulting from the vibrating of the half, the third, the fourth, and so forth, of the string are, in their succession, the octave of this tone (the *c* above middle *c*), the twelfth of the key-tone or the fifth of the octave of the key-tone, the *g* above middle *c*, the second octave (*c*¹), the third of this second octave, *e*¹, and so forth. But these tones are not heard by themselves; in the sensation of hearing sound appears in their stead. These tones are given objectively as physical events; they meet the ear and stimulate the mind. But events in the sensation of tones are unified and blend into a presentation of the single acoustical or tonal image which we call sound. The deepest and strongest of the partial tones of a sound (in our example, middle *c*) is its basic tone, the other tones being the overtones. The pitch of a sound therefore coincides with the pitch of the basic tone; the presence of overtones is consciously noticeable only in the color of the sound. All of the partial tones of a sound have a basic rhythm in common: namely, that which is given immediately in the basic tone; they are therefore differentiations of this basic rhythm. The sound is thus an absolutely unitary, but at the same time a more or less rich, system of "tonal-rhythms," absolutely unitary for the reason that a single fundamental rhythm is the basis of all of the tones. This fact causes Lipps to believe that

he can explain not only the feeling of inner uniformity which we have in the experience of such sounds and also the pleasurable nature of this feeling.

If higher overtones are lacking in a sound or if only the lower ones have considerable strength (say, the basic tone is accompanied only by the first and second tones, which are in an especially simple vibration-relationship to it), then a sound takes place which is intrinsically as consonant as possible, but which at the same time is poor in quality and far too simple and empty: A richer differentiation of the basic rhythm is wanting. But if its higher overtones are added or take on greater power, then the sound will be richer, fuller, more interesting. If the high overtones become too strong, they take on sharpness, and, relatively dissonant, sound clanging, because among themselves they have fewer simple vibration-proportions than do the lower ones. Thus the seventh and ninth partial tones are in the relation of 7:9, which means a decidedly dissonant relationship. Strong differences in sound-colors result precisely in terms of whether the even-numbered or the odd-numbered tones, respectively, fall out or become too weak. The even-numbered partial tones—that is, the second, the fourth, the sixth, and so forth—are related to one another as 2:4:6 and so forth. These vibrational proportions of vibrations are distinguished from the uneven-numbered partial tones (3:5:7:9) by their simplicity: 2:4, like 4:8, equals 1:2; 4:6, like 8:12, equals 2:3. But the proportions among uneven-numbered partial tones (5:7; 7:9; and so forth) cannot be reduced to simpler proportions. By this fact are explained the nasal, snarling, turbid sound-colors of some instruments and the jingling of others. Helmholtz, as he lays down first principles in his work, *The Theory of the Sensations of Tone*, has been more precise in examining the dependence of sound-colors on the quantity and the relative strength of the overtones. The chief results of his attempt are, in short form, the following: sounds lacking in strong overtones (those, for instance, of most stopped organ-pipes) are soft and agreeable, but not very strong. More resounding are those which are accompanied by a number of their lower overtones, those, possibly, up to six. Here belong the piano and the horn, the sounds of open organ-pipes and the soft *piano*-tones of the human voice. If only uneven overtones occur in the instrument, as in the low register of the clarinet and in tightly stopped organ-pipes, then the sound is empty, hollow, nasal. When the higher overtones on the other side of six are distinct, then the sound is raw and sharp. If they are not especially strong, then the sounds actually become ex-

pressive despite their sharpness. The sound-products of stringed instruments, of the oboe, the bassoon, the trumpet, and of the high register of the human voice are of this kind. Sounds having very many overtones which are in part nonharmonic produce an impression which approximates that of noise, and then even distinctness of pitch too is gradually lost. This is true of the kettle drum, and even more of tympani cymbals, and vibrating discs.

What we designate as sounds and use in music is therefore colored single tones and tonal complexes. Sound-color, timbre, is thus not an attribute, not a quality of simple tones, but a resultant made up of several simple tones; it is the consequence of an inner blending (melting) of simple tones which (subordinated to a governing basic tone) are merged into a whole and are therefore experienced no longer as a simultaneity or summation, but as a something original which is unitary but intrinsically quite simple. Sounds (which can never be devoid of color) are therefore chords below the surface, which are felt not as such, to be sure, but as a single sound. On the organ there is a register called "quint." If it is pulled out, a fifth is added to every key that is struck; the result is not parallel fifths, however, because they do not assert themselves as such and are not heard so; but they color and illumine the more powerful basic tone. Another acoustical phenomenon, that of tone-differentiation, is profited by when organs are built. Instead of the sound-pipes necessary for the producing of the deepest tones (these pipes are very long and therefore very expensive), builders use shorter pipes which give the overtones of the ones wanted. If, for instance, two higher pipes are blown into at the same time, the differentiated (*Differenz*) tone appearing at once replaces the basic tone which is wanting. In the octave-stop, the higher octaves of the tone played are utilized as helping voices for the purpose of increasing the loudness. Orchestral practice frequently snatches at the same expedient means and can do so because octaves act as a strengthening factor; to be sure, their aesthetic effect is still not exhausted in this way. If two instruments of the same kind (flutes, for instance) are asked to proceed in octaves or to play in unison, the resulting sound achieves not only power, but also brilliance, fullness, warmth, and animation; thus it is increased not only in quantitative-dynamic terms, but also in qualitative ones. Here something entirely original takes place which can only be described as something legally formed, but not at all as something atomistically summative. Of course, the instruments playing in octaves or in unison must be entirely clean in sound because to nothing are we

more sensitive than to small discrepancies within the high and the extreme ranges of degrees of blending. Octaves and primes (unisons) are the most ticklish of dual sounds because the more consonant they are, the more sensitive we are to the purity and cleanness of intervals. To explain this fact, one can point to the acoustical phenomenon of differentiated tones which appear when two tones are sounded at the same time. In intervals of the highest degree of blending (octaves or primes) just a tiny encroachment on purity and cleanness is enough to bring about a marked distortion of the intelligibly hearable tones in combination (difference-tones and summation-tones). It is well known that the octave cannot take on any kind of "temperament," but must always sound clean and pure according to its nature. Within tempered tuning, too, octaves, fifths, and fourths remain pure in this way; for the elimination of the pythagorean comma, thirds, sixths, and the dissonant second are employed. Thus even the fifth is a very critical matter too, and for this reason the violinist is able to control the tuning of his strings in fifths with the help of difference-tones.

The painter has an unending richness of shades and tones on his palette; the musician is not poor in resources either. Because a great variety is possible in terms of the number, the quality, and the intensity of overtones, single instruments have a pronounced individuality which the skilful composer knows how to take suitably into his service and to turn to good account. To this fact is attached another fact which is very interesting aesthetically: The pronounced character of the sound-color which gives an unalterable individuality to each instrument is the result of certain characteristic imperfections and defects and thus of the fact that no instrument is able to produce the simply perfect ideal tone. But even this is an advantage: The maximal approach of every instrument to its ideal form or to the producer of the ideal sound would simply mean a very grievous loss of color. Thus the orchestra of today, with its key-bugle, silver bohemian flutes, and so forth, is incomparably superior to the orchestra which Beethoven knew as regards perfection of tone and acoustical efficiency; but at the same time it is decidedly poorer in sound-color. As cylindrically bored flutes came into fashion, the older flautists and conservative conductors universally deplored the disappearance of the tender, veiled, sad, and elegiac sound of the old conically bored flutes. The fullness of tone which was possible on the bohemian flute seemed to these people to come too close to that of the clarinet: an unwished-for advantage. Richard Wagner too seems to have been of the opinion that the advantages

brought by the flutes of new construction were bought at too high a price; for he once said¹¹⁹ that flautists had changed their earlier soft instruments into reed instruments of genuine power. When Heckel's construction of the bassoon invested this instrument with a distinctive sound, many deplored the disappearance of the earlier soft sound. According to the view of many devotees of music, the appearance of the valve-horn and the key-bugle meant an undesired betterment of instruments. Symphonic musicians for decades after the coming of innovations still used the old instruments just because these had produced a greater variety of timbres. The valve-trumpet has never really made its way in symphonic and operatic orchestras; today in any case it is reserved for popular band-music, with the exception of the Italian orchestra. As one encounters the increasing loss of color in the modern orchestra in which, because of their growing perfection, the instruments become too much like one another, he repeatedly hears the warning that it is quite undesirable to sacrifice the plenitude of sound-colors and the combinations of attractive sound made possible by them for the sake of ease of tone-production. Is one to interpret jazz-music and its decided cult of grotesque-peculiar sounds as a reaction against the idealized unification of the sound of a symphony orchestra? If an artist-performer knows how to destroy the force of characteristic deficiencies of his instrument, the result cannot always necessarily be beneficial. Thus the composer Goldmarck said that one can learn instrumentation only with a mediocre orchestra: in a good one, everything sounds good.

Sterzinger is wrong when he says that in listening to so-called music of ether-waves (*Ätherwellenmusik*) one has the impression that we are aiming at pure tones. The opposite view of Müller-Freienfels¹²⁰ is far more correct: Music, he insists, does not try to use "exclusively tones and instruments which are free of interfering noises. On the contrary: tones free of distortion are no more the best-sounding than chemically pure water is the best tasting. Simple tuning-fork tones sound empty and expressionless." It remains, rather, that sound-color is of the greatest significance for music. Everywhere there are effects aimed at by way of differences in sound-color, and these effects immensely intensify the aesthetic effect of the music. Although people went without differentiations in sound-color long enough, it is difficult to believe today that orchestral music was ever able to do without them. The use of sound-colors is a relatively late discovery. While a real cult of it began with the Romantics, a cult which reached its high point in

the orchestral music of Impressionism, earlier people had not yet become sensitive to this medium of effect; so, for instance, wind-instruments had little individual value of their own as sound-color, but only served as harmony or as *tutti* instruments. It is interesting that the Greeks, who did not know polyphony as we understand it, attributed the greatest value to the tone of the flute, which is poor in overtones. The use of the orchestra and its color-value as made up of string-, woodwind-, brass-, and percussion-instruments was an affair of the last century. "The Middle Ages, yes, even the time of Bach, replaced instrumental voices with vocal ones, and often arbitrarily substituted the instruments without regard for their specific sound-color."¹²¹ A Haydn symphony was reduced for string quartet or pianoforte without any loss to the essentials which were a part of a structure composed of clear melody and harmony. This cannot be done with the Prelude to *Rheingold*. And after such a reduction, hardly anything would be left of most of the works of Impressionism. What has been said about Haydn is true in a far-reaching fashion for Mozart, although he already did noteworthy preliminary work for the Romantics. In his *Requiem* and the *Masonic Funeral Music*, for instance, he used the deeper tenor clarinets instead of clarinets to achieve more gloomy effects. After Wagner and Berlioz,¹²² and actually after Weber, the distinctive effects of sound-colors were taken into special consideration; but Impressionism went further in exploiting them. The cult of sound-color, which in Debussy and others approaches a reveling in the naked beauty of the single tone, was attended by completely new formal possibilities. Because the neo-Romantic and Impressionist composers from the beginning worked in the spirit of an uncommonly copious, analytical, and differentiated orchestra sound and because the many shapes of the modern orchestral gave to them an abundance of colorful effective sound-mediums, they could work with repetition and contrast in an entirely original way. Grieg's "Morning" from the *Peer Gynt Suite* is an example which is made up only of the differentiations of sound-color in a single chromatically inflected motif. One and the same chord sounds differently as it is made by metal or wood, and the same theme played by strings makes a different impression when it is produced by the woodwinds. There is even a coherence between the sound-color and the tempo felt: a melodic phrase gives the effect of being faster on violins and on flutes than when it is played in a tempo metronomically the same by the clarinet or horn. And what riches in the medium of sound-color has the symphonist had at his disposal

in the modern orchestra in the last five or seven decades! To the classical settings for wind instruments (of two flutes, oboes, clarinets, bassoons, four horns, two trumpets, three trombones) are added piccolos, the English horn, bass- and alto-clarinets, the contra-bassoon, the bass- and the contra-tuba, the horn-tuba (in Wagner's *Ring* and occasionally in Bruckner), bass trumpets, the heckelphone (in Strauss), the celesta, the harp, and so forth. Jazz-music too produces thoroughly original sound-effects with the saxophone, singing saws, the Hawaiian guitar, the banjo, the jazz-tuba, harmonicas, and so forth. Pinched, nasal, quacking, howling sounds are preferred to clear and pure ones, and that the cult of noise reaches its culmination here is a fact which, growing out of the same roots as grotesque distortions in melody and rhythm, is of interest to psychology. Impressionism, too, of which a certain drive towards rawness of sound is characteristic,¹²³ has in its craving for maximal tone-differentiation directly sought out dissonances and noises. One thinks of the role of percussive instruments in Mahler.

The art of instrumentation and of the exploitation of the orchestral palette brings about: 1. a far-reaching differentiation of the direct acoustical factor, a broadening of sensuous stimuli according to a new and individual tendency; 2. a decided enrichment of associative effects; 3. an increase in expressive possibilities and, with this, in empathy. Program music, with its far-driven demands for the imitation of noises, and tonal painting, with its characteristically imitative tonal effects, would be impossible without these means. According to Müller-Freienfels,¹²⁴ the prime effect of sound-color lies, not in the sensorial, but in the associative realm, and it is no accident that the champions of the art of instrumentation were also the champions of music which has meaning. Sound-colors are the results not only of overtones, but also of the noises mixed with tones (like, for example, the rattle of the reeds of oboes and bassoons); and from precisely this fact it follows that their effect lies not only in the abundance, enrichment, and multiplicity of the hearing-impressions, and also in the fact that they are the beginning for all kinds of representations, and thus are of moment as agents of moods and bearers of expression. One thinks about the horrible effect of the deep clarinet-tones in the Wolf's-Glen scene in *Der Freischütz* or of the exciting effect of the trumpets in the battle-music of Tchaikovsky's *1812 Overture*.

In connection with music one could also bring to the fore the concepts of abstraction and empathy, and, indeed, precisely with respect to the sound-coloredness absent from or present in the tonal

materials used. The type of art of the Netherlanders of the 16th century, which was rational and which reminds one of sounding mathematics, and the contrapuntal fugal art of the 17th century—both when they are heard on contemporary organs work in a way that is quite abstract and requires hardly any empathetic acts at all. By contrast, the song-like art of the opera of the Italians and, still more, the music of the German Romantics are pointed in far greater measure towards empathy. A conception of music for which the expression of the psychic is its most important task (Wagner), will give full attention to the thorough cultivation of sound-color. According to Volkelt,¹²⁵ tones as sensuous forms are starting-points for an empathy of mood-symbolism; only by way of these tones and the feelings and moods “laid into” them in this way do the tones embody aesthetic meaning. What pleases or what fails to please aesthetically is, after all, always tones full of deep meaning. If meanwhile, Volkelt’s theory of empathy is related only to sounds as components of rhythmic and melodic forms, Lipps says something about the empathizing of sounds as such.

Every tone and, even more, every sound is already an expression of life. We give immediate expression in sounds to our inner excitements. These sounds are related to the sounds of music, which therefore appear to us in a direct fashion, as do colors in painting, to be expressions of something inward. There seems to be something inward which is made directly known in them, a striving and a willing streaming out of them. This striving and willing, this pouring forth of the self, is, in any case, something other according to the nature of sounds. This “other” is not only something more intensive in a louder tone and something softer in a soft one, but it is at the same time quieter, broader, heavier in deep tones, and impetuous, less heavy, and therefore more pointed in high ones. I feel it as simpler or richer, as more consonant in itself or as divided within itself, according to the sound-color which, moreover, causes the sound to appear jubilant or plaintive to me. In the single sound we can experience a certain mood, a definite kind of psychic excitement.

Jubilation, happiness, cheerfulness on the one side, oppression, sorrow, desperation on the other can be expressed musically, at least through suggestion, not only by tempo, rhythm, and melody, but initially too by the sounds and their colorfulness. Thus for reasons still to be stated, these sound-colors are universally understandable as relating to the values of expression and mood. “The singer colors his voice more brightly in cheerful pieces, more darkly in serious songs; the composer uses instruments with many and particularly

with higher overtones to express vivid, radiant, and exciting images; for different ends he uses snarling, nasal, sober, lusterless, or shrill sound-colors."¹²⁶ On the basis of elementary processes of synaesthesia which themselves go back to fundamental personal experiences, there is a certain relatedness between sound-colors and the character and the general condition of mood of a piece of music. In a requiem flutes will have less to do than do the trombones, and for this reason, if we disregard technical difficulties, the bass-tuba as a rule is not expected to do rapid passages; and piccolos are not used in a largo because slowness, seriousness, dignity, and solemnity are as directly related to the lowness of the tonal position as cheerfulness, jubilation, and abandon are attached to high tones occurring in rapid succession.

The root and base of all empathy in tones is our basic inherited knowledge which is unequivocal, cultivated, and enlarged through the various experiences that are our own and our fellow-creatures'; this is a knowledge of the expressive value of the human voice according to which it is the voice which presents one of the chief lines of connection to the empathic enjoyment of sounds. It is just for this reason that tones and sounds invite us to sympathetic animation. "Accustomed to hear the soul in the voice of a human being, we cannot help perceiving psyches everywhere where sounds meet our ears. Whenever nature rings, it seems to make known what is within it."¹²⁷ For a human being, one's own voice is the most natural and the oldest of the musical instruments about whose expressive possibilities one has quite direct information. In different frames of mind and moods, the voice has many different sound-colors: it sounds higher with sthenic, lower with asthenic affects; it sounds dull and choked in sadness and depression, sonorous and full in delighted, courageous, and self-confident states of mind; in malicious agitation it is sharp, cutting, pointed. In his symphonic poem *Ein Heldenleben* alongside a motif delineating "the hero's adversary" Richard Strauss wrote a direction for its execution which reads: "Very sharp and pointed" and "rattling" (*schnarrend*). Thus we have now made a transition to what follows.

We have already alluded to tone-painting, imitations of noise, and characterization in sound; tone-painting plays no very small role in music even if it belongs, not to its central nature, but merely to its outer borders. Tones and sounds as examples of artifacts are neither bearers of objective meaning nor imitations related to reality; normally, they present nothing and signify nothing. According to Volkelt, there are in music no representations meaning things,

but only those of material and technique (for instance, one asks if the sound he has just heard is that of a violin or a flute or whether it belongs to the higher or lower register of the instrument—and so forth). In exceptional cases which are rare, therefore, but all the more striking, the art of tone can try with its own means to reproduce or hint at real circumstances. This can occur acoustically (birds' calls, the splashing of water, the rippling of the brook, the humming of insects, thunder, rain, hail, and so forth) through direct imitation; but this is possible for optical phenomena (as in the convulsive actions of lightning, the glimmer of lights, the glitter of the "Water-play at the Villa d'Este") only as synaesthetic sound-metaphorism. For example, in Haydn's *Creation* lightning is imitated by a jagged note-image, and in other examples by the cutting tones of the piccolo (as for example, in Rossini's *Tempestà*). Such kinds of tonal painting as a rule demand construction in melodic-harmonic-rhythmic formation; whenever the tone (or sound) suffices as it is presented by itself, tone-color is the decisive factor. In the bird-concert in the second movement of the *Pastoral*, tonal painting through sound-color (the flute as the nightingale) accompanies that of melody (the cuckoo) and rhythm (the quail).

Tones are for the aesthetics of time what lines and colors are in the aesthetics of space. More than a *tertium comparationis* makes this comparison permissible despite its violence. Even Révész, who is completely aware of the figurativeness here assumed, does not want to give up a certain analogizing between spatial and temporal spheres, the employment of certain spatial terms "which are used in musical acoustics, aesthetics, and theories of style and form on behalf of the dynamic character of music—terms like intervals, stretches, distances, melodic lines, contrary, parallel, and lateral motion—as designations for voice-leading." He also rates the factor held in common by sounds and colors as informative—despite all of his warnings against ultimate and over-hasty identifications. Similar statements are found in a profitable way in E. Kurth's *Musik-psychologie*,^{127a} where still other concepts of aesthetic space are employed for the understanding of that energetic character of tonal contents which makes a bridge from sensuous impressions to aesthetic effects. As for the concept of color, it has found its use beyond the phenomenon of sound-color in music-psychology and music-aesthetics, a use exhibited in the notions of "tone-color" and "chord-color." Simpler relations are under discussion here, however. Isolated only infrequently and tendered only in extreme cases, the basic figural or melodic-harmonic-rhythmical structures, colors and,

even more, tones, can work by themselves in a positive fashion if they satisfy the requirements of the formal laws of precision (*Prägnanz*), clarity, decisiveness, and purity. If a tone sounding at the same time as others is to be satisfying, the first requisite is that it agree, that it insert itself into the harmonic context. Only people blessed with absolute pitch can demand that an isolated tone have the definite pitch of one of the specific tones which are used in music and can know if a tone is *c* or *c* sharp and not something lying indecisively between them. But for the overwhelming majority of hearers, the absolute pitch of the isolated tone is a matter of indifference; demanded only is that the tone be intrinsically unisonant, firm, clear, and constant, that the pitch hold fast without change, that it not move, tack about, or slide in a floating fashion up and down. In the musical practice of the Western World, it is demanded on principle that sung or played tones in their clearly determined and maintained pitch be sharply (diastematically) separated from one another. The *cercar la nota* and *portar la voce* (*portamento*), the "gliding" of the violin, the slipping of tones into one another, these are exceptions which can be used only infrequently and with caution. Here belongs also the howling effacement of tonal boundaries one finds in oriental (for example, gypsy) music, which has a certain exotic allure for us without our wanting it as a rule or as a normal thing.

This leads us to a consideration of the fact that our musical practice and the hearing-habits caused by it select relatively few tones out of the abundance accessible to our acoustical perception and limit themselves to a few "labeled" ones. Hearing-perceptions are caused by longitudinal waves having vibration-numbers of from 16 to 24,000 per second; within this field we are able to distinguish the pitch of about 11,000 tones. But music uses only about 100 tones (the organ 108, the orchestra from the contra-bassoon and contra-tuba up to the piccolo, 90, a concert piano the same, an everyday piano, 84); the numbers of vibrations of the tones normally used in music run from 25 to 4200 and thus towards the top do not by far reach the outer boundaries of what is acoustically still perceivable. Within this field, which is filled out by from 90 to 100 musical tones, we can distinguish 9180 tones, and thus possibly one hundred more. What lies outside the sphere of music cannot be held securely apart. Therefore the extreme tones lying above the upper limits of music cause only impressions of distance, but not impressions of intervals.

Now, what does this limitation achieve, i. as concerns the

boundaries of sound, particularly at the top, and 2. as concerns the picking out of certain tones, tonal steps, and tonal degrees? Furthermore, can this limitation be supported by certain naturally given (physiological) bases or is it a bare convention which could be canceled immediately? Therefore, 3. are there any prospects of increasing the tonal material at the disposal of music by the introduction of quarter-tones? To answer the first two questions, we can cite certain statements by Külpe.¹²⁸

"In the first place, a universally valid tonal system can be built only when equal relations are established and therefore when the musical intervals have the same significance on all steps. For this reason, a choice must be reached, for low tones must not press too closely upon one another beyond a certain limit if they are to be comfortably distinguished. The quotient $1\frac{6}{17}$ represents the small second, c to c sharp, while $2\frac{36}{181}$ represents c^1 to c sharp¹ and $5\frac{12}{514}$ c^2 to c sharp². If the absolute difference in both last two examples amounts to, say, 24- to 36-fold of that which can barely be distinguished, then in the first case the difference is hardly double and the next is only quadruple. Secondly, the remembrance of absolute tone is by far too defective in most men even if many of them are highly musical in other respects; music must therefore base itself on established interval-relations for which a musical person alone has an ear. Third, the human voice is not with any certainty able to produce finer differences than those which are presently used in music. (This does not exclude the fact that an individual case of Weber's law is present.) Fourth, the sensitivity of the ear to differences cuts sharply off on the other side of the boundaries maintained by music. And fifth, with an increase in the number of tones the clear superstructure of musical works would suffer."

Something has been said in this quotation in answer to my third question, but the following must be added as a supplement: That quarter tones can clearly be heard as a matter of fact and can be clearly distinguished cannot be doubted after the investigations of Abraham and Hornbostel;^{128a} but there is still a serious question of whether a normal enjoyer of music who can separate low c , c , and high c when they are presented alongside one another would not apperceive quarter tones in relation to normal tones as false (as too low or too high). Laws (already mentioned) by which phenomenal forms take place support this opinion. Just as in the optical sphere there are no angles phenomenally of either 85 or 95 degrees, but, instead there are right angles which are too large or too small; so in the acoustical sphere too there is no specific interval which

corresponds, say, to the proportion 2:3:1; instead, it is experienced as is a somewhat "ample" (*reichliche*) ("sharp") fifth. The attempt to structure a music with more refined interval-components has so far shown itself to be impossible in practice—that is, according to the judgment of authoritative connoisseurs, "because reproduction is not made certain either instrumentally or vocally. Even the enharmonic scale is in practice reduced by so-called tempered tuning, which brings about twelve units of half-steps."¹²⁹ Psychological examinations of artists have shown that quarter-tone music cannot be followed in practice. Of course, one can see that we are practically only at the threshold of the evolution of quarter-tone music and that this makes final judgment seem premature. Although one does not deny that there are innate presuppositions for the acoustical organizing of form and labeled proportions, yet it is very possible that much of that which appears to us as a naturally given physiological component is nothing other than a system of habits and conventions which have become fixed. Furthermore, an orchestra for quarter-tone music could be created without more ado with electro-acoustical instruments for which those certain technical difficulties do not exist which make quarter-tone music difficult or impossible for the usual instruments. Finally, it must be pointed out that at the lower end of the acoustical macrocosm of our musical world there looms a real micro-melody and micro-harmony whose existence was established by H. Werner.¹³⁰ These are less a problem for aesthetics, however, than for the psychology of tone. The tonal materials at the disposal of music could probably be enriched if one were able to undergo accumulated and consistently directed influences which followed a direction opposed to those of our hearing habits and which were turned into particular channels not demanded by a hearer up to the present time but for which there are psychophysical potentialities and bases.

In connection with the problem of pitch one must still mention the so-called two-component theory of G. Révész because in many respects it illumines anew this basic characteristic of tones (sounds), and then makes a fruitful connection with the discussions to follow. Up to the present, the continual change of tones and therefore their ascent within the tonal realm from the lowest up to the highest positions, and, further, the differentiations of intervals and chords have been reduced essentially to the single characteristic of pitch, and, indeed, not only by music-theory, but by acoustics too, because the variety of tones in the tonal realm is produced by a physical variable: namely, by the change in the frequency of the vibrations

of tone, which, for their part, correspond with the change in pitch. The continuous tonal series is represented by a straight line. But, according to Révész, this single-component theory will not do if we are to understand acoustical and musical circumstances. If one begins with a certain tone (for instance, c) and gradually increases the number of its vibrations, he gets the practical knowledge that the sensations of tone following one another (c -sharp, d , e , and so forth) are continually more unlike in relation to the starting-point until he as it were imperceptibly arrives at a tone which again is marked by a special similarity to the starting-tone: he has reached the octave. The octave-tone c^1 is in a double relation to the starting-tone c . In one respect it is the one the least like the beginning-tone of all of the tones within the octave because in terms of distance it is the farthest from it. On the other hand, it proves to have the greatest qualitative similarity to it. Thus as the tonal series is performed, there is, besides an increase in pitch that pushes forward, a certain valid periodicity in that similar sensations return with the tones of the octave. The tonal series can therefore be understood in a two-fold respect: one can experience it as a series of sensations occurring in a straight line, the course of which can satisfactorily be characterized by the phenomenon of "ascending-descending"; and also as a series whose course is marked by a certain periodicity, a regular return. As it ascribes to our sensations two basic musical characteristics, one can also judge certain musical phenomena in terms of this two-component theory more accurately than was possible with the means available heretofore. There is, for instance, the interval-problem: were the size of the distance between two tones decisive for the character of the interval, one would not understand that the qualities of intervals are complete already within the octave and that in enlarging the distance further and thus going beyond the octave, one does not create new interval-qualities either in the melody or in the harmony. Pitch and tone-quality are therefore not identical. For an imaginary observer who could experience pitch by itself alone, the tonal series would seem to be without tonal qualities, in analogy with the way the varicolored spectrum reveals to color-blind persons only differences in brightness, but not at the same time distinctions in color.

c.¹ Tonal forms. a.² Simultaneity (Chords, Harmony). A central problem links the section just ended to the present one. There we put the question of which sounds have an aesthetically favorable effect, or, in other words, by what characteristics the agreeable sounds

are distinguished from the less agreeable or from the disagreeable ones. In the answers given to this question it was precisely the decisive and essential which was lacking. What is it that binds the two problem-spheres together? The agreeableness of separate sounds as well as that of simultaneous sounds, of chords (among which we have already included two tones sounding simultaneously), depends on equivalent, or at least definitely similar causes. Again we ask: why are two tones more agreeable than noises, and sounds more so than tones? By a noise we mean an acoustical phenomenon which comes to be by means of aperiodic vibrations of small particles of air, the many vibrations interfering with one another. In experiences of tone, on the other hand, the decisive thing is periodic vibrations of air particles. Tones are marked by an especially simple periodicity and indeed by the sinoidal shapedness of the vibrations producing them. Sounds as ordered and lawful complexes made up of sets of tones are composed of such sinoidal vibrations, but in a very simple manner so that the periodic character is not lost. In tones and sounds, therefore, there appear for our acoustical perception incomparably clearer and better organized constituents than occur in confused noises. Now, modern physics tries to destroy the force of the sharp separation between tones and noises and to trace the one back to the other. Here we begin with Helmholtz,¹⁸¹ according to whom noises are nothing but a summation of numerous tones of slight differences in pitch sounding together. So, for example, one can make a surprising imitation of the striking of great tower-clocks by simultaneously playing six dissonant tones of the contra-octave at once on the piano. The *Heldentenor* Erick Schmedes, famed as such in his time and also a virtuoso-pianist, used to play for his friends one of his own pieces in which he painted a visit of Russian battleships to the Port of Copenhagen: the Russian and Danish hymns rang out and in their midst was heard the dull roar of the honor-salute of the heavy ships' cannon, which was created by short blows on numerous keys of the subcontra- and the contra-octave, which produced the dissonant tones. The ear could not possibly grasp such stimuli as sounds—although the strings of the piano did produce sounds—and thus there was an impression of noise. As products of aperiodic air-vibrations, noises are far less complexible than tones and sounds. The reason for the very characteristic differentiation between them as regards the pleasure they produce is as follows: if noises are confused, incomplexible, wearisome, and mixed-up for our perception, tones are far too simple

and ordered, far too complexible, and therefore empty and boring. Sounds, on the other hand, are as well organized in their acoustical components as are the tones, but they are more varied at the same time: they set the ear into activity in a manner which is as rich as it is organized; for our perception they achieve the much desired agreement between that pleasant sensation coming from the recurrence of the similar which is characteristic of every form of periodicity (pleasure in recurrence) and pleasure in novelty (pleasure in variation); here multiplicity and unity are in balance.

Thus sounds are marked by an objective-physical organization and the eurythmy of vibration-proportions; when these are absent, when acoustical impulses in confused and disordered succession affect a drum-head, there is an impression of noise. But yet other objective signs belong to tones as compared with noises. Tones arrange themselves for our hearing into a series within which they create specific degrees of "high" and "low"; this is not the case with noises, which are not capable of being represented by notes and which are not graspable in terms of pitch-values. It happens also that tones and sounds have the possibility of being consonant and of making consonances; with them the harmonic sounding-together of many tones (sounds) is possible; but such a possibility is lacking in noises. Strokes occurring simultaneously on the drum, the triangle, and the cymbal do not result in harmony. The greater agreeableness of sounds as compared with noises is based also on the fact that the former is in a higher degree adequate to the principle of economy, the rule of the minimum expenditure of energy. Tones and sounds can be uniformly produced and similarly perceived with less expenditure of energy and therefore for a longer period of time than noises. From the sides of tonal production and of tonal perception, one can understand why, according to the basic principle of the minimum expenditure of energy, sounds are preferred to noises and why there is an art of tone, but not one of noise.

According to Müller-Freienfels,¹⁸² sounds are distinguished from noises in that their rhythm, which remains below consciousness, has an organized form which cannot be found in noises. Thus tone in a purely physiological fashion arouses pleasure in participation on the same grounds as those for which consciousness experiences a rhythmically ordered series of tones as pleasant. But sounds have a still further fundamental form of organization in music: consonance and harmony. Musical sounds are not simple tones, but consonances having a certain organization. Even in this respect the material of music is not something simple which has no order, but by

nature it carries an organized form within itself. In connection with sounds, therefore, one can speak not only of an unconscious rhythm, but also of an unconscious harmony; in both instances a law in condition below the threshold of consciousness asserts itself, a law according to which music in greater measure is enlarged into the harmonic system known as a world of aesthetic form. If our modern sense of sound prefers instruments which are richer in overtones, it does so because we unconsciously hear even an apparently simple sound as a chord—that is, we participate in the enjoyment of the possibilities of simultaneous form which are in the germ. Sound is more welcome to the ear than noise for the same reason for which the ear also prefers organized chords to confused dissonances. The modern European harmonic system in its outlines is only an amplification of the overtone-structure operating below the threshold in every musical sound. Separate sounds not only make up chords; they *are* chords. Besides the rhythmical and harmonic elements that are below consciousness, there is in the single sounds also a melodic element which is below consciousness. This is an interval-character which is below consciousness. The overtones in musical sound have a certain position-value. The shaping of this organization into scales takes place only in artistic application, but the presuppositions for this application are already in the material itself, in the sounds themselves. The overtones sounding together as octave and fifth are not merely the pre-forms of chord-building, but in succession are also the foundation-stones of all scale-building and therefore of all strict melody-writing. The scale with its natural degrees is the sound separated into its overtones; and to the extent that the melody moves along these tonal degrees, it is pre-structured in the single sound. Sound is therefore a highly complex structure that has in its germ the possibilities of leading to artistic form and expression. Sound is intrinsically a form already given order, and its usefulness for music lies precisely in those natural conditions of form which are below the surface.

If we have been able to establish that the single sound is as it were a sub-threshold chord in a nutshell, then we have arrived at the point from which we can make a transition to the next train of thought. We have already had occasion, in speaking of the well-organized and complexible manifold of sounds and of the chaotic and unorganized multiplicity of noises, to say something about the central musical-aesthetic phenomenon of consonance and dissonance, which is at the core of the theory of chords (that is, of the simultaneous union of two or more tones [sounds]). In a great number

of cases when a person hits two keys on the piano at the same time, it appears that, in terms of direct impression and of the feeling attached to it, the tones do not agree; they do not blend, do not sound in agreement, and therefore produce a strongly unpleasant effect which is called dissonance. In other cases, again, the opposite is true: the tones fit and sound together, agree well, and seem to exist as if for each other; and they make and blend the "sounding together" into a delightful novelty without, however, giving up their individuality or without themselves disappearing. What has occurred is the agreeable impression of consonance. But here one finds a series of gradations. Not all consonantal tones have an equally favorable effect as they are sounded together. The highest degree of agreeableness of effect does not really lie in the highest degree of consonance, but rather in degrees of slight diminution of it.

Let us recapitulate, to begin with, the physical facts which apply here. Any tone one chooses, let us say c^1 , is related to its octave c^2 as 1:2, to its fifth g^1 as 2:3, to its fourth f^1 as 3:4, to its major third e^1 as 4:5, to its major sixth a^1 as 3:5, to its minor third e flat¹ as 5:6, to its minor sixth a flat¹ as 5:8, to the tritone (augmented fourth) f sharp¹ as 5:7. Then for most people there is a clear turning-point, and the following chords are sensed as dissonances: the major second d , which has the proportion of 8:9, the minor seventh b flat¹ (5:9), the small second c sharp¹ (15:16), the major seventh b (8:15). The intervals not included in our scale correspond to proportions of still larger numbers. If we establish 100 vibrations for a beginning tone, there results an octave in the regular series of 200 vibrations. The fifth has a series of 150 vibrations, and the major third 125—and so forth. The vibration-proportions of simultaneously sounding tones decrease in simplicity—as can be seen in the preceding series, and therefore the impression of the consonance of the corresponding tones becomes less, a process which finally in the vibration-proportions of the least simplicity leads to the impression of dissonance. Therefore it has been said that the sense of consonance is in a relation of legal dependency to the proportions of the series of physical vibrations from which the sensations of tone arise.

We shall speak later of what can be brought in critical objection against this proposition; here I am again only considering a fact which has already been mentioned. One experiences the most perfect of consonances when a tone sounds at the same time as its octave. But this consonance-feeling is not at the same time also the highest kind of pleasurable sensation which one can have as two tones are sounded simultaneously; instead, somewhat less perfect consonances like fifths and (even more), fourths, sixths, and thirds

produce a greater sensuous pleasure. Octaves, and even fifths too, are uninteresting and empty in sound. The fourth, the third, and the sixth are more interesting because they are richer in content (*inhaltsreicher*) and more varied as to nuances (*nuancierter*); in these dual sounds (intervals) an aspect foreign or antithetical, the relative dissonance, is added to pure consonance, but it is precisely this that is a requisite for the highest pleasure. Again we meet with a confirmation of the principle of multiplicity in unity. It is exactly for this reason that today we are really better pleased by polyphonic than by absolute and maximally consonant music which is homophonic or antiphonic (proceeding in octaves). The fact that somewhat differentiated consonances in which a slight dissonance is "suspended" (*aufgehoben*) (in the Hegelian sense of negation, conservation, and suspension) please us more than do undifferentiated and absolutely pure consonances can therefore be explained in terms of a law which is at the base of all aesthetic effect. But we now ask, further, why it is that sounds occurring together which have physically distinctive vibration-proportions cause aesthetic agreeableness. In answering this question, which is related primarily to the ratios of dual sounds (intervals), we shall include the condition of the harmony of sounds which is below the threshold.

The answer nearest at hand (which therefore is also the oldest) seems to lie in the acceptance of the notion that the character of consonance-experience is decided specifically by the pleasure one finds in the simplest possible numerical proportions. Thus Euler¹³³ said that "*ordo simplicior et facile perceptibilis gaudium, ordo magis compositus et eiusmodi, ut difficilior possit perspicui, tristitiam.*"* And Leibniz¹³⁴ as he explained this state of affairs also began back at the complexibility of rationally intelligible numerical proportions: "*Musica est exercitium arithmeticae occultum nescientis se numerare animi . . . errant qui nihil in anima fieri putant, cuius ipsa non sit conscia. Anima igitur, etsi se numerare non sentiat, sentit tamen huius numerationis insensibilis effectum, seu voluptatem in consonantiis, molestiam in dissonantiis inde resultantem.*"† This idea

* "In joy the order is more simple and easily perceptible, in sadness the order is more disciplined and of such a kind that it can be perceived with more difficulty."

† "Music is the secret exercise of arithmetics of the mind unaware that it is arranging figures . . . They err who think that nothing is constructed in the mind whose very being may not be conscious. The mind, therefore, even if it may not realize that it is arranging figures, nevertheless feels the effect of this unconscious arranging, whether the result be a delight in its harmonies or a distress in its discords."

was already found in the music-theory of Pythagoras and in that of Plato, which derived from Pythagoras: both draw upon the simplicity of the numbers of vibrations to explain consonance. The facts cannot be shaken: agreeable dual sounds are marked by an especial simplicity in the ratios of their vibration-numbers. Therefore our tonal system is governed by the principle of the simplest numerical ratios. "The simplest numerical proportions which also exhibit the purest consonance give our music its melodic and harmonic frame" (Révész).

But the role of mathematical relations is even greater. If a person who hears two tones sounded together takes in regularly appearing difference-tones in addition, it becomes clear that a complete arithmetical series is erected by the difference-tones of consonantal dual sounds, but not by those of dissonances.¹³⁵ In similar terms the greater agreeableness of tones (sounds) as contrasted with noises has been traced back to such kinds of complexible arrangements in the realm of the pre-aesthetic substrate. The repetition and return of likenesses which is characteristic of all periodicities is an aesthetically effective factor by which so-called pleasure in recurrence is caused. As a special example of this one may admit pleasure in legality itself. The sinoidal vibrations which are at the base of simple tones reveal an especially simple lawfulness which we can express

by the formula $Y = a \sin 2\pi \frac{t}{T}$. Finally, the periodic interpreted in mathematical terms is labeled or marked, whereas the aperiodic dispenses with such marks of distinction.¹³⁶

Despite its hoary age and despite the fact that it has been adopted by authorities of the highest rank—besides the people named, Schopenhauer too could be cited—this theory must be rejected as untenable. To derive the greater agreeableness of tones as compared with noises, and of consonances as compared with dissonances, from a pleasure in organized numerical proportions one must presuppose an unconscious counting which can never consciously be demonstrated, but which may not be postulated either. In the psychological view, the theory mentioned is thoroughly inadequate because it takes into its service as a psychical presupposition of pleasant sensation an idea of numerical proportions which are no more present in consciousness than is the number of vibrations which one hears in single tones. This theory attributes to the ear or to the mind a kind of knowledge of the numbers or of numerical proportions upon which psychology absolutely cannot draw to explain tonal representation, tonal judgments, and tonal feelings, and it cannot do so

precisely because only people educated in physics, and thus only a minute fraction of people who are capable of tonal-aesthetic experience, know anything about this counting.¹⁸⁷

One can produce a further grave objection to the fact that for the greatest number of hearers the simplicity of the proportional numbers of vibrations and the pleasing sound are not identical or completely parallel: Thus fourths, thirds, and sixths, despite their more complicated vibrational proportions, are more pleasant than fifths and octaves. Inversely, the major second, despite its simple vibrational proportions (8:9), is accented by unpleasantness. Even if one admits that the simplicity of vibrational proportions is of significance for aesthetic experience, yet one must still point to a factor which causes certain tonal pairs to be lacking in aesthetic value despite their simple vibrational proportions. This looked-for factor has in fact been made famous: namely, by Helmholtz¹⁸⁸ in his theory of the beats or blows (*Stösse*) which, it is supposed, comprise the main factor of displeasure in dissonances. Before we can go into this matter, however, I must indicate briefly a theory as advocated by Theodor Lipps of the agreeableness of simple numerical proportions which is free of certain of the narrownesses of rationalism, a theory which attempts to put this agreeableness in accord with the basic epistemological requirements of psychology.

He admits that between the physical factor and the aesthetic factor associated with it there is a relation of causal dependence, "that that legal relation between consonance and dissonance in tones on the one hand and simplicity and lesser simplicity of vibrational proportions on the other is not a matter of chance, but that the consonance and dissonance of tones is caused by the simplicity or lesser simplicity of vibrational proportions." To be sure, one has to reflect that these vibrations are something physical, whereas the feeling of consonance takes place in the psyche. The sense of consonance and dissonance can be understood in terms of vibrational proportions only under a hypothesis: namely, that these vibrations or their proportions occur in some way too in the psychic experiences resulting from these vibrations, in the tonal experiences, that the physical vibrations "sound across" into the experiences of the sensation of tone. The psychic excitement which is caused by the series of physical vibrations is caused by their character. Thus one is justified in accepting the idea that even these vibrational rhythms which specifically are the distinctive mark of the different series of vibrations in some way also recur in the corresponding psychic excitement.

This theory, which according to the more recent opinion does not present a satisfactory solution to the problem of consonance, is marked by an acceptance of a thorough-going parallelism between physical-physiological events and the contents of psychological experience. According to this view, the degrees of consonance or dissonance depend on the larger or smaller rhythmical similarities of two tones with respect to their vibrational frequency, which calls forth a greater or lesser similarity of nerve-processes and therefore a corresponding impression of similarity or likeness in connection with consonances, and an impression of a lack of similarity or of an unlikeness in connection with dissonances. According to Révész, consonance is an original phenomenon which cannot be explained by analyzing it into its elements and reducing it to something more basic.

The Helmholtzian theory of beats (*Schwebungen*) explains the unpleasant effect of dissonances by means of certain variations in intensity, variations which appear when two tones sound at the same time and which correspond to the difference in the numbers of vibration of the two tones. Such beats or blows occur the more numerous, on the average, between the overtones as the vibration-numbers are in less simple ratios to the basic tones. By this Helmholtz means to conclude that the so-called sense of dissonance exists in a lack of pleasure in the beats of the partial tones. He succeeds also in building this assertion into a more general law, into the over-reaching fact, namely, that intermittent sense-impressions (the light of a flickering flames, the scratching of the skin, the sudden alternation of light and shade as one walks along a paling-fence between the palings of which the sun shines) procure for us a lively displeasure. Such a disagreeable intermittency appears in beats. But a series of special (physical) and more general (psychological-aesthetic) objections have been brought to this theory, which was completely developed only in the investigations of Preyer and Krüger about difference-tones. It is only with the more general objections that we can occupy ourselves. The assumption that beats are the ultimate basis for our pleasure in consonances and for our displeasure in dissonances leads us directly to logical difficulties. Pleasure in consonance would then be something purely negative: namely, the lack of displeasure in beats. But pleasure presents itself with strong experiential certainty as thoroughly positive. At best the theory just mentioned therefore explains displeasure in dissonance, but not pleasure in consonance. This would then be a theory for consistent Schopenhauerians because, for them, happiness and pleasure are

only something deprivative: that state of being free of pain and unpleasantness which alone has affirmative potency. After all, such conceptions are not entirely unique, even in aesthetics. According to a theory I have already discussed, everything in the world can be the object of aesthetic pleasure if only it does not suspend our interest in form because of disgust or fear and does not make impossible a delight in that contemplation involving surrender to and a dwelling on the object.

Yet I believe that we do better by approaching the position of Ziehen, according to whom there is no point in tracing a positive feeling of pleasure in consonances back only to the absence of unpleasant beats. To be sure, we are familiar with the fact that freedom from unpleasantness is felt pleasantly; but in the example given it is required that we assume that an object arouses pleasure in the absence of predominant unpleasantness merely because it does not call up displeasure. For this reason Ziehen finds it impossible to see how the single source of dissonance and consonance can be the presence or absence of beats; he merely recognizes that through the addition of displeasure in beats a wider assortment of chords takes place because many which on the basis of the simplicity of their vibrational proportions could well claim a place among consonances lose their positive feeling-tone because of the unpleasantness of beats.

Thus the theory of beats and difference-tones only in part explains the state of affairs in question; and therefore other theories have been put forth also, such as those of tonal similarity and tonal blending. According to the first, one sees similarity as the reason for pleasure in the alliance of two tones. Consonantal dual-sounds are certainly distinguished by the fact that they have overtones in common. But even apart from overtones, consonantal sounds exhibit similarities of "tone-color,"¹³⁹ those which, for example, in octaves of the higher reaches can actually cause permutations and confusions. In the abstract, however, this basis for explanation is not satisfying because it suffices only for the octave and perhaps also for the fifth; it must be rejected for the other intervals. Therefore one has to broaden and modify the concept of agreement on the basis of similarity; this sort of thing is attempted in the theory of tonal blending. Similar tones are consonant because they blend with special ease when they sound together. Many scholars have found the most important characteristic of consonance in this fact and have therefore defined it as the feeling of pleasure growing out of the complete or high degree of blending of two tones sounding simultaneously. Already in the music-theory of late antiquity¹⁴⁰

it was said that consonant tones produce a unified, but that dissonances have a cleft and unblended (*δούγκρατος*) sound-effect. In our day this theory has been taken up by C. Stumpf.¹⁴¹ Now it cannot really be disputed that the degree of blending in the octave and the fifth is very great, and that in the second and the seventh it is extremely small; still, degrees of blending and degrees of pleasure do not coincide. Therefore blending cannot be the single decisive issue in a pleasing sound. A psychological-aesthetic analysis of blending-experiences is very interesting. Lack of pleasure in the intermittencies of sounds, displeasure in beats, is a direct sensuous feeling. The sensuous effect of these beats in their offensiveness can be convincingly perceived if two flutes play c^3 and c sharp³ at the same time. Let us remark incidentally that Haydn in *The Seasons* in an ingenious way used the beats made by seconds on the flute to reproduce the chirping of crickets. As compared with this, experiences of blending are on another rung of the ladder. Here there is experience of a relation which takes place on several levels of intuitivity. To begin with, the degree of blending (that is, of the uniformity of the impression) is in close relation with the pleasure-factor of complexibility which plays a role already in single sounds; afterwards, such an experience of blending takes place not only as one hears two tones sounding at the same time, but also as one recalls two tones which are no longer given in sensation in the present time but which exist only in memory. According to Stumpf,¹⁴² intellectual factors of perception like these also play a role in the so-called experience of concordance. The augmented triad $c-e-g$ sharp produces an impression of dissonance which lacks delight because people, by reason of their familiarity with the major chord, imagine the tone of g with c and e ; the g sharp which actually sounds does not therefore fulfill an anticipation. Here is a question of beats between the tones actually given in sense-experience and the tones imagined into it. This is not an isolated example of the fact that elements of associated representation can cause a direct sensuous unpleasantness; in connection with geometrical-optical illusions too associated ideas influence the sensuous appearance.

To summarize: in acoustical experiences too the factors of recurrence (the return and recognition of similarities) and of complexibility (easy comprehension conditioned by good objective organization) have a positive effect in their train. According to Ziehen, recognizability and complexibility are at the center of musical-aesthetic experience. Furthermore, it is suggested that these

two principles be combined under a superior concept of assimilability, and then one can say that tones are more assimilable than are noises, and consonant chords more so than dissonant ones. Assimilation therefore implies perception and combining. The vibrations of the musical tone *c* are more easily brought together and more unequivocally grasped than are the screams of automobile brakes; the tonal combination of *c-e-g* is more easily combined and grasped than *c-e-g* sharp or *c-c* sharp-*d*.

But here too our explanation does not reach finality. A metaphysical hypothesis is occasionally summoned for the mastery of the remaining unexplained matters. Then one admits to a direct connection between the mathematical simplicity of stimuli or of the excitement of the cortex and products of aesthetic feeling, a connection which is not psychologically established and which therefore cannot be explained further by way of psychology. This is the warranted kernel at the base of the theories of Leibniz and Euler. At all events, one can with a certain justification ask whether a simple periodicity of stimuli on the cortex is not already accented by pleasure, without regard to whether it arises from single tones or consonant chords. Occasionally it is taken for granted that there is a direct pre-established harmony between the organization of our hearing-system and certain acoustical organizations and orders. Müller-Freienfels,¹⁴⁸ for example, does this when he looks for the basis of the pleasantness of consonances in the physiological (that is, in the fact that for organs of hearing a regular and uniform stimulation—which as such is not conscious—is more acceptable than an irregular and disproportionate one). This at the same time conforms to the law of economy of means. Now, the organization of our hearing is precisely such that organized participation is experienced as pleasant, whereas the disorganized kind is experienced as unpleasant. Clearly there is appeal here to one of our nativistic-*aprioristic* possessions. But how is one to think of this possession? There are certain facts in this connection which are true for everyone's sound-organs: the fact, for instance, that at the lower and at the top extremes of sound nothing is heard and, further, that over-loud stimuli which can ruin our ear-drums and the far-too-soft ones which we are usually not able or which we are hardly able to perceive universally result in disagreeable effects. But can one say that the human organ of hearing is "tuned" ("*abgestimmt*"), so to speak, within the marked-out limits of quality and quantity for certain orders of vibrations? By contrast, it seems possible to say that in the course of centuries what civilized people of the Western World

have demanded of tone-color, consonance, and harmony has changed in nature, and indeed that outside our civilization there are very different tonal systems, those of the Siamese, for instance, the Javanese, the Chinese, and so forth. Thus the Javanese scale is made up of five steps of equal size; these are separated from one another by tonal steps which lie between our whole and half steps and sound unpleasant to our ears. On the other hand, one must emphasize a fact which is of great importance: that even in musical systems so different from ours, the mathematical simplicity and the distinction of the proportions of the vibration-numbers seem to be of decisive significance for the accentuation of aesthetic feeling. Yet despite the recognition given to certain elementary aptitudes for form, even in this sphere one must constantly reckon with the fact that it is exactly here that habit and the experiences transmitted to one's generation play a role larger than elsewhere and that, as a result of this, certain positive aesthetic effects are attached to certain combinations of two or more sounds which do not belong to them in other places. For this reason there is no more an absolute boundary between consonance and dissonance which is valid for all times and all people than there is between the pleasant and the unpleasant. Chords and voice-combinations which seemed cacophonous and dissonant to people of earlier centuries and which they therefore most seriously forbade are today risked without objection as pleasantly sensed and therefore as truly allowable. I am not thinking about atonal music and its functionless chords, but about the harmonic practice of late Impressionism as Strauss, Mahler, and others pursued it. Every great composer is a discoverer and a remover of boundary stones in the realm of harmony. Mozart, who for us is the height of harmonic-melodic euphony, allowed himself many things which seemed forbidden audacities to a Fux or a Keiser; and in the works of his last years, Beethoven was particularly esteemed as a revolutionary in the realm of harmony. The works of Richard Wagner seemed in this respect even more audacious to his tradition-bound contemporaries. His "held (*"vorbehalten"*) chords of the diminished seventh which ask for resolution" become a characteristic of his harmony. Thus an interval whose title as dissonance was well-fixed until recently has advanced upwards, so to speak, to become a consonance. Hearing-requirements are quite variable and can be markedly influenced by habit and custom. Révész therefore speaks of the elasticity of hearing. Let us remember that the Middle Ages still felt the third as a dissonance. Such practices make it clear that consonance and dissonance are extremely

relative concepts, that a tonal combination which sounds dissonant to listeners of one epoch is felt as consonant by other hearers and times. There is even a certain line of development in evidence according to which always stronger dissonances are apperceived as unities.¹⁴⁴ The evolution of modern harmony consists of the gradual inclusion of always more startling tonal combinations which only at first were sensed with an original shock of unfamiliarity as dissonant, but later as thoroughly pleasant in sound. Our capacity for experiencing even slightly related tones as a unit can be greatly influenced by training, and when enough authoritative examples appear, a chord which for a long time has acted as a dissonance will be felt as a consonance. These authoritative cases are supplied by standard composers of every epoch who are under the compulsion of having to create something new. From Liszt comes the dictum that a tonal work is worthless unless at least three unprecedented chord-connections appear in it. The incessant striving for originality which persistently drives the individual who is not an epigone into the creating of material which advances expression—this causes him to make projections into the realm of dissonance and to make harmonic discoveries in it.

Even if we have represented consonances as pleasant and dissonances as unpleasant, one must not conclude that in music consonances and dissonances are inimically and conclusively opposed as good is to bad or that the one should be exclusively sought for and the other be discarded without qualification. The opposite is correct: even the most euphonious system of harmony cannot renounce dissonances. As untoward as accumulated or isolated dissonances may sound, a music made up of sonorous consonances in *forte* would be hardly less intolerable. Dissonantal intervals can lose their unfavorable effects by means of two aspects as a result of which they become the indispensable building material of music: through their formal embeddedness in a vertically effective structure of chords and through their horizontal interrelatedness with what precedes and what follows—by the so-called resolution of dissonances. The two tones *c-b* flat are disagreeable in isolation, but in a formal context of the dominant seventh chord *c-e-g-b* flat they are quite pleasant even if one disregards the pre-prepared resolution in the direction of F major, because dissonant intervals undergo modification through moderate degrees of blending which form multiple-toned chords. In the same way, a tone and its ninth are disagreeable (the ninth is the second of the octave); but in the ninth-chord (for example, *c-e-g-b* flat-*d*¹) this interval, offensive

in isolation, takes on something sad and full of longing; it lends to the chord an "anticipatory" (*erwartenden*) good sound, so to speak, which in resolution then finds an out-and-out happy realization. Pure consonantal chords—like the triad—contain something reposeful, final. Our entire harmonic system—at least the traditional one when it is undisturbed by attempts of whole-tone composers like Debussy or of the atonalists, and so forth, to depart from it—is built on the triad, starts from it, and constantly returns to it. It alone means rest and a conclusion. For our hearing-habits, developed as they have been in the course of a long tradition, major and minor triads are the simple chords which guarantee a conclusion, and for this reason all polyphonic material is oriented in their direction. They are therefore called "definite" (*"bestimmt"*) chords, and dissonances like chords of the seventh and the ninth are called "indefinite" (*"unbestimmt"*). Thus their mood-contents are very different too. If the major triad expresses joy, pride, restfulness, confidence, and courage, and if the minor expresses sadness, despair, melancholy, resignation, then those called indefinite reveal longing, anticipation, lack of satisfaction, uncertainty, fluctuation, and unrest. There are psychic moods and planes of feeling which cannot be indicated or reproduced by consonances; if they are to be expressed, dissonances must be used; and thus it is that as the sharpness of the dissonance grows, its expressive value grows also, as does its power to describe and characterize.

But a theodicy of dissonance would have not only to point to its expressive value, but also to discover its significance primarily in the fact that without it there would not even be a complete consonance and that it is ultimately a necessary aspect of the forward driving of musical happenings. In order to perceive this correctly, we must remind ourselves again that the sense of harmony is not a mental sense, but the emotional reaction to a formal relation, a quality of structure. Critical for the experience of consonance and dissonance is the relation of the single sounds to a unit of sound. If the relation is fixed or if, though not given in and with the perception, it at all events is securely added by one's mind in terms of intellectual factors as Stumpf¹⁴⁵ has stressed them, then the impression of consonance takes place.

According to this point of view, as Dessoir correctly maintains, a consonance no longer appears as a direct accompaniment to the contents of the sensation of sound, but as the prime condition of the so-called cadence-faculty (*Schlussfähigkeit*). It is not that harmony is supported by concordance, but, inversely, that con-

sonance is found wherever tones belong to the same harmony (that is, to the same major or minor chord). If it is said that tones which belong to the same basic chord are consonances, one has traced consonance back to the latent sense of harmony which is inseparable from music (and which will occupy us again in the section on melody). More important for us here at the beginning is the justification of dissonance which grows out of such considerations. According to Dessoir, dissonances are not meaningless accumulations of tone at all, but musical formations which partly serve the secondary aim of being offensive and which partly have their own peculiar worth. Dissonantal sounds are not proper to the harmony concerned, but contradict it, though in a fruitful and significant fashion. In dissonant combined sounds there is a conflict between individual sounds capable of being combined into a harmonic unit and the ultimate tone with which they are inimical; otherwise they would hardly be bearable, not to mention necessary. Even when there is a question, not of a typical chord, but of the coinciding of several voices contrapuntally led, there is preparation as one grasps the course of the multiple voices for an alleviation of the impression which is disagreeable to the ear.

A consequence of our sense of tonality is that the task of dissonances is to work as tension-bearers in melodic-harmonic structures, and this is demonstrated by the fact that in atonal music they lose this function.

In connection with meaningful dissonance, consciousness takes the position of denying homogeneity. But musically meaningful dissonances are not for this reason added capriciously, but have an important task for the harmony of the piece; here are the bases for their appearance and the justification of their existence. In the realm of matters harmonic, dissonances have the task of introducing multiplicity and modulation as well as of enhancing the effect of the consonances by way of contrast; furthermore, they serve to diversify and enrich melodic possibilities and, with all of this, to reinforce the effect in the service of expression. We have elucidated only a part of what has just been said when we stress the fact that the introduction of dissonances serves the forward motion of music: thus the dissonance of the "deceptive cadence" ("*Trugschluss*") leads further on and beyond, as contrasted with the full cadence of the final triad.

To be sure, chiefly and in essence, harmonic effects are essentially effects of simultaneity; but there is a certain pressing forward in the direction of succession in them because only a perfect har-

mony is intrinsically restful, in contrast with which all disharmonies have an aspect of tension that presses forward in a certain way and direction. "In any case, it is a characteristic trait of the dissonances used in our harmonic system that they press not for resolution in general, but for a resolution which is specifically anticipated within certain boundaries, and that after the resolution the preceding tension continues to sound. This harmonic backwards-and-forwards relation extraordinarily strengthens the compactness of modern music." A tension-character of this kind already befits the third which stands between harmony and disharmony and in which for this reason is inherent the kind of tendency which pushes forward in a certain direction. A series of chords containing a pressing-forward which points in a certain direction is called a cadence.¹⁴⁶

It is the business of a special empirical aesthetics which is as rich in tradition as it is well developed to concern itself with the theory of the formation, the structure, and the legal sequence of chords made up of more than two tones, of different voices sounding legitimately together: I mean the theory of harmony. To enter into this realm of competence cannot in any way be the ambition of aesthetics proper. In conclusion, therefore, let us consider only one general problem: the differentiation of tonal species. That major and minor produce basically different mood-effects is a fact which is as familiar as it is difficult to explain. A piece of music written in a major key sounds cheerful, delightful, resolute, spirited; in a slow tempo serious, but thoroughly elevated. Minor keys sound plaintive, sad, and melancholy; in quick tempo something wildly bacchantic and fiercely boisterous enters into them. People have often argued about the reasons for these so different effects which in experience are so distinct. We shall follow the explanation of Külpe that there is a characteristic difference as to how degrees of blending are ordered: the major third can be above or below the minor one in the triad. Of all dual sounds, the major third in isolation already makes the most delightful impression because unity and disunity are in approximate balance in it. But in the minor third disunity is prevalent, and small deviations are especially disagreeable because they sound sad. By way of the major or the minor third, however, the major or the minor triad receives its characteristic chordal color.

b.² Succession (Melody). If harmony is the simultaneous arrangement of several sounds, of their sounding together, melody is an arrangement of sounds in succession; it is a series and a unitary composition of sounds which are perceived in relation to one another; it is a meaningfully effective musical totality arising out of

the organized succession of single tones, a form-in-a-series of higher and lower tones (sounds) moving on the legally established degrees of the tonal system (scale). In all cases, a melody is more than a mere summation, more than an aggregate of tones; instead, it is the model of a form and as such is beyond summation and transposable. Tones are not near one another in a whimsical fashion and without connections, but are related to one another meaningfully and present themselves to direct apprehension as structurally necessary and as organically interrelated. When one is not forced into having an impression of a meaningful state of interrelatedness, as sometimes occurs, for example, with unfamiliar kinds of tone-leading, we hear, not a tonal form, not a melody, but only a series of tones which are not formally unified. Melodies exhibit the form-qualities of tonal steps; but in addition they also have the factor of temporal-rhythmical organization and are so dependent upon it that every rhythmical change that occurs even in the tonal contents which continue the same produces a far-reaching change in the melody—this is self-evident, but not a fundamental point for us as yet; thus I can bracket it off for the present.

Melody and harmony are in the closest relationship to each other, and this is true in a number of senses. In the first place, the two are normally bound together. Most primitive people who created melodies also knew the harmonic accompaniment to them. Moreover, with us melody and harmony are inseparable—for example, in accompanied monody as it prevails in arias and songs for a single voice or for solo instrument, or in the sense that, of the four essential voices of a strictly composed passage, the highest voice, which carries the melody, is supported by the three other voices and that this upper voice which comprises and forms the melody is at the same time an integral component of the harmony. But, above all, this characteristic union between melody and harmony is expressed by the fact that they cohere genetically and grow out of each other. Therefore Rameau¹⁴⁷ called melody a harmony drawn apart, by which he meant to say that our melodic sense is entirely and always supported by a latent sense of harmony. "In whatever way a melody may be executed—by a single voice, by many voices, with accompaniment—it contains a harmony in a succession. The harmony which is not simultaneous, or tonality, implies that all constituents of the motif are brought into relation with a tone or chord lying at the base of the tonality; in every motif grasped as a unity, a primary tone or primary chord is held in memory."¹⁴⁸ That today revolutionary tendencies are making an assault on tonality and

on the subordination of melody to the harmony which is based on tonality—this does not do away with the fact that all of the master-works of the musical tradition we esteem have grown out of this basic relation between melody and harmony. The melody-building of modern Western music is a display of harmony and is definitely determined by the factor of latent harmony. Müller-Freienfels¹⁴⁹ has stressed this especially.

In our melody-building, the later elements are predetermined by the earlier ones, even though not unequivocally, and thus they are got ready before-hand. Even the smallest section of melody, the motif, already moves in a harmonic series which then, in a uniting of many motifs into larger structures, arrives at a certain conclusion or close, which also is prepared for. By these means a far greater compactness of the melody is accomplished than is possible in an arbitrary tonal series. Because the ear is prepared, it can apperceive the entire tonal complex more easily; and possibilities of a poignant surprise are also given, possibilities which cannot be thought of as present in an arbitrary series of tones. All of the melodies of modern music are harmonically supported. In a later place¹⁵⁰ Müller-Freienfels says this even more decisively, and thus his formulation has a certain vigor which grows out of the coercive influence of a system. The tonal-scale and the melody which moves within it are a separating out of the overtones vibrating in unison with the fundamental tone. As that fundamental tone and scale work through memory and anticipation from out of the subconscious into the conscious, the melody is not a mere formation of a series of tones, but a kind of coexistence. In every case it has its spring in the same source, the subconscious harmony in the single sound, out of which the harmonic system working in coexistence has been derived.

The construction and the effect of melody are organized indirectly and below the surface from out of the harmonic, and this harmony asserts itself not only in the intervallic relationships of single melodic steps, but also in a series of secondary requirements, but requirements which prevail in an established convention: thus, for instance, the demand that the melodic formation of a musical piece hold strictly to the unity of the tonic—that is, that the musical piece after all of its key changes and modulations return to the tonal point of departure. By these means a formal concentration is effected which, despite all the multiplicity of the melodic happenings, secures the unity of the whole. Beautiful melodies can be derived from the individual tones of the triad and the dominant seventh chord. One recalls the singing-exercises of Concone, the

music which introduces Mozart's *Bastien und Bastienne*, and the motif of the first movement of the *Eroica*, all of which are made up of the E flat major triad; or the *andante* to the "*Kettledrum*" *Symphony* of Haydn, which is built on the tones of the C major triad and the dominant seventh chord associated with it.

Lipps¹⁵¹ in impressive formulations has also pointed to the intimate connection between melody and harmony. In melody it is the proximity of tones which achieves aesthetic significance. Not the proximity of any tones one would like to pick, however, but that of tones which are in relatively simple vibrational ratios and of which the one to a certain degree points to the other as its base. The effect of the affinity of such tones and especially of this method of pointing towards something is increased by the proximity. In the use of these relationships lies the generating and operative factor of melody, which is a closed and unified system of tonal rhythm erected on or arising from a succession of tones. But to this system there belongs the unity of a basic rhythm which governs the entire melody, which proceeds directly from the basic rhythm enclosed in the tonic, or which brings in the basic rhythm by way of tones related to and aimed at it—above all the fifth as a dominant. It then abandons this basic rhythm, this foundation-stone, this state of equilibrium, and assimilates the conflict, the opposition, dissention, antagonism, but only to prevail over it. Because it does this, it brings the tonic into domination at the end. The melody is the history of this kind of quarrel and the victory over it.

Important as these connections between harmony and melody are, reflection in the face of an over-evaluation of those relationships still warns us that when two tones follow one another which make an unfortunate dissonance as they are sounded together, the beats (*Schwebungen*) which in the playing of chords are a characteristic aspect of the unpleasant effect are absent. If a person analyzes a series of beautiful melodies which through ease of psychic participation invite us to a hearing-perception which has life and excitement, one will find that intervals which are unpleasant when they are produced simultaneously (like, say, the major or the minor second) make a favorable impression if they are sounded in succession and that they contribute in a fundamental way to the beauty of the melody. Experimental investigation of two tones in sequence¹⁵² has revealed with certainty that the accentuation of feeling attached to them does not coincide with that which comes from the same tones occurring as an interval played at once. Without doubt, the possible echo in memory of the first of them has a certain influence

on the second because of psychological present time, but the resulting weak feeling of consonance or dissonance can at once be drowned by the impression they make as a sequence—that is, if special circumstances do not come to assist that feeling. There is an entirely different scale of pleasure as concerns two tones when they are played in succession and, analogously, when they are played together.¹⁵³ Thus major and minor seconds in sequence lose their negative feeling-accentuation, and the minor third is often more pleasant than the major. As for facts which have been ascertained experimentally, the statement of Lipps¹⁵⁴ is for theoretical reasons untenable; I mean the statement that there is no basic difference between the simultaneity and the succession of tones. Fifths and fourths as melodic steps following one another are far more pleasure-accented than they are when they are sounded together. But the inversion of the effect of seconds is especially decisive because they make their best effect of all in melody as suspensions and appoggiaturas: much of the agreeableness of the melodies of Rossini, Kuhlau, and others depends on such devices. But sounded together, seconds are disagreeable. For the movement of tones in melodies, small steps are constitutive and characteristic. According to a commonly accepted idea, the smallest steps in sound (half- and whole-tone steps) within a good harmonic phrase have validity as being truly melodic, whereas the larger ones (especially those of the fourth and fifth) are called harmonic. In his aesthetics of music Schopenhauer has placed special importance on this stipulation. According to him, it is a distinguishing mark of the voice carrying the melody that it move in small steps, in contrast to the heavily-moving bass, for which large ones are characteristic. In his music-psychology, Révész also follows the notion that intervals in sequence and intervals sounded simultaneously (chords) must be strictly differentiated, for they are phenomenally different tonal structures. That there is a difference between the impression of the interval of the third sounded as two and of the same interval sounded together is indicated by the fact, among others, that the major third and its reverse (the minor sixth) can easily be interchanged as tones sounding together, but that the third in sequence and the minor sixth in sequence cannot. It follows that sounds occurring at the same time have the appearances of consonance and blending which are absent from structures of tones in sequence. When E. G. Wolff^{154a} thinks that simultaneous sounds and tonal series of the same interval are identical and advocates the view that the interval as simultaneous sound implies as a sound-sensuous possibility its

being given as tones both successively and simultaneously, he in a quite untenable fashion is over-pointing a correct basic idea.

It is not by any means only in laboratory terms that two tones in sequence have aesthetic meaning; they play a large role in the practice of music too; still, they can always be only a motif, never a finished melody, which is a matter of many tones in succession. To the experience of genuine melodic form and to the feeling of pleasure belonging to this tonal sequence there is also added the so-called sense of conclusion (finality, *Abschlussgefühl*). Even of two tones as a sequence and, what is more, of the succession of many tones in a genuine melody, it is characteristic that the essential effect is reached through changes of pitch, which are the medium constitutive of all melody-building. There can be rhythmical forms without variations in pitch, but there can never be melodic forms without them. Moreover, the up and down of tonal motion, its rising or falling, strives for markedly modulated feeling- and mood-effects. If one is concerned with a tonal step including *c* and *g*, there is a fundamental difference whether the one or the other of these tones is the first. The step from *c* to *g* sounds like the departure from a state of rest or equilibrium, the step from *g* to *c* as a return to it. And, further, the motion downwards has something restful, the motion upwards something stimulating. The upwards motion of a melodic tonal series creates a feeling of tension in the hearer, of anticipation, of heightened vivacity, and even of joy, active determination, and spirit; downward motion has in its train a mood-accentuation of relaxation, resignation, sadness, and despair. It is significant that in Beethoven's *C Minor Symphony*, in which the inexorable hand of fate knocks on the door, the first phrase begins with two very characteristic two-toned series; but the Finale, in which the triumph of moral freedom is glorified over all of the urgencies and forces of destiny, begins with a jubilantly impetuous upward motion in a radiant C major. Musical hermeneutics as it is pursued chiefly by H. Kretzschmar¹⁵⁵ lays great weight on these matters. And particular reference is made to the rising and falling motion of melody: Repeatedly it is said that music delineates a life of feeling and mood and is able to reflect the affective movements of the psyche. Apropos here is the statement of Plato¹⁵⁶ that the motion of melodies imitates the qualities of the soul in its affects (ἡ τῶν μέλων κίνησις μεμνημένη ἔν τοις παθήμασιν ὅταν ψυχὴ γίνεται). In the melodic movement of tones Schopenhauer saw a direct symbol of human striving: Melody reveals the deepest secrets of will and feeling. With the symbolism, laden with expression, of its movements

—in absolute music the coincidence of the unity of form and unity of mood is as good as complete—melody proffers the strongest invitation to empathy.

Volckelt¹⁵⁷ thinks that the melic movement towards high and low gives occasion for special feelings of motion which then play the decisive role in the empathizing of tonal forms. "The ascending of tones, like their descending, their swinging to heights of rapture and their plunging into the darkest depths, their soaring upwards and downwards . . . are impressions which are automatically brought about by way of sensations of motion." The changes during the progress of tonal motion towards high and low are especially accompanied, then, by sensations of movement if they make themselves felt in a significant degree, or in an unexpected manner, or persistently according to the same trend. Occasionally this can arrive at surprising analogies with motoral experiences of easily achieved or restrained types. Once Hugo Riemann¹⁵⁸ indicated that the repetition of the same tone in the midst of a series of tones which change in pitch has the effect of one's being rooted to a spot with the peculiar sense of constraint in one's failure to advance in spite of his going forward. In addition there are analogies of synaesthetic meaning and mood which have for a long time been judged to be telling in the musical symbolism of tone. "A web of high tones can easily suggest a realm of light, but a gentle upward and downward undulation in the deep tones suggests dark and night." When tones and series of tones give us the impression of an upward swinging or a downward falling, associations of similarities play a certain role, the significance of which one must not over-value, however. Such associations are not always necessary because there is a direct effect of feeling and mood in tonal forms. Empathy cannot in all cases demand reproductions of symbolic sensation or of the mediated effect of special knowledge from experience. If we are able to experience certain series of tone as bold and fervid, and others as soft and sweet, no connecting links are needed: "[A] certain melody makes the hearing-impression it does purely because of its unmistakable relationship with gentle moods, and another with those of spirit."

Explicit associations or the producing of direct connecting links are not necessary in such cases. Basic personal experiences for our own sakes and our inborn habits of expression, an equally basic knowledge of the "you" (*Du*)¹⁵⁹ and the basic kinds of expression of our fellow human beings, have compressed themselves into an unconsciously effective system of categories of expressive meaning,

a system which operates in the form of an opaque feeling-deposit. I am pointing here to what William Stern¹⁶⁰ has to say about the personal dimension: for instance about the symbolism of above and below. In tenderness and cheerful excitement, and also in negative sthenic affects, one's voice sounds high; we thus express ourselves in bright tones. But in sadness, despair, and asthenic effects, one's voice produces low, dull, and dark tones. One thinks of the I and U-symbolism [onomatopoetic language] in Goethe's tender love-poem, "*Wenn ich, liebe Lilli, dich nicht liebte*" and in Tieck's terrifying ballade called "*Das Schweigen im Walde*," which is entirely set in dark vowels. Furthermore, what contributes to the peculiar qualitative significance of the high voice-positions and of a rising series of tones is the practical knowledge which every speaking and singing person achieves for himself: a certain tension of the voice-organs is required for the production of higher tones which is mitigated when the voice becomes lower. Here one can draw richly informative lines between the sound-symbolical product of musical tones and the sound-symbolism of language (that is, the characteristic mood-effect of vowels, to which attention has been paid not only by A. Wellek in his inquiry concerning synaesthesia, but also by language-aesthetics as a whole, by sound-physiognomy [Werner], by the theory of sound-signification [Fenz]). Here, for example, belongs the signification of the U in the realm of the sacred and divine, a meaning which has been pointed to by W. Havers in conjunction with W. Schulze and F. Specht.

Every melody is in a certain key. According to the formal law of transposability, every melody can be transferred to every other key without undergoing a loss of the character it has as precisely *this* melody (that is, as a tonal form in sequence). Yet there is the question of whether in this process its mood-value, its feeling-effect, remains entirely unaltered. According to a wide-spread notion, individual keys have certain feeling-realms as their special domains; certain ones are supposed to sound cheerful, festive, radiant, and others darker, more depressed, more veiled. Especially to be noted here is not the mood-value of major or minor, but a difference in the effects of the individual keys within each of these types. Musical persons, even those who do not have absolute pitch, repeatedly and definitely say that every key has its characteristic mood-value and is marked by a sound-character properly only its own.¹⁶¹ E. T. A. Hoffmann once specified the interesting characteristics of individual keys which obviously went back to corresponding musical experiences on his part, but which (as I have been convinced by the

experimental investigation of many persons) can be realized only by the smallest number of hearers. Although the experimental investigation of persons who said they themselves could realize such characteristics on the basis of unequivocal experience turned out to be mostly negative, there still is a notion abroad throughout the musical world that individual keys are distinguished, as are different intervals, by their specific characters. In the keys as they intrinsically are there lies their own expressive value which distinguishes them qualitatively from one another.

One often encounters the view that "the character, the mood-content, and therefore too the aesthetic effect of a musical work suffer a change as soon as a piece of music is transposed from one key to another—when merely the absolute pitch changes, therefore. There are musicians who go so far as to explain that every transposition is a serious interference with musical feeling and an improper violation of the intention of the composer. They hold, for instance, that Beethoven's *C Minor Concerto* and Chopin's *A flat Ballade* are constitutively bound with their keys. . . . It was not chance, therefore, which caused Beethoven to choose E flat major for the *Eroica*; instead, he did so because this key agrees the most with the basic musical idea and mood of this symphony." Yet very weighty objections to this idea are possible. "Within a tonal species our scales are exclusively differentiated by their regional pitch (that is, according to the section of the octave by which the beginning and the end of the piece are determined); otherwise they are all the same because they present the same frequency-proportions. The series of tonal steps is the same in all major and minor scales and, in conformity with the temperament of equal steps, the half-steps too are of equal size." Besides, what was played in Mozart's time as a C major and judged to be "boldly resolved" (*männlich entschlossen*) has, as a result of the change to concert pitch of as much as three quarter-tones, become an entirely different key than the C major of today, which, however, is described in the same way as regards pitch. The normal tone alters itself extensively without the nature of its key having undergone a corresponding change. Révész therefore arrives at the conclusion that "theory of key-characteristics has weak feet. The original theory—namely, that keys are unified musical structures which have their own characters exerting a decisive influence upon the emotional and aesthetic effect of a musical work—receives no support either from observation and experiment or from any tenable hypotheses. The consequences attendant upon this theory also indicate its untenability."

Perhaps it is only the distance from an indifferent position serving as a normal- and starting-point which is decisive, as is true with regard to C major. Yet, with this, certain secondary key-differences are not denied; they occur because of the structure and nature of instruments. The harp is tuned in C flat major; the normal scale of the trumpet is E flat major, whereas D major was the most natural scale for oboes and flutes of older construction: what is written in these keys is played very easily and freely. If a person transposes a violin solo in D major into D flat, it sounds markedly different, but only because the player now can hardly use the more bright-sounding empty strings at all. By these means particular effects are tried for, such effects as are demanded, for instance, by the third movement of Beethoven's *Violin Concerto*, in which there is an indication for the player that he execute the theme at the beginning as "sul G." The fact that an aria for a coloratura soprano sounds more brilliant when it is transposed from C to D major is attributable not to the key of D major, but to the fact that the singer thus takes a higher position as to pitch. It is precisely for this reason that the pitch of stringed instruments constantly pushes upwards so that the normal pitch (a^1 equals 435 vibrations per second) was given up long ago.

I shall give only a hasty glance at the use of melodies for programmatic-musical and tonal-pictorial effects.

A discussion of the illustrative and imitative effects of melody in particular and of music in general belongs, as does a statement of their representational- and feeling-effects, in a general phenomenology of the nature of this art. The special structural analysis of melody, motif, phrase, theme, period, and so forth, a survey of the role of contrast and counter-answer, of modulation, variation, conclusion, and other specific questions belong to the sphere of competence of the theory of composition and of music-aesthetics and can therefore properly be left untreated here.

But in terms of the insights which have in the meantime been amplified, something must still be said for the purpose of understanding melody as a kind of unification of successively sounding tones in effective form. Melody is a succession of tones; but this sentence cannot be reversed; for not every series of tones is a melody. To be so, the tones (sounds) entering into a temporal series must fulfill a set of conditions. To begin with, they must be attached to a scale and be justified by it; and, furthermore, they must be "pure" in the sense that they have a relation to a tonal system (that is, they must be organized into system-related intervals). A pre-

supposition of every melodic structure is a systematization of the tonal manifold as it is realized through the development of fixed scales. Such a fixed scale, which in its clear steps means the regulating of an obscure manifold of tones in terms of order and unity, presents in the labeled specific intervals and tonal steps which are a part of it the tonal scheme on the basis of which melodic forms in the true sense can first of all come to be. In this way it also becomes possible to undertake far more definitely and unequivocally than was possible beforehand the making of intervals and, with these, of a melody. Yet tonal scales and their system of organization too are only the presuppositions of melodic form-building; they are, so to speak, only the negative pre-condition for the appearance of melodies. For even within scales of a well-established tonal system, meaningless series of tones are possible, series which in no way merit the name of "melody." If a melody in the full significance of the nature and value of the word is to come to be, there are required certain latent harmonic form-connections between the tones; here the latent successive harmony is governed by a more liberal legality than is the simultaneous organization of genuine harmony. The pure series of tones making up a melody will therefore be supplemented by relations of simultaneity which are below the surface. In all cases, melody is more than a series of isolated tones appearing alongside one another without any connection; it is a totality in which the total is co-heard in all of the individual tones. In terms of a formal relation the tones already sounded make an after-effect and blend with those just being heard. It is exactly by these means that a series of tones becomes a melody. That which comes later is not grasped for itself alone, but is connected with and related back to what has appeared earlier; besides this, that which is to come is anticipated and expected. Contrary motion could not be experienced as such if the original motion did not produce an after-effect in consciousness. Only on the basis of this subconscious after-effect, of this awareness reaching backwards, does a series of tones become form in the first place (that is, become a unity in a multiplicity). In the awareness of melody there is thus something else that is characteristic of the hearing of it: that making of the successive components into a whole and into a cohesive unit which depends on the phenomenon of psychological present time. The objective pre-ordering of tones requires an adequate act of perception to become the melodic form intended by the composer. The pathological phenomenon of deafness to melody (which one can find even in normal persons) makes clear the fact that the

hearer's activity is necessary to the experience of comprehending a melody as that melody is made into a whole, into a simultaneity, and into a perceived form. What is customarily called unmusicality is primarily an incapacity for melody (that is, an inability properly to grasp intervallic relations and simultaneous-successive formal organizations).

Scales and melodies are closely related. To set up a scale one assembles the intervals used in the music of a particular cultural environment and arranges them according to pitch. For Révész "scales" are the fixed successive tones which make up the constituent parts of the melody and harmony of a given music and which are circumscribed by a beginning- and end-tone. The scale is merely the selection in question for the melody, the choice deriving from a musical tonal system of a cultural group or people. As von Hornbostel^{161a} stresses, scales are not norms for melodies, but are the rule gathered empirically from the melodies themselves.

According to H. Conradin,^{161b} melody is nothing but the scale converted into musical form; but the scale is a structure gathered from concrete melodic creations, a structure manifesting itself in the form of a sequential tonal series. Before there was a fixed series of tones (which means, a series in which the numbers of vibrations of tones appearing in it are in a relation of constancy to one another), there was no music. This constancy of tonal proportions, the fixedness of intervals, is (according to Révész) the most characteristic presupposition of music. Where there are no fixed intervals, there are no melodies or motifs, no scales, no building of musical periods, and no harmony. The building of perfect consonances is possible only within a definite system of tones. Without fixed tonal intervals (which permit transposition), music is not possible.

The pattern of formal organization of the scale and of the intervals connected with it has not only the task of arranging tonal form inwardly, but also the function of being a frame for it. In large musical forms of many movements we often find that a definite frame is produced so that the composition describes a circle, as it were: the theme of the last movement returns to the beginning motif. This happens in the "*Dona ut Kyrie*" of the rococo masses of the Haydn-Mozart tradition. And in like manner the *Third Symphony* of Bruckner and the string-serenade of Tchaikovsky (to give only a few examples) in their last movements go back to the theme of the first. Such frames are found also in the microcosm of separate four- and eight-measure melodic phrases because the be-

ginnings and the closings are related to one another. Every musical tradition has developed stereotyped cadence-formulas which serve as frames. The return to the initial key also serves as a frame and as an effect of finality. As the melodic line returns to its initial position there appears the impression of conclusiveness, of a coming to rest.

A melody is not merely a formation in terms of an organized series of a row of tones, but also a kind of coexistence and simultaneity. The tone sounding at a particular instant is embedded in a structure of functional relationships and is therefore neither isolated nor limited in its effect to the instant. With this fact, the hearing-event takes on an abundance of perceptual-psychological problems about which I shall say something here. When we hear a new melody (for the sake of simplicity, let us admit that we are not speaking about the work of an absolutely original composer, but about a tonal form which falls into the circle of our traditional awareness, our established habits of hearing, and our readiness for apprehension), we approach it with certain formal anticipations given through our awareness of scale and key, through a latent sense of cadence, of conclusion, of harmony, and so forth. Indeed, we do not know the new melody; we know the elements of its construction, the elements with which it works; we know the law of the direction and the final close of the tonal series. Very often we could continue a melody and bring it to a conclusion after we have heard only half of it. A melody is agreeable not only if the perceiving of it on the grounds of the, to us, familiar categories of musical apperception is easily accomplished, but also if, as a result of the new and original things in it, perception is not too easy, but places interesting problems before us. Thus when our expectations as regards cadence are too easily satisfied, the result is banal; what is affectedly original violently shocks us; but we are delighted when the banality of that which is too familiar is ingeniously avoided. This latent sense of form is even more evident in its negative effect than in its positive one: it comes forward immediately and impressively when its demands are violated. We sense a vivid unpleasantness as soon as a false interval is sounded or an incorrect chord is played in a piece of music even when we are hearing it for the first time. Then we say at once: "It cannot possibly be that way." Nevertheless, such a recognition of what is false is possible only on the basis of an anticipation of what is correct, which in turn presupposes a scheme of organization of scale and harmony which is below consciousness. As one achieves these things the empirical factors of cultural educa-

tion and the sociological aspects of familiarity and adaptation participate along with certain physical-psychic matters.

The individual melody moves within a certain key; but a longer piece of music has a history, so to speak, because the key which is the basic and beginning one and the one returned to in the end is constantly being left behind. It is possible to say that the melodic development of a tonal piece takes place in a dialectical tension between cadence and modulation. According to Westphal,^{161c} cadence is the means of fixing the chief key once it is employed, but modulation is the means of unfixing it and of setting it in relation to other keys.

The former is a static principle; it tends to persist; modulation, which tends toward motion and brings it about, is a motoral-kinaesthetic principle. The curve of tension which exists between the ability of cadence to persist and the energy of modulation to drive forward determines the content and the worth of every composition. In the course of development, the possibilities for modulation always became more audacious and the distance from the principal key increased. The cadence was studded with modulatory elements and more and more was stripped of its steadfastness. Modulation takes advantage of every chord, using it as a spring-board for new modulation, and it ultimately arrives at the chromatic. If modulation had already put the principle of cadence in question, Debussy was to make a decisive thrust against the tradition based entirely upon the absolutistic evaluation of melodic-harmonic tension-potentialities in the major-minor tonal system. In Debussy there appears a dissolution of the, up to his time, chief strength of the keys determining a musical creation and of the harmony based upon the cadence-principle. In melodies now no longer bound to key and harmony new potentialities and possibilities were disclosed. Whereas in the older system melody and harmony blended into an indissoluble unity mutually to condition each other, and the one element included the other during the course of their progress, now individual chords were only affixed, as it were, to the melody and, independent of the motion of the melody, followed the special law of so-called parallelism.

Harmony with its simultaneous organization is the vertical aspect of music, so to speak, whereas melody is the horizontal. This spatial symbolism and metaphorism is suggested by the way in which music is written; chords are written in notes underneath one another, the tones of a melodic sequence being written alongside one another.

The linearity of music is given with its horizontality. Where the melodic factor is in the foreground, listening in linear-horizontal terms is the proper attitude for perception; when the harmonic is predominant, listening is vertical. Thus two types of hearing are designated: one is horizontal hearing as tones follow one another in more isolated fashion, and the other is simultaneous hearing more in the fashion of chords, which is a simultaneous-vertical hearing. For us today who are accustomed to vertical hearing and who prefer it, the polyphonic music of the late Middle Ages is a harmonic phenomenon, though for the people for whom it was contemporaneous it was a poly-melodic one. The polyphony of the Middle Ages is marked chiefly by a law of succession which is many-voiced indeed and which is only incidentally marked by effects of coexisting tones. In the estimating of this state of affairs, one must not let himself be confused by the term "counterpoint." For counterpoint is made by the setting not of note against note (*punctus contra punctum*), but of line against line.^{181d} In the contrapuntal handling of voices, the voices moving against the leading voice are not manipulated merely as a harmonic filling which (in itself quite dependent) has only to carry and to support the upper voice stating the melody and in so doing takes on the stamp of a primitive kind of harmony in whose terms the melodic phrase is to be understood. Instead, the voices as they run alongside one another melodically shape themselves into the so-called concerted style of counterpoint so that there results an effect of a struggle (*concertatio*) of the voices among themselves around the one at the fore. Good contrapuntal (polyphonic) voice-leading is therefore poly-melodic because it allows independence to the individual voices. According to Kurth,^{181e} the kernel of counterpoint is that "two or more lines can develop at the same time in the most unhindered melodic development possible, not as they sound together, but in spite of their sounding together." Counterpoint does not depend really so much on the simultaneity of tones as on that of melodies. Where contrapuntal statement is the governing principle, one primarily experiences a large number of sounding voices. Thus people in the late Middle Ages heard individual voices separately and in succession, but never together and in simultaneous conjoinedness. Therefore they also put up with tones sounding at the same time which are completely intolerable to us with our vertical manner of listening. People listened quite preponderantly in a horizontal, not in a vertical, manner (that is, the separate voices were grasped in isolation and not as chords) because listening to chords in their simultaneity had not

as yet been developed. Consequently, most of our contemporaries, because they grasp the tonal web in a vertical-chordal formation instead of in a horizontal-isolated one, find the music of the Middle Ages and even that of Bach to be inimical to them and incongruous; and they therefore project harmonic uniformities into it which do not lie within the creative intention of the composers of that past time.

Horizontal poly-melodism has in our day awakened to a new life, however, and particularly because of Arnold Schoenberg. What separates his counterpoint from Bach's is the way he continually puts the tonal functions out of circuit. In Bach, the sum of the many melodic lines crossing one another gives greater mobility to the harmony and draws the ultimate in tension out of it. In contrast to the harmonic counterpoint of Bach (and to that of Reger, too), the linear counterpoint of Schoenberg is conditioned only by considerations of melodic voice-leading. Here, according to Westphal's pertinent formulation, the chord and its relationships lose all form-creating value. The chord sinks to the level of an accidental outcome which occurs when melodic lines are in operation which alone make up the polyphonic web. The melodic tonal sequences are no longer really related to one another vertically: the linear-horizontal principle has arrived at an absolute culminating point which cannot be exceeded. This melodic constructivism has lost all support from sound and is more delightful for the eye reading the notes and for the analytical understanding than for the ear.

d.¹ Rhythm. In the preceding sections we have been occupied with exclusively musical-aesthetic facts and problems. Now we shall discuss a phenomenon which plays a decisive role in the other arts of the muses also (poetry and the dance). Indeed, we shall be concerned with an objective aspect of such central aesthetic significance that people extend its value beyond its original sphere, the temporal-aesthetic, into that of the spatial-aesthetic, as one does, for instance, when he speaks of the rhythm of an arrangement of columns. The legal argument for the metaphorical broadening of this concept lies in the fact that our empathic experience of the spatial contiguity of column-organizations changes into a temporal succession, as, when we walk through a room of columns, an optical impression of succession results. Nevertheless, in the interest of exact terminology one would do better to avoid a transferred usage of this sort for the concept of rhythm and recognize other principles of organization for spatial objects. Thinking thus, Schopenhauer said something as precise as it is correct: rhythm is to time as symmetry is to

space—namely, a division into equal parts matching one another. As a matter of fact, the word “rhythm” even etymologically has its own characteristic connection with the factor of something’s taking place temporally: *ῥυθμός* (which means equal movements, time, and measure) comes from *ῥέω* (which means “to flow,” “to stream”); the derivation also attempted of *(ε)ρῦ* (meaning “to draw”) is less probable. Thus the source of the concept of rhythm lies in the idea of a fluid element and is transferred from there to every kind of quick forward motion, and above all to the motions of dancing and running. To it there is then attached the idea of the well-organized, of artistic forms, and thus “rhythm” generally becomes measure and order, especially in the dance, in song, and in the mimicking motions of practicing experts. Plato uses this concept chiefly in close connection with the dance, and in the broader sense with choric art which combines the word, music, and the movements of the dance. In the usage of Aristotle, this concept means chiefly a quality of the sung or spoken word (the weight of accent), but on the other hand it means something like *ἀριθμός*, and thus number and expressible measurement in numerical proportions, or order which is lent to material previously formless. Aristoxenus the Peripatetic called special attention to time as the substrate of rhythm; according to him, rhythm is an organization of time-value (*ράξις χρόνων*). Such a definition is necessary, for the word from those days already had contained a meaning going beyond time because by means of it one can designate also the beautiful relation of the part, of symmetry, and of proportion. Then Vitruvius placed this meaning in the foreground, and the concept of rhythm was transferred as “correct proportion of measurement” (*“richtige Massverhältnis”*) from time to space, and now it was possible also to speak of rhythm in plastic art and in architecture.¹⁶²

But I should like to hold to the relation of rhythm to time as characteristic and to define rhythm as a kind of organization and unification of temporal courses by way of the regular return of the same elements (or of maximally similar ones) which match one another within the same space of time. Rhythm is the most basic and at the same time the most effective means for the shaping of well-organized form in the sphere of motion-contents (that is, of things in some way realized in time—by way of tones, noises, visible movements, words); it is the regulated organization of acoustical, optical, and verbal units of motion; it is a consequence of uniformly recurring portions of time and their realizations. Rhythm is every organization of physically perceivable events in the realm of tem-

poral issue which, agreeable as such, results because of gradations in the elements of weight and space of time and because of a systematically ordered concentration of the members.

According to F. Saran,¹⁶⁸ rhythm has the following component parts: "1. A quite definite differentiated kind of heaviness of distinguishable parts of the organization and a quite distinct shading of these degrees of heaviness against one another. 2. A quite fixed duration of the parts and a fixed gradation of the duration values against each other. The requirement of agreeableness is naturally determinative for rhythmical weight and duration. It operates in the fact that the values of heaviness and duration in a rhythm are selected, limited in number, and well distinguishable. 3. A quite definite uniform compressing of the parts and, as occasion arises, of the structure already occurring by way of the compression. Even the manner of compression is conditioned by the demand for agreeableness. It is therefore a) a systematic compression (that is, it produces a grouping which in many organizations mounts one upon another); it depends b) on the principle of bipartiteness, and c) on the principle of repetition and the matching of similarities. The similarity or the likeness must be clearly noticeable."

The phenomenal forms in which rhythm appears are multifarious; it can be audible or visible, or both at the same time; yet rhythmical experience can take place in connection only with an external instrumentality through the eye in the realm of imagination, in a dynamism of phantasy, so to speak. The last is the case when one reads verse-poems or a full musical score silently. The simplest form of rhythm is realized in the stamping dances of primitive peoples (the step-dances of the Lithuanians are an example of this on European soil), in which rhythm is marked only by the stamping of the feet, eventually by hand-clapping or rhythmical cries, without any interference from the genuine musical factors of melody and harmony or any fundamental participation by them in the primitive rhythmical work of art. This kind of rhythm occasionally prevails also in civilized music when all of the tone-producing instruments are silent and the percussion instruments (the large and small tympanum, the cymbal, the triangle, and castanet) play a sharply accentuated rhythm, usually to prepare for a march which is to follow after a few measures or a musical passage of marked rhythm, to exercise the rhythm and thus to make provision for pleasure in repetition. The overture to Donizetti's *A Daughter of the Regiment* is an example of this; in just the same way the "*Alla Marcia*" of the last movement of the *Ninth Symphony*

begins with only a forceful syncopated rhythm played by bassoon and large tympanum. The rhythm which is freed to the maximum from music and which makes its independent appearance in the arts of motion we call, after a term of F. Saran, "orchestic rhythm." (*ὀρχηστικός* means belonging to the dance). That which is characteristic and primary here is dance-movements or the rhythmical noise of the steps accompanying them. Any musical accompaniment added by song and instruments is only secondary. If it is connected with the dance, music must be organized according to the form of the dance, which is rhythmical itself. Primitive dance-music follows the rhythm of dance-movement, and the rhythm of the dance presses itself upon the music. As the rhythm of motion is combined with music a very powerful combination results which is especially evident in dance- and march-music. Orchestic rhythm exhibits chiefly a strict mensurability and the recurrence of small, easily graspable units.

Whenever music—that is, melody—becomes independent in a rhythmical relation and produces an autonomous rhythm without borrowing anything from dance-forms, whenever the rhythmical force of motion affects pure musical tone and its sequences, then so-called "melic rhythm" occurs. In this "melic" way there result rhythms of a peculiarly free and wandering kind, examples of which are the melismas of the Gregorian chant and the shepherd's motif in the third act of *Tristan*, and possibly also the clarinet melody, also pastoral, at the beginning of the symphonic prelude to d'Albert's *Tiefland*. In a purely melic rhythm, all measurable characteristics of rhythmic quality are absent; our music, which is essentially regulated by measure, is therefore made up of an alliance and interpenetration of dance and melic rhythms. From this fact there result interesting musical-aesthetic questions: namely, whether a music without rhythm and a rhythm without music are possible. The second part of this question has been answered by what has just been said: in the dance and in movements which accompany work there is rhythm made by hands, feet, cries, noise-making instruments (noise-boards, tympani, and so forth), rhythm which is pre-musical, as it were, and has nothing to do with music even if it can be considered one of its springs. Meanwhile, the saying of Bülow, "In the beginning was rhythm," which has been quoted to the point of becoming tiresome, must not be seriously overvalued as a new pythagoreanism: for example, so that the ultimate ground of existence would lie in principles of order graspable in terms of numerical laws. But it is very simple to understand that in the practical making

of music there is concern for the working-out of rhythm and that in this process an offense against measure weighs more heavily than does anything else. There is no doubt that there was a primitive art of noise among individual primitive tribes which, in the absence of a tonal system, was limited to a rhythm devoid of the rising and falling of tones in fixed, legal connections; but the result was not music. Nor is the result music when the marching of a company of men is accompanied by drum-beats or when the rhythmical dancing of the school of Hellerau-Laxenburg is given support by beaten instruments. In all of these cases a pre-musical orchestric (dance) rhythm occurs.

Whether there is a music which is devoid of rhythm is less easily determined. No less a person than Richard Wagner has expressed the opinion that there must be a music free of rhythm since there is no necessary connection between rhythm and melody; as a matter of fact, there is something like an unrhythmical music among primitives and natives. Examples of this fact seem to be supplied by the Malu songs of the Murray Islands as published by Myers¹⁶⁴ and also by the Japanese type of music, called *Roei*, of the 12th and 13th centuries;¹⁶⁵ but this is so only on the assumption that one interprets the concept of rhythm in the narrower sense, "namely, as rhythm of a particular symmetrical kind as is used in music under the name of measure."¹⁶⁶ But if one adopts a wider and freer concept of rhythm as a base, it seems doubtful that, insofar as it must be the expression of a psyche in its temporal course, music could do without this freer organization of rhythm. What then disappears or is not present is orchestric rhythm merely; but the melic is not and cannot be absent.

If rhythmical force takes hold of speech-events, then a linguistic rhythm takes place. Examples of this are rhythmical prose, language as it is treated in the *secco-recitativo* of the opera and also in Gregorian *accentus* and *concentus* (*cantus non mensuratus*). If dance-rhythm is attached to speech, if measured rhythm and linguistic accent work together, there arise verse-bindings, poetic meter. Dance rhythm is the most elementary, the purest, and the most definite form of rhythm; and this is true because its effect is not acoustical only, but motoral also, and primarily so. The kind of beating, clapping, stamping, beating of drums and kettledrums as occurs in sharply accented rhythms is felt with particular effectiveness over a long period of time when one submits to them motorally, when a person follows or inwardly imitates the kinaesthetic impulses deriving from them in walking, physical motions, and gestures. Here

(according to Müller-Freienfels) the effect lies not so much in sensorial reception as in motoral reaction. Optical rhythm by itself has a weak effect; it brings strong effects to hand only when sharp motions (say, in gymnastic calisthenics) work on our own physical dynamos as do the inner imitation and empathy just mentioned. Acoustical rhythm, which is quite capable of the more vigorous impressions even by itself, also achieves its most powerful effect when it lays claim to and influences the motoral centers. The muscular sense in connection with the sense of articulation, equilibrium, and posture is an ancient domain of rhythmical participation in the time-filling forms which are possible for us here (orchestic, dance). The rhythmical qualities of sensations are closely tied to the tendency of our movements towards rhythmization. It has therefore often been conjectured that all rhythmic feelings trace back to kinaesthetic sensations. This is an exaggeration, but the cooperation of motoral factors contributes much to the accentuation of aesthetic feeling in acoustical rhythms. This is especially clear in our primitive drives towards experience of rhythmical significance in which a heard or seen rhythm is transferred for as long a time as is possible across to the dynamism of one's own body and is directed outwardly by way of motions. In speaking verses, children try for an extreme kind of scansion while they make all kinds of physical jerking motions. Hearing sharply rhythmical dance-music, motoral types of people cannot sit still: the rhythm enters into their legs and they have to stamp the rhythm at least by suggestion; and this is so even if refined persons restrain such motions for social reasons or do not allow them to become apparent. But even when the effect does not extend this far, it appears in so-called "*Kapellmeister*" movements, and in the sympathetic actions (*Mittaktieren*) and in all kinds of muscular motions which many musical amateurs make in motoral accompaniment to the rhythm they hear. All of this speaks for the close alliance of acoustical rhythms with those of motion. If music is experienced not acoustically alone, but motorally also, this is because of its rhythmical effect. For the chief effect of rhythm is in the motoral sphere, and the perception of rhythm is always a feeling of motion and leads to an affecting of the entire person, an affecting which takes full effect in more than one of the realms of sense.

Müller-Freienfels¹⁸⁷ urges that the organization-pattern on the basis of which we feel rhythm as such is an unconscious accompaniment in motion and for this reason a reinforcement of the heard rhythm. Therefore with accompanying motions we clothe in flesh

and blood the dance which is below consciousness in all rhythmical music. "Our body is not merely a passive antenna for the rhythmical delights interwoven with it, but it is also an active strengthener which transfers the acoustical impulses towards motion into motions that are actualized, even if they often are only hinted at."

For children and savages music and motion have the closest of connections. Therefore people have tried to derive music genetically from rhythmically organized physical motion. This is not really feasible in this form despite all the recognition that is given to the closeness of the existing connections; and primarily for the reason that the rhythms of melody of even primitive people are often so complicated that they could not rise out of the dance. The relation between music and rhythm is always so close that music-psychologists like Révész think music exists only where there are rhythmically order tonal sequences (intervals, motifs) which are constant, fixed, independent of pitch, transposable, and reiterated in different combinations. Thus rhythmical order is interpreted as a constitutive and as a necessary constituent of music, and the question of whether there can really be a music devoid of rhythm is resolutely answered in the negative.

The most thorough-going formulation of the view according to which rhythm is felt not acoustically or phono-receptorially, but motorally on the basis of reflexive accompanying and imitative motions, is to found in A. Stöhr.¹⁶⁸

The ear works as a collector of the motion-stimuli. "We accompany acoustical happenings automatically with a readiness for motion, and many people openly sway in rhythm. Rhythm is not only taken part in, but it is also repeated once and sometimes oftener in an outward imitative movement. If we over-hear these imperceptible imitative movements, we have the impression as if we had drawn the rhythm out of a recent acoustical recollection. If we have heard three strokes of a clock sounding at equal intervals, we are motorally adjusted to the hearing of the fourth stroke." If the fourth stroke does not occur, then we feel as we do at the sudden non-appearance of a noise. All of these are not sensations which come from nowhere, but are motoral reactions. "In this connection the stretching and relaxing of the skin of the drum seems to play a big role. The three strokes of the clock: one, two, three, nothing! create a rhythm which can be repeated a certain number of times as unsensed motion. This repetition-time is the time of the so-called recent recollection (*frischen Gedächtnisses*) for the rhythm. If this rhythm in this time should change by mistake, we

then get a jolt because our reflexive repetitive or imitative motion falls into conflict with the new added motion."

We are not disposed to follow the most extreme consequences of these considerations, which, however, are closely related to the problem now to engage us, that of the psycho-physical basis of our pleasure in rhythm. But to begin with, we must clear up the question of when rhythm really takes place (that is, to what objective organizations the experience of rhythm is due). If one and the same tone is held in the same intensity for a long time, no rhythmical effect takes place. But a rhythmical effect is begun when the uniform tone is broken up by pauses occurring regularly so that the sound-material presented falls into parts of the same lengths and exhibits the organization-principle of equal duration and equal distance. From this one achieves the basic insight that for the experience of rhythm the presence of smaller units which are regularly ordered and compressed is a presupposition. Rhythm is the organized arrangement of a temporal succession of tones, the structure and the regular alternation being produced in different ways, among other things through simple interruptions of tones, so that fullness and emptiness, tone and pause, alternate regularly. A further means to the production of rhythmical organizations is the regular alternation of stronger and weaker stresses (accents). If after a strongly accented unit one or two lightly accented units follow in precise alternation, the resulting arrangement is agreeable in terms of an impressive and completable rhythm. This is something like the method of German verse-poetry which is built on the principle of accentuation: Here dynamic differentiation is the vital matter. Greco-roman metrics, being quantitative and employing measured length, were different: that is, as a principle of the rhythmical-metrical arrangement of words, the regular series of long and short syllables (words) was used. It is clear that a rhythmical figure occurs when a tone lingers longer in time than the neighboring-tones which combine with it to make a formal group; but it must nevertheless remain a matter of question whether this kind of rhythm is just as precise as are those figures deriving from dynamic differentiation (difference in accent): Is a purely quantitative metric possible? As for the construction of ancient verse, whether it did not concede some kind of value to accent has recently been questioned. "For in music too, the first part of every measure has an accent, even when it is of equal length and intensity with the rest. And it therefore seems as if there is a universal demand for accentuation, if only a very slight one, for a thrust of energy which is

probably indispensable for rhythm." ¹⁶⁹ Still, it has been conjectured that classical-ancient verse-building drew upon the principle of differentiation of pitch for support; of the fact that pitch is a factor making for rhythm, that it belongs alongside the pause, accent, quantity (that is, in their regular succession) among the elements producing rhythm—of this there is no doubt. As high and low regularly alternate when air raid sirens howl, a rhythmical impression occurs. But if different intensities, pitches, and lengths of tone are produced without organization and in confusion, there is no rhythmical effect. Even in the rhythmical impression which results from a regular succession of tones of like length or of equally strong accentuation—even this is very weak to begin with; but as soon as an intelligible and therefore an agreeable rhythm appears because of the subjective-spontaneous rhythmicizing which we project into a form by filling it or making it precise, the objectively uniform series of acoustical stimuli produces a typical and meaningful form in time. In the uniform ticking of a clock or in the uniform clatter of a railway-train we hear a rhythm because we instinctively more vigorously accent one of the beats in the regular series. This subjective rhythmical ordering of an arhythmical series is a serious argument for the acceptance of the idea that there is a pre-disposition for rhythm working in us or, better said, there is a pre-disposition for rhythm which grows out of the psychophysical conditions of our organism. If a person using a noise-hammer in a laboratory makes a uniform series of acoustical stimuli, the listeners will immediately supply these accents subjectively (even though the stimuli reveal no kind of difference in accent and though they are separated by pauses absolutely equal in length) and concentrate them into groups; and thus, as the researches of Frischeisen-Köhler ¹⁷⁰ show, an individually varied psychic tempo comes to the fore. Such experiments as these reveal that sounds which are uniformly intense do not belong to duration as such but that, instead, they are changed into a regular series of stronger and weaker sound-impressions. "The assumption is only that the pauses have a certain length in time which they may not exceed either upward or downward; if they are too long, we deny that the tones are concentrated; if they are too short, the legitimate series of subjective accents becomes impossible" because then the individual stimuli cannot be held apart clearly enough. ¹⁷¹ The rhythms occurring thus are essentially like those used in music and the art of verse, where to a dynamically accentual or qualitatively marked unit (*ictus*), one up to three weaker ones are added. But while the prevailing unit

which is strongly marked or distinguished in some way can easily bring along one to two weaker units, in a four-part rhythm a so-called secondary accent (*Nebenton*) appears on the third quarter. Whereas in a musical measure of 2/4 or 3/4 a "solid" ("guter") part of the measure (thesis, accented beat) succeeds in carrying the following weak part of the measure (arsis, unaccented beat) or the two weak parts, in 4/4 and 6/8 time the secondary tone is placed at the third or the fourth tone, respectively. In German versification, "verse-feet" of more than three parts hardly ever appear in practice. Although it is not out of the question to transfer the expressions of quantitative ancient metrics over to German accentual verse, still the verse-science of tradition always defines verse according to the old names, and thus distinguishes: 1. the trochee (— ∪), 2. the iamb (∪ —), 3. the dactyl (— ∪ ∪), 4. the anapest (∪ ∪ —). Even autochthonic German verse (*Knittelvers*), which has four beats to the line between which no secondary beats need be or between which there may be many syllables, does not normally go beyond the number of two unaccented beats, although occasionally even three unaccented syllables occur. But ancient metrics knew of complicated verse-feet of many parts: thus the proceleusmatic (∪ ∪ ∪ ∪), the diiamb (∪ — ∪ —), the antispast (∪ — — ∪), the choriambus (— ∪ ∪ —), the ditroche or dichoreus (— ∪ — ∪), ionicus minor (∪ ∪ — —), ionicus major (— — — ∪ ∪), the first, second, third, and fourth paeon (— ∪ ∪ ∪, ∪ — ∪ ∪, ∪ ∪ — ∪, ∪ ∪ ∪ —), the first through the fourth epitrite (∪ — — —, — ∪ — —, — — ∪ —, — — — ∪), and the dispondee (— — — —). There are many reasons why we today forego such complicated units of verse. The reason that the quantitative principle of organization would be more efficient than the accentual is not very serious; but more important is the one that, as even our attitude towards prose-rhythm, number, and period demonstrates, we place less value on the sound-musical aspect of the artistic treatment of language because other matters are more weighty; for this reason, rhythm in modern poetry, and, even more, in music, without question relinquishes certain over-complicatednesses which played a large role in more primitive times. Our music arises from a very close interpenetration of a conceivably perfect melody and harmony with rhythmical arrangements which, just because of the high development of other fundamental factors of music, can be kept more simple than was true in primitive music, which cultivated rhythm excessively in connection with the simplest melody and with a harmony which was practically non-existent. Kinds of measure divided into five and seven parts were already to be found in east-

European folk-music; among Indians, $5/4$ and $7/4$ measures too were frequent, and these measures alternated quickly among themselves within the same piece and even with even-numbered measures. In the music of negroid Africa there is a constant rotation between $3/4$ and $6/8$ measures mixed with three to a beat which as Hornbostel says¹⁷² in part extend beyond the measure-bar. In general, we cannot keep up with a multiplicity of changes because our hearing-habits and our training in hearing are not adequate to them: for instance, when two different rhythms are realized simultaneously, so that, for example, percussive instruments follow another or a differently accentuated melody than does the rhythm of the song. Sometimes wind-choirs or choirs of stringed instruments play in different kinds of measure at the same time, making it necessary for a conductor to beat one kind of measure with one hand and another kind with the other; this occurs even in Mahler; but it remains a rather curious experiment nevertheless and merely a beauty of the score, as it were, rather than something becoming an effect of vivid perception. But even in the most complicated rhythmical forms the principle is the same: the repetition of a temporal form which, more or less complexible and organized internally, is centered around a dominant element.

Rhythm, as exciting emotions are produced and received, is a kind of arrangement which brings about exceedingly effective forms, an organization which has in its train a pleasurable sensation which affects and weighs upon our entire personality, and even upon our "physical humanity." This is a fact which is evident, which is warranted by experience, and which has never been disputed. How can it be explained, however? Why does the producing and the vivid perception of rhythmical forms produce pleasure? The answers to these questions are various even though many of them point in a uniform direction. In any case, there are argumentations coming from metaphysics, natural philosophy, physiology, and psychology, as well as from sociology, which it pays one to get to know. To begin with, it must be indicated that rhythm is an uncommonly broad and comprehensive phenomenon that occurs outside art too—in work-activities, for instance. But is rhythm also a pre-human phenomenon which one can discover outside the organized and articulated activities of human beings, or is it a correlative and prerogative of the human mind?

This last is asserted by F. Saran:¹⁷³ "In themselves events in nature never operate rhythmically. Rhythm arises only when the mind is addressed. Neither the roar of the sea nor the fall of rain-

drops is rhythmical in itself; both occurrences are uniformly monotonous and rhythmless. In order to escape the unbearable monotony of forms of arrangement in nature, one can give rhythm to them; from out of himself he can place a rhythm into the events. He then meets them face to face, but actively, not passively."

The apodictical assertion that rhythm appears only in artifacts, in mentally formed products of human beings, is not correct. The call of the quail, that of the cuckoo, when they sound repeatedly one after another (as often happens), present us very meaningful rhythmical forms. But this is not to say that a human being finds it necessary to imitate such kinds of models in order to achieve rhythm. Rather, each person carries within himself the presuppositions necessary to the achievement of rhythm, a basic natural tendency towards meaningful form in time. If we ponder the matter, organic life everywhere and always is unified through the principle of rhythm. According to Klages,¹⁷⁴ the courses of organic life are rhythmical without exception. This is especially apparent in the processes of vegetative life.

In viewing the activity of the ganglia and the nervous system peripheral to them, physiology repeatedly lights upon occurrences that are rhythmical. Every excitement (as Abderhalden¹⁷⁵ stresses) rhythmically follows a refractory phase, and this in turn follows a condition out of which that which excites can come forth renewed. There is a marked individual rhythm in paths of action as well as in ganglia, and in all of the phenomena of life, rhythm governs functions. "One recalls, among other things, the rhythm of heart and respiration; and, further, the 24-hour rhythm of bodily temperature. Even in the liver, the kidneys, and so forth, we light upon activities that are rhythmically piloted. Without any doubt the autonomous nervous system plays a large part in this connection. Activity and relaxation alternate at certain time-intervals. Only in this way is it possible that everywhere in the organism preparation for new courses of action repeatedly come to be."

We have no room for the speculations of natural philosophy. But one must indicate that economically precise figurations pointing in the direction of labeled formal structures are not wanting even in the world of space. As we think of it, matter cannot endure the disorganized state of the atom; therefore, the constant and balanced end-condition of matter is always crystalline. Wherever this condition is not reached, a process has been interrupted in some way and has not been carried to a conclusion. The fact that in crystals there is an abundance of aesthetically effective natural

structures needs no special mention. In this connection I must again call attention to the proof of the existence of "good forms" ("*guter Gestalten*"), as attempted by Köhler, in the physical realm, in electrostatics, for example. But this is only by way of being exhaustive.

Now, it is undoubtedly true that certain movements are accomplished more easily, certain activities are more comfortably exercised, if they do not oppose the primary rhythm of vital and organic life, but adopt and introcept it and make it their own. Because motions of heart and breath take place rhythmically, certain motions of the hands which are dependent on them in walking, talking, and doing certain kinds of work are best at accommodating themselves to this rhythm. In these terms, musical measure and the tempo of the march are related to the heart-beat.¹⁷⁶ It is not true, however, that the muscular sense literally brought rhythm into perception for us, but that "the muscular system reproduces the rhythm without sensing it while it takes part in it and repeats it. This is true of the motions of walking, dancing, singing, and speaking—in short, for every muscular activity." In this way a human being from out of himself and entirely by himself arrives at the production of rhythmical arrangements. Can one see this as the basis for the agreeableness of rhythm? As a matter of fact, several of the physiological theories of rhythm seem close to accepting this idea. Thus H. Riemann¹⁷⁷ brings musical rhythm in terms of its aesthetic qualities into relation with the beat of pulse and heart, and from this relation draws certain consequences in explanation of our pleasure in rhythm; and H. Wetzel¹⁷⁸ says something similar. According to G. Adler,¹⁷⁹ respiration and heartbeat assert themselves as an underground of a rhythmical motion which shines through. H. Kretzschmar¹⁸⁰ too suggests that rhythmical utterances turn almost more in the direction of heart and pulse in human beings than in that of the ear; and the experiments of Bolton¹⁸¹ factually demonstrate that rhythm (even that which is apparently merely sensorially apperceived) influences activities of heart and breathing. To be sure, opposition to this physiological-aesthetic theory is not wanting. Thus Dessoir¹⁸² is expressly opposed to earlier attempts to derive rhythm from motions taking place periodically in the animal body: A naïve person is so little aware of the periodicity of his breathing and pulse-beats that he finds it difficult to consider them the bases for his rhythmical creations. Lipps,¹⁸³ A. Polak,¹⁸⁴ H. Cohen,¹⁸⁵ R. Wallaschek,¹⁸⁶ and P. Moos¹⁸⁷ also oppose earlier attempts to derive rhythm as an artistic phenome-

non from the physiological rhythm in life-events and to relate it genetically to them.

But what we must reject need be only the vulgar interpretation of this theory, according to which a person in the rhythm of his musical and poetic art-works so to speak imitates the rhythmical movement of blood-circulation and of breathing and follows the consciously felt relation of similarity with satisfaction and pleasure. But one could not attack the idea that a person in his entire psychophysical organism is made for rhythmical organizations. It is natural for a person to realize certain motions and actions in terms of labeled and precise terse forms ordered in time and to experience such good organizations with pleasure wherever he meets them, and to do so quite directly and without a clear notion of the reasons, because the grasping of such acceptable organizations proceeds easily. He need not in any way, therefore, be aware of any of the reasons, which are rooted in his own physiology.

To rise from physiological-biological to natural-philosophical and metaphysical considerations, the Russian reflexologist, V. Bechterev¹⁸⁸ has tried to bring proof that the principle of rhythm must be viewed as one of the laws of the world, a law whose expression can be observed in all movements of the inorganic, the organic, and the superorganic world. It is entirely possible to seek an explanation of rhythmical feelings in universal basic principles. In these terms, a modern text-book on psychology,¹⁸⁹ sets the rhythmical phenomenon in art in a close context with respiration and the circulation of the blood. "Here too [there is] a regular alternation, an up and a down, an exertion and a relaxation of energy. Rhythm is nothing more than the reflection in clear perceptual articulation of these forms of occurrence in all life-processes. But as this satisfying of a universal necessity for periodic change which governs psychic as well as physical life takes on shape in certain rhythmical forms, rhythmical feelings of a different quality appear, feelings which are in direct relation to certain kinds of the remaining courses of feeling."

But it is possible without further question to let the relation to the physiological, the genetic-etiological appeal to the rhythm of the events of life, retreat to the background completely and, in grasping this concept, to limit the natural dispositions for rhythmical organizations entirely to psychological determinations. Sterzinger¹⁹⁰ does this; to the question of what the force of rhythm can be traced back to he answers thus: "Clearly, the human constitution must be tuned to rhythmical impressions in entirely the same

sense as that in which resonators and radios are tuned. In other words: Our psychic life must itself in some way be rhythmically articulated." The proof of this, he believes, was brought by his own researches¹⁹¹ and those of A. Prandtl.¹⁹² According to Lipps,¹⁹³ artistic rhythm is delightful because it conforms to a need of the mind which we learn to know in the most direct fashion from the fact of subjective rhythmicizing. In this connection he refers to the law that in our psychic events an alternation between the straining and the relaxing of attention naturally takes place everywhere.

To explain the way in which rhythmical organizations come to be and the pleasure growing out of the experience of perceiving them, people have referred to one of the most universal of psychophysical neutral laws of economy, to that of the minimum amount of energy. It is interesting and also in a certain sense something having the force of proof that from different sides this law is constantly and independently alluded to.

Thus H. Rohrer¹⁹⁴ once occupied himself with the question of why the electroencephelogram of cell processes from which so-called alpha-waves arise show regular sine-curves, and he worked it out that the sine-formation here observed proves "that there are cell-events which are capable of producing rhythmical sine-shaped alternating tensions; but for this purpose an event is required which comes off with extraordinary precision in thousands of ganglia simultaneously." This great exactitude doubtlessly has a biological purpose and aim. The question of why the alpha-process produces precisely sine-shaped tensions in the brain can be answered in the form of a hypothesis which runs thus: One may well conjecture that "at the basis of this curve-form lies the principle of economy: that, namely, the cell-process from which it arises is so devised that its purpose is reached with the smallest expenditure of energy possible. The alpha-curve is the electrical expression of an event increasing and decreasing rhythmically in intensity; that this increasing and decreasing proceeds in such a way that the ascending and descending take place in the form of a sine points to the fact that the event takes place in terms of a simple law which is favored in nature everywhere. . . ."

Earlier I had the opportunity to show how people have drawn upon the regular periodicity of the phenomena of brain-electricity just as they did upon other physical processes to explain our predilection for rhythm, which is supposed to have its, to us, ultimate recognizable basis in them. Yet this is not so very important at this point. More significant in terms of method and basic principles is the fact

that even the physiologists and the physiological psychologists appeal to the law of economy; thus they bring into practice a principle which earlier researchers of entirely different approaches and training already had taken up emphatically, and occasionally with a monomaniacal one-sidedness, to explain the way in which rhythmical phenomena and our satisfaction in them come to be. Thus, for example, Müller-Freienfels¹⁹⁵ who as a representative of a broad tradition must be given the opportunity of speaking in detail.

For a psychological theory of the genesis of rhythm and for one of its effects there is significance in the fact that rhythm suits a given talent of our organism: namely, that the organism strives to pay for a high degree of active or receptive use with the least degree of the expenditure of energy. Rhythm to a high degree meets this attempt half way. Because our psychic functions take place in time, the order in which they take place is important. This order allows the adaptation of the entire organism, the automatization of all processes which help, and the restraining of all processes which disturb—in short, the greatest economy in the expenditure of energy. Commensurably with this innate tendency, we adjust our simplest actions (walking, rowing, pounding, and so forth) rhythmically. An unrhythmical activity requires more exertion than does the same activity as it takes place rhythmically: in the latter, psychological energy is saved. On this basis rhythm even as it is applied in art (dancing, beating drums, and so forth) can already be accounted for. Rhythm makes the production of such artistic mediums of effect extraordinarily easy.

Something analogous is true for the effect of rhythm. One needs less psycho-physical energy to apperceive a rhythmical series of impressions than to apprehend an unrhythmical one. This last requires that attention be set up anew each time, but the former always concerns a preliminary preparation: it can be brought into a unity (a process also experienced as a facilitation). A rhythmical series of tonal impressions allows a maximal stimulation to the nerve-centers concerned without forcing still other centers into continually renewed, irregular adaptations which are felt by the total organism to be a burdensome annoyance. Only when a stimulus is adequate for the entire organism and arouses an easily controlled function of the organ concerned does pleasure arise; and thus the phenomenon accompanying a rhythmical succession is as a rule a sense of pleasure and that accompanying an unrhythmical group a lack of it. For this reason every sensorial stimulus has a motoral resonance of its own and transplants itself quickly into the mecha-

nism in motion. Especially in savages do all rhythmical hearing-stimuli directly cause motoral applications too. For such applications the same conditions naturally apply as for the rhythm-producing ones. In his later writings, Müller-Freienfels,¹⁹⁶ trying to explain rhythm and the pleasurable effect of rhythmical organizations in preference to irregular presentations, works out even more skilfully the relation to the principle of the smallest degree of effort.

If the rhythmicizing of all corporeal and mental activities is an elementary pre-artistic and pre-musical fact whose basis lies in the highest degree of performance it guarantees with the smallest amount of energy it employs, then it is evident that there are close connections between rhythm and work. Numerous work-activities, singly as well as severally, are accomplished rhythmically. The cooper, even one who works alone, like the shoe-maker and the blacksmith, pounds on the hoops with a precise rhythm. When several persons work together, a rhythmical adjustment even becomes indispensable, as, for example, when smiths use sledge-hammers or when three or four persons are threshing. There are many advantages in carrying on work rhythmically. 1. Rhythmical adjustment brings to work-activity a temporal and dynamic symmetry, avoids one-sided and ill-adjusted bodily demands and efforts, and through the saving of effort brings about a mitigation of the work. 2. Dexterity is achieved when work is made automatic and mechanical through facilitation and acceleration, and continued exertion of the will is made unnecessary for the same reason. 3. A simultaneous sharing in energy and power of all persons working together is achieved by this means in a short period of time: thus the combined lifting of a heavy burden by many persons under a rhythmical command like "*Ho-ruck*," in which "*Ho*" gets the attention and "*ruck*" is the command for action, these following one another at equal intervals so that each person taking part can distribute the exertion of his energy. 4. In many activities it is only when rhythm is used that a number of people find it possible to assist one another in work done in common. If forging metal and threshing grain were done without measure, only one person could safely do the work without danger, because people who would be doing the hitting in the absence of rhythm would cut open one another's heads; but as the rhythmical organization of a period of time fixes the contribution of each worker and determines when each shall do his part, the working together becomes possible. 5. This work is not only possible, however, but is pleasant also. Rhythmization brings a certain amusement into the work. Accom-

panied by the sounds of a work-song, the activity itself is more easily and more gladly accomplished. Rhythm has something inspiring and exciting. And thus we are led to the socializing (community-producing) effect of rhythm, which I shall discuss in a short parenthesis.

Everyone knows how stimulating it is when a crowd claps its hands rhythmically or cries rhythmically in chorus at football games, regattas, preliminaries to races, and so forth. This is true even for the crowd itself, which as a collective unit of people welded together feels enjoyment because of a common excitement it senses; this is true also for the players, the rowers, and the jockeys. It is equally well known that speech-choirs using words in rhythms can exercise an unbelievable effect.

In a way that is very correct methodologically people have therefore drawn on collective-psychological and sociological connections for the purpose of understanding rhythm. Rhythm is not an organizing principle for the individual alone; it is so too for people in a group. All mutual activities become tied together by rhythm, become unified and enhanced. Similar adaptive relations which are valid for the individual are so too for the social subject. But commonality causes not only the outer mutuality of experiences, but also a qualitative change within them, which gives us a new insight into the effect of rhythm. Rhythm as the binding member of a mass unchains all of the phenomena which depend on the absorbing of the separate individual into the mass-increased emotionality and the unconfined surrender to all the psychic excitements which flow through the mass. The intensified emotion which rhythm brings about in the individual person is now multiplied as the individual is absorbed into the mass.¹⁹⁷ A greater susceptibility to influence is added, and thus that peculiar feeling-effect which arises in the part of the crowd which likes what is going on is spread abroad by way of suggestion, and for this reason rhythm is not only a universal requirement, but also a means of transmittal.

Therefore a work-song which is sung by or for a collective group has a special force. An example is the work-song of the leader of the choir of a group of fighter-pilots:

Oamal auf
Zwoamal drauf
Dreie hoch
Viere noch

and so forth, up to twelve; then a witty stanza:

San oa dabei
 Dö ziagnt net an
 Dö kennt ma glei
 Dö hau ma davon

Dö zahn ma aus
 Und schicknands z'haus
 Hoch auf und hat's
 Hoch auf und Rast!

The incontestable fact that rhythm has a work-furthering effect has been broadened by the political economist K. Bücher¹⁹⁸ into a (not really tenable) theory which has subsequently met with much sympathy; for this reason it must be discussed here. Bücher suggests that rhythm first made its appearance in work-songs, that the earliest rhythmical productions occurred in connection with mutual work and grew out of it. Even before it was possible to conceive of the use of rhythm in art of any kind, work was given rhythmical form so that it could be regulated and facilitated. The real source of rhythm could therefore be found in the physical (muscular) feeling of rhythmical articulation. The uniformity of rhythm would have organized the consumption of energies, suppressed weariness, and put a work-furthering sense of pleasure in its place. To the rhythm of motion would be added the noise of the working-tool and of the work itself, and finally that of the work-song. Different objections have been brought to this theory, which allows rhythm to appear for the first time as a work-rhythm and which derives rhythmical music from the noises of work and from the noises of the work regulated and made audible in rowing, hammering, rhythmical lifting and pulling, and so forth. The soundest of these objections goes thus: kinds of work like those here mentioned appeared only in relatively late stages of civilization among established husbandmen and did not appear at all in the really primitive beginnings of mankind's evolution in which the human being lived in his environment as a hunting and plant-collecting parasite without working the land. But even under such primitive conditions there was a muse-inspired primitive art which was rhythmically ordered (as we deduce from modern savages), an art which could not have arisen through collective work. For its part, work-rhythm is rather the practical evaluation of an aesthetic phenomenon already existing; it is the transfer of a musical pre-artistic rhythm to the purposes of work. Particularly when work of such kinds came into question for really primitive stages, the saving of energy certainly could not have been sought for, either consciously or unconsciously, for people of these stages of civilization squander their energies. Only after an original art (*Urkunst*) of the muses existed in its rudiments and only after (on the other hand) work had undergone

a certain development could the already existing rhythm be cultivated for practical ends. Bücher's theory reverses the relationships, therefore, and contains a *hysteron proteron*. And for this reason it is also oblique because it substitutes a special form of the rhythm of motion, the work of the body, for the concept of motion in general, which does not ever have to be work at all.

According to Müller-Freienfels, work is not the root of music, but a branch related to it. The root of both is the general motion of the body. The production of tone does not occur only as the accompaniment to work; but every musical product presupposes a physical motion, and the kind exercised without practical purposes existed for a long time as play before work was performed, just as, also, rhythmical music came about, not in connection with practical activities, but either alone or in connection with other artistic practices (dance and poetry), which are not work either, but are purpose-free aesthetic applications. Indeed, the activity of rhythmization can develop in a far more unhindered fashion in art than in work. And here is the reason that all applications of our organism, which otherwise is turned in the direction of practical purposes, take on a more vigorous rhythmization as soon as they are used for purely aesthetic ends. It is true that extra-aesthetic walking, running, moving of the arms, and so forth, too have a certain rhythm, but this appears more purely and more vigorously as soon as such activities, like the dance, are followed for their own sakes. In the same way, prose-speech has a certain rhythm which nevertheless is more tautly and regularly concentrated in poetry. Consequently, the tonal product which is created without an end in view is more tautly rhythmicized than that which serves outer ends.

No matter how strikingly one activity furthers another, one cannot immediately use such a furtherance to set up a causal and genetic connection between them. Undoubtedly the tired soldier marches more willingly, more easily, more vigorously, and more rhythmically when music begins, and even when the signal-horn or drum is sounded; but one must not for this reason say that rhythm was developed for the purpose of facilitating marching. Thus rhythm was developed in connection, not with work, but with its primitive application in dancing and music. Later, to be sure, it reached beyond music because it then also represented a principle superior to and outside art. But not an extra-aesthetic one; for its effect is always aesthetic, either as a whole or at least in characteristic part. Furthermore, it is a completely independent musical

phenomenon. Satisfaction in it is independent of the act in which it is used, and independent too of the peculiar quality of the time-filling factor which shapes it. Genuine and autonomous pleasure in rhythm clings to the organization as such, not to the quality of the elements, to the sound-color of the tone, for instance. Thus it must still be present when tones sounding unpleasant by themselves replace pleasant ones.

Rhythm is pleasant and operates even where it is temporarily suspended and placed in question, as in musical syncopation and in misplaced accents and indecisive emphases in verse-poetry. In syncopations the accentual proportions are moved out of place and for this reason are made particularly impressive for our experience (according to the law of psychic blocking [*Stauung*]). Syncopations contradict the law of the chosen rhythmical order; the accent is moved from the "good" (strong) division of the measure; the syncopations (like sharp dissonances in the harmony as they follow their resolution) are especially agreeable following the repetition of the rhythm based on order, but they have set up an entirely individual effect in advance, as is clear in jazz-music, which is made up consistently of syncopation. In misplaced accents, the stresses of verse and phrase are in conflict, as are ethical and metrical accents; the passage must be recited with shifting (*schwebender*) accents, and the conflict between the stress of the word and that of the verse results in a certain setting off of important words. Striking offense is done to the rising rhythm of the *quintain* of *Wallenstein*:

Ernst ist der Anblick der Notwendigkeit

or

Bahnlos liegt's hinter mir und eine Mauer
Aus meinen eignen Werken baut sich auf

or

Abgesetzt wurd' ich!

—in all of these cases the dramatist aims at an especially weighty effect as the iambic order is relinquished. Consideration of consciously cultivated and attempted blockings (*Stauungen*) and roughnesses (*Rauheiten*) which interrupt the smooth flow of dramatic verse (the "iambic roll") leads us to a basic insight which is important for the aesthetics of rhythm.

In all cases, rhythm arises from the dialectical tension between a domineering likeness and slight diversities which struggle against this likeness, not finally to break it up and to set it in question, but

merely to lend to it a pulsating life as they are brought into agreement with and included in it. Patterns and anti-patterns are set in attractive statement here; they fight that "friendly fight" ("*artigen Krieg*") in which Nietzsche sees special aesthetic effects. The pattern as it appears in musical measure and poetic verse is necessary, but it is not everything by any means. The vital matter is the lively and convincing loosening-up of the pattern, the giving of multiplicity to strict unity. Indeed, the more a rhythm is hardened into a rigid pattern, just that much more does it lose the capacity for operating aesthetically and artistically. Klages bases his antithesis of measure and rhythm on the opposition between pattern and freedom. If the latter is the return of the similar, the former comes from the exact repetition of what is mathematically the same. Only for a short time can the measured-metrical assert itself in art in complete austerity (as in the imitation of the metronome in Beethoven's *Eighth*) or can it serve the ends of parody (as in Stravinsky and Prokofieff): at most, it will furnish only a canvas, which, covered by the colors of embroidery, is blurred in its lines, and may indeed be lost to view. A draftsman who rules his straight line and in a perspective representation holds strictly to the laws of presentative geometry as governed by learning neither produces an impression of the highest naturalness nor works artistically. A person dancing in a maximally strict measure would create the impression of an automaton, and ballet-dancers and singers therefore take great pains in moving thus if they want to create such an impression, as they do in the ballet *Coppelia* and the opera *The Tales of Hoffmann*. Music and verse-poetry too are directed towards that vital aspect which comes into being when something beyond the purely regular is present. Everyone knows of the horrible impression made by penny-in-the-slot music, by electric pianos, pianolas, and so forth. The chopped-off and soulless effect of such pseudo-music goes back to the fact that as the rigidly measured is stressed to the maximum, every kind of living agogic is lost. Furthermore, everyone knows the anti-artistic impression made by overly-strict scansion and by the monotonous repetition of verses done by children. But to reject that working-out of metrical patterns as it is carried out in the schools is not to justify the contrary practice of most actors who, not able to speak verses, reduce verse to prose and only bring stresses of meaning and feeling into being. Why should the poet really have written verse? Under the living expression of meaning and feeling there must always be at least a suspicion of the clear construction of a rhythmical art-form: The sound-unity

of the verse must not be spoiled by powerful *enjambements*. A good speaker is a person who, despite his possessing every kind of meaningful and freely flexible diction, is able to let the metrical structure of the verse sound through. It is precisely this lively conflict and polite battle between the fixed lines of metrical enclosure and the motion of a diction changing independently and dedicated to the requirements of expression which gives to musical-mensural combinations and those of verse and stanza in poetry a genuine and full artistic charm.

Experimental investigations have shown, not that metrical units and basic forms, say a dactyl or an anapest, embrace units of time which are absolutely the same, but that between individual parts of a structure there are certain intervals of time which are not always exactly alike. The sequence making up an anapest (∪ ∪ —) is not heard as a regular figure, but has a greater interval of time between the first and the second than between the second and the third divisions. In music this over-balancing of temporal intervals has no small significance. Sterzinger,¹⁹⁹ to whom we owe important research-results for this insight, speaks about a "natural pause" (*natürliche Pause*). It is different for individual intervals and is followed instinctively by musicians. This is unusually important in the practical exercise of music. Different dance-forms, like *Ländler*, waltzes, minuets, are all in $3/4$ measure, but the rhythmical impression of the well and correctly played waltz as compared with the other forms well played has its own individuality. The characteristic agogic of the waltz lies in a failure to play an exact, metronomically perfect $3/4$ measure, the second note (the "weak" part of the measure) taking on a certain weight and being slightly extended by way of a somewhat lengthened time-interval coming between it and the third note of the measure. If a person plays a strict $3/4$ measure with monarchical control of the first quarter, a caricature of the waltz ensues.

In the art of poetry too it is not true that a verse as a living unit of force could be composed of verse-feet (trochees, iambs, and so forth) which are absolutely equal in kind and in value. The poet never so proceeds that iamb follows iamb; rather, he begins with a complex verse-intention which has form, an intention which he organizes as he writes and files his work. Poetic atomism, according to which the poet's procedure is like a bricklayer's placing brick upon brick in rows, leads *ad absurdum*. According to this untenable view, the poet would begin by building words and verse-feet out of ultimate sound-groups (the syllables) which he feels

precisely as a unit. These syllables would then be combined into verses, the verses into stanzas, and the stanzas into the poem. Such a way of building the poem is impossible; no artist proceeds in this way. It is well known that Goethe,²⁰⁰ thinking entirely in terms of a theory of form, turned against the concept of "composition" precisely with respect to this kind of idea about the construction of an art-work; according to him, an art-work is not "com-posed"—that is, not compounded. Such an atomism does not take sufficiently into account the indivisible form which the art-work as a whole possesses.

Thinking in these terms, Dessoir says: that which is given as an aesthetic object to science is form. When science analyzes this object (as is inevitable), it must not forget that it goes from the concrete into the abstract. Epistemology has for a long time seen that it is not the characteristics of the thing that are the realities out of which the object is composed, but that one must start with the thing itself; elementary theory of logic no longer begins with the concept, but with the judgment. Accordingly, a well carried out theory of rhythm could begin with the period (stanza or musical phrase), then descendingly proceed to the lower-level unit of the group (line or period), to end with the "foot."

What the poet has in his ear before he begins to write is a verse-intention, a sound-structure, whose exact organization and realization must not be fixed in the particular despite the primary thorough rhythmization of experience. Therefore particular "verse-feet" are not always created with mathematical equality throughout; this very fact does not allow a person to read verse in strict scansion, for in doing so he would only justify an adding up of sums made up of separate feet, an adding up which just does not take place in connection with verse, which even in the most precisely maintained metrical pattern sounds along with the living pulsation of rhythm. The principle of temporal rhythmical organization allows and asks for more freedom than does that of the spatial organization of symmetry. Whereas in the latter the repetition of a single element is satisfying, it is a form which must be repeated in a rhythm. Mere repetition of simple sense-impressions does not produce a rhythmical impression; only a repeated form does that. But if the repetition of simple elements, to be agreeable, must lay weight on the complete equality of the thing repeated, the repetition of forms allows a greater freedom.

The discussion of the question of the relation of rhythm to

the phenomenon designated as "measure" or "meter," a question which is easily connected with what has been said up to now, belongs to more special disciplines—to music-aesthetics and prosody. I mean the more exact kinds of combination of the schematic sort which occur when the principle of universal rhythmical order is realized: in the realm of dance and music (measure) and in the transfer of rhythm to linguistic material (meter). These things are nevertheless so important that they must be treated at least briefly. By rhythm we mean the articulation of a sequence filling a course of time, a sequence which is sensuously graspable and productive of feeling; by measure and meter (concepts that are not identical, however) we mean the pattern or scheme of the idea of rhythmical order which is brought to consciousness through reason and understanding and which therefore is consistently carried out. Rhythm is the primary principle of the organized passage of time in terms of precise (*prägnant*) forms occurring in succession; meter and measure are means by which this idea of temporal order is realized. Rhythm is the more universal and the broader concept; by contrast, meter and measure have narrower and more special significations.

P. Habermann distinguishes the concepts under discussion somewhat differently. Rhythm is every organization of sensuously perceivable occurrences which is agreeable as such and which takes place because of gradations of the weight-elements and time-intervals. Meter is a characteristic of certain rhythms: namely, of those composed of a dance- or music-substrate. As concept, meter is useful for classification. Stressed always are the rhythmical signs by which a verse, a stanza, a *type* of verse or stanza is classified: thus, in general, the number of accented and unaccented syllables in their general arrangement, the formation of verse-endings, the positions of the joinings, the number of lines, and the concatenations. Intrinsically, measure has nothing to do with the formation of rhythmical groups. The distances from accent to accent are immaterial to it. But it is concerned with the duration of the divisions or the members of a measure and their shades of stress. Measure is a counting-period of centers of gravity returning periodically in equal intervals, a period which by itself has nothing to do with the rhythmical limits of real rhythmical groups. In strict orchestric (dance) music measure is indeed the rule, but mensurability does not belong to the character of rhythm.

Just a little about the feeling- and mood-value of rhythm: a person who surrenders himself to a pronounced rhythmical or-

ganization is easily moved in terms of a certain affection of feeling and mood. Rhythm stirs up the passions, is exciting, cheerful, dallying, playful; or it is repressive, heavy, and severely burdened. Without any representations of meaning entering in, there come toward us from out of one rhythmical arrangement composure, dignity, seriousness, and sadness; from another soaring cheerfulness and a delightfully exciting sense of life. The mood seems to come directly from the rhythm and to be contained in it, so strong and unequivocal is the invitation to empathy coming from the aesthetic object. There is no lack of corroborating facts. There are "mood-drummers" (*Stimmungstrommler*) who not infrequently make a successful attempt forcefully to suggest all kinds of moods and states of feeling with nothing but the rhythm of their noise-instruments; the French drummer in the book "*Le Grand*" in Heine's *Reisebilder* seems to have been their ancestor—that is, if their origin does not go back to the most ancient of times. In a modern novella an attempt is made to reproduce in words the stirring mood-value of a rhythm like that of the funeral march-like theme of the second movement of Beethoven's *Seventh*. That slow and dragged-out rhythms in which the individual tones have a far-reaching equi-duration and when cut up into smaller note-values have sad and depressing effects—this has its natural basis in a certain likeness to states of the whole personality. In sadness and depression there occur slowness of pulse, a reduction of physical tone, a slowing up of associations, sleepiness, and heaviness of all movements; psychic depression has in its train weariness and slowness of all forms of expression in the physical realm. Consequently, a funeral march in quick, skipping rhythms is a total impossibility. According to H. Riemann,²⁰¹ length as compared with shortness acts as a sedative, and shortness as compared with length is stimulating, the result being that a greater number of lengths is solemn, dignified, even burdened and oppressive and a greater number of shortnesses is restless and exciting. In this connection Ziehen²⁰² points to the fact that a heaping up of short tones (short relative to the measure-pattern, but in the absolute sense too) seems to be the proper expression for exciting affects, and that, inversely, an abundance of short tones also arouses such affects in us in turn. A heaping up of long tones is in complete analogy to the affects which do not have an exciting character, such as sadness and awe. Here one immediately sees a connection with what has already been said: individual physical applications which, like breathing, pulse-beat, and heart-beat, take place rhythmically are influenced by mental incitements of different kinds.

Happiness, which causes our hearts to beat more intensely, accelerates them; grief and pain retard them.

"As a result of this, the interweaving of seen and heard rhythms with our physical life draws the psyche with it at the same time; an accelerated rhythm sets us on fire and sounds as if it were inspired with courage; a slow rhythm depresses us and places us in a sober mood. What under the force of rhythm we experience as physical motion, as the enhancement of life and mood, we give back to it in aesthetic contemplation as its own special life. But even when rhythm does not through sympathy directly draw upon our own life-rhythm, we are able to catch sight in it of a living power which takes an active part in it. The rhythmical movements we have experienced ourselves suggest to us that we can 'see into' the movements of rhythm the force and the mood which would govern us if we moved according to such a rhythm. Both kinds of contemplation are frequent also in play, and both allow rhythm to appear as an especially powerful bearer of motion, excitement, and mood."²⁰³

To be sure, it is only in especially precise cases that rhythm offers an approximative unequivocal expression of mood; in less striking ones, it is the ready receiving-vessel of many different mood-values. All possible feelings have been musically expressed in a moderately moving 4/4 measure (in which not only the measurable pattern for, but also the rhythmical accomplishment of these feelings are identical), and in poetry the trochee has expressed equally well sad resignation (the introductory lines of Grillparzer's *"Ahnfrau"*), quiet firmness (*"Eines schickt sich nicht für alle"*), and melancholy tenderness (*"Hirtenknabe, Hirtenknabe, dir auch singt man einmal"*). The indeterminateness of meter as well as of rhythm, which by itself alone can express particular moods only with moderate distinctness, shows itself also in the fact that in the same poem the rhythm followed in individual stanzas can be associated with the expressive effects having entirely different contents of feeling and mood; of this Goethe's ballade *"Der Gott und die Bajadere"* is an especially convincing example. In the latter half of the second stanza the iambic-anapestic rhythm most strikingly portrays the dance of the prostitute:

Sie rührt sich, die Cymbeln zum Tanze zu schlagen
 Sie weiss sich so lieblich im Kreise zu tragen,

and so forth; in the seventh stanza the same rhythm delineates with equally coercive effect the death-songs of the priests:

Wir tragen die Alten
 Nach langem Ermatten und spätem Erkalten,
 Wir tragen die Jugend noch eh' sie's gedacht.

But, still, rhythm does not appear alone in most cases, but is embedded in an artistically total form which derives from the cooperative efforts of many factors. And because rhythm, by way of the other elements of art—the word, its sound, its signification, and its psychic content, by way of the meaning of the entire situation (which suggests to the reader or reciter a quite definite kind of inner or outer delivery), or by way of musical melody, sound-color, tonal intensity, and tempo—because rhythm is thus supported and raised to be something more definite and precise, it gains a power of expression which is unequivocal and striking. "Then it appears first to be passionately excited or solemnly quiet, then tripping and rocking or monotonously hurrying, then shouting with joy to heaven or grieved to death; and it forces the hearer unresistingly to enter the state of mind which apparently is rendered by it." ²⁰⁴

What in very many cases makes empathy in a given rhythm into something which is uncommonly coercive (that is, what on the one hand decisively calls it up and what on the other hand turns it into certain emotional paths) is the sensations of motion which are so decidedly a part of the rhythm. Through these sensations empathy is realized in musical and linguistic rhythm. Furthermore, they are the basis of the dynamic character which rhythm has for us. When we find rhythm to be the expression of a powerful emotion, it is to sensations of motion that it traces back.

By themselves alone (as Volkelt ²⁰⁵ correctly remarks) the hearing-impressions would not be able to give rhythm its manifest dynamic character, which is possible only through the joining together of sensations of tension and those of motion. In no other sphere is empathy so closely allied with sensations of motion (even though motion-sensations are felt only in the manner of a natural tendency) and not replaced by mere knowledge coming from experience.

But other mediating forces also play a role in rhythm experience: thus, possibly, the experience of a *tertium comparationis* given with a certain rhythm which can extend from clear associations of resemblances to opaque and vague analogies in sensation. This occurs when one certain rhythm makes an impression on us of the energetic and vigorous movements of striding and marching

and when another gives the impression of a person softly and contentedly rocking himself.

Lipps²⁰⁶ with his usual skill and attention to detail has traced the relation of rhythm and mood and the empathy-problems coming from it. Here I shall merely refer to the statements filling one extensive chapter of his *Aesthetics*.

In closing this section, which has been preponderantly dedicated to music, I should like to say something more of a general nature. Previously when I separately examined sounds, melody, harmony, and so forth, I forcibly isolated certain phenomena into far-reaching theoretical abstractions; these phenomena in the actualities of art-creation and art-enjoyment hardly ever appear in absolute separation, at least not over a long period of time. For the superior form of completely developed music, the supreme fact from which all aesthetic contemplation has to begin is that melody, harmony, and rhythm appear in inseparable cooperation as an organic and unified form of effect. As the individual aspects of the impression work together, they enhance one another mutually. For example, melody comes into its own only by way of the accompanying harmony. I well remember that when I was four years old, I was already dissatisfied if my mother played me a melody which had one voice only; I demanded that she should play "with both hands." The necessary cooperation of all three factors does not shut out the fact that the stress and value of each of these mediums of effect can be a different thing with different composers. Rossini wrote charming melodies, but his harmony has neither particular charm nor particular problems; and Wagner²⁰⁷ cannot have been entirely wrong in poking fun at the "little counterpoint" ("*Kontrapunktchen*") of Rossini's most serious music. Matters were no different in connection with the early Verdi, say with works like *Trovatore*, the composition of which has been derided as being as meagre and lean as a cornet-à-piston solo. Wagner, Bruckner, and Brahms, by contrast, were more dependent on harmony. But it is not true that a melodist renounces the two other mediums; they merely retreat to the background. The indispensable cooperation, which cannot be abrogated, of individual mediums of effect in the vivid impression of the art-work does not exclude the fact that the theoretical-scientific observer can isolate and analyze the separate mediums of operation for the purpose of a more precise discernment: nor does this cooperation make isolation and analysis impossible. A researcher proceeding thus must constantly remember that, in so doing, he is abandoning, even destroying, the genuine and primary reality of

the effect: not foolishly and not arbitrarily, to be sure, but precisely in the way the anatomist comes directly to the assistance of the living organism through analysis and isolation, so that by way of analytical dissection he gets to know the particularities.

In the sphere of aesthetic matters the shape or form in every case remains the thing immediately to be encountered and, above all, the thing to which the true effect is attached. In a musical work of art this form-character is especially manifest because it is emphatically presented in its undoubted existence in terms of different aspects. If melody is truly not a mere summation of single tones, but a genuine totality, a form-composed structure as such, then the complete musical effect is a form-composed unification of the factors of melody, harmony, rhythm (and sound-color). The shape of a melody is something other than the sum of its tones; it does not change when all of the tones are transposed an octave, a fifth, or a fourth. By contrast, the changing of a single tone is enough, as Révész correctly stresses, to give the melody an entirely different character. "Still more clearly does the phenomenon of a change in the total unity of the form stand out when the whole of the structure is very slightly inflected, when one leaves the tones of the melody unchanged, for instance, but changes the rhythm. In this case the melodic structure is altered completely although the tones have remained unchanged. Interesting also in terms of *Gestalt* psychology is the reversal of the theme as it frequently takes place in the fugues of J. S. Bach, for example." What is aesthetically effective in music is totalities of form; musicality is therefore identical with the excellence of musical form. For an unmusical person who does not hear a meaningfully organized totality of form of melody, harmony, and rhythm, a composition is a confused aggregate of tones. Music brings about deep and rich feeling-experiences which are the goal of all art, but only when the autonomous musical contents created by the composers—contents which are determined by melodic, harmonic, and rhythmic formations, and also by structure, proportion, good organization, and complexibility—are *de facto* grasped in the proper manner. Musicality is one's capacity to experience adequately the autonomous effects of tonal art (that is, the formal structures accomplished in the sound-material) and to receive an impression of them in terms of the intention of their creator.

H. VERBAL AESTHETICS

a.¹ *The Aesthetic Effects of Language.* In other essays I have already been more or less thoroughly concerned with the problems

which are relevant here ("Poetics and the Aesthetics of Literature," "German Stylistics and the Aesthetics of Language," "Rhetoric," and discussions about the psychology of language). I am therefore excused from having to be more detailed, though certain most general statements for reasons of systematic continuity do have a place here.

For the human species in the course of the six to eight hundred thousand years during which it has existed, language has developed into a cultural field of the greatest diversity; it has become a true in-between world which thrusts itself between human beings and things. The entire world is contained in it, and to it (that is, to the symbolical representation of things of the world and to the abundance of connections effected by this representation) are attached the same effects and results as to the primary perceptions and direct experiences of things. Someone who, being the first and only person to see a fire which has just started in the theater, sounds the alarm to others by crying "Fire!" causes the same effect in all persons as if they themselves perceived the fire. As the death of her son is communicated to her through language, a mother just as strictly falls into grief as if she herself had seen him lying on the bier. Through representation, language is therefore able to impart all of the circumstances with which human beings can have to do; it is really the world once again, the world in the mirror of human apprehension, thought, and imagination. Alongside the logical-intellectual and the ethical-practical effects of language there are its aesthetic effects of which the comprehensive mouthpiece of civilization is no less capable than it is of the others. Thus language brings about very powerful aesthetic results which are used in particular arts (the "speaking ones" [poetry and rhetoric]), but which at the same time play a role antecedent to and outside them. The skilful narration of circumstances, the well-written letter, the wittily pointed remark—none is literature or is intended to be literature; yet each produces aesthetic effects, and often very powerful ones indeed. Linguistic structures are therefore very often the occasion for aesthetic experiences in which the effect lies not entirely or intrinsically in the mental facts of the case which are communicated, but in the linguistic presentation, in the "how" of linguistic composition. Spoken in other words, made less precise (*prägnant*), or in any other way composed differently, the same thought, the same circumstance, would not create the same effect. The manner of linguistic composition and formation is thus definitely a part of the aesthetic impression and is indeed the true bearer and cause of it.

Wherein does the aesthetic effectiveness of a linguistic structure lie? Chiefly in a powerful product of feeling. Aesthetically relevant linguistic structures are distinguished by intensified emotional effects. At the same time certain intellectual products are not absent. The represented relationships of the intellectual sort, because of the complexible-terse manner in which they are presented, are easily comprehensible—something which causes a certain functional pleasure of the logical-aesthetic type. Belonging here also, then, are certain metaphors and comparisons which are felt to be surprisingly ingenious, pertinent, and informative. Earlier, people expected to see the aesthetic relevance of literary linguistic structures chiefly in their inner perspicuity (*Anschaulichkeit*), and literature was consequently defined as the art of imagination and sensibility. Today we know that a perceptual image of that which is presented by language is no more necessary for aesthetic enjoyment than for the understanding of the linguistic structures;²⁰⁸ an understanding of what is meant, a mental comprehension of the relations expressed: this is enough. On the whole, language is not directed towards imaginative-perceptual representation; be that as it may, one can still say that such a representation asserts itself the most strongly, relatively speaking, in the aesthetic realm. It is able to increase aesthetic enjoyment and make it more intense; but it is not absolutely necessary for the latter's coming into being.

The aesthetic effects caused by linguistic structures can be divided into two groups, that of form-aesthetics and that of content-aesthetics, a dualism which gives us at least a serviceable starting-point for the following discussion. To begin with, what is agreeable here can initially be the sound of the speech-structure: the euphonic and eurythmic product of words regulated into a smooth flow which avoids cacophony and disturbing equivalences and coarsenesses as much as possible; to the words belong also the organization-principle of rhythm and meter (this happens in versification). Here it is chiefly the mass of sound, in a certain way approximating that which is enjoyed in music, which is the vital matter, and the so-called sound-figures (rhyme, alliteration, assonance, and so forth) serve this effect. Here belong the very often impressive effects of imitations of noise and of painting in tone as they are aimed at by linguistic onomatopoeics; in the happy meeting of these effects a considerable aesthetic effect can be generated, as, furthermore, can also the tonal-symbolical mood-effects aimed at by the vowels. Such structures—but only in extreme cases—approach meaning-free sound-music; as a rule, such devices are thoroughly in the serv-

ice of intellectual matters. Alongside the formal-aesthetic effect of the word-bodies, of the physical sound of language, is the complex of those effects which language as the bearer of intellectual matters realizes in the contents of its word-signs and in its syntactical arrangements. Through symbolical presentation, because for an especially long period of time it claims our entire thinking and imagining, our knowledge, and our imaginative and associative activity, and transforms them into a fruitful and also easily successful activity, language can bring all possible intellectual contents and associations into existence; it is able to narrate, to delineate, to communicate everything possible in the realm of human experience: destinies and events, conditions and occurrences, as well as their effects on human beings, their influence on the life of human mind and feeling. But in these cases too, where content is in the foreground, language is not merely a vehicle and an indifferent mediator of these contents which by itself could not add anything to its effect. How vital its contribution is, how the contents only in a particular, and in no other kind of, linguistic presentation make their effect, can be seen in the fact that a poem, and even a witticism or an anecdote, can be deprived of its effect as soon as a person chooses other words and takes away its proper linguistic form. Then possibly not even a beautiful thought is left, and generally nothing at all remains. The same event can be narrated so that it makes a powerful aesthetic effect; but on the other hand it can be presented with a linguistic awkwardness that makes it tedious and deprives it of any possibility of interweaving with our feelings.

b.¹ Literature and its Kinds. If one defines art as formation directed towards feeling-experiences, then literature is the art which takes language in its service to produce these effects. Literature is art by way of language; in it language is used in all the abundance of its effective means, the acoustical-phonetic and the motoral as well as the mental-meaningful ones. The medium of literature is the word, not only in terms of its central core of meaning, but also in those of its sound-mass, its timbre, its collateral associative products, its word-range and feeling-tone.²⁰⁹ It is precisely with the last means that the poet knows how to aim at those effects of which the bare prose of everyday communication hardly has any notion. Literature as a whole is therefore made a unity through its work-stuff: linguistic-material and the laws of its nature.

Apart from its ultimate materially conditioned oneness, the concept of literature shows itself to be an abstraction in that it brings together very different types of linguistic-artistic formations which since ancient times have been divided for aesthetic, psy-

chological, and linguistic-theoretical reasons: ²¹⁰ aesthetic because very different kinds of feeling-effect occur; psychological because these effects arise on the basis of very different psycho-mental attitudes of the creators and apply to very different psychic realms in the people enjoying art; linguistically-theoretical because different functions of language come to the fore. The division here proposed is that of lyric, epic, and drama.

If literature is primarily an art of things, an art of objective relations of concrete meanings, of states of fact and sense related to things and certain associations (because it is the nature of the word to mean and imply a certain object of outer or inner reality which is beyond itself), if literature is this, then the lyric is that species of literature which most nearly approximates the non-objective mood-art of music. The sound-aspect of language comes to the fore, and connection by way of meter and verse is almost obligatory; rhyme and other means of binding sound together are not obligatory to the same degree, but they are still extremely frequent. The cultivation of sound-as-form is necessary in the lyric because it is relatively poor in world-stuff and because it consequently has little breadth. All aesthetically relevant linguistic structures—and with this only the correlate of its characteristic feature of conformity to feeling is indicated—are built chiefly on the linguistic function of expressing and making things known; but in the lyric a one-sidedness is especially in evidence: this is the giving of expression. The lyric narrates nothing and describes little. Its subjects are the experiences of the poet or the world on the side of feeling and mood. In a timeless present, not bound to a definite place, it expresses everything which can agitate the human heart: love and death, the beauty of nature, the majesty of God: all of these in terms of feeling. Wherever the objective contents are concentrated and consolidated, wherever events are narrated and communicated in poetic form, as in the ballad, the pure lyric, which is centered to the maximum on subjective experiences and mood-relations, has been left behind. The epic, by contrast, has to do in the first place with such objective contents (whether or not it employs verse or a free style) which it presents in the objective mode of narrative. It relates events and destinies and is therefore especially dependent on the linguistic function of presenting a report, of giving information, about matters of fact and mind which it interprets, not, to be sure, in a prosaic-sober manner, but quite in the literary one—that is, in the vivid way which produces a feeling-effect. Yet the

pragmatic subjects of the world are more important to the writer of epics than are its feeling-aspects, and from this fact there results a series of important consequences for the epic style. One can narrate only what is past, and therefore the epic, in contrast to the lyric, which is in the present (or beyond time), is mainly in the perfect tense ("Once upon a time"), whereas lyrical forms in a past tense testify to the precariousness of the lyrical sense of style or make transitions to the ballad style. The events delineated have long been over, and therefore just for this reason the epic writer finds it possible to take on "objective" attitude towards his characters and their fates. The epic derives from imaginative looking-experiences; the love of the epic-writer for the interesting contents of the world means that he can give considerable play in his work to comfortable depictions of peaceful conditions; this makes the epic into the broadest, most comprehensive of species (epic totality, epic breadth). But yet the chief subjects are human destinies, which are presented either in a careful unfolding of character, as in the novel, with a detailed consideration of forces (like the milieu) depending on evolution, or in the fashion of the short narrative called the novella, in which a complete personality is placed in a critical situation in which he must prove himself. From the remotest of times the drama has suggested a synthesis of epic and lyric; and yet we need not take this identification too seriously, although there is much to be said for it. Thus the "preterite-present" character of drama brings past things forward into a renewed present time. Here courses full of tension and occurrences which are set off, fate-directed, and meaningfully made are presented, not in the form of an expressive monologue or of an objective report by the writer, but in dialogue accompanying action by performing persons who live out their fates before us. The essence of drama is action, but action causes conflict (that is, the exposition of antagonistic tendencies of will). This basic two voicedness, this powerfully concentrated and pointed antinomy, has in its train that character of tension which is typical of drama and which turns primarily in the direction, not of pure experiences of feeling and representation, but of the motoral dynamism of willing and striving. Here the linguistic function of appeal is more important than in other kinds of literature. Using the terms "lyric," "epic," and "dramatic," one has designated not only the constitutives of the styles of the three basic literary species, but also poetic-literary-aesthetic categories which go beyond their own proper and primary

sphere of application; and for this reason it is meaningful to say that novels have revealed a lyrical stamp, or that many a dramatist has "epicized" (*episiert*) the drama.

3. OBJECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF THE EFFECT OF BEAUTY

A. PRELIMINARIES

In the discussion to follow I shall deal chiefly with the insights which I shall condense from previous empirical considerations and I shall form them into precise kinds of aesthetic principles. It has become clear that it is quite possible for one to set up objective principles for the effect of beauty if one interprets the concept of the principle in the free sense of "principle," and not in the narrower and stricter sense of "law." There are certain objective presuppositions which must be fulfilled if an aesthetically positive impression is to come to be. What principles are apropos here has been implicitly laid down in the previous discussions; we need only group them more succinctly and clearly together. We deliberately speak of "principles" in the plural; for, according to our view, we are concerned with a plurality of such. It seems impossible to me, or it at least seems misleading in terms of the present state of research, to give any questions about the objective conditions of the effect of beauty an undivided answer which would be in the position of asserting a unique superior principle. Every single one of the "unique" principles which aesthetic singularists have specified as having a pretended claim of totality rightly sinks into the place of a merely useful formulation as soon as one applies a comprehensive critique to a definition so hopefully and so hastily made. It is quite possible to set up such principles for the sectors of aesthetic matters which are content and form; but then a metaphysical interpretation must remain so that this dualism can be raised to a higher unity. But the time for this is not yet; I shall therefore content myself here with describing certain superior principles in the realm of content (the beauty of content) and in that of form (the beauty of form). In so doing, I shall call to mind some definitions by Theodor A. Meyer²¹¹ which are useful as a starting-point for these discussions. We call beautiful everything which provides us with pleasure and joy in aesthetic contemplation. Nevertheless, it depends on things and their qualities (not conclusively, but to a degree which cannot be relinquished and which is funda-

mental) whether they stimulate and satisfy aesthetic contemplation or not.

"On what characteristics of the thing does its aesthetic effect, its beauty, depend? What is it which, always the same, returns in different appearances of the beautiful? It must be remarked, to begin with, that this impression usually does not flow from a quality of the object, but that it grows up from various constituents, at least as concerns the richer structures. It is built out of a great number of separate impressions. But no matter how many elements of any sort may be present, all of them still lead back to two groups of beauties—to the beauty of form and that of content. The freely symmetrical grouping of figures around the Sistine Madonna of Raphael which makes the picture so clear appears to the eyes as an attractiveness of form, whereas the inexpressible sublimity and heavenly ecstasy which speak from the figure of the Madonna belong to the beauty of content."

Indeed, in the highest types of aesthetic experience, form and content (to emphasize by repeating what I have already said) must work most intimately together. Form is only the expression of a humanly significant content which is aesthetically relevant; the highest aesthetic value belongs to it only when it is realized with life and mind. Content, on the contrary, must be given body in adequate form and revealed in suitable sensuous appearance; the life-content in evidence must have become form to reveal the effect of the highest beauty. This supreme and ultimate unity of aesthetic things is a coercive fact of experience and hence at the same time a fact which every aesthetic theory, which is adequate only if it takes account of it, is duty bound to recognize. This fact (as has just been shown) is thoroughly graspable in conceptual definitions, but only in those which are very abstract and general. To arrive at concrete definitions, one must descend a step lower and keep the division (which cannot be suspended) of the beauties of content and form. This procedure justifies itself methodologically because it gives occasion for fruitful statements about the aesthetic object and its organization; and it justifies itself objectively too because each of the two sides of our instinct for beauty can on occasion find independent satisfaction. Besides the superior examples just mentioned there are also other cases of considerable aesthetic relevance in which a content which has not succeeded to its full mold procures pleasure for us and, inversely, in which a formal shaping as such (that is, apart from the content given body in it, a content which in

this case is less vital) does so. Thus the separation of form and content in aesthetic objects remains the starting-point of the following discussions, except as this dualism is later dissolved into overlapping definitions. By content-aesthetic objects we mean the seeming life which through the value of its substance invites us to and satisfies us in an intuition filled with feeling. As the objective principles of positive aesthetic effect which belong here we can cite: conformity to type and Idea (ideality), plenitude of life, expression and the state of animation (*Beseeltheit*), and perceptual perfection (*anschauliche Vollkommenheit*). By the beauty of form we mean the especially satisfactory mode of the appearance of things. Beauty of form depends on the appropriateness of the shaping of an aesthetically contemplated object as regards the perception of its forms and their contents. Certain forms are appropriate for perception, then, if they allow that act of apperception directed towards them to be easily successful and to take place agreeably. This is the case when spatial and temporal relations of good organization (symmetry, proportion, eurythmy, harmony) are realized, when the object is eusynoptic and complexible, and when it by means of repetition (recurrence), variation, telling contrasts, and intensifications sets the contemplating mind into an activity which is stimulating and full of change and variety.

B. PRINCIPLES CONCERNING CONTENT

a.¹ *Conformity to the Idea and the Type (Ideality and Typicality)*. The great aestheticians of content from Plato and Plotinus up to Hegel and Schelling have defined the beautiful as the sensuous appearance of the Idea. This is a definition which, because of the partial truth that it contains, has had so manifest and so persuasive an effect that for a long time it could be presented and seen as the whole truth. Nevertheless, anyone who bases the beauty of an organization on the fact that it brings its Idea purely into appearance and that it realizes fully the type of its species exposes himself to a whole series of objections which, so to speak, can be heard at the first attempt. First of all, this definition is valid only for the beauty of things. A person, a horse, an oak tree, a rose are beautiful when they are adequate to the requirements just mentioned; but what about beauty in the realm of the mood-arts of the non-objective kind, of music, architecture, and handicrafts? For tones, chords, melodies, and rhythms there is neither Idea nor ideal; neither, according to Plato, are there Ideas for artifacts like houses and pitchers. And, then, not everything is beautiful which in truth

conforms to Idea and type. An earthworm and a toad can fully and purely realize the Idea of their species without their being beautiful for this reason. Finally not everything atypical and inimical to Idea is repulsive. The plumage of the peacock and of the bird of paradise, the veiled fins of macropterous animals wholly contradict our primary ideas of birds and fishes, but are aesthetically forceful in certain ways precisely for these reasons. In the same way, the youthful type of figure which is often preferred to that of the ideal woman does not entirely correspond to the Idea of womankind, but it too puts into action considerable aesthetic values (and not erotic ones only). In the face of these objections and contradictions, the consistent theory of the Idea is helpless; it can be saved only if it retreats to the realm in which it is valid (which is that of the aesthetics of things) and if it declares itself ready to take on a series of limitations.

Besides, it is a really problematical undertaking to clarify aesthetic concerns by setting up the concepts of Idea and ideal. For there are hardly two concepts in all philosophical terminology which are more indefinite, and M. Geiger²¹² has said some telling things about the difficulties for the aesthetician which grow out of the ambiguous character of these terms.

Is the Idea, as Plato suggests it is, something transcendent from which physical copies are made and to which they owe their beauty, or is it a something immanent in the body, a law given through the concrete body itself? Is the Idea of the human body an abstract concept of its species, or is it in opposition to everything abstract, the most intuitive (perceptible) thing that always continues to shine through even the worst-constructed body? Is the Idea the ideal that takes the lead over everything empirical to which it conforms; or, inversely, is the Idea wrested from the empirical? Is it nothing but the average impression rising out of a piling up of an endless number of impressions of the human body which in the course of time stamp themselves on our minds (Kant's normal Idea)? Is it that kind of impression which undertakes the balancing of opposing characteristics? Does it give what is characteristic of species by the omission of everything fortuitous, the question of whether the essence is beautiful or ugly in itself being a matter of indifference; or does it mean an idealization which selects and raises to the norm only that which is beautiful in a type? Is it the unique expression of the characteristics of the physical species, or does the universally human in its psychic attributes betray itself in it?

Considering the multiplicity of problems covered by this con-

cept (I mean the series of different ways in which this meaning has been realized in the course of philosophical history), a conscious confining of the term to the clearest and simplest of contents becomes necessary without qualification. By "Idea," therefore, I mean the prototype of the thing, its original (*Ur-*) type, the lawful existence inherent in it. The Idea of the horse (better, of horse-ness) would therefore be the building-plan at the base of all concrete individuals of this kind, the basic plan of the structural law of appearance interpenetrating them without any variants. According to Plato, the Ideas are the transcendent representatives of the universal, the intellectually original images and models of empirical phenomena, the pure and eternal forms of empirical things, the unified-typical of a species of things. Since Descartes and Locke, people have interpreted the Idea as the image which the mind creates of a thing, the nature of a thing enclosed in a concept, which at the same time is thought of as a pattern and model never corresponding entirely to reality.

According to Kant,²¹³ Ideas are concepts based on reason, concepts for which no object is given in experience. They are neither intuitions nor feelings, but notions of a perfection which man does indeed approach, but which he can never entirely reach. A counterpart of the Idea based on reason, which is what a concept is, this something to which no representation in imagination and intuition can be adequate, is the aesthetic Idea. By this Kant²¹⁴ means those representations in imagination which cause much to be thought without any kind of specific thought's (concept's) being adequate to it, however.

The Idea is so separated from the logical-abstract concept that a certain intention and tendency towards intuitivity is inherent in it, and just for this reason it proves to be something closely connected with aesthetic matters. The Idea is the aesthetic correlative of the concept. That which the expression "Idea" designates has therefore, ever since Plato, been used to explain the effect of beauty. What lends beauty to things is their sharing in the Idea. A living being and a thing, then, have the value of beauty when each in a perceptually persuasive manner conforms to the laws of the nature of its type, of its species—when it is conformable to its Idea. For a long time, therefore, aesthetics has tried to arrive at useful definitions of the concept of Idea, and it has, as a matter of fact, not infrequently attained them.

According to M. Carrière,²¹⁵ who is being mentioned here as the single representative of a broad group, the Idea determines the

true nature of things. It is the substance and the point of unity of everything living; the manifold arises and derives from it; it is the universal which does not exclude the particular, but includes it in and under itself. The Idea expresses the nature and the determination of the particular as it in its perfection at once reflects the universal and realizes it: in it, therefore, the perceptual is united with the conceptual.

The term "Idea" is closely related to the concept of "ideal"; in the usage of many philosophers they are so closely related that to separate them is difficult. I define the ideal as a reality corresponding to the Idea, as the concrete shaping of an Idea and the giving of perceptibility to it; I further mean by it models of perfection coming into being in this way. According to Hegel,²¹⁶ the ideal is the Idea as its reality shaped in conformity with its concept; according to Kant,²¹⁷ the ideal is the Idea not only in the concrete, but also in the individual: that is, as a particular determinable or so determined by the Idea alone. An individual object is ideal in the pure intuition of it, the most perfect one of each kind of possible being, and the ultimate foundation of all imitations in phenomena. Consequently, the ideal means a *maximum perfectionis*, the epitome of perfection, and a supreme goal in intuition as well as in willing and acting. Here the relation to the aesthetic is clear too. In all realms of being which really are potentially capable of a beautiful effect, the ideal also signifies something aesthetically distinctive. Idealization as a principle of art and as a mode of artistic process in these terms means the reverse of imitation, which naturalistically and in an individualizing fashion portrays things with all of their fortuitous imperfections; it means a beautifying of things through an approximation of the highest form of their types and species. A sculptor who does not reproduce (*οἷος εἶσιν*) a human being, a horse, a lion in this way (that is, giving it, as his model looks, with all kinds of inessential defects, partial traits, imperfections), but presents *οἷος ἂν γένοιτο* each of them as if it had been possible for each to realize the highest development of its species adequately and fully—this sculptor exercises the activity of typifying and idealizing.

In scientific writing the concepts of Idea, species, and type (and consequently the concepts of idealization and conformity with species and type) are brought into such close relation that they can be used promiscuously as interchangeable terms. This applies also to the important matter under discussion here. I am following this usage and have only one thing more to say about this terminol-

ogy. The concepts "Idea" and "ideal" have been sufficiently discussed, and the concept of the species as it is adequately known from natural science is not unclear either; but I must still say something about the concept of type. By "type" we mean that which a group of living beings has in common, the invariants running through them and unifying them, the law of nature and appearance which they have in common. A living being must not set itself too far off from the type to which it belongs; if it does, it seems monstrous. J. Cohn,²¹⁸ who carries forward certain thoughts of Kant, distinguishes within the typical a normal type and an ideal one. The last reproduces in an especially pure way the nature of the species, its building-plan. The approximation of an exemplar to this ideal type allows it to appear beautiful. Beautiful exemplars of a species lift themselves above the normal and average type through a perfected development of the members in connection with perfect proportion.

Now, it is natural that in aesthetic contemplation only one individual, a concrete single phenomenon, is given; and we do not go beyond the view of it in the sense that we consciously make a comparison between it and an empirically derived representation in terms of a standard and a regulative. Instead, we remain concerned with the image-in-appearance of the individual object and perceive quite directly and unreflectively the type shining through it, the type which manifests itself in the concrete here and now. Type and the individual expression must not separate as if they were things disastrously divergent, but in aesthetically distinguished cases even the individual phenomenon includes the typical, reveals the species (without doing injury to it as a solitary and individual object), the type, and the Idea lying at its base. To remain with the aesthetics of nature, the beautiful object is on the one side a whole, living individual (otherwise it could not appear sensuously), but at the same time its appearance is organized through its conformity to the Idea: the physical phenomenon in certain cases, which are precisely those which are propitiously aesthetic, moves in the paths of conformity to type.

In nature, says Th. A. Meyer, everything is individual. Life realizes itself only in individuals and in individual occurrences. But just as certainly as nature knows only individual existence, it nevertheless does not show that lack of rule and law which is consistent with the single appearance of everything that exists only once. Even in nature, one thing is not absolutely incomparable with another. Species and laws shine through the individual form. The individual

man, dog, or tree does not remain entirely in the individual. More or less clearly it realizes in itself the species of man, dog, or tree, by means of which the solitary single occurrence of its appearance is not destroyed, but is held to certain paths.

The aesthetically relevant object often owes its power to the fact that despite the individual character which, like everything actual, it must have, it at the same time corresponds with an Idea of universality or type in a more particular way, so that it is not entirely necessary for the contemplator on his part that such a universal representation should appear as a separately known process. Thus something universal is present in the individual at the same time; when a person says that Mr. X is a typical Englishman, that Horribilicribrifax is a typical bully, that a tree located in a picture of a landscape is a typical oak, then the expression "typical" means the universal as it is encountered in the individual presented or met with. The concept of type can be quite valid for the objective definition of the beautiful; in opposition to frequently raised objections, it is not as reversionary as is often believed. Just as truth is revealed in the conceptual understanding of world-ideas, the beautiful is revealed in terms of appearance precisely because the beautiful is typical: that is, it sets off the law of the species and the aim of the species with the force of perceptual conviction. This notion, according to which only typical (that is, representative) and characteristic phenomena earn the designation "beautiful" and which accordingly indicates beauty to be the perceptually graspable essentiality of being, is very much worth being advocated even today if a person can avoid two narrownesses and one-sidednesses: 1. if we get the impression of conformity to type, of the conformity to species, and of the characteristic quite directly from the aesthetic intuition, and therefore not by way of an agreement brought about by detailed comparison of the contemplated object with the regulative normal idea of the species concerned as it is deposited in our minds; 2. if no dissolution of the individuality is intended; for perfect typicality can be presented in a quite individual way. Therefore the phenomenal image of an individual conformable to the Idea which works favorably aesthetically signifies a happy synthesis of the universal and the particular. Thus types in this sense are not empty arithmetical averages and mean values, but forms saturated with life and experience.

Neither is it at all true that the typical form which conforms to the species has its excellence only in the logical sphere, so, for instance, that the typical appearances, as being familiar and adequate

to the norm, make contemplation easy and hence functionally pleasant. Thus Groos²¹⁹ called that which conforms to the species the logically agreeable (in contrast with the sensuously agreeable) because the phenomenon which conforms to the species makes inner imitation (aesthetic apperception) easier. From this there stems a certain still pre-aesthetic pleasure for the explanation of which one could refer, with Lipps, to the pleasure in "empirical uniformity." The typical in this sense would be a content which is complexible, in contrast with the form which is complexible because of regularity and so forth. Correct as this surely is, it is not the whole story by any means. Besides the logical, the factor of the excellence of conformity to type has also put in action aesthetic qualities which are still not exhausted by logical functional pleasure. Moreover, between this heteronomous theory (which would trace the aesthetic preference for factors conforming to the type back to logical factors) and the autonomous aesthetic one, there appears a very interesting line of connection in the history of philosophy. It is true beyond a doubt²²⁰ that the typical as compared with the individual is the simpler, and we already know that within certain limits the simple is aesthetically preferred, as was clear when we discussed the ratios of vibration-numbers in simultaneous sounds and in acoustical rhythms. The formations conformable to type and Idea are distinguished by certain badges of office. Thus Plotinus²²¹ sees the nature of the arts not simply in their imitating the given, but also in their ascending to the Ideas (*ἀνατρέχουσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους*), and thus in their realizing the true nature presented. He interprets the Ideas as numbers, however, in doing which this neoplatonist moves entirely in the paths of his master, who also identified the Ideas with simple mathematical structures. As a result of the pythagorean number-mystique worked out here, the theory of Ideas noticeably borders on the art-theory and the art-practice followed by Polyclites, who transferred the beauty of the human figure into certain proportional values fixed by numbers. We know that the sculptor just mentioned constructed his "Doryphoros," in which he wanted to present the athletic type, according to certain proportions. The unit of measure was the transverse across the diameter of the finger; four of these units of measurement showed the width of the hand at the root of the fingers; three of these hand-widths the length of the foot, and so forth. Thus he arrived at a figure which antiquity already had praised as being exactly of the right size (*ἑμμετρος ἀκριβῶς*). In full consciousness he himself proceeded in terms of his theory that the beautiful depends on measure and number and arises from the co-

operation of many numbers ($\tau\acute{o}$ $\epsilon\ddot{\upsilon}$ $\pi\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha}$ $\mu\iota\kappa\rho\acute{o}\nu$ $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}$ $\pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\omega}\nu$ $\alpha\rho\iota\theta\mu\acute{\omega}\nu$ $\gamma\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$). The definite measurements which Polyclites gave his statue and handed on as a working recipe to his students he gathered from trustworthy measurements which he took of numerous persons, the result being that he was led to think of abstracting from many individual forms a typical, and therefore an aesthetically satisfying one. As much as he was admired for his form-pattern ($\kappa\alpha\nu\acute{\omega}\nu$), he did not have too many followers. Praxiteles, Scopas, and later sculptors, who also wanted to present something in their works that was superior to the individual and typical, tried to achieve the universal, not through measurement and calculation, but in other ways. But the normal average value was striven for later too. Thus one can read in a writing of Galen²²² that the painters and sculptors present the beautiful to the extent that they have the average before their eyes ($\tau\acute{o}$ $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\omicron\nu$ $\sigma\kappa\omicron\pi\omicron\upsilon\acute{\nu}\tau\epsilon\varsigma$). In the Renaissance there were new attempts to construct typical beauty by means of measure. Thus Leone Battista Alberti²²³ measured human bodies of acknowledged beauty and calculated the average. Dürer²²⁴ too was filled with the notion that the beauty of the human body depends on mysterious dimensions. His search started from a fundamental measure the multiples of whose whole number must be repeated everywhere in the ideal body. The notion that one can arrive at a quantitative definition of an aesthetically positive average of the human cubic measure by way of calculation in the manner of anthropometric statistics can also be found as occasional after-effects or consequential effects in philosophical theorists of art even in later periods. Here one must mention Kant above all: we judge the beauty of the human figure with the help of an aesthetically normal Idea which we carry within us. How do we achieve it?

For an explanation of how it takes place, Kant gives us a psychological statement: "It is to be noted that, in a way which is quite incomprehensible to us, imagination occasionally not only calls back to us the signs for conceptions, even those of a long time ago, but also reproduces the image and the form of the object from out of the incalculable number of objects of different kinds or of even one and the same kind; yes, this is true also when the mind concerned with making comparisons lets one image fall upon another, if not in reality, then in a way satisfactory to consciousness, and by way of the congruence of a great number of the same kind can achieve an average which serves all of them as a common measure. Everyone has seen a thousand grown-up men. If he wants to judge of the normal size as estimated by way of comparison, then . . . the imagi-

nation lets a great number of images (probably all of the thousand) fall upon one another; and if one is permitted to use an analogy with optical presentation, they fall into a space where most of them coalesce and within the outline where the place is illuminated with the color most strongly laid on; there the average size will be discernible, the size which is equally distant in terms of height and breadth from the outside boundaries of the largest and the smallest persons. And this is the stature of a beautiful man." Imagination arrives at this determination, not mechanically, but through a "dynamic effect which arises from the many-sided perception of such figures on the organ of the inner sense." Truly, the highest aesthetic significance does not belong to this normal Idea; the forms developed in terms of it would still be not beautiful in the full sense; they would only be free of errors; they would be merely correct according to rule. Artistic realization of the normal Idea pleases one "not because of beauty, but merely because it does not contradict any conditions in terms of which a thing of this species alone can be beautiful." It therefore has only a prohibital or negative significance; it helps one to avoid errors; but it still cannot create the beautiful. These assertions of Kant take on new importance in the present time and have received astonishing corroboration as well as interesting amplification through the help of experimental aesthetics.

We shall now try to bring proof that conformity to Idea and species presents a distinctive example of beauty, that the typical-universal character of certain givennesses influences aesthetic enjoyment positively and therefore is to be viewed as an aspect of the aesthetic Idea. By this we mean (as does Ziehen) the qualities of representation to which an aesthetically positive effect belong. In the sentences just cited, Kant speaks of the fact that imagination causes a great number of recalled images to fall upon one another to the end of obtaining the normal image of a man. What he thus outlines as a hypothetically psychic occurrence has become possible through modern photography, and, indeed, by a method which fixes the different individual images one after the other to a certain place on the same plate, and does this through the adjustment of individual peculiarities which recede to the background for the benefit of the universals they have in common. What Kant imputes to the dynamic activity of imagination is here done by the photographic apparatuses; what is common to the two is that the result (in one example, the inner image, in the other, the photograph) presents an aesthetically marked case (that is, there are values which belong to them and do not adhere to separate individual images). Hence, the modern me-

dium of experiment gives the answer to the question of what the typical, what that which conforms to the species and is characteristic, is able aesthetically to do. All doubt is removed that the compensatory synthesis brings forth peculiar beauty-values which do not belong to the bases of this synthesis. But at the same time it is also shown that by this means these aesthetically distinctive normal and average images present not something faintly general and therefore aesthetically irrelevant, but an original concrete beauty instead. Thus the classical aesthetic concept of the sensuous appearance of the Idea is verified and given new meaning. One difficult case is beyond consideration here; that is the fact that things in nature and the copies of them are able to be positively aesthetic even when they do not adequately represent Idea and type—if not in terms of a genuine pure and perfect beauty, at least in terms of other aesthetically basic forms. For such effects never present the simplest and the most characteristic case in which the aesthetic comes to light clearly and without an effacement of the boundaries between it and the ethical, the erotic, and so forth.

What I claim to be the verification of the declared beauty of species and type are so-called profile pictures (*"Durchschnittsphotographien"*), and, indeed, this concerns a use of composite portrait-making or of the generic images of Francis Galton²²⁵ for experimental aesthetics; G. Treu²²⁶ has reported about this in a very important article which has to do with a process of showing average profile images of families, classes of human beings, and so forth through the congruence of the separate photographs of the heads of kindred kinds on the same photographic plate or through renewed taking of a series of photographs.

By the use of this method the fact was arrived at that in a collective image the traits held in common by the individual photographed heads were intensified and that those which diverged were faint. Galton, a cousin of Darwin, began his first investigations in connection with his researches on the laws of heredity. But here we are concerned with how profile-pictures apply to aesthetics. Treu chooses only examples which are suited to illustrate the blending of remembered images into kinds of representation which are felt either to be characteristic or to be beautiful. He discusses as characteristic a picture of a child which was got from six separate photographs of the same youngster, the result being that the collective picture is far handsomer than each of the six separate photographs. What comes to be here is an image of the characteristic, an image which rejects certain accidental determinations, possibly the

changing play of features, for the benefit of the characteristic features which continue. One requires of a perfect portrait that the essence, the innermost nature, of the person portrayed be brought purely and clearly into perception unobscured by momentary states of mind and accidental indispositions. This is actually achieved in this profile-picture of a single person. In two further pictures, the heads of mentally ill persons were photographed by way of superimposition: in the first, the heads of eight persons suffering a progressive paralysis of the brain and, in the other, eight persons emotionally depressed. In both cases a clear and impressive image of the essential features was achieved and a presentation very characteristic in form and expression of the two types of illness was supplied. The lines of the mental idiots were flabby, and the mouths expressed insensible unconcern; by contrast, the people who were in a depressed state looked strained, the lips being pressed close together. The eyes of the people who were paralytically demented had an expression of idiocy, and those of persons who were melancholy had a slyly-sad one. It was as if the collective pain of many pairs of eyes looked at us touchingly out of them, as if there were disclosed the precipices of a suffering psychic life which in real life are overgrown with all kinds of accidental brushwood. The typical image of the melancholy persons actually approximated an art-work because the expressive piling up of physical and mental traits of melancholy makes the head in its inner life easily explicable and sympathetic to us. Thus we have arrived at an explanation of how through repetition common and therefore distinctive traits occurring in memory and imagination are intensified. For the discovery of racial types many Saxon and Wendic soldiers have been photographed. Twelve of these pictures were re-photographed and combined into a profile. Seeing them one is astonished chiefly by the fact that such different faces produce, instead of a confused patch, a truly collective picture, and, in addition, one so clear and to a certain extent so individual that it could be taken for a picture of a particular person. Here too the profile (average) pictures are more beautiful than is each separate one of the pictures combined in it (these pictures were also made public, as controls). Thus the impression of beauty is enhanced by the number of the individual photographs giving it support. One profile picture of the heads of 449 male students from North America demonstrates this, as does a parallel picture of a great number of female students: It has a distinctive, regular kind of beauty.

It is therefore simply not true that, as one might have anticipated, such pictures of averages and types would look like the vacant

faces on hair dressers' advertisements,²²⁷ which have an empty sleekness and generality. Instead, the profile pictures which introduce us to the beauty of the pure type have the merit of proving convincingly that the typical content and the individual phenomenon need not be mutually exclusive, that as a matter of fact peculiar aesthetic values are contained in the typical, and that these are not mere speculative assumptions. It can be said that there is a law that we experience an approximation of the fundamental mean values of a species as something beautiful and typical. Galton's device lifts a corner of the veil which hides the mystery of the beauty of the human countenance. At the base of the ardent desire of human beings for beauty lies an unconscious sensing of the typical natural forms of its own species.

A summary of what is of aesthetic significance in profile pictures will produce the following statements: 1. as a portrait, the profile (average) picture, as compared with that of the single person, has more similarity and distinctiveness because of the concentration of characteristic features; 2. a condensation (for instance, of melancholy persons) into a character-image is typical as compared with the separate photograph and is more expressive because of its easier psychic interpretability; 3. the racial pictures produced by photographing the profile (average) are felt to be more beautiful as compared with separate photographs, and indeed the more so as the number of components is greater (that is, the more thoroughly the deletion of the varying traits and the greater the intensification of those held in common, the more the racial image approaches the type of the kind); 4. photography of the average (the profile) is adequate in all of these connections to the explanation of the taking place of typical remembered images, just as these images are at the base of artistic creation too.

Idealistic theories in aesthetics and art, as compared with all realistic-naturalistic trends, follow the emphatically promoted claim that art does not have to copy accidental reality *telle qu'elle est* but should strive for a higher truth: but this truth lies in the reality of the Idea. Such requirements have no authority if realistic trends are supposed to be banned by them, for even in connection with consistently realistic paths of art, objects can be created which are of high significance aesthetically, just as, conversely, an avowal of idealism does not protect one from obvious failures in the realm of artistic things. But at any rate it is correct to think that at the side of the mere poor impression made by the bare reality of phenomena which are fortuitous and conditioned by the moment there is a

higher and a more genuine truth which, moreover, even the realist can share. Individuality and transparent typicality do not exclude each other. In his aesthetics Th. A. Meyer has pointed to this higher truth of the ideal or the typical in an especially successful formulation.

The truth one meets in nature has degrees. To be sure, everything in nature is true, even that which is individual and unique; but we still feel ourselves moved by a higher truth where the individual thing is illumined by something permanent and allows a constantly recurring law to appear. If we call the permanent and the constantly recurring the typical, then the typical which is in the individual because it discloses a permanent mode of formation or happening has claims to a higher truth and unveils a higher reality. It goes from the foreground to the background of being, from the accidental to the universal and necessary. When we have a coercive impression that a given object of nature we are seeing is true in terms of the necessary laws of nature and human life, a quite positive effect takes place. The higher animal which conforms to its species and, among human beings, a person who represents clearly some kind of class of human beings, and the event in which a law of human destiny is expressed in a pure form—these achieve an unmistakable projection of truth beyond what is apparently unique. Joy in beauty becomes richer and deeper as it flourishes not merely in the individual and the fortuitous, but in the real and the necessary.

Saying this, one has not expressed a disrespect for the individual phenomenon; one has merely said that the successful synthesis of the phenomenon which is individual, replete with life, and concrete, with the typical-characteristic substance in the background is something distinctively aesthetic. The truth and characteristic nature of the beautiful reaches its highest range in the typical. For certain areas (especially for the aesthetics of things) the requirement of conformity to type is binding within certain limits still to be discussed; thus it represents a principle of the effect of objective beauty.

b.¹ *Perceptual Perfection (anschauliche Vollkommenheit)*. Among the most easily remembered of the definitions in the aesthetics of content is this: Beauty is perceptual perfection. The idea is so attractive that one usually underrates the difficulties it creates; it is these difficulties which are our critical concern here. To begin with, one must point out that this principle of perceptual perfection is in the closest of relationships to that of the conformity to Idea and type, and indeed at bottom is nothing other than a variation

which can illustrate such conformity and be a paraphrase of it. For a living creature or thing is obviously perfect when it does justice to the law of its species in an absolutely proper way and when it is free of the defects which stand in the path of an absolute realization of the Idea. A perfect being is higher than a merely normal one which fulfills the law of its species only in an average way and does justice to claims which are merely the average, and not the highest, ones. Only such living beings and things can be perfect which have a law of their species or an aim of use, a function, which can be realized. Perfection is a referential concept which presupposes a connection with a law of being, a norm. But the perfect being or object need realize only the requirements of its species, in connection with which precisely this value-predicate of perfection—and no other—is awarded. Where this perfection of a creature or an object occurs with the power of direct conviction in intuitive contemplation, a real effect of beauty takes place. The perfection of the perceived object is characteristically and non-excludably a part of the impression of beauty which is the highest and purest case of aesthetic experience. This is an unalterable requisite for the occurrence of the impression of beauty, at least in the negative sense that an offense against the requirement of perfection makes the effect of beauty impossible. To be sure, beauty is not produced as this demand is realized—that is, not in all cases and not in an obligatory fashion. Therefore one can say that for certain creatures and things, perfection is the necessary presupposition for the impression of beauty. No organic being in nature can be called beautiful if it is not perfect; but one cannot say the reverse. Beauty is indeed bound in a direct and obligatory fashion with perfection, but the latter is not so bound with the former. If we call a tiger or a parrot beautiful, a rose or a magnolia, an apple or a peach (*nota bene*, not as a type, but as a concrete exemplar offered merely for our contemplation)—this can occur if these things fully realize all of the possibilities granted them by nature, if they are completely developed, healthy, and free of blemishes, if in their purest development they exhibit those forms and colors which are possible in the kinds of species concerned. Every falling away from potentially superior examples of the species-type is noticed immediately as a disruption, whereas its complete conformity with that type is felt pleasantly in perception. A powerful emphasis on the normal type is felt to be beautiful, but only when a potential aesthetic relevance already belongs to the species-type. If certain exemplars of a species which is intrinsically capable of decided effects of beauty are not agreeably

aesthetic, or are so only a bit, the reason is primarily because the exemplar concerned diverges from its species-type to its own disadvantage, and that it therefore misses perfection. Adequacy to the species-type is certainly not able by itself to create beauty. Any kind of horrible reptile or insect will not be beautiful just because it realizes the Idea of its species perfectly; and it is also seriously a matter of question whether a perfect earthworm is more beautiful than an imperfect one. But when the species as such is generally capable of a really beautiful effect, a member of it makes an aesthetically positive effect only if it realizes the law of the species perfectly; every serious deviation from it causes the individual to appear as a *monstrum per excessum* or *per defectum*. Therefore the exemplar of a species must have the beauty which is proper and possible to its species; any other beauty does not apply to it. The peach may not take on the color of the cherry, and what would happen if a person were to make an animal beautiful by giving it traits of the appearances of other species has been shown in the fable of the horse who was dissatisfied with its appearance and who finally, because of his different proposals for a betterment of his own appearance, became a camel. The species-type presents the norm according to which we judge the appearance—and reject with displeasure any deviations from it. We usually find it revolting when individual members of a body remain smaller than normal in size or when they are developed far beyond it. They seem to claim in the life of the creature concerned an excessive significance, or to have less than the proper significance belonging to them, and to destroy the harmony of the parts with which they have to work. Here custom plays a decisive role.

There is no reason why a nose has to be exactly as large as it usually is in the average person. But once we have made a certain perception of the usual size of the nose into our Idea of the normal type, a nose smaller than the normal seems to lack the effective structure which we expect of it. It seems not entirely developed; it seems inadequate and therefore unbeautiful. But when its size considerably exceeds normal measurements, it is even more intolerable. It demands an attention not proper to it and diverts the attention from more important parts of the face. Thus it destroys the harmony of the life-functions which are depicted in the face and does harm to the spiritual expression. "Thus insofar as physical defects and under-developments are not at once thought of as restraints on life, they displease us as deviations, be it from the life contained in the type or from the normal image which we create

for ourselves from the outer appearance of the species. They appear unnatural to us because they are a long way from the image that nature has established for such a life-formation. They seem to infringe upon the organic formation and on its purpose in life." ²²⁸

Thus one sees the limitation that perfection is not the basis of aesthetic effect in every case and that an impression of beauty can take place even when one is in the presence of absolutely perfect structures only if the type that is properly realized is by itself and as such already for other reasons capable of the effect of beauty. A further restriction is to be added: that the value of the principle of perfection is narrowed down to the aesthetic objects which are things. If one is aware of this limitation, no objection can be raised if a person even today grants the principle of perfection the value it formerly had. In aesthetics, as a matter of fact, it still plays a certain role. Schelling ²²⁹ gave it importance in his definition of beauty as an existence having no defects; John Stuart Mill ²³⁰ too made a strong case for it. As applied to the central questions of experiences of beauty this concept has of course a famous opponent: namely Kant.

The superscription of part 15 of the *Critique of Judgment* reads: "The Judgment of Taste is completely Independent of the Concept of Perfection." According to Kant, perfection is the inner objective purpose of an object; although this purpose has a closer relation to the aesthetic than does outer objective purposefulness (utility), Kant still believed that in his critique of taste he could give decisive proof that beauty cannot be reduced to the concept of perfection. If one is to be able to judge something as perfect, he must be acquainted with the concept and the purpose of the object. But it is just these which do not play a role in the judgment of beauty. For this is an aesthetic judgment: that is, "such a one as rests on subjective grounds and the basis of whose determination cannot be a concept and therefore not that of a certain purpose either. Thus by means of beauty as a formal subjective purposefulness, a perfection of the object is never thought of as an ostensibly formal, but nevertheless objective purposefulness."

Köstlin ²³¹ for good reasons objects to Kant's rejection of the principle that beauty is contemplated perfection. To be sure, beauty is a perfection not of the "object," but presumably of its form, its appearance. If I say that a male shape is beautiful because I have to explain it as a perfect male figure, then this judgment of form is certainly an aesthetic judgment too. That the judgment of taste depends solely on subjective grounds is not correct; it has objective

grounds too (and "objects conforming to the norm" are proof of this fact). Actually, Kant does not agree with himself when he declares that aesthetic judgment is only a subjective judgment of taste. If, according to him, that is beautiful which has multiplicity and order adapted to imagination and understanding, then, according to him too, beauty has objective conditions in this multiplicity and order. His "subjective grounds" are not subjective in fact, but are intellectual (that is, in the objective nature of those two human faculties of cognition which the beautiful pleases), unshakably given grounds. In addition, Kant is opposed less to the concept of perfection as such than to an inadequate rationalistic theory which places that concept at its center: namely, that the experience of beauty arises from a perfection which is confusedly imagined (*verworren gedacht*), but which does not achieve full insight. In his critique of this teaching as followed primarily by Wolff, Kant goes far too far and throws out the child with the bath. The prime reason for his untenable propositions lies in his over-pointing of the characteristic of conceptlessness which we have already criticized. Our aesthetic contemplation is not as conceptless as Kant believes; the reference of a contemplated manifold to a concept is not absolutely wanting. Anyone who contemplates an animal, a plant, some furniture, or any other object also has certain normal expectations in mind, at least below the threshold, at the same time as he has representations of meaning; these expectations are certainly not a matter of indifference to the experience of beauty.

According to Köstlin beauty is the formation or the form of a thing making for the impression of perfection in perceptual contemplation and arousing aesthetic pleasure thereby.

Perfection in the narrower (and in our opinion the only tenable) sense, according to him, rises from the fact that there is nothing wanting in a being of that which by nature belongs to its individuality—of that which it can be and should have. A tree which has root, branch, boughs, twigs, and leaves and in which none of these parts is spoiled or crippled is perfect. A person is physically perfect when all of his organs are developed and in good condition (that is, adequate to their functions); a person is mentally perfect who in all of his parts has become everything or has made of himself everything that he could achieve on the strength of his natural tendencies. In this connection Köstlin takes cognizance of a still broader and more general concept of perfection. In this sense, the term means a quality or condition which fits a thing well and which reinforces or enhances its existence. Such a perfection is largeness,

let us say; the large object is not so easily ignored or denied as the small one. In the same way, strength is a perfection; for it makes the living being having it at its disposal fit for acts and operations which people not having it could not practice. Designated as perfection too is the good proportion of the parts of the body of a living being; and harmony, purity, unity, and multiplicity are called so too.

It becomes clear from these last statements how untenable the broadening of the concept of perfection is, even if these formal aesthetic laws fall under it. This extension of the concept is untenable too because beauty not connected with things or related to moods, which from the point of view of definition has nothing to do with perfection in the only sense that is tenable, would then also fall under it. But the chief objection lies in the fact that Köstlin absolutely defines certain concepts as bearers of perfection, though these concepts can exercise this function only in relation to a species-norm: a horse as large as an elephant would not be a beautiful animal, but a monstrosity; a Pekinese dog grown considerably larger than the norm would not acquire more beauty, but would decidedly lose it. The tendency to absolutize certain value-predicates is a very doubtful procedure of Köstlin's. If he alleges that softness, elasticity, tenderness, warmth, agility, and so forth are positive qualities of beauty, nothing is accomplished; for alongside all the aspects whose value as beauty is not in numerous cases in dispute are their opposites which are often meaningful aesthetically. Not only softness, but hardness too is pleasing; not only elasticity, but solidity too—that is, wherever they belong. It depends therefore on where, in which context, and in which object the quality concerned appears. In a roe, slimness is pleasant, and slimness is undoubtedly its chief charm; but a horse or a bull having the slimness of a roe would be unpleasant. It depends, then, always on the norm for the species of creature concerned which brings this or that characteristic of beauty into appearance. Softness, slimness, tenderness, and, conversely, also strength, largeness, and so forth, are perfections only when the norm for the species of the creature includes this trait and therefore requires it. Perfection is and remains a relational concept, therefore, as I have already said.

Many aestheticians are of the decided opinion that when one attempts to derive the impression of beauty from perfection, he is making the logical error of *hysteron proteron*. Just the reverse is true: we have a quite direct impression of the beauty of a living being or a thing from the very first without our in some kind of

way producing the relation necessary to the impression; and then on the basis of the beautiful impression we then designate the object concerned as perfect.

Thus the "abstract psychologism" of Witasek²³² is directed against the evaluation of beauty on the basis of its relation of the species-ideal. This is "the prototype of the perfection of the individual in the species to which he belongs, a something which as such never occurs in empirically experiential reality and which the individual of the species can more or less approximate, but never equal. The closer to the prototype it comes, just that much greater is its beauty." This often-heard train of thought contributes nothing, according to Witasek's view, towards a clarification of the circumstances we are discussing; for it only makes a presupposition of what must first be explained.

So that a beauty of this kind could be accessible to the human intelligence, the Idea of the species-ideal must be at its disposal. But from where does the intellect get this Idea, if not from experience? Now, the ideal is not an object in empirical reality; to get an Idea from the ideal would be possible at most by an increasing of the perfections of individuals closest to it. Still, how are these perfections to be recognized as such? What in them is perfection? It is certainly not only efficiency; but again it is beauty. For experience, beauty comes the earlier, and only on it does experience first base the award of perfection. Thus experience cannot grasp beauty by comparing it with perfection. But even if we have the Idea of the ideal of the species from some other place, our inner experience speaks decisively against the notion that when we contemplate the beauty of something conforming to the species, there whispers in us some kind of comparison of the contemplated object with the Idea which in some way takes precedence: only a glance, and the impression of beauty is there.

This objection has in its essentials already been answered in what was said in the chapter on the aesthetic state. No one disputes the notion that in experience the impression of beauty is quite direct. But into the state of direct observation there can enter all kinds of associations and reproductions, and within it certain relations can be realized without their being noticed as such. They simply are there, and no kind of isolated acts of awareness were necessary to their production. To be sure, logical discursions in terms of assiduous reflection are impossible, and would contradict

the nature of the occurrences under discussion: but the unremarked influence of one's familiar ideas and latent knowledge is as permissible as it is unavoidable. The intuitive character of the aesthetic experience need not suffer because of all of this. I see a well-built horse. From out of my latent knowledge I can take up a conceptual subsumption on the basis of which I know and designate the horse as such; in precisely the same way I can set up a relation between the concrete content of perception and an ideal regulative which I carry in me as an outcome of long experiences and of the psychic treatment they have received. Such a setting up of relations takes place quite directly. A human being who undergoes an aesthetic impression is normally not an uninscribed page, but already has an abundance of experiences behind him. From these experiences he has derived certain regulative Ideas for a great number of living creatures and objects, Ideas which later are handily at his disposal. These regulative Ideas are not merely poor copies of experience; rather, a certain transforming activity of mind is asserted in them. As is well known, remembered images do not remain entirely unchanged; but in the course of time, along with undeniable weakenings, they undergo certain intensifications also, and certain beautifications and idealizations.²³³ According to Liebmann,²³⁴ experiences do not remain the same in our minds, but undergo constant manipulation; for the progressions achieving efficiency in this way, the best example is transfiguration in memory. In reproduction a certain selection takes place which rejects the inessential and the unimportant and associatively completes the *lacunae* thus arising,²³⁵ a process which builds up a deposit for progressive substitutions. Through this mnemonic mechanism, Ideas which experience supplies often suffer far-reaching metamorphoses in terms of greater aesthetic satisfaction. Landscapes, women, houses, and interiors after a time seem much more beautiful in memory than they in fact are, and for this reason a second acquaintance with them as a rule undecieves us. Thus Schnitzler's warning: "There is nothing one should want to experience twice."²³⁶ I have therefore indicated the possibility that (and how) a number of individual ideas through mental handling can create an Idea of the species, of the characteristic, of the typical and the ideal. True, our notions of the species-ideal are not pure; nor are they entirely taken from experience; for the ideal is not an object of empirical reality. Rather, it is a convergence-product of the facts of experience with the mental treatment which follows the direction of progressions towards beautification; according to Schopenhauer, it arises in the

human mind through the cooperation of imagination and reason. Nevertheless, I should not like to assess the increase of the perfections to be met with in individuals empirically on a high level as being so unimportant as Witasek does. Probably in the intuiting of ideal possibilities one can point to certain natural dispositions of our minds which are an outcome of transmitted experiences of past generations, but which one need not think of as inborn ideas (in which we have had to learn not to believe since Locke's *Essay*).²³⁷ The human mind is undoubtedly, by means of psychic handling of the data of experience, capable of arriving at ideal regulatives. This could be demonstrated psychologically without one's having to get help from metaphysical argumentations, as Liebmann does.²³⁸ According to him, the ideals of human beings arise out of the mysterious and unexplained depths of their nature under the stimulation of the outer world. Still, one is not compelled to apply such hazardous hypotheses as this. Phenomenology has been able to show that there are circumstances which in their rightness and necessary legality one can penetrate by way of intuition, through the perception of a single example, and that increased empiricism is not able to increase the correctness of the statement so derived. A law can be derived from a single representative example, and in the same way one can get the right notion or a regulative Idea from the perception of a single maximally perfect individual object; the presence of this notion or Idea is the key to the evaluation of the other individuals of this species.

The images in the imagination of the creative artist are marked by a certain *kalotropie* (that is by a beautified and essentials-giving metamorphosis of the material of experience). An introspective confirmation of this *kalotropie*, of this perfecting transformation of our possession of Ideas as it makes its effect on the basis of an inner activity, especially in the working artist, is merely an intensification of our general human aptitudes and functions; and this is confirmed by O. Sterzinger,^{238a} who is an art-psychologist and painter in one. In conjunction with the assertions of the Jaensch school about the power of perceptual inner images and perceptual concept-images in which one could see a clear working-out of what is typical and perfect, he cites some further facts of experience.

A painter who makes up a picture of flowers or fruit can reproduce actual objects of this kind naturalistically by including all of the particularities just as nature shows them to him. Or he can paint according to a real model, but in such a way that unbeautiful lineaments which are a detriment to the aesthetic impression and

not essential to the object in question are omitted. Finally, there is painting from memory, in which the selection of the important and the omission of the unimportant are left to unconscious processes. If the work by Jaensch and Schweicher here drawn upon has shown how such inner images from intuition generally take place, Sterzinger tries to go still further in making clear what happens so that they can also be beautiful. "If I have picked some strawberries for two hours in the early morning, clear images of fruit-bearing strawberry plants appear before my eyes when I close them, and especially in the evening." These strawberries in the image of inner perception are not inconsiderably altered as compared with the real ones, and precisely in terms of greater beauty. "They are more regularly constructed, above all, and more regularly distributed on the stalk. They are more uniformly round; the more luminous places are . . . also more rounded and more uniformly dissolved into the red color. This more intense uniformity and roundness is . . . the most striking mark of distinction for the strawberries of the images contemplated." Even the soil from which they grow is more uniform. Therefore the perceptual images show changes in terms of an inner geometrism whose effectiveness is exhibited in countless artworks. "The surfaces of the bodies of Ingres' women are more uniformly rounded, and their skin is more uniformly colored than is found in any kind of model; the forms too are better proportioned." Similarly, the folds of clothed figures as they appear in the classicistic painters are drawn far more beautifully.

The effect of the beauty of the Greek plastic artists which is thought to be typical also traces back to this transformation-tendency in terms of perfection. But not only to that of the artist; in every aesthetically receptive person such a standard of perfection develops on the basis of an inner dynamism and activity of imagination, and wherever in experience forms approach us which correspond to these standards, the perceptions bring about a mentally satisfying effect, an impression of beauty.

We still have to analyze one objection. It asserts that if the constant realization of the norms of a species on which perfection depends must be the presupposition of the effect of beauty, the experience of beauty could occur to us only in the face of such living beings and things with which we are acquainted and whose appearance we know from practical experience. But this is not so. Even a person who sees an antelope or a bird of paradise for the first time feels the beauty of it. To this one can answer that there are types and norms not only of biological species and families, but

also of kinds superior to them. Besides, if rules for a certain type are wanting, it is quite possible to judge it according to the structural image of the next-related one. Thus it would be quite feasible aesthetically to judge the unfamiliar phenomena of the antelope and the bird-of-paradise in terms of the familiar ones of the roe and the peacock. But the normal case is that of a human being who is only to a certain extent educated and experienced and who approaches the world of the beautiful not entirely unprepared, but provided with a treasury of standards for the species. Such an inner possession is absolutely necessary if one is to have the proper experience of the beautiful; wherever the human intelligence is in fact a completely uninscribed page and has at its disposal no kind of model and leading schemata which experience supplies, it cannot do justice to higher givennesses in any way and thus not in an aesthetic one; a person so unendowed cannot do more than stupidly stare in astonishment or go past things without giving them attention. A person who is entirely without experience is even incapable of experiencing the beauty of such objects in which, for want of any mental rules, he cannot see perfection. We have acquired species-images by way of experience through mental treatment (*synaesthesia*, selection, characterization, and progression). Because we have seen something like it often, we know how an oak, a birch-tree, a lion, a bull looks and must look, and also how large a human head or nose should be.

Out of the abundance of our experiences we have an image of how a human being, for example, customarily looks in general and in particular. "We place this average image of the outward, of this normal type, at the base of our judgment when we find a nose or a mouth to be too large or too small."²⁸⁹ In these terms one judges whether a person is built large or small, fat or thin, well-proportioned or not well-proportioned, perfect or imperfect. The physical components of the Idea are acquired through the sensuous perception of the outer world; even the knowledge of the individual aims of the kinds and the concept of them is not in us from the first; rather, we acquire it through the sensuous perception of their appearance and the mental experience of their characteristic limitations.

In connection with such considerations as these, one has only to guard himself against one-sided empiricism and constantly to bring to the fore the convergistic corrective of it. What allows us to come to such experiences are certain directions and predisposi-

tions of perception which we have in us as inherited possessions of our origin.

But do we really have such images of perfection ready and functionally prepared in a clear arrangement of details in our minds? No: the Idea, the rule, is not anything perceptually evident, but is an efficient cause which confirms itself in given intuitions. It in many respects behaves like the moral Idea which we are not clearly aware of either but in terms of which we still with clear certainty make judgments as soon as we are placed before the concrete necessity of action. The Idea is not a clear image that lies peacefully within our consciousness, but a criterion of our nature which first comes to life through (and in) a concrete representation in perception. Thus Theodor Alt²⁴⁰ stresses that the intellectual and sensuous components which realize the Idea create a more or less dark deposit in our consciousness, a composite image of more or less characteristic components which usually appears quite clear in our consciousness as soon as we encounter a phenomenon which fulfills the Idea completely. According to B. Heimann,²⁴¹ the Idea is the rule according to which beautiful human beings and things are compared. These ideals are not particular fixed images which remain in the mind of a person without change and with which he compares outer things as if with a pattern. Instead, the ideal is an active, dynamic tendency in our psyches.²⁴² In the creative artist who is able to bring forth perfect ideal forms, these patterns and prototypes are perceptual, at least to the degree that they can be set free, so to speak, by means of the model so that they catch fire in complete strength in approximative forms. For people who are not creators, for people in whom are missing the highly sensitive talent of the creative artist, the ideal is a rule in criticism which requires an object given in intuition, but which then gives a powerful and decisive vote.

According to everything said so far, the requirement of perceptual perfection retains its validity as an objective aesthetic principle: but, to be sure, only for certain areas of the beautiful and only in terms of the consideration of different qualifications which will be discussed in the coming section.

c.¹ *The Plenitude of Life, Expression, and the State of Animation.* We shall begin with a recapitulation. We have already said frequently that a certain givenness of life can be conformable to Idea and type, can fulfill the laws of its species in perceptual perfection, without its therefore being beautiful. Undoubtedly, conformity to type and perceptually convincing perfection are in many

cases aesthetically satisfying, but this is not true of all of them: there are even types which are not beautiful. Thus conformity to type (perfection) is aesthetically satisfying only in such creatures as belong to the type or species which itself is already potentially capable of aesthetic effect. Not all perfection in organic existence is beautiful; what perfection *is* beautiful therefore? In the first place, it can quite generally be said that some perfect beings and things have a beautiful effect though they realize still other requirements than those of perfection and conformity to type. The conceptual formulation of this will reveal a limiting rule. In other value-disciplines also, for instance in ethics, we find restrictive determinations like this which more closely define a general law—but a law which does not include the phenomena falling within a narrower realm. Thus the laws of the judgment of moral beauty, according to Herbart,²⁴³ for example, are determined and limited one by the other. The law of “inner freedom,” for example, according to which even a bad deed would be morally valuable if it were consistent and convincing in its truth, is more closely defined by way of the second principle, that of perfection. Something analogous is true for aesthetics too, and in our case we can say that all perceptually perfect beings which conform to type and Idea (or, more briefly: to all such types) make for aesthetic satisfaction when a) aesthetic contemplation is not disturbed, restrained, or made impossible by disruptive influences, b) the beings or types fulfill certain formal-aesthetic requirements, and finally c) they are marked by a special measure of concrete life in its plenitude, expression, and animation (*Beseeltheit*). Enough has been said about the first point. That the most perfect reptile, the vermin most adequate to its Idea, in spite of all of its conformity to its type, is never able to operate aesthetically is true because of factors which make contemplation impossible (feelings of fear, abhorrence, disgust, association with the cold, the slimy and slippery, the poisonous, and so forth). The requirements of the second point will be discussed in their own section; here I shall engage myself only with the requirements of the third.

Thus there are types which are more agreeable than others and which bring a full and rich life into proper expression. Yet are there not degrees and differences in the realms of life? Is not everything in life equally alive? One can only answer that it does not matter here what is true from the biological point of view. But from the aesthetic point of view there are such value-differences of life and these achieve an appearance which is decisive aesthetically. That

a mussel pursues a duller life than does a higher mammal or, especially, than does man and that he will remain eternally behind those which are on the high plateau of attained degrees of consciousness: this may well be self-evident. A human being "lives"—and here a mental principle is added to the animalistic-vegetative one—in an entirely different dimension from that of the animal, and it is precisely on this other and higher dimension that beauty is based. This higher, richer, more fully realized life comes into perceptual expression in the total appearance, in the mien and movement of the living being which is valued less for what it does actively than for its potentialities. Many living beings seem flatly predestined for powerful and elegant motions, and it is precisely this expression of the plenitude of life that causes it to appear beautiful in preference to other types. Hippopotamuses and rhinoceroses do not live less than do other animals; they are truly at home in their element. But they present themselves to contemplation as clumsy and coarse; their mass of flesh seems to stifle any kind of higher life and their iron skin does not allow that life to press outward. Absent here is not only the beauty of a full life attaining adequate expression, but all beauty of motion as well. According to J. Cohn,²⁴⁴ any motion which is carried out easily, steadily, and yet vigorously is beautiful. The clear course satisfies our understanding, and in the easily accomplished movement the inner unity with itself of a life seems to become palpable.

The outer appearance informs us of the life-possibilities of the organism in question. If we as human beings find the highest beauty in the human figure, then this beauty is grounded in that figure.

In the structure of the perfect human body as it is richly organized throughout we recognize the capacity for many-sided free activity. "The symmetrical construction of breast and arms and the disengagement of the arms from the torso make it possible for a person easily to invade the world about him in many ways. The hand is a miracle of organization; even when it is at rest we sense in its richly organized structure a plenitude of dormant possibilities for change. One sees a refined hand as having a far greater fitness for the tasks which the hand is given than does a clumsy or animal-like paw. The delicate, transparent skin of a human being is open to all the stimuli of the nerves, whereas the thick, impenetrable skins of many four-footed animals seem to us to symbolize a dull existence closed off from reality. The free, upright head of human beings, its disengagement from the torso as the home of vegetative life, in-

dicates to us the superior mentality of human beings. Even when he is not moving, a hump-backed person seems like someone whose power of motion is restricted, whereas the sinewy and elastic person is in the fortunate possession of powers which are ready to be displayed at any moment. In all of these cases there is the possibility of participation in life which we perceive without our having to wait until it really manifests itself." ²⁴⁵

By arranging and graduating the value of the impression of beauty in terms of manifest life-contents one is able to correct the one-sidedness of a consistent idealism; the correction, however, has only had to carry on further trains of thought which are found in idealism itself, even if they are only in the bud. Idealism teaches us that the representatives of a type are beautiful when their form purely by itself pronounces the species' life-contents, which are interpreted as the Idea of divine creation. Now, if it is true that the adequacy of the form to the Idea produces beauty, then beauty must be conceded to all creatures whose formation conforms to the nature of their species. For in connection with all of these, the Idea of eternal creation manifests itself as their appearance ennobled and made luminous. It is precisely these notions which idealistic aesthetics emphasizes: for it, every created thing is beautiful if, constantly and without any falling-off, the design of divine creation is expressed in its appearance. Yet at the same time, idealism finds it necessary to make the important limitation that degrees of beauty are possible. A created thing takes on beauty the higher it stands on the rungs of organic development, indeed the higher as is the development of the creation-Idea of the living being which is presented in it. On this basis the statement which is heard on occasion that there are beauties everywhere undergoes correction. This statement is not right, for we know of types and species which are inimical to beauty. One can therefore say merely that there are perfections everywhere. But only such living things are legitimately beautiful on the basis of perfection whose species-norms and whose laws of life appeal to us aesthetically.

Why is a perfect appearance of a horse more beautiful than that of a donkey? Both conform to type; both represent their species in an ideal manner. Thus one cannot use the concepts of type and perfection to explain that the appearance of the donkey is incomparably less delightful aesthetically. The explanation lies, instead, in the donkey's poor and insignificant appearance, and in saying this, one has pointed to an entire complex of aesthetic determinations of form and content. Seeing a perfect horse, we have the coercive im-

pression of fullness of life, of mobility, and of flexibility; we are amazed at its harmonic and well-proportioned build, its beautiful curves, its plastic carriage, and its distinctive color—all of these being united into an organic, persuasive form which in every feature arrives at vigorous animation and in which powerful life-contents achieve convincing expression. But the donkey is repulsive in form and movement; its tufted dull grey hide and its overly-long ears do not enhance its beauty. The donkey serves human beings just as well as does the horse, but it has never yet been called man's friend and comrade. In its figure and in its entire temperament there speaks a more restrained, a less rich and less complete, even a poverty-stricken, life. The horse therefore seems also to realize the Idea of whole-hoofed creatures more perfectly than does the donkey, just as the rose more abundantly and impressively embodies the Idea of flower than does the daisy. At the same time, all the closely-allied associations—the stupidity of the donkey, the role of the rose as the queen of flowers—can quite be left behind, but that they could develop at all is perhaps the result of coercive impressions as they were described before.

Why are amphibians displeasing even where they are not inimical and do not inspire aversion? Because they seem to stand unfinished and undistinguished between two spheres of life and seem not to be related to any particular one entirely.

We look at the body of a living being as the expression of the powers of life which rule in it, and we evaluate these powers revealed in the appearance according to the scale of life's plenitude and deficiencies that exists in ourselves. The more the form of an animal reveals the vigor of life and the depth of life in terms of this scale, the more beautiful does it appear to us. We ask that the powers of life coming to light through the perception of the appearance of the animal reveal themselves as powerful and strong, as easy and unrestrained, or as graceful and elegant. The fact that one species of animal is on a narrower elevation of life than another in spite of their similar intensity of life causes the former to appear less beautiful. "Measured by such a scale or rule, the worm appears ugly and cannot appear otherwise. It is an unstructured, long thin leather skin. But we experience within ourselves the fact that a rich organization contains an uncommon possibility of movement and therefore a great wealth of participation in life. Because of this, we cannot judge a total lack of structure otherwise than as the poverty of life." ²⁴⁶

According to the definitions of content-aestheticians, beauty

lies in a free, full, rich life in which all parts agree. Animation, expressive appearance, and plenitude of life are requirements which must be satisfied if we are to have an impression of beauty. What must effect us in terms of beauty must in all respects go beyond the average narrowness and ennui of the life about us. The impression of beauty lies precisely in the increase in the sense of being which is incited by the fullness of the life of the creature contemplated. Life's plenitude and richness, expression, and animation are in the closest possible relationship. A full and rich life seems to occur only when a psychic-mental inner self which cannot be presented otherwise than in an individual accentuation is convincingly expressed in the forms and attitudes of the body. The classicists, the idealistic-realistic academicians of all periods, have often painted, modelled, and drawn ideal forms of men and animals of the highest formal perfection without their having created anything more than smooth empty works which have cold, boring beauty. In the faces and figures produced by Carstens, Overbeck, Genelli, Cornelius, and many of their contemporaries, one clearly experiences a beauty which is correctly average, and even perfect and ideal as to type, but one which is devoid of content, expression, and mind—that is, it has no individually characteristic expression producing the apparent enlivenment and animation from the inside, from their spirit, of the persons presented. This requirement naturally applies primarily to human beings *in natura* and in artistic representation.

Let us mention something said by Schopenhauer about these matters: In the animal-world, the character of the species and that of the individual coincide: what is most characteristic of lions is at the same time the most beautiful in them. But in the artistic representations of people, character of the species and that of the individual separate: the latter is expression, the former beauty. Aesthetic excellence lies, then, in beauty which is perfect according to the law of the species and at the same time expressive and characteristic of the individual. In the neighborhood of these definitions there belongs also the separation between the normal Idea and the ideal prototype of the beauty of the human species, a division already mentioned as made by Kant. The former does not as yet include genuine and completely human beauty because it does not reveal the specific and the characteristic, and indeed, as the normal Idea of the species, cannot do this at all. The ideal of beauty subsists in the expression of the ethical (we would say of the spiritual [*Geistigen*]). Requisite to a complete human beauty is not only the normal and perfect formation of the outward, but also the

"visible expression of ethical Ideas as they govern human beings inwardly." Lotze²⁴⁷ too is of the opinion that everything that is actual becomes beautiful only as in a real sense it goes beyond the requirements necessary to the type. Modern aesthetics holds fast to these definitions, and Meyer sounds quite Kantish and Schopenhauerian when he says that the beauty of species and breed is a genuine beauty only in animals, but that in human beings it is only a condition of complete physical beauty. A human being is not only an exemplar of his species, but as a mental (*geistig*) being, he is also an individual: It is an aesthetic defect when an individual stamp is lacking: "In a human being absence of individuality shows a defect in the level of existence allotted to him."

The mere regularity of formation, the beauty of the species, does not want entirely in agreeableness, but a higher aesthetic value is realized where individual impulses are combined with normality and conformity to type, impulses which are what first makes an individual who belongs to a beautiful species-type into a beautiful individual. All of this shows that the principles of the plenitude of life, of individual expression, and of animation are important laws of the objective effect of beauty whose product lies chiefly in the fact that by these means the objective principles mentioned before this are elaborated in a fruitful way through modification and supplementation.

C. FORMAL PRINCIPLES

a.¹ *Symmetry and Proportion.* In the following, I shall consider the objective principles of form, the most universal categorical statements about basic mediums of the effect of beauty of form. The question concerns the principles of good organization as it is intuitively perceptible (that is, as it is obvious to the senses), organization which makes contemplation agreeable and easy and which guarantees that the course of comprehension will be pleasant.

We shall begin with symmetry as the simplest and most convincing case of formally good organization in space. Hence we are concerned with a primarily visual experience of form in which motoral factors also have a share, however, and which can be realized in exceptional cases (say, in blind people) by means of the sense of touch. By symmetry we mean an equal arrangement of the parts of a figure so that at a certain point or linear axis or plane (median line or median plane) the whole is divided into two halves which are congruent (that is, mirror-like). Symmetry in the strictest and genuine sense takes place where a spatial structure of two or

three dimensions as a result of spatial bifurcation by means of a perpendicular median line falls into two halves, each part of the one half corresponding completely with each part of the other and the two halves being congruent. Thus we call symmetry that experience of form going back to corresponding objective arrangements, an experience which arises on the basis of three simple aspects of form: repetition, contrast, and an organization like that of an image reflecting itself. Symmetry, like repetition, is an experience of a formal relation, but the aspect of difference powerfully sets itself off alongside that of unity and identity; indeed, the impression of symmetry is possibly tied directly to difference, as will become clear from the following reflections.

The point of location, the vertical axis or the center, need not be given in intuition; often one must call it deliberately to mind (when, for instance, one thinks of the bilateral-symmetrical form of human beings and of most animals); but if it is presented in intuition, the repeated parts of the figures must be set in relief through antithetical construction from it, their point of location. If three points that are equidistant from one another are on a straight line, only a numerical organization of three is present, but not the form-experience of symmetry; this is present only when the median point is thrown in relief by means of color or size, or when the two outer points coincide or agree as being differently equipped from the middle one. Among the universal characteristics of symmetry Sterzinger names: 1. transposability: symmetry can be erected on all possible foundations of a sphere of sense; 2. an inter-sensorial character: it can appear in optical as well as in acoustical or motoral realms; 3. symmetrical agreement above all; thus it has a total character, and the relationships deriving from this are unusually strong; allied with this fact is that it probably possesses 4. a center which is marked with particular clarity. The second of these seems problematical to me. In my opinion, not all sensuous spheres are equally capable of bringing about impressions of symmetry. A full and genuine impression of symmetry is a visual experience and is therefore limited to the optical sphere, which is the sphere of co-existence and simultaneity. In the realm of the time-arts (music, poetry), only analogies and approximative formations metaphorically called symmetry are possible. Such a thing appears in music when an ascending series of tones descends in the same fashion immediately afterwards, an example of this being the scales played by the flute in the overture to *Don Giovanni*. One thinks, further, of the canonic forms which depend too much on artifice: A motif is

repeated in a mirror-like reversal or in retrograde order (*contrapunctus al inverso, al rovescio, contrapunctus cancricans*). The composers surrounding Schönberg are adept at playing in a constructivistic way with subtly-invented forms—Anton Webern especially, of whose music it has been correctly said that it is far more impressive as an image of notes, as an eye-impression, rather than as a hearing-experience. This is so not only in this case, however; wherever symmetry in music is spoken of, it seems to me that the relation to the note-image plays a critical role. In the realm of successive things, a complete impression of symmetry is not possible; it appears only when two halves are beside one another in intuition. The relation in perception to a median (point, line, plane) is necessary. When Viehoff²⁴⁸ says symmetry is a property of the poetic art, his examples show that he is concerned only with vague analogies. The relation to the optical printed image as a basis for the experience of symmetry is the decisive factor of the picture-poems of the Baroque and of "middle-axis poetry" ("*Mittelachsenpoesie*") in Arno Holz's *Phantasmus*. If the strong antithesis of alexandrines ("This is the forest primeval, the murmuring pines and the hemlock") * is traced back to its symmetrical construction—the six-foot iamb is divided into two equal halves by a caesura coming exactly in the middle—the relation to a printed image is also decisive here. The realm of the motoral too is not normally of interest as an independent sphere in which rhythm is realized; it is hardly more than a collaborator, one which is very important, perhaps, and Mach²⁴⁹ and Sully²⁵⁰ have been right in pointing to its significance.

But even within the spatial-optical realm all organizations do not produce symmetrical effects in the same fruitful way; rather, this result is completely tied to the arrangement of a reflected image around a vertical axis. The marked location of the perpendicular middle plumb-line, which is distinctive in the experience of symmetry, may be physiologically conditioned. Such kinds of ordered sense-impressions meet our entire sensorial organization half way because our entire sensorial as well as our reactive apparatus is arranged around a vertical axis. Therefore it follows that we do not sense a figure "which arranges itself symmetrically around a horizontal axis as symmetrical at all. . . . When we see a castle reflected in the water, no kind of symmetrical relation between the castle and the reflected image comes to mind."²⁵¹ Organization around a vertical median line, which is the most frequent and most marked example of symmetry, is called bilateral, zygomorphic, or

* Kainz's illustration is: "Ich bin im Denken wohl, im Handeln nicht geübt."

axial symmetry. It occurs when every point of the symmetrical structure is equally as far from the middle axis as is its correspondent point lying on the other half of a straight line; it consists therefore of the equality of the equally placed members on the right and left sides. A central (radial, actinomorphic) symmetry occurs when repeated objects are equidistant from a point, from the symmetrical center. Here symmetry arises not with relation to a certain line or plane, but with respect to a central point. If a person places a diameter through it, then the parts equidistant from the central point on the diameter are equal. Circles, stars, regular polygons, many flowers, star-fish, crystals are examples. Symmetrical structures of two types are found in great abundance—at least in forms of far-reaching approximation—in nature, just as they are in purely useful artifacts of human beings in the manufacture of which symmetry of its own accord occurs, unintentionally, so to speak, without the enrichment of aesthetic effects having been desired. Something or someone who maintains secure equilibrium in walking, swimming, and flying or in whom equilibrium steadfastly persists, achieves symmetrical structures automatically. A person quite soon comes to realize that certain weapons and utensils fulfill their aims only when they are constructed symmetrically. A spear, a primitive grindstone, or a vase requires symmetrical construction, as does a wagon or a ship. Meanwhile, nature too seems to show a love for symmetry which goes beyond effects having static-mechanical purposes when it arranges the designs on animal bodies, leaves, and so forth symmetrically. That a butterfly must be symmetrically constructed if it is to fly with security is self-evident for reasons of necessity; but the fact that it exhibits symmetrical design on its wings besides—this is a matter of luxury, an aesthetic “plus.” A human being in his artistic and aesthetic work arrives at symmetry not only because he has often seen it in nature and is therefore accustomed to it; nor only because technological considerations which he follows unconsciously direct him into similar paths as he produces useful instruments; but also because he finds that symmetry meets concerns of basic form. Symmetrical formations are particularly clear, uniform, and therefore effortlessly and agreeably graspable. To explain the agreeableness of symmetry, Ziehen refers to the realization of an expectation, to recurrence, and to the complexibility attached to recurrence. In the case of symmetrical construction we perceive a relation of equality and, thanks to the relation, we are able easily to combine the whole into a unity. Physiological reasons also have been cited to explain the aesthetic agreeableness of sym-

metry; at the same time here again a labeled or distinctive example in terms of mathematics and physics is present. I should like to mention the principle-based discussions devoted by E. von Hartmann²⁵² and A. Zeising²⁵³ to the forms of regularity in appearance as being "mathematically pleasant." And as we have already frequently discovered, mathematical order often, though of course not always, postulates an aesthetic one.

Symmetry unites all excellencies of organization, of equilibrium and balance, of repetition, and of contrast. It brings about the clearest organization of two parts which are in contrast to each other. Equilibrium occurs between right and left; the forms repeat themselves not in terms of a series, but in those of contrast: they recur in the antithetical way. In symmetry a lively stimulus to see things together links itself with the supreme easiness of this kind of seeing and with a vigorous energizing of forms through reiteration. The middle piece or point gives the eye secure support so that it can combine symmetrical parts into a unit. The fact that formal structures created by symmetry make the impression of something resting as if it were complete and stable in itself undoubtedly contributes to the positive effect of symmetry.²⁵⁴ According to Sterzinger,²⁵⁵ pleasure in symmetry is rooted in a phylogenetically very deeply anchored natural disposition of human beings which, of course, does not always operate in the same way. Fechner²⁵⁶ thinks in this connection about an instinctive reaction on the basis of an *a priori* possession.

It is important, furthermore, that the agreeableness of symmetrical structures exhibit gradations of degree which are a result of differentiation and diversity. A circle bisected by a horizontal diameter too is a symmetrical structure which, because of the paucity of its content, however, arouses only a limited pleasure. The pleasant impression is intensified with the increase of the symmetrical partial-contents as long as the complexibility is not encroached upon by these means. In ornamental structures which are differentiated in especially rich and various ways, strict symmetry is on occasion loosened up by way of variations, and often even intentionally broken through, the result being a certain intensification of the impression of liveliness. Again it is confirmed that the optimal aesthetic effect occurs in a slight variation of a case of special mathematical and physical distinction, that, for example, in colors it is not the fully complementary contrast, but the slight inflection of it, that is especially agreeable; in tones it is not the full and most remote harmony of octave and fifth, but that of third, sixth, and fourth. Here the basic principle of multiplicity in unity asserts itself. The

higher an aesthetic formation is, just that much less can the elementary and, precisely for this reason, primitive organization-principle of symmetry be undisguised, uninflected, and unvaried. There are great areas of aesthetic-artistic objectivity in which merely approximate forms of symmetry have a more favorable effect than do the fully realized kinds when they appear. Mathematically exact symmetry is possible only in the space-arts which are not related to things (architecture, ornaments, handicrafts); they alone hold to strict symmetry or permit it, although even here, circumstances permitting, a slight breaking through, or even a total asymmetry, which is not infrequently consciously sought for, has a certain charm. But even in the forms of organic nature, symmetry undergoes more or less strong inflections. Leaves, blossoms, plants, and the bodies of animals are far from being strictly regular even when they are symmetrically constructed. Nor are the halves of the human body quite identical: An ear, a foot, a hand are as a rule somewhat larger than their mates. The right and left halves of faces are not entirely the same either, and it is precisely on this fact that the expression of liveliness which appears on the human countenance in part depends; absolute identity would make the face lifeless and statuary-like. These inequalities, usually not so slight, of the halves of the face are clearly shown in photographic experiment. If a person composes a human face by combining two left parts through copying or making a photomontage, the effect is entirely different from that of a copy made of two right sections. Similarly, the horns of stags and roes do not reveal a full symmetry, but only a free one. In sculpture, complete symmetry is even more impossible. Certainly the individual statue must not show an absolute mirror-like similarity between the halves; in a sculptured group or in a painting made up of many figures, absolute symmetry is excluded entirely, whether the painting is a landscape, an interior, a representation of people, or a figural composition. In place of absolute symmetry, which would make for a stiff, unnatural, and heavy impression, there is a weighing of the parts, a free isodynamism, a harmonic imbalancing of perceptual accents, of lines and fields of force. What a painting concerned with a good distribution of space must try for is only the "perceptual median" ("*anschauliche Mittel*"), the proper balance of color-accents and sense-accents. Dividing a picture into two completely equal parts by means of a middle line is to be avoided. Strict symmetry was displayed only in primitive early times; later it was relieved by freer organization, just as a picture of a mature period in art will not imitate archaic

isocephalism. The increasingly free inflections of symmetry can in the end arrive at their opposite, and this too, which is asymmetry, has certain attractions. Here the meaningful typological differences in the artistic intentions of different periods, civilized groups, and nations assert themselves. If the traditional classical art of antiquity and the High Renaissance grants symmetry the greatest possible room in architecture, ornamental art, and plastic art (one recalls the triangular composition inaugurated by Fra Lippo Lippi into the pictures of the *quattro-* and *cinquecento*, for instance the very symmetrically planned *Madonna Canigiani* of Raphael), the Baroque, with the diagonal composition of its paintings, and the Rococo, with the charmingly splenetic asymmetry of its inner architecture, strove to go beyond it. Still more marked is this tendency in modern movements like the "Secession" (*Jugendstil*) and neorealistic functionalism in architecture and handicrafts. Under the influence of the artistic productions coming from these movements symmetry was disowned emphatically, even in theory, as when A. Weiser²⁵⁷ speaks programmatically of the "worthlessness of symmetry." Other people too take a hands-off attitude towards this principle: the Japanese do this above all, something one clearly discovers in the writings of Kakuzo,²⁵⁸ Tsudzumi,²⁵⁹ and others. Though it is thus rejected, the principle of symmetry has not lost its value entirely; nor is its every value destroyed; one has only demonstrated that it is not the sole and unique principle of aesthetic form and that its value is not absolute.

Having pointed out the limitations of this principle, one has also indicated that the principle of regularity which is superior to symmetry cannot claim an exclusive value in the realm of aesthetic objects in nature and in art. Agreeable as it may be in many decorative and ornamental creations in handicrafts and architecture, regularity is a comparatively primitive aesthetic principle.

In different spheres of art and in the realm of natural objects, this principle takes a place at one side of the aesthetic impression because "it retreats in favor of irregularity, so that it is reduced (one thinks of representational arts) to a mere hint and trace. Therefore it is incorrect to represent forms of regularity as aesthetic pattern-images, as pure manifestations of beauty." According to Volkelt,²⁶⁰ who with these formulations turns emphatically against certain exaggerations of Zeising,²⁶¹ the pull towards regularity must in one way or another pair, according to the actual state of affairs in art, with the pull towards irregularity. The more purely regular something appears, just that much more does it approach the aes-

thetically inadequate, just that much more does it approach an aesthetic boundary point which has an empty and therefore threadbare effect.

The relational form of symmetry is in closest neighborliness with another aesthetic phenomenon, that of proportion. By this we mean an agreeable relation in perception between two sizes, between the separate parts of a formal totality among themselves, or of one part (or several of them) to a superior whole. Proportion is the symmetry of the parts of a complex formal whole; it is a relation between the whole and its parts or between these with respect to their measurements, a relation which appears with perceptual necessity and which arouses pleasure. The question is one of certain relations within an objective whole, primarily in the realm of the spatial-visible, which depend on proportions of number and size, although even within temporal organizations proportion is spoken of in the figurative sense.

From ancient times to the present, proportion has been considered a characteristic of the effect of beauty. According to Plato, who tried to correct certain of the one-sidednesses of content-aesthetics, harmony, symmetry, and proportion are intrinsic qualities of beautiful things, and since Polyclites and Lysippus, sculptors have carried on an inquiry about the beautiful proportions of the human physique. Leonardo,²⁶² Dürer, and, later, Schadow,²⁶³ Carus,²⁶⁴ Zeising,²⁶⁵ Bochenek,²⁶⁶ and various others have continued searches for universally valid standards of proportion for the human figure. In the realm of architecture, Vitruvius²⁶⁷ tried something analogous. For the beauty of a building, the pleasant relation of forms, the moderate agreement of separate members and parts, is, among other things, critical. In this connection an important requirement was subsequently set up in the proportion-theory of architecture: that a pervading unit of measure must lie at the base of the parts of the building. Ultimately, the number-values of beautiful proportions were precisely defined. If Vitruvius directed his efforts towards agreeable proportions in architecture and handicrafts and if Polyclites and his followers looked for a key to the proportions of the human figure, others inquired after and attempted to discover a universal and absolutely valid formula for this principle. In fact, there is something attractive in the speculatively achieved thought that all beauty of form in nature and art depends on the same harmony of numbers: the central distances of the planets, the relations of atomic weights, the vibration-numbers of major chords, and the normal shapes of the human body.²⁶⁸ The

relation which has been so looked for is believed to have been found in the "*sectio aurea*," the Golden Section; it has been supposed that in it one can see the original and basic proportion of living beings (human beings, animals, plants), useful objects, built objects, and all art-works. According to the opinion of scholars and practicing artists²⁶⁹ who acknowledge this law, all creatures and things which please one as being beautiful are so ordered and organized that the smaller part is to the larger as the latter is to the whole; this law is expressed by the formula $a : b = b : (a + b)$, or in the simplest numbers: $3 : 5$ equals $5 : (3 + 5)$; that is, the smaller part must come to three-eighths, the larger to five-eighths of the entire dimension. The most definite proclaimer of the aesthetic significance of the Golden Section is A. Zeising. On the basis of numerous measurements of the human body and of art-works of different kinds, he has been led to the conviction that in the Golden Section is the long sought-for basic relation of beautiful proportion. His assertions stimulated Fechner to make painstaking attempts to confirm Zeising's theses, but with many kinds of qualifications. More recent attempts by Witmer,²⁷⁰ Ziehen, Sterzinger, and others have not fully recognized the claim of these limitations. Thus it remains that a proportion which does not diverge too much from the Golden Section does call up pleasure and that this system of measurement therefore decidedly has a mark of aesthetic distinction. Among the most recent art-historians, H. Wölfflin²⁷¹ especially has been emphatic in confessing to the Golden Section; he sees in it the law of proportion which is authoritative for the art of the Italian Renaissance. Leone Battista Alberti,²⁷² who as creative artist and, even more, as art-theorist is representative of the artistic tendencies of the Renaissance, located the essence of architectonic beauty in the harmony of the proportions of the parts to the whole. Raphael and Bramante are supposed to have realized these leading ideas in art, and, indeed, according to Wölfflin, the agreeable aesthetic mensural relation of proportion (*travée rythmique*) is supposed to be represented by the Golden Section. Even the standard human figure reveals a distinct proportionality in its organization, a proportionality which is comprehensible if one observes the relation of the stretches between soles of the feet to hips, between hips and shoulders, between shoulders and crown of head; similar proportions are shown in the arrangement of the arms into three segments (shoulder to elbow, elbow to wrist, wrist to ends of fingers), as well as by that of the face, in which the major line reaches from the middle of the throat to the eyebrows, the minor from the eyebrows to the crown of the

head. The Golden Section also plays an important role in the complicated calculations of Bochenek, who measured the construction of the frontal view of the male figure. Thus we can say that according to all of the people cited, the aesthetic distinction of the Golden Section seems demonstrated: The repeated approach to it in objects of formal beauty is so striking that dependence of this approximation on mere chance is impossible and the optional room for the action present in architectonic photographs and mensurations must in some way reach an adjustment. But a monarchical governance, an absolute priority, of this relation in the realm of proportions is not indicated. It is not the only relation, and not one which is agreeable under all circumstances; instead, it is only one among many agreeable ones because a considerable agreeableness of effect belongs to the ratios of 1:1 and of 1:2 too. Also, in relation to spatial orders, simple rational ratios and those of whole numbers seem distinctive in some way; in music we have learned to recognize something similar, and thus the value-claim of the Golden Section, whose relational numbers are not absolutely simple, but even irrational, is not inconsiderably limited. Whether the mathematical sign for this relation is the basis of our aesthetic pleasure in it must still be discussed; first of all, one must give space to considerations which have been brought against mathematical inquiry into such aesthetically auspicious proportions.

According to Dessoir, the computation of such mean values can show only that aesthetically valuable forms lie within certain numerical boundaries. If mathematical ratio were the basis of our joy in forms, then it would have to be valid in all strictness (just as, for instance, in music even a slight deviation from an agreeable interval makes the interval extremely unpleasant); the structures corresponding to it rigidly would have to be the most delightful, and those not conforming with it would be the more devoid of beauty the further away from the equation they were. But, as a matter of fact, the simple ratios in spatial order, with the exception of the ratio of 1:1, allow considerable variation without very much reduction in the aesthetically propitious effect; even the proportions lying on the confines of the Golden Section are able to work agreeably.

But more than anything else, the fact that such relations are offered us chiefly in formal contexts and thus are modified by aspects in which they are embedded and that considerations of content associatively produced are able to influence the pleasant impression—this fact militates against such attempts at mathematical

inquiry. Window openings which have the proportions of the Golden Section are for the most part very agreeable, but only in buildings whose other dimensions agree with them. In another totality of architectonic form, very different proportions can be agreeable. Thus the Villa Erben in Hütteldorf (built by Otto Wagner) has windows which in their excessive narrowness seem absolutely to scoff at the Golden Section, but they have a favorable effect precisely in the totality of form of which they are a part. Experimental psychology and aesthetics have tried to do justice to actual conditions like these by giving up simple attempts at research in the agreeableness of the simplest geometrical structures and going in the direction of more complicated investigations. Proportions should be examined which approximate architectonically partial forms (windows, portals, gables, roofs).

Thus Sander²⁷³ combined an upright rectangle with triangles, semi-circles, and semi-ellipses which were placed above its shorter side, and he investigated the aesthetic effect of these figures which, besides, he gave to his experimental subjects with many variations. In similar experiments, Ziehen paid attention to whether the impression undergoes a change if the size of a rectangle is differently selected within a group and, further, to how the effect of rectangles, circles, and ellipses is changed when they are placed within a larger rectangular surface. In this way he succeeded in approaching the kinds of experiences of form which one has in the presence of concrete art-works; but at the same time, experimental investigation has almost completely abandoned the influence on the impression of proportion by factors of content and association.

But a vivid impression very much depends on such factors. Thus the agreeableness of a pillar depends not only on the proportional number which applies to its own dimension, but also on whether it bears a great or a small load. Therefore a column which itself is well-proportioned may seem to lack proportion if it seems not adequate to its task. Here the norms of personal statics (which have already been mentioned) come into play. Our demand for proportion is sweepingly determined by reason of static experiences which, as an outcome of many experiences, have shaped themselves in us in cooperation with innate tendencies towards form. A famous painter who was censured because he had painted storks with thick legs answered that a person could not demand that he repeat the mistakes of nature. It is self-evident that nature has not erred in the case of the stork; for the legs of this wading-animal are quite capable of carrying him with all the security which is desired. But

the covering of feathers creates an illusion of a larger physical mass, and the fact that the stork, like all birds, has pneumatic and very light bones remains in the realm of mere knowledge and is not capable of being grasped through perception.

Nor does the Golden Section govern absolutely in the sense that it supplies dimensions which are binding for all of the architecture of all times; it is much more true that in different epochs often quite other kinds of proportion-requirements occur.

According to Dehio,²⁷⁴ in a gothic cathedral the height of an equilateral triangle whose sides correspond to the half-lighted open space of the middle aisle is taken as the basic proportion. If one were to call this measurement p , then in the cathedral at Rheims, for example, the entire altitude to the top of the binding-arch is exactly $7p$, and the relation of $1:7$ is often repeated in this building. In other Gothic churches, the height comes to $5p$ and $6p$, and then the relations $1:5$ and $1:6$ are repeated. The proportion of height and breadth is of course something different in each church, but it constantly forms the multiplication-product out of a fixed proportional unit.

It can be easily shown that in classical buildings of ancient Greece and of the High Renaissance of Italy the simple and very complexible relation of the Golden Section is predominant,²⁷⁵ but that there are more complicated relations in other stylistic movements. The demands of different times and people for formal beauty created primarily by means of proportion are certainly different. Italian art, for instance, looks in the direction of sensuously perceptible completeness and formal perfection and therefore places an incomparably greater weight on clear and harmonic proportionality than does the art of the North, which is devoted chiefly to the expression of the psychic, of dynamic tension and agitation. Wölfflin²⁷⁶ is right in saying that a Florentine-Roman building of the High Renaissance (the Pitti Palace, for instance) at first always seems naked and cold to the northern traveler. This is quite explicable as long as the structure is looked at in our terms for moving and expressive contents; but such an attitude is wrong with regard to this particular architectural work. As soon as a person has the right (that is, the Italian) assumptions, the apparant paucity of the impression turns into enormous wealth. For people of the Mediterranean area, architecture was at one time the truest of the arts of harmonic proportions. The beauty of an antique temple and of the buildings of the Renaissance lies chiefly in the beauty, the clear well-weighedness, of the proportions. Beyond their elegance

and euphoniousness, not much is present. But in a gothic building or in one of the German Renaissance (Heidelberg Castle) many other factors are put into service: decorative accessories, sculpture, the pictorial effect of light and shade, dynamically affected formal contents, and so forth.

How is the agreeableness of formally beautiful proportions to be explained? Let us begin with the most famous example of it, the Golden Section. Many theories have been asserted to explain its effect.

Sterzinger²⁷⁷ supposes that our organism in some way unconsciously senses the equality of the two ratios (in the Golden Section) and that this likeness arouses pleasure in us. Külpe²⁷⁸ brings the agreeableness of the Golden Section into immediate relation to the law of Weber and Fechner, according to which the differences between two stimuli seem the same to us when both stimuli are objectively in the same relation. In the division in the Golden Section, the difference between the larger and smaller sections and the difference between the larger section and the whole would seem equal, and the pleasantness of the Golden Section would therefore be nothing other than the pleasantness of apparently equal differences. It would thus be a symmetry of a higher order, so to speak. In a later work, Külpe²⁷⁹ sums up the matter thus: in simple relations in space, the apparent equality of the sections is preferred first; then follow simple proportions, especially the Golden Section; and then, further, the marked regularity of clear organization. Ziehen expresses himself less concisely: he starts with the agreeableness of simple mathematical ratios established in other divisions of aesthetics. But one must not believe that in having mentioned this analogous situation in the sphere of musical and spatial aesthetics one has already solved the philosophical-aesthetic problem. The question remains as it was. How can one explain the aesthetic effect of simple mathematical relations? Is it possible that we must interpret it as we do the fact that in the formulas of physics relatively low exponents of whole numbers play the greatest roles? In the end, Ziehen feels compelled to accept the fact that the approximate recurrence of the same ratios between smaller and larger stretches, as between the latter and the total stretch, produces the effective aesthetic factor. Perhaps the experience of repetition (recurrence) too plays a role in this connection. He then presents the question of whether consciously or latently associative factors play a part in the agreeableness of the Golden Section. In particular, one could think that familiarity with the image of the human form, in which the breadth

of the shoulders and the entire height possibly are related as is $1:3\frac{1}{2}$, has led to a preference for the longer stretched-out rectangles, so that the average preference of the ratio of the sides of 3:5 or 5:8 therefore depends only on the fact that the rectangle with the simple side-ratio of 2:3 has been assimilated, as it were, with the human figure. Then he mentions all kinds of mechanical associations, but these too do not suffice. In all experiences and in the reproductions of them, the effect of proportionality-in-itself plays the critical role. But Dessoir finds it necessary to be completely skeptical and to hold off judgment. He says that the efforts of Bochenek in connection with the mathematical construction of the human shape are in no position to solve the aesthetic problem. No one can show what connection there is between changing and complex proportion of measurement and our joy in form; no one is really able to explain the one by the other.

I too think that it is impossible to explain completely the problem under discussion here. One can only approach such an explanation with the very general statement that the basis of the aesthetic agreeableness of certain proportions lies in the fact that they make aesthetic concentration, or "complexion," easier and meet it half way. If an explanation is sought for by an appeal to the superior principle of complexibility, then one has also undertaken to derive it from the principle of unity in a manifold, in doing which, however, one has prepared a way for an explanation of pleasure not only in the Golden Section, but also in all complexible divisional relations. A division like the Golden Section is pleasant as it gives to the greater part the power of subordinating itself to the smaller and invests the smaller with the power of holding its ground within that subordination.

The agreeableness which most observers feel in connection with certain proportions has the following basis, according to Th. A. Meyer: "The fundamental principle of unity in multiplicity is decisive in connection with the pleasant relation of unequal parts among themselves. There is satisfaction for us when two or more parts are different in size and thus are diverse and still at the same time uniform and harmonic in their uniformity. And this is the case when the larger part as the ruling one includes the smaller one without overwhelming it." In such cases, there is harmonic unity in the multiplicity. What is meant becomes clear if one compares a square and a rectangle. The square is marked by the immediacy and the impressiveness of its oneness; it is delightful because of its convincing unity. Nevertheless, the rectangle is superior to it in

beauty of form, assuming that the ratio of length and breadth is proportional. It has not only a greater multiplicity than the square, but a pleasanter unity also. Our eye is set up to subordinate the shorter sides to the longer ones, whereas no subordination of breadth to length can occur in connection with the square with its equal sides, all of which claim the same rights. Because the subordinated sides are not overwhelmed by the larger ones, but are close to it in importance, proportionality looks after both sides. The same considerations are valid too for higher and more complex forms. A piece of architecture organized into a central structure and side aisles realizes the requirement of proportionality if the central part governs and the side aisles hold their positions in subordination. The structure is unpleasant as lacking proportion if the central section only with difficulty asserts its dominance or if it exerts a violent control over the side aisles so that they seem to be insignificant appendages.

Such discussions as these are best suited to come close to the problem of the pleasantness of certain proportions. Still more penetrating investigation is required for the problem of the extent to which appeal should be made to the (already frequently mentioned) elementary natural dispositions and tendencies towards form, which become operative in terms of an *aprioristic* sense of proportionality and require a correct relation of the parts to the whole corresponding to the importance and duties of those parts, so that one can judge favorably the things which harmonize with those dispositions and tendencies towards form and unfavorably those which are at variance with them. Let me point briefly to the fact that experimental psychology (Bühler,²⁸⁰ Benussi²⁸¹) has taken up this problem. According to Bühler, one designates as impressions of proportion those significant considerations regarding linear relations with respect to height, breadth, and depth of the object seen as one perceives spatial forms. There is a special sensitivity and receptivity for the proportional values of spatial size, for which reason certain proportions like the Golden Section have been widely disseminated. Perceptions of proportions are very impressive psychical experiences. The fact that in the realm of space, as also in that of time, we perceive proportions, and that, indeed, we do so very precisely and directly, points to a primeval possession of our race. This basic function is properly and therefore pleasantly satisfied whenever a clear diversity of the parts occurs without this diversity's being carried to an extreme quantitative and qualitative differentiation of the one part. In formally beautiful proportions there appear clearly graspable and distinct organizations which as a conse-

quence of an energetic differentiation are multiple, but as a result of the clear self-assertion of the smaller part are still uniform besides.

b.¹ Eurythmy and Harmony. When in foregoing sections I had not as yet spoken about the principles of formal beauty in the spatial realm, the laws to be shown here required more particular discussion; but it is no longer necessary specially to discuss the pleasurable factors of aesthetic objects in time.

By eurythmy is meant an agreeable rhythmical structure. Because all rhythm as such already presents a pleasant organization, eurythmy can mean nothing more than an especially fortunate and satisfying formation in the realm of things occurring in time. Such a thing occurs when decisiveness, preciseness (*Prägnanz*), and clarity combine with good composition and an easy flow, when structural and effective mediums of rhythmical matters are present in full stamp and shaping, when an impressive, acoustically-motorally effective scheme of organization is realized vividly, when the expectations of rhythmical form and the requirements which we bring to a musical or poetic work of art are satisfied in a way that is full, rich in variety, and unified in its diversity. The way in which the fundamentally pleonastic expression "eurythmy" came into being can be easily explained through an analogical dependence on an older expression "euphony," by which one means the forming from within of acoustical impressions which reach the highest degree possible to them of tonal formal beauty, of the effect which guarantees pleasure, and of tones and sounds with regard to their acoustical qualities (pitch, intensity, tone-color, volume, tonality, vocality, and so forth). The counterpart of euphony in the realm of temporal sequence, its organization and structure, is eurythmy; it is a satisfying pleasure in the comprehension of a temporal organization of a series of sounds; it is the pleasant symmetry and proportion of a motion (music, dance, speech), the beautiful agreement of the parts of a form occurring in succession. Undoubtedly, not all pieces of music are equally satisfying and agreeable in this respect. There are those which in their rhythmic formation are indifferent, insipid, and useless; there are others which are uninteresting in their melodic and harmonic formation, but which have much to offer as regards rhythm. To praise the early and middle Verdi as a great harmonist will occur to hardly anyone, but he is a clever writer of melodies and a gifted creator of rhythms indeed. Among the moderns, Stravinsky and Bartok are especially famous for their rhythm.²⁸² Ravel's *Bolero* owes its thrilling effect not only to the technique of mono-

maniacally obstinate repetition and to very able instrumentation, but primarily to the rhythm. Among dance-forms of different nations there are those about which one asks how anyone can feel motorally moved and aroused by their tedious rhythm; by contrast, there are others (I am thinking here, for instance, of the polonaise and the czardas) which exhibit rhythms which are immediately fascinating.

Of course, one must not hope to find eurythmy exclusively in the drastically strict measuring of time of certain dance rhythms. With their motoral-kinaesthetic effects these create only their most striking and most concise phenomenal forms. Eurythmy can also include the free organ-phantasy of free improvisors (who therefore do not play music which recalls other pieces of music). In a real improvisation, the harmonic stream of tones is constructed and arranged only by means of the mild pulse of melic rhythm from which all strict rhythm is usually absent. But good rhythmical structure will be present—though a freer, less easily perceptible kind in which our sense of motion is not addressed and in which the motoral effects are at a minimum.

Harmony means the sounding together of two or more partial impressions combined into a unified total form, the blending and merging of them into it. Harmony is a "good form" (*"gute Gestalt"*) and a labeled structure in the realm of simultaneous acoustical impressions, in contrast with which rhythm always means an organization of something taking a certain course through time, a formal construction of successive impressions. Harmony is the suiting-one-another of two or more tones as bases of a higher acoustical shape; it is the experience of a formal relation which is presented when several simultaneously sounding tones are easily graspable in terms of a higher unity. The Greek theorist of music, Nicomachus, in speaking of "symphonic" intervals gives prominence to the characteristic of blending as something intrinsic, in comparison with the "diaphonic" ones, "in which the sound produced to a certain extent sounds crumbling away and cut up" and thus contradicts the experience of harmonic unity and concentration in hearing-events. According to Révész, harmonic structures are distinguished by independence, well-roundedness, definiteness, and stable balance, and thus show the intrinsic characteristics of good form; in contrast to harmonic order, unharmonic multiple sounds are characterized by irresolution, a straining for resolution, unsuitability to one another, and an immanent dynamism which only strives towards uniformity.

Consequently, harmony understood in the full value of its meaning would be the continual forming from within and the utilization of all of the potentialities of a formally beautiful impression which is to be aimed for by way of several tones sounding together. Harmony is the happy impression in comprehension-experience of one's hearing two or more tones sounding simultaneously. It is the task of music as the art of tones and sounds to give to the medium it uses the highest possible degree of the beauty of form; this is accomplished by way of euphony, eurythmy, and harmony. One recommends that expressions like "eurythmy" and "harmony" be used only for acoustical givennesses in time which are artistically treated and that we abstain as far as possible from transferring them metaphorically to the realm of space, even though since the time of Vitruvius,²⁸³ it has been customary to speak of the eurythmy of a hall of columns and of the harmonic measurements of a building, just as Platonic aesthetics had already mentioned a eurythmy in the human figure.

c.¹ Eusynopsy and Complexibility. The particular aesthetic principles of the objective-formal kind brought up here are not on the same plane with respect to their universality and their importance. The principles now to be discussed are two of those already mentioned to which the highest and the ultimate universality adheres. In comparison with these, the principles mentioned just before are not basic and universal in the same way, but can be considered means and ways to these superior effective laws and demands.

Eusynopsy means the capacity for looking well all together; by complexibility one means the fact that the object makes easy and possible the "complexion," the condensation into a unity of a formal whole, because it presents itself convincingly to intuition as an organic unity. An object which advances to meet comprehension has beauty of form and allows it to succeed effortlessly and agreeably—and this despite all of the richness of the product of contemplation. In this last statement I have suggested that complexibility must not make comprehension too easy; otherwise, the unanimity of a single voice which is perceived with incomparable ease would really be more beautiful than more difficult music in several parts; and in the realm of space, a square strictly drawn and a circle correctly drawn would be the most beautiful structures because, with respect to eusynopsy and complexibility, they are not to be excelled. The aesthetically positive effect, therefore, lies in the dialectical tension between, on the one side, clear presentation, distinctness, em-

phasis in the formation, organization, uniformity, and, on the other, a manifold made up of a life-content which is as rich and varied as possible. The dualism of content and form presents itself even in the realm of formation, which on the one hand strives for unity, but on the other builds itself out of a well-composed abundance of members: unity because works of art intended for the eyes are eusynoptical and complexible if the glance does not have to wander helplessly all around and because these works exhibit a clear group-construction and a clearly sensible centralization around the core of a complex, the impression of which one need not piece together out of single parts (as one does with panoramas, "prospects," and paintings of gigantic proportions). Such a method of combining things in groups must be present when one is concerned with large sizes and a great number of figures on pictures and on reliefs, so that these clearly organize themselves, as if voluntarily, into a unity of the whole. In such cases it is indispensable to put in relief what is important, to bring to bear the accents of meaning which make possible one's orientation within a totality which can easily split into parts, and to guide the eyes decisively. The demand for perspicuity and easy comprehensibility is valid for all of the arts. Paintings of the late Middle Ages, in which an over-abundance of figures uniformly covers their entire surface without any recognizable arrangement of the groups or any emphasized structure, are disagreeable. Gutzkow's novel, *Roman des Nebeneinander*, has an unfortunate effect because of its defective complexity, as do all many-volumed prose-epics to which pedigrees and long lists of persons have to be appended for the benefit of the readers. If one calls Mozart's music "transparent," he has made a judgment in terms of eusynopsis and complexibility; and one cannot say anything like the same thing about the thematic work and the instrumentation of the later symphonies of Schumann.

Only when the aesthetic object has eusynopsis and complexibility does one arrive at a well-developed aesthetic attitude which occurs when an object invites us to view it, when it satisfies us in an experience of looking as such. This can occur only when it is offered in a sensuously agreeable way and, besides this, in one which brings about a clear, intelligible, and impressive idea of the object and which, in so doing, guarantees an intensive, exciting, completely exhaustive, but relatively untroubled activity of the comprehending organs (the peripheral receptor ones and the working spheres of the cortex). As the principles being discussed here are realized, the form of an object supplies the organization and the uniformity with

which the appearance is offered us; it supplies a certain character of summons or invitation to us to experience in perception the formal unit as an organic whole, a functionally pleasant course of activity of comprehension being at the same time guaranteed. Eusynopsis and complexibility are the most important conditions of formal beauty by means of which the structures whose outer appearance is felt to answer the purpose of our comprehension-activity are distinguished for us. The requirements of clarity and emphasis in the presentation which are occasionally set up as independent laws of form are together to be subsumed under the principles of eusynopsis and complexibility. The hazy and indistinct, or whatever is presented in a faint-hearted and merely allusive fashion, is never eusynoptical and complexible; only things clearly and emphatically formed are so. Clearness with respect to form presupposes clear outlining and decisive formation; with respect to content, it is the condition by which the object concerned expresses its nature, its character, completely and unequivocally. For this reason we have of late understood why conformity to type is an important ideative aesthetic factor and why an animal of pure genus is more pleasant than is a bastard form; in a similar way the distinction of orthoscopically formed views becomes plausible again. The opposite of all synoptical and complexible, of all clear, intelligible, and expressive formation is the confused, the desultory, and the abrupt. Pinched faces make their effect in terms of disagreeable formations, and in contrast to faces which are distinguished by large and reposeful lines; dilettantes on the stage make precipitant and convulsive motions which have an effect contrary to that of experienced actors, who carry on their language of gesture by slowing all movements down and by making them clear. If a person defines art in this as in other respects to be a representation of existence, then a legal argument supporting the experienced actor's practice is to be found in the fact that it is possible to hold disturbing influences—that is, all of the determinations of moment and chance which encroach upon the pure effect of the true character of the creature or thing represented—at a distance and to bring the optimal phenomenal form, the living thing, the Idea, into expression in a manner which is undeviating and clear.

According to Meyer, the fact that the aesthetic content, the life which the artist aims to represent, must constantly pour itself out in form and be read off by the spectator with ease and certainty—this fact is valid as the supreme principle of form-construction. Thus we are pleased by a statue in which organic physical powers

forming the body and causing its motion become quite visible for the sake of the clarity itself with which they appear. Works of sculpture and paintings in which in a physical image there are vigorously reflected the peculiarities of character and psychic states of the person represented, a landscape which in clear and unambiguous stamp reveals the mood which is in it, all awaken joy because of the distinctness of the composition. In music we value not only the feeling sounding out from the melody, but we also sense an attractiveness in the form which is the greater the more the melody says: that is, the more certainly it renders up to us the mood-content which it has concealed in itself.

Genuineness of material and suitability of the means to the end operate in a similar way: but these represent claims which are in duty bound to handicrafts and useful art. Such a kind of complexible formation arouses delight in form wherever a work-material is clearly acknowledged for itself, or wherever an end is striven for in an undisguised and unmistakable manner. Complexibility also means the formation from within of the vital and the characteristic, may this be an Idea, a law of the material, or an aim. Eusynoptical and complexible forms not only quite universally force an aesthetic attitude in the spectator, but also guide the activity of comprehension by suggestion, so to speak, into the right paths from out of which the intended meaning of these forms is completely disclosed.

The produced form (one is not concerned with whether it is an object in actuality or a reproduction of it, or a figuration of lines which is not associated with things or musical tone-structures) must offer itself as a genuine organism in the aesthetic sense (that is, as a convincing whole made of parts clearly existing for one another), as a unit made up of construction-factors which are absolutely necessary. The abundance of the particulars and of the participating parts must be bound together with clear connections; they must be as far removed from amorphous, undifferentiated bulkiness as from the separateness of things occurring in confused coexistence, of things which, being devoid of connections, are not related one to the other. The eusynoptical and complexible organization serves the clarity of the parts as well as the unity of the whole. To comprehend something so formed throughout is to make functional pleasure certain, and through such determinations as these does the concept first take on its full meaning.

Ziehen has given particular attention to the concept and the fact of complexibility. As art develops, the object becomes increasingly more complicated, and variations within the subjects are em-

ployed increasingly. The more complicated the syntheses become, the more essential is it that synthetic processes be made easy. On this fact depends the unity of the aesthetic work of art. Primitive simplicity in the literal sense is more and more replaced with increasing syntheses by way of uniformity, which is a simplicity of a higher order. This uniformity assumes a genuine cooperation of the parts of the object itself. Just as important is the adequacy of the sensations called up by the object to our functions in the comprehension of form; and at this point a basic thought of Kant's comes into its own.

d.¹ Other Principles. I shall now mention certain more special objective-formal organizations which, without possessing the universal significance of the more comprehensive and more basic principles mentioned heretofore, are quite capable of investing an object with aesthetic value or of increasing the aesthetic effect already present.

Repetition should be mentioned first. It is repetition which, especially in primitive art, creates aesthetically effective structures out of indifferent formal givennesses. A dark berry alongside the white tooth of an animal are like two objects accidentally hit upon together: they have no aesthetic significance. But if these coexisting objects are consciously repeated with a formal intention, if berry and tooth are placed on a string in repeated, regular succession, then an aesthetically effective givenness is derived from repetition and from organization in a row. Primitive motifs of which each is unimportant in isolation too become an aesthetically significant ornament through repetition. It is well known that primitive choric poetry is often made up only of the constant repetition of a single statement which in itself has little to say. Children find endless delight in like things, in the rhythmicized repetition of any kind of an accidental word or sentence. Repetition is not only the soul of ornament and the creative principle in the art of ornament and decoration, but also that of music and architecture in their most primitive as well as in their most highly developed phases. The beauty of a musical motif comes completely to consciousness only through repetition, and even one of a lesser beauty gains decidedly by way of that pleasure in recognition which is a result of repetition. Through repetition a motif (and indeed not only a musical one) is exposed more clearly, more impressively, and more expressively, and at the same time the abundance of offered motifs is unified and understood. Repetition is one of the most important means of procedure in any work made up of themes. Certain musical

forms, like canons and fugues, are based on it entirely, but any movement of a sonata or symphony also offers us examples. As an extreme and drastic example verifying this principle I shall only mention the overture to Mozart's *Così fan tutte*. The form-principle of repetition in music has an objective significance entirely different from that in the other arts because, as Külpe correctly states, the combining of the motifs, harmonies, and themes is far more difficult than the combining of thoughts and moods poetically formed and spoken in words; in sculpture, by contrast, it is coexistence entirely which very much facilitates comparison. How could a view of the content and organization of a musical art-work be achieved if there were no constant repetition of important matters and supporting ones? Yet it will not do to trace pleasure in repetition back entirely to joy in such facilitated comprehension. Rather, repetition is of great significance also as a purely aesthetic (not merely as an intellectual) factor; for by repetition above all (and certainly by that of the motifs of leading melodic elements) does the relation so important for aesthetic judgment between separate impressions and the total impression come to be.

But repetition plays a large role also in the remaining arts which are abstract and unconnected with things, and is a significant source of pleasure even where the repeated motifs are so simple that the facilitation of comprehension is not required at all. Here governs, not the variegated change in organic forms of the world of living beings and concrete things, but pure law. Repetition is important above all when there is a stylization of natural forms in the work and when the natural is changed into the geometrical. If a branch of ivy, the leaf of an oak or an acanthus tree, is used as an ornamental motif, it is simplified and regularized in its language of form, and at the same time it is often repeated. Repetition is one of the means by which the geometrical style of decorative and tectonic art controls natural objects in terms of a clear linear regularity through the imposition of the legal force of the abstract intellect. What kind of role repetition plays in architecture is too easily discernible to require detailed discussion. Series of windows, columns, and pillars are the result of the frequent repetition of a structural member or of a motif. To the right and to the left of a ruling middle rise, the side-rises are repeated symmetrically, and the same ornamental motif runs in numerous repetitions as a line of ovals or as a meander along the entire frieze. Here repetition serves comprehensibility without its aesthetic effect being exhausted as it is so employed. No matter how a series of columns or windows is expanded and no

matter how complicated every single part of it is, it gets its uniformity from the fact that the same member is constantly repeated.

Repetition in the strictest sense of so-called simple repetition takes place as the same member is multiplied, as it is placed in many positions; at the same time, there is a varied or free repetition in which members which show slight changes are used more than once. Here repetition and variation are combined. Possible examples are the windows of gothic cathedrals which quite agree in size, but each of which shows a different tracery-pattern or a different picture on glass. In music, motif and theme are repeated not only note by note, but also in transpositions and with rhythmical changes, and in different instrumentations besides. Grieg's "Morning" (*Peer Gynt Suite I*) is an example of varied repetition based on chromatic changes.

According to Ziehen, who has made some penetrating observations about this phenomenon, repetition (recurrence) is an important factor in aesthetic objects. He places a primary pleasure in repetition, a genuine pleasure in recurrence. The return of things which are alike immediately causes an aesthetically pleasurable sensation, and every recognition as such is bound with a positive feeling-tone. Rhyme, refrain, the epithets in Homer, and the *leit-motifs* of Wagner owe a large part of their effect to repetition and the pleasure one finds in it. Many other matters can be traced back to this elementary pleasure in the return of similarities: pleasure in consonance, pleasure in certain proportions, as well as that in symmetry, which in its bilateral form is understood as "fixed recurrence" ("*orientierte Rekurrenz*"). Recurrence is the return of similar or alike sensations or characteristics in sensation at different times and in different places. The act of recognition which takes place in thought once or in repetition corresponds as a correlate to the sensorial constituent of recurrence. It is not significant whether recognition comes to our consciousness as such and in isolation or whether it arises from the entire process of aesthetic experiences. According to Ziehen, an important special case of recurrence is regularity. Generally speaking, recurrence through regularity achieves far-reaching significance both as a principle of aesthetic form and as a theoretical-aesthetic category of explanation. This is a significance which other aestheticians do not grant to recurrence and which as a matter of fact does not belong to it.

Apart from these differences within the theoretical treatment of this spatially and temporally neutral principle of form, the role of repetition is very different in individual arts and in different

periods of development. It claimed its greatest significance in primitive art, where givennesses which were the simplest and the most indifferent in themselves (a line, an unimportant theme) were raised into the realm of the beautiful and at once took on aesthetic relevance as they were repeated in succession again and again. A primitive ornament came into existence, for instance, when slightly curved lines were repeatedly placed one under the other; a dancing-song of certain Indians of South America is made up of many repetitions of the line, "In the large sea on the Aciman there are many otters."²⁸⁴ With the broader and higher development of art, in which increased complication and growing differentiation are characteristic, there already entered the tendency to exact a certain aesthetic value from motifs described by repetition and to use repetition only as an aspect of intensification, as a multiplier, so to speak. In more highly developed art, clearly observable tendencies are in evidence which frustrate repetition or at least make it less simple, possibly through an increasing of complication, a concentrating of the repeated elements into higher formal groups, or a replacing of simple repetition with varied and free kinds. In poetry, the forms still in use today in which repetition appears as an aesthetic factor (verse of many feet, stanzas composed alike, refrain, rhyme, and stylistic repetition-figures) have to do only with the form, the composition, but no longer with the meaning, as was true at the beginnings of literature.

In ornamental art which is independent of objects and in music, repetition has the value which belonged to it in general in the art of ancient times, although the elements which are active in them, the motifs and themes, became ever richer, more multi-fissured, and more refined through differentiation and complication, which increasingly governed all cultural events. The sequences, the reprises, the repetitions of thematic work in modern music are surely something other than the simple repetition of primitive music; but similarity is at the ultimate center of the nature of this artistic medium. One can see the rite of repetition in the third movement of a classical symphony (the minuet, the scherzo). There, to begin with, each subdivision of the first part is repeated once by itself; then comes a trio, also made up of several parts repeated separately; finally, the entire first part is played once more, but now "*senza replica*." In literature, the increasing differentiation of the formal medium and the putting of simple repetition out of circuit (caused by this differentiation) occur in an increasing use of free rhythms and in the avoidance of regular expressions and epithets and of a per-

vading metrical scheme in drama. A person who follows the classical tradition writes ungainly dramas in a pervading iambic pentameter; but in the drama of Expressionism, the expressing of psychic content has to shape the form of every line anew and independently without the author's being in any way cramped by a prescribed plan. Nevertheless, looked at more closely, the later drama quite easily reveals itself as having a repetition which is only more refined and complicated: repetition has not in any way been entirely suppressed.

I must still say something about the outer evidences and the inner psychic roots of repetition. The demand for regularity and for a clear intellectual law takes a decided hand in this connection, as do also a desire for intelligibility, forcibleness, and facility of comprehension, even if one is able to see in these only secondary motifs, not the primary one. When there is a question of filling a large empty surface, this can be done by means of decorative lines, ornaments, and grotesqueries of which each one is different from the other—that is, if all repetition is avoided. Such a procedure is difficult, however, not only because it presupposes an unusual richness of thought or idea in the artist, but also because it is not satisfactory aesthetically, the confused multiplicity coming about in this way missing all regularity and any possibility of its being oriented in an intellectually legal principle which is easy to understand. In connection with the arts of the muses, it is particularly the transitory character of the artistic impression appearing in time which leads to a plea for regularity.

A few things about this matter have been said by Sterzinger, who, without accepting a peculiar and primary pleasure in repetition, agrees that one would like to make permanent that which appears fleetingly to ear and mind; first because a pleasant sense-impression is present, but then also because of the imperfection of our memory, which needs several repetitions if it is to note artistic impressions and figures and to be able, further, to handle what it has noted. For this reason, American dance-compositions present a motif for so long a time that the audience can become thoroughly acquainted with it, and only then do they go on to a stronger inflection of the theme. But there is still another psychic root for repetition, and it lies in the following: every feeling-situation continues for a certain period of time. If a long-lasting feeling-state suits the subject of a picture or an impression of nature, then the like-mindedness between the inner and the outer worlds can be established so that the painted picture or the image tendered us by

nature can be contemplated for a corresponding period of time. In the acoustical realm, however, this like-mindedness can be obtained only as the motif corresponding to a long-lasting psychic state is repeated as frequently as is adequate to the feeling-state of the hearer. In primitive poetry, joy in sense-impressions played a lively role. Once upon a time, psychic life was still simple, the higher psychic functions were not valued so highly as they are by us, and the life of sensation was even more vigorous, and, possibly because of the lack of other attractive phenomena, awakened more pleasure than it does in us. Sense-impression had therefore to be tasted fully, as oftentimes did happen in productions in word, tone, and image. To this was added the fact that attention was less stable, more inconstant among primitives, who always were ready to be distracted. Now, if one must spend a long time in paying attention to an object, he has a disagreeable feeling when his attention is diverted, and he feels an increased demand for restoring it and paying attention; this demand is answered by repetition above all else. The pleasant effects of repetition lie in the fact that the recapitulation of a musical theme or even of a larger piece (reprise) is felt as an agreeable refreshing of the impression which has disappeared too quickly, as a welcome support for a capacity (memory) which is deficient in holding fast to things. Moreover, the repeated object works in a fashion more penetrating, more vivid, and more clear. Finally, new arrangements, all kinds of possibilities for the combining of elements and of creating forms, occur because of repetition.

As I have already said, repetition can be simple (that is, made up of equal units which are used more than once: columns, pillars, windows, ornamental motifs, and the note-by-note repetition of a motif in music) or free (in which things are repeated which are merely similar, and thus slightly different), although even here there is agreement within homologous structures. Strict or simple repetition can in greater measure occur only in the arts unrelated to things, and not in those related to them. A picture made up entirely of the same figure repeated over and over would be unbearable; it would then approximate decorative wall-ornaments, as does, say, Hodler's famous "Procession of Students." In sculpture, exact repetition is possible only where sculpture takes over parts of architecture, for instance where caryatids and atlantes replace columns and pillars. In a drama written in blank verse the metrical scheme is repeated a thousand times over, but the poet takes the trouble to bring about differentiation by way of ethical accents,

misplaced stresses, and so forth, so that he can as far as possible destroy the monotony of the "implied barrel-organ" ("*heimlichen Leierkastens*"). The repetition of things which are merely similar, or varied repetition, is a distinctive means of producing unity and multiplicity at the same time.

The concept of variation does not mean that a completely new object achieves value by being placed alongside a certain given one, but that the existing constituent of a form is in some way altered, that to the old which in part prevails is added something new which still is not something entirely different, but something which has a certain connection with the old. In musical variations on a theme, the theme itself must still "sound through" in some way; indeed, the rule should really require that one be able to play the theme at the same time as each variation. That music must proceed from variation and that unchanged repetition cannot be the single formal principle of thematic work: this Sterzinger bases on psychology and derives from the nature of our feeling-life in the following way: in most cases, a feeling-state, once it has arisen, will not remain unchanged for a long time, but will very soon undergo slight alteration. Such slight alteration finds its musical expression in the fact that music does indeed use the same theme, but that the theme is also inflected in a corresponding direction.

Thus alongside the pleasure in the return of the alike or similar which is satisfied by repetition there is pleasure in variation, or joy in the different and the new. Pleasure in recurrence and pleasure in variation, as principles of psychic life, are to one another in the same determinative dialectical tension as are the objective principles of unity and multiplicity. Pleasure in the new operates with pleasure in the alike in a way which is individual and cannot be brought under one law, and the antithesis of pleasure in recurrence and that in variation moves through almost all aesthetic objects. Thus even in pictures of the High Renaissance, which are very symmetrically composed, their forms being produced in a complexible triangular arrangement, one discovers, not the absolute likeness of the two halves as though they were reflected in a mirror, but variation in repetition. These two so important aspects act together for the objective determination of aesthetic objects: to this fact Ziehen has devoted informative discussions. If the same stimulus is presented us over a long period of time, the effect is blunted. Variation within recurrence counteracts the stimulus-fatigue created by the repetition of like objects. Examples are variations of the theme in move-

ments of sonatas and symphonies and the inflections of the *leit-motif* in Richard Wagner.

Literature is a convincing example that the delight in simple repetition can be considerably increased when the factor of differentiation is introduced. Rhyme is decidedly pleasant because one finds joy in the rediscovery of what is known and his aroused expectations are fulfilled. Here there are interesting shadings of the effect of pleasure, however. More pleasant than the simplest form of rhyme-order (couplet: aa, bb, and so forth) are the more complicated examples of the same type (crossed rhyme: abab; embracing rhyme: abba; tail-rhyme: aab, ccb; interwoven rhymes: abc, abc; outer chain-rhyme [*terza rima*]: aba, bcb); delight in recognition is enhanced by the hindrances which to a certain extent lie in its path, or as psychic dammings-up are caused, so that satisfaction is deferred. More complicated forms of this type (say, repetitions of groups) are of course already experienced as phenomena of correspondence.

A short time ago, and earlier too, I referred to the state of anticipation and fulfillment which gives us pleasure; I was implicitly declaring for two other correlative principles of form, tension and resolution,^{284a} which are often presented separately. In this connection I am not thinking so much about the dimensions and tendencies of the feeling-life as set up by Wundt for these designations; neither am I thinking of the literary-philosophical mode of realizing meaning with which Erasminger invested the concept of tension. He meant by it a dynamic principle contained in every subject-conception in literature: that is, the polarity suspended in every Idea. But I am thinking of a product of aesthetic pleasure which appears wherever a stimulating factor is relieved by that which it demands because it is concerned with and intimately dependent on it—that is, wherever a certain course of feeling comes to a satisfying conclusion. One can agree with Christiansen that tension is an aesthetically primitive phenomenon, or at least that it is a basic factor in the construction of aesthetic clusters and in the effective dynamisms immanent in them. Everywhere one finds pairs of qualities which are constructed by the combining of an exciting factor with one of fulfillment. Here belongs measure with its series of accented and unaccented elements; the ascending line of tones of different pitches creates tension, which demands a winding-up and therefore resolution; in harmony, dissonance calls for a “re-solution” (“*Auf-lösung*”) in a consonance, and in every melody, a tension-producing devia-

tion from the tonic is brought to a close by a restful return to it; verse-feet and rhyme-arrangements are further examples. But far higher still (that is, more complex) is the concept of tension as it is realized in the realm of content. Even popular aesthetic terminology calls a drama or a crime-novel "suspenseful" if it arouses breathless expectations as the artfully tied threads of a conflict are unraveled; as a lively curiosity reaches towards what is coming, the issue and the nature of which has remained opaque from the start; and as something in the future occupies us intensely without our being able to imagine what the outcome will be. The exciting anticipation of something to come in the future can make the feeling of oppressive tension particularly apparent, as can also the feeling of unpleasantness in the torment of uncertainty attached to it, that uncertainty whose ending is in some way pleasurable if the initial event does not satisfy us. Tension and its aesthetic value are found in their most powerful form in stage-drama and in the movie; but it is not absent from narrative either. Powerful tensions enter into our motoral system; and the well-developed sense of tension is bound to the feeling of excitement. As R. Hartl indicates, both find "their physiological coordination in motoral arousals, the feeling of excitement in more simple, the feeling of tension in more complex kinds, a difference which reveals itself in phenomenal things too in the differences between the two conscious experiences. The feelings of excitement and tension caused or increased in the enjoyer by events of strife and frustration as presented with intense sympathy in the drama are nothing other than a far more meaningful reinforcement of motoral excitement." According to Büchler, tension has the character of mysterious dilation and pressure; Rath calls it a repressed motion which wants to be set free. According to Meyer, tension grips us whenever something is intrinsically unsatisfactory and unfinished and therefore craves balance and consummation. That which is dissatisfying arouses the feeling of tension which drives forward, and the end and adjustment are welcomed with a feeling of release. The phenomenon of tension occurs in the experience of simple musical forms just as it does in connection with events described in literature. The resolution of something which has become exciting in whatever fashion, the coming to rest of something pressing forward, the lighting up of the obscure and disguised—these are the certain factors which are useful for describing the relation of tension to release. Tension is not a principle of content any more than is the release which of necessity is allied with it; rather, it is a principle of form. By way of this correlative

relation, that which arouses tension is coupled in the closest connection with that which releases it. Resolution is the release of tension. Thus the release includes that which causes tension, just as, inversely, that which causes tension by intimation already includes the possibility of release. The formal beauty of tension and resolution depends on the fusion of the most securely tied unity and on the highest degree of emphasis.

What we are of course examining here is tension as an aesthetic principle and the organization which, having value in the realm of aesthetic matters and artistic objectivity, corresponds to it. Besides tension interpreted more narrowly, there is a cruder kind. This kind of tension is so driving and so one-sided in its attitude towards what is to come that it makes impossible any kind of aesthetic reflection or contemplation requiring long concentration. Yet this does not destroy the force of the idea that justifiable factors of tension can be aesthetic principles; especially since, as Wundt has shown, tension-factors are already included in every apperceptive event.

Correspondence is in the closest coherence with repetition. This term does not mean any mere repetition, but something more special: the return of like or analogous members in the same or in analogous places of the context which has in the meantime been changed or which has in some way been realized differently: here something is added to repetition. In using this term, we have a spatially-temporally neutral technical expression which embraces symmetry and synonymous forms of organization in the realm of time. Thus the rhyming syllables of a poem correspond to one another, but so do certain color-accents and meaning-accents which outbalance one another in a picture. When a poem has the rhyme-arrangement of abc, abc, abc, symmetry is not present, but neither is simple repetition; what is present is correspondence; in the rhyme-order of *terza rima* "*Weisen*" which are related to one another correspond; and certain structural divisions which are related to one another in 4- and 8-measure musical periods correspond. When the second part of a musical motif contrasts with a first one in an approximately contrary motion, people talk about "correspondence in contrary motion" ("*gegenläufige Entsprechung*"). Correspondence makes possible or facilitates the presenting of connections between the different parts of an art-work, and in so doing it furthers comprehension as well as clarity, intelligibility, and forcibility. When we say that certain parts of an art-work are coordinate with one another in terms of anticipation and fulfillment, it is the phe-

nomenon of correspondence in the wider sense which is of concern.

Variation can go to different extents, and the differences and dissimilarities found in variation can therefore be of different degrees. As its maximum is reached, there is contrast. Contrast too is not a matter of absolute difference, however, but something on the same plane as contradictory concepts, which are not juxtaposed in a heterogeneity which lacks coherence (as are those that are merely contraries), but are bound together by certain communities of meaning. With the concept and phenomenon of contrast, we have reached the exact opposite of the repetition of the identical. Contrast is opposition in the same respect, and therefore something more and something essentially other than difference (disparity) as it is customarily thought of. Any two colors at all are merely different, but complementary colors make a complete contrast in relation to the quality of gaiety, in the sense that each realizes the fact of gaiety by a means wholly lacking in the other. In just this way black and white, dark and light, are in complete contrast in terms of luminosity. Contrast is not only one of the most forceful means of bringing multiplicity and change into the aesthetic objectivity produced, but it is an effective element which is absolutely indispensable in another respect too. We know that a grey piece of paper on a blue background appears lighter, but on a white one darker, and that by means of surrounding dark values, the light ones can be considerably intensified in their luminous effect. Impressive illustrations of this fact are to be found in the cellar-light of "*Tenebrosi*" and in Rembrandt's chiaroscuro. This fact, as well as the fact that contrasting colors mutually strive for depth, helps the painter go beyond the deficiencies of his palette, which produces only colors and not the values of light. Only by combining antithetical and opposing tendencies of will is the dramatist able to bring about moving dramatic action. It is only when a contrasting figure who is temperately and practically realistic is put against a romance-hero who is a high-flying idealist that the latter is impressive. Don Quixote and Sancho Panza can be mentioned as a unique and thus as a more extreme example. The comic pair of Pat and Patachon illustrate that the preference for this kind of easily perceptible contrast extends even to the film. Drama too loves such contrasts, just as it generally loves strikingly powerful effects. A person who is of too refined a nature to understand this kind of powerful medium of effect can succeed as a lyricist or as a writer of prose-epic works of genuine feeling, but not as a dramatist. For drama likes the white-

black technique; the leading role is a type developed from out of the nature of the theatrical and of the *mimus*. Natural-born dramatists like Schiller have derived a large share of their most powerful effects from such character-contrasts: Franz and Karl Moor, Luise Miller and Lady Milford, Wallenstein and Max Piccolomini, Countess Imperiali and Leonora are some of the protagonists in a long series of contrasting characters who are appointed by their effects mutually to enhance the natural predispositions of their natures by way of antithesis. Drama also presents contrasts in terms of action: The juxtaposition of "noble" and "belle" passions has been the chief medium of drama since the *tragédie classique*; the sharp contrasting of the antinomical demands of duty and inclination furnishes a large part of the dramatic work in what is tragic. A great number of kinds of contrast is also at the disposal of the musician. Besides dynamic antitheses which extend from *fortissimo assai* to the tenderest *pianissimo*, there are those of the sound-colors of instruments, and also those in the structures of individual themes and motifs; one recalls the opposition between the more heroic-energetic first themes and the more melting and elegiac secondary themes in a sonata-movement: The *Egmont* overture contains this kind of very vigorous contrast. Solo and tutti, sound and silence are further mediums of this kind. Even the opposition between a course of time which is filled acoustically and that which is empty (the pause or rest) is a particularly powerful contrast; Wagner made frequent use of it in the *Flying Dutchman*, the *Ring*, and other places.

According to Sterzinger's good formulation, the pause or rest occurs "through the stopping of a sensuous, an essentially acoustical impression which in some way takes place in time, and it appears only when within a certain, not-too-long period of time our sense-organ is again affected. Thus it is not a nothingness, but the vacancy is psychically filled up by means of a tie which slings itself from the earlier impression to the new one. We know this tie as a characteristic of formal impressions. The rest is quite justly accounted as a motif in music; as a constituent, it helps to create the musical impression."

Contrast is of equal value as a principle in the aesthetics of space and in the aesthetics of time; in all cases it is a matter of the juxtaposition of antithetical contents in perception or idea which arouse or increase attention; by these means the true nature of each of the two members profits as it more effectively and vigorously asserts itself. Because of contrast, the act of comprehension be-

comes more lively and exciting, and intelligibility and the force of the presentation are increased. Without a doubt, contrasting elements become more urgent (intensive) in the sensibility of the apprehender, and this stronger sensation as such can already work in terms of a heightening of pleasure. In addition, according to Sterzinger, contrast adds intelligibility, clarity, and repose, and a certain great vigor besides. The great vigor is the physiological reason for every concomitant phenomenon of the emotional kind which is called up by medium contrasts. For the artist, contrast is a means of pointing to the vital and of decisively revealing the characteristic. Because contrast not only reveals opposition, and stresses it as such (as in antithesis), it is much more also a certain invitation to us to see contrasting parts together and to relate them to one another; it not only separates, but it also unifies.

Fechner was the first to recognize the form-character of contrast. According to him, the opposition between black and white and between red and green has an effect on the eye which cannot be explained as the adding up of effects which black and white and red and green could express by themselves, and in virtue of which opposition, black appears blacker and white whiter as they are contemplated by themselves; but the contrast has the power of a characteristic stimulus with which the mind is occupied in a way that cannot occur in connection with a single stimulus. Experimental psychology and aesthetics too indicate that contrast is a very peculiar experience of a formal relation (an experience which does not coincide with the usual impression of differences). Contrast is not any gradual difference one chooses, but a special case of "otherness" which is also marked by a certain qualitative aspect.

If a person presents his experimental subjects with only two straight lines on white cards and in such a way that the length of the one remains constant but that of the second decreases step by step, most people have many impressions of difference. To begin with, there is the impression simply of difference: the one line is just somewhat shorter than the other. Then by single steps there follows the impression of from large to small differences; thus that of a certain antithesis to which after some shortenings of the changing straightnesses there follows the impression of genuine contrast. Still further shortenings weaken the impression or destroy the force of it.²⁸⁵

By itself contrast is too sterile an effective medium to produce very considerable aesthetic results—with the exception of the comical, which very often is essentially the result of a special kind

of contrast; but as contrast works with the other mediums of aesthetic effect which make up the complex aesthetic object, it produces a good and vigorous result. So, for instance, the proper use of contrasting phenomena gives a picture that clarity and inspiration, that restfully balanced character in connection with a decisive and intelligible formation, which we encounter and cherish in classical paintings. The vagueness and indecision in the colors of much *plein-air* painting, on the other hand, derives from an absence of contrast.

A further objective-formal principle of the effect of beauty is that of intensification. I am using this expression not in the special terminological sense I adopted in my monograph on the phenomenon of intensification (*Steigerung*), but with a broader meaning. And here I really mean by this term simply the fact that the effective medium of an art-work occurring in time is not presented in a uniform order and strength, but that towards the end of the piece it takes on impressiveness and force. Beethoven calls for a substantially strengthened and enlarged orchestra of piccolos, contra bassoons, and trombones in the fourth movements of his 5th, 6th, and 9th Symphonies, and in the 9th Symphony he also asks for solo-voices and a chorus. In an especially rich instructive way his *Choral-Phantasy* illustrates intensification by means of outer apparatuses: at the beginning, the piano is alone, then there is piano plus orchestra, and finally come solo-voices and a chorus in addition. Here, as in several symphonies of Mahler too, absolute music increases its effect through the use of the human voice and the words of the poet. Conversely, many dramatists increase the effect of their final acts and scenes by including music, by ascending into the melodramatic and the operatic. In many of his works, Schiller is an example, as is Wildgans (who achieves his very powerful final intensifications by an ascent into the mystical). In Goethe's *Egmont*, the final effect is intensified by dream-music, and the magnificence of the tragedy is increased by a "victory-symphony." Alongside an extensive intensification, which depends on the enlarging and strengthening of the outer apparatuses, there is an intensive one, in which the motifs take on the significance and the substance of psychic expression. In the operas of the older tradition, the strongest effects did not appear at the beginning because the composer with wise restraint held back his most impressive numbers until later. In the same way, the most effective tones of an aria come at the end only: "If the end is good, the entire thing is good." Skilful intensifications are also vital matters of concern in the drama; thus the ex-

perienced dramatist saves his most powerful scenes until the end and does not shoot all of his powder at the beginning. Whenever an effective first act is attached to a weak fifth—as not infrequently happens in Wildenbruch and Georg Kaiser, who tie a dramatic knot very well but are less skilled at untying it—the interest of the observer is frustrated and the impression remains flat. Even though it is an art of space, architecture follows the principle of intensification, the fact being that the antechambers of a structure do not reveal the entire magnificence of the building but let an intensified effect remain for the chief rooms. The beginning should excite us, win us over, and interest us, but not anticipate and dispose of all points: artistic wisdom is proved as it pays attention to this rule. Every orator who understands his calling will try to arouse the good will and the sympathy of his hearers at the very beginning (*captatio benevolentiae*) and make them curious about what is to follow; he will not show the trumps in his hand prematurely, but will reserve his most powerful arguments, his soundest reasons, his loudest tones, and his most passionate appeal to the end (*amplificatio, peroratio*). Massillon began his funeral-oration for Ludwig XV with the words: "Only God is great, my brethren." A later critic says of this somewhat too full-mouthed start that "The beginning has killed the discourse," just as an introduction destroys the speech to follow if it does not allow the possibility of intensification. Proper manipulation of intensification strengthens the effect and restrains the falling-off which, according to the law of blunting and the weakening of the stimulus, must appear in every person perceiving a longer musical, literary, or oratorical performance. One cannot constantly live in an exalted state; unrelieved intensity of attention is also impossible for a long period. Therefore attention must always be demanded and stimulated anew by means of a proper intensification of the effective medium. It is an artistically prudent precept that one must avoid the risk of a falling-off which inevitably takes place when a person begins with the most powerful, the best, and the most efficacious matters. These do not allow any more intensification because what has already occurred cannot be surpassed. A person who shows several pictures dare not begin with the most valuable one because the weaker and less effective ones will then no longer exercise an effect, as they would have if they had been shown at the beginning. Artistically weaker elements should precede stronger ones, for artistic impression and pleasure grows out of this practice. Inversely, if there is a falling-off, a very marked unpleasantness ensues. The law of intensification requires that in an

art-work stressed for a longer period of time, more powerful means of effect be constantly aroused. In Verdi's *La Forza del Destino*, the entire effect is harmed because nothing which is its equal follows the initial scene, which is hardly capable of being excelled musically or theatrically.

After an effective starting-out, a powerful increasingly intensified continuation must follow. This continuation will of course not ascend with a uniformly growing force, but in the interest of the effect, must introduce occasional retardations, pauses, and blockings, examples of which are found in the lyrical and epic aspects of drama. Intensification of the merely dynamic, the increasing insertion of ever stronger means, is indeed not everything if the inner importance of what is presented, the motif, and so forth do not grow too. Not quite everything is accomplished by the outer apparatus; intensive progressions must accompany the extensive ones. In the largest things and in the smallest ones, intensification reveals itself as a superior powerful principle of effective form. A scale played in a uniform fashion is aesthetically almost irrelevant, whereas a *crescendo* increases its effect considerably. The attributes of a literary work as they follow one another achieve an impression if they take place in the form of a climax (that is, if each succeeding word is stronger, more to the effect, and more powerful in expression than the preceding one).

Sometimes contrast and intensification are brought together in a context. According to Dessoir, aesthetically spatial things generally include that sort of multiplicity which people term contrast because of all of the forms which make things various and diverse, this one has the greatest value for experience; aesthetic events in time favor intensification because the adding of something new to what is given under the maintenance of what has just occurred calls up in the apprehender the most vivid kind of re-echoing. But it is self-evident that there are also contrasts in the time-arts. Here contrast and repetition are able to enter into the service of intensification; the art of composition having so-called repetition-figures (epizeuxis, perissology) furnishes good examples of this possibility.

D. UNITY IN MULTIPLICITY

In all aesthetics, there is no more famous or venerable principle than this one, which has retained its value from the earliest times up to today. It was first formulated in Plato's aesthetics. In the *Philebus* the nature of beautiful objects was seen to lie in symmetry. The criterion (that of the suitable relation of the parts to one another

with respect to a whole) appears a) as unity in multiplicity, b) in terms of its effect, as harmony.²⁸⁶ In a conception which is still valid today, Aristotle declared for this basic principle in which he saw the central law of objects capable of the effect of beauty. Beauty as a whole is the unity in a manifold, a principle allied with completeness as well as with the correct placing of the parts. From this central requirement were derived different others like, say the clarity of the whole, the ability of the whole to be surveyed in relation to its parts. With respect to spatial size and with respect to the temporal dimension (the fable of the drama), the object must be εὐσύνοπτον and εὐμνημόνευτον, respectively; that is: it may not extend beyond what can be held in the memory. But the stipulation of unity in multiplicity can be brought into relation not only with the law of complexity, but also with that of harmony interpreted in its wider sense. This was still in acceptance later, as when Leibniz defined harmony as "*unitas in multitudine*." In these discussions I have presented a narrower meaning of the concept of harmony, but there are a number of reasons which make it possible to think of harmony as a spatially-temporally neutral relation of unity in which, through a unanimous and therefore positively accented cooperation of the parts which suit one another legally and intelligibly, a spatial or temporal totality in form comes to be. If a person conceives of harmony as the agreement of the parts of a whole, as a proper relation of the parts of a totality in form, the phrase "unity in multiplicity" is *de facto* the most characteristic universal assertion which can be made about the structure of this relation.

From this point onward, certain consequences lead directly to the metaphysics of aesthetics, the problems of which cannot be considered as yet, however.* But the principle under discussion continues to be used among those aestheticians who are far removed from the fancy flights of the metaphysical soul. The principle of unity in multiplicity is admissible and elastic enough to serve different points of view. The English empiricist Hutcheson tried to explain it by way of associational psychology, and it underwent a rationalistic coloring in the aesthetics of the German Enlightenment (Baumgarten). Later it appeared in the formal aesthetics of Herbart and Zimmermann, and still later in the work of Fechner, Lipps, Külpe, Ullrich, Theodor A. Meyer, and many others. At one time the attempt was made to grasp it psychologically, and at another to examine it in terms of speculative-philosophical thought-contents,

* See the outline for Volume II at the end of this book. (H.M.S.)

as it was by Lotze,²⁸⁷ who wrote the following statement: "The aesthetic force of unity is the greater as the manifold which it governs appears in its immediate form, not as a plurality of equal instances, but as a majority of characteristically irreducible opposites, and when, for all of this, a series of transformations in intuition realized without conscious reflection make perceptually clear their submission to unity." Most recently, the Danish aesthetician V. Kuhr²⁸⁸ has made a plea for this principle, in which he tends to see the genuine core of the objective organization of beautiful objects, just as the phenomenon so designated must be the control-station of every experience of an aesthetic character.

To be sure, the designation of unity in multiplicity if it is taken by itself is quite general and formal and therefore proves very little; this formula has genuine value only at the moment "when we can say what this 'unity' really makes possible, how in the particular case it comes to be, and by means of what its effect gets precisely its character of 'aesthetic' (in contrast to a unity in multiplicity which is 'intellectually' achieved by way of the concept through thinking)." But Kuhr, despite these qualifications, is also quite ready to recognize the significance of this central principle: This significance lies specifically in the fact that (probably along with other aesthetic principles) it points to a kind of background in material reality. Kuhr believes that as a matter of fact he has found a solution to this self-posed problem; but because it belongs entirely to the realm of the psychology of artistic creation and of the philosophical theory of art, we need not give it any notice here.

More important for us is the fact that authoritative modern aestheticians too acknowledge this principle as a category which satisfactorily explains the peculiarity of aesthetic and artistic effects and as a useful structural formula for their objective presuppositions. If a person does not ask any more of this principle than it is able to fulfill, it can be accepted even today. It is not a magical formula, but only a neat and abstract statement of an elementary fact that aesthetic effect occurs only when the parts of an object which is presented for aesthetic contemplation constitute a perceptual, inwardly necessary, and organic whole, a clear organization, in connection with which an element establishing the unity asserts itself with conviction; a cooperation of necessary parts is clearly in evidence (that is, parts which are intuitively plausible as they exist in terms of one another). The multifarious is related to the communal and the unitary, which is realized in it and by it.

By way of perceptually meaningful unification, the comprehension of the manifold is facilitated and made pleasant. Where the requirement of unity in multiplicity is fulfilled, where the individual parts become sections of a structure seen clearly in its entirety, they do not occur alongside one another in the mode of an aggregate of unconnected events, but are constructed according to law. This principle is acknowledged and employed not only by aestheticians, but just as much by psychologists and humanistic scholars who have the most diverse of aims. Thus Müller-Freienfels derives a series of explanations for musical-aesthetic matters from this principle. According to him, unity in multiplicity is the most fundamental description of "order" (*Ordnung*) by which aesthetically effective form is distinguished. There is an ordered multiplicity in which a rational system of structural lines or a metrical scheme seems to be filled out in a living fashion, in such a way, indeed, that the schema as a principle of organization remains markedly below the threshold. The organizing by means of a rationally clarified pattern creates the unity, whereas the vivid realization of this pattern gives the multiplicity.

Rational psychology and philosophical aesthetics traditionally trace the principle of the unity of the manifold back to a basic requirement of the psyche for unity, to the desire to unify the various, which is a fundamental need of our minds.

"The mind and its physical-mental organs, which are the eye and the ear, are not satisfied if they are not able to combine into a unified whole the multiple which is given them. In complete disunity and disparity the mind is lost. Only where it succeeds in ordering the diverse manifold into a unit does it really feel at home. Only then does it feel itself to be what it should be, a lord over things. It is sheerly the nature of mind to organize separatenesses into a unit." 289

This desire for unity is expressed very clearly in the aesthetic state; nor is it absent from the ethical and intellectual realms. If the mind is to preserve itself and if it is not to drown in an abundance of impressions, perceptions, and occurrences, this abundance must mentally be given a unity and must be mastered through the concept; after that it must succeed in tracing the multiplicity of facts and phenomena back to laws which penetrate the unity. The great number of practical attitudes and reactions to acts must be made a unit by means of the invariants of character which remain the same and in which leading ethically basic principles are manifest. What is to satisfy us aesthetically must be organized into a

unity through a subduing of the various by means of a law of appearance which steps forth convincingly. Only that which has style is artistically valuable, and by style we mean a principle of form penetrating a whole and a stamp of form which remains the same.²⁹⁰ But we have now found the crossing over to value-principles which must not engage us at this point.²⁹¹

Discussing this law, one has shown that the rich, the manifold, and the multifarious is more beautiful than that which is merely plain and all too simple. Forms complexly shaped in the sense that they are organized as unity in multiplicity are more pleasant than confused, amorphous, unorganized, merely multifarious ones because the forms so shaped in all of their abundance and wealth are easily to be comprehended and retained, something which carries great weight in the comprehension of form in the temporal arts; here the Aristotelian concept of *εὐμνημόνευτον* asserts itself again. Wherever an abundance and a multiplicity of characteristics of content is ordered into a unity of form-totalities, what is presented in aesthetic experience meets mastery through comprehension half way, makes this mastery easy and pleasant despite all the intensity of its claim and despite all of the fullness of the result brought about by it. Thus we have found the means of making a transition to the next principle.

E. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE MINIMUM EXPENDITURE OF ENERGY (THE PRINCIPLE OF ECONOMY)

More than once I have said that the principle of unity in multiplicity of necessity requires supplementation by a principle of multiplicity in unity. Unity is satisfactory only when an abundance and variety is organized, brought together, centered, and controlled by it. But the multiplicity which is demanded alongside unity must assert itself in such a way that as it is grasped no greater effort is needed than must be exerted according to the nature of aesthetic things. A person who has to handle subjects from pure physics, higher mathematics, or epistemology can never so present these problems that the layman who does not have basic knowledge will at once understand them. An inevitable difficulty is quite necessarily attached to these subjects. Yet the presentation is economical and therefore pedagogical when it so takes place that a person who is trained and initiated in the subject and who is in command of required scientific assumptions is able to grasp it without a greater effort than is suitable to the nature of the thing. When Schopenhauer approaches

philosophers with the demand that they should say unusual things in plain, familiar words which do not make understanding unnecessarily difficult, he is speaking in terms of the principle of economy which is important in scientific expositions.

The same requirement has validity for art; and the ultimate consequences of this requirement can be discussed only in a section dedicated to principles of value. What makes the numerous works of Mozart, the symphonies of Beethoven, and the works of the mature Goethe so valuable is the fact that their unheard-of depth of content is expressed with relatively simple and modest means. This is not true of Berlioz' and Richard Strauss' work, and surely not of Goethe's *Faust, Part II*, or of Rilke and Stefan George in their later periods; here the language of the forms is often complicated in such a way that a far greater effort of assimilation is necessary if one is to experience the work than is adequate to the depth of the content. Of course we do not ask a symphonic phrase to be as simple and agreeable as the *Andante* of the "*Kettledrum*" *Symphony* or the orchestral accompaniment to an aria or an ensemble of an opera, or that it be presented in so primitive a fashion as that of Donizetti, who treats the orchestra merely like a large guitar. Instead, a work of art can and must have richness, multiplicity, abundance, and depth, and, circumstances permitting, it must be many-fissured and complicated—but always only insofar as the content justifies this.

An act of looking or hearing is pleasant only when it is adequate to the nature of the comprehending organ and when the act of comprehension is realized decisively in its complete development and intensity, but at the same time with a relative absence of difficulty (that is, at least with no greater trouble than suits the content of the object to be grasped). It is valid that the practicing artist be required to strive for a maximum of impression and effect with a minimum exertion of means. From what we have said it will be clear that there is no question of an absolute minimum; the demand for the least effort conceivable in connection with the effective medium and the energy used in comprehension would result in an unbearable impoverishment of substance and form in the aesthetic and artistic realms. The desired minimum is only a relative one; it is relative to the yield. Lack of difficulty in comprehension is not everything; if it were, a popular song would be higher on the scale of value than a song by Hugo Wolf. Nor does the least possible exertion do by itself; if it did, a history which follows the calendar or a carnival-joke written by a dilettante for stage-amateurs would

be rated higher than a *Novelle* by C. F. Meyer or Balzac or than Schiller's *Wallenstein*. Instead, something must be exacted of our comprehension-activity which makes powerful demands upon it; except that these demands must carry a reward.

In the emphasis with which the object enters into consciousness and in the abundance of impressions which we control at once without mental effort and without confusion and lack of clarity, we expect to arrive at a happy awareness of our efficiency. The pleasurable value increases if difficulties must be overcome. Aesthetic comprehension is not a feeble thing; it demands the straining of our powers. A waltz by Strauss falls lightly upon our ears; this undoubtedly means an attractiveness of form; its form is particularly so created that together with the mood-content it embraces, it presses upon us most vigorously and forces upon us not only an easy, but also an intensive contemplation. But a person who can readily absorb a symphony by Beethoven or a tragedy by Shakespeare achieves a far higher pleasure because his powers are challenged quite otherwise."²⁰²

To be sure, a connoisseur feels great admiration when something succeeds in attaining the most vigorous kind of effect with a levy of means which is absolutely as well as relatively minimal. An example is the tragedy called "The Female Devil," which is dramatically welded together as if in iron by Karl Schönherr. Three persons, a single setting: with this minimum of means Schönherr obtains an effect which could hardly be conceived of as being tighter; unfolded before us is a dramatic event of breath-taking tension which does not allow the observer to leave its jurisdiction for a moment. It is just in this way that Mozart in his *E flat Major*, *G Minor (Jupiter)*, and *C Major Symphonies* knew how to bring out of his small orchestra essentially more in the way of tone than many later symphonists can get out of incomparably larger ones.

One can easily draw lines of connection between the principle of economy and the formal principle (already briefly discussed) of clarity and emphasis of formation. In every case, emphatic and clear formation means a saving of power for the apprehender, a making easier of the act of comprehension, an act which must always be realized in an incomparably more painful way in the presence of confused, feeble, and hazy formations. The principle of economy is fulfilled only where an object presents itself in that kind of appearance which shows sensuous agreeableness, clarity, and emphasis, as well as a multiplicity governed by uniformity. The psychic content must have entered wholly into the sensuous or

representational phenomenon so that the apprehender can grasp it easily and surely, and without his having to probe hesitatingly about. Only the psychic content which has truly become form can unequivocally and without the intrusion of disturbing indirect by-ways lead to a regeneration of that psychic experience out of which the artist in his time has created the work. One could mention the first stanza of the evening song of Matthias Claudius or Goethe's deathless "Wanderer's Night-Song" as examples of true economical formation. In both cases the most profound content is effected by inexpressibly simple words. Here in word, image, sound, and rhythm the experience of the mood and peace of the evening has become form as authentically as it has perfectly, and, indeed, the rich and deep experience effected for the deeply moved reader is produced expressively with the neatest and the sparest means conceivable. One cannot with less levy on the linguistic medium describe the peculiar state of mind which emanates from the wood mysteriously standing there in darkness than Claudius has done with the words, "*Der Wald steht schwarz und schweiger*" ("The wood is dark and silent"). Storm's small "Summer-song" made up of six lines of poetry is a truly great work of art because of his method. The cosmic secret of fertility which is operative equally in young women and in nature as it ripens during the summer is deeply and lingeringly opened up to sympathetic experience in a series of image-related symbols with the most meagre and, for this very reason, the most affecting means.

The principle of economy as an important law of aesthetics does not play any less a role in theory.

Emulating some of his precursors, Fechner also was made mindful of it. He set up a "Principle of the Economical Use of the Means (of the Smallest Degree of Force)," and to establish it, he argued thus: the beautiful is always that which also is physiologically right. What is achieved with the least possible expense of muscular power makes an impression of the beautiful, the easy, the unconstrained, the free. Any work of art need employ only such means as are required for the reaching of a goal. Such a realization of the principle of the smallest amount of power is aesthetically satisfying too. Later, biological-sensualistic aesthetics used this principle excessively. Thus Müller-Freienfels in his earlier work derived all aesthetic agreeableness from it. He traces the effect of pleasure caused by what is aesthetically valuable to the dexterity of the brain's activity, and also to the slickness and effortlessness with

which the activity of comprehension of the peripheral organs of sense prove successful. Objective presuppositions for this are forms which are created according to the principle of the minimum amount of energy; and, as a matter of fact, almost all of our artistic forms have a tendency "to bring about the richest possible content with a minimum of expense of energy."

Müller-Freienfels derives from William James and anglo-saxon psychology. There he found models also for the trains of thought he placed at the center of his psychology of art. Therefore, Stratton²⁹³ derives the aesthetic agreeability of "graceful lines" from an "economy of attention"; similar trains of thought are to be found in Vernon Lee²⁹⁴ and E. Landmann-Kalischer.²⁹⁵ The last employs the principle of economy in matters psychological and defines the process of aesthetic contemplation in its terms, so that a minimum of given stimuli produces a maximum of the reproduced representations by means of which we interpret the object.

F. AESTHETIC PRINCIPLES AND LAWS AMONG VARIOUS AESTHETICIANS

Not a little of what has been ascertained by authoritative critics about the principles of the objective organization of aesthetic structures has entered into our systematic presentation and has helped determine it. To round off our discussion and conclude it, I shall cite statements about this subject as they come from individual professional researchers who have organized them systematically.

In his *Introduction to Aesthetics* (*Vorschule der Ästhetik*), which is as ingenious and original as it is unsystematic, Theodor Fechner has had the ambition in the greatest possible abundance and with completeness to set up principles and laws of the objective organization of things which are aesthetically effective. It was a programmatic matter with Fechner to admit to a pluralism of aesthetic laws which he enumerated in superabundance and without trying to unify them or reduce them to certain central principles. Qualitative laws were differentiated from quantitative ones, primary from secondary ones, those of content from those of form. The most important of his aesthetic laws or principles of pleasure are the six laws enumerated in the first part, after which still another series follows in the second part, all of which could be spoken of as derived (in Kant's terms) in a "grabbed" ("*aufgegrast*") fashion, and not according to a system. What he gives us are essentially laws of aesthetic objectivity, although he places the greatest value on

the psychologizing comprehension and presentation of them and claims that with them he has erected principles of the psychological type, laws of aesthetic experience and behavior.

The first is the "Principle of the Aesthetic Threshold." If something given is to achieve aesthetic effect, the strength of the influence emanating from it must cross over a certain threshold. Colors which are too weak and tones which are too soft do not produce a feeling-effect. But besides the outer threshold, the inner one too must be stepped over: Our susceptibility must not be too indifferent and our attention not diverted. The second law is the "Principle of Aesthetic Assistance or Intensification." A poem read in a strange language which we do not know gives us a total impression made up of meter, rhythm, word-sound, and rhyme; and yet the agreeableness is limited. On the other hand, the most beautiful poem loses all charm if its meaning is given us only in a prose translation. But as both factors of agreeableness (sound and sense) support one another a pleasant result takes place which is incomparably great as compared with the aesthetic effect of the individual factors. The same is true when a person plays the tones of a melody unrhythmically and, on the other hand, claps the rhythm without the melody. From this there comes the following principle: there is a far greater pleasure-resultant in the uncontradictory coinciding of pleasant conditions which accomplish little individually than there is in the pleasure-value of the two conditions as they occur separately; there is a greater result than could be explained as the sum of individual effects; indeed, only through this kind of coming-together can a positive pleasure be obtained and can the threshold of pleasure be crossed over when the separate factors are too weak to produce this result. In the third spot is the "Principle of the Binding of the Manifold into a Unity." According to his inherited capacity, a person, if he is to feel contented as he is occupied with things, requires a certain change in activity or impression; otherwise the object would create the unpleasant impression of bleakness and monotony. On the other hand, a person by reason of equally inborn natural tendencies wants to connect individual factors into a unit; otherwise the object creates the unpleasant impression of dispersion, violent disruption, and even of disagreement. If one is to find pleasure in being receptively occupied with an object, he must find a unitarily connected manifold there. A building which has planless and arbitrarily changing shapes and figures affects us unpleasantly. But if, despite all the multiplicity of forms, we see that a law of composition is carried out in it logically, we are pleased by the unity in

variety. Therefore unity in multiplicity is pleasant, in contrast with which monotony and planless change are unpleasant. A fourth law is the "Principle of Lack of Contradiction, of Unanimity, or of Truthfulness." When the same thing is perceived on several different occasions and if it then arouses different groups of images in us, pleasure takes place as we perceive the absence of contradiction in this thing; but a lack of pleasure occurs as contradiction comes to mind. Here one must distinguish between outer and inner truth. An angel with wings does not occur in actuality. But we assume that a painted angel must be, not a copy of a true one, but only the symbolical representation of the celestial messenger of God, and thus that the wings are absolutely compatible. But they must be so formed that they appear fit for flying, for otherwise the image aroused as they are intuited would contradict the image by which they are determined. We can find pleasure in reading a novel even though we know that its persons and their destinies are completely fabricated; we know that the author was not concerned with presenting a concrete reality. But the novel must not contain real or psychological impossibilities or improbabilities which clash with the conditions of everyday existences, the awareness of which accompanies our reading as a requirement. Here it is not an outer, but merely an inner truth which is demanded. The fifth law—which is at the same time the supreme principle of form—is the "Principle of Clarity." It intersects with the preceding one and really only means that what matters as concerns the principles mentioned up to now is that what they demand reach consciousness in full lucidity. About the sixth of Fechner's laws, the "Principle of Aesthetic Association," enough has already been said.

Later he sets up a second series of aesthetic principles which begin with the "Principle of Aesthetic Contrast." If different sense-stimuli influence us in such a context that their difference really as such enters our consciousness, the effect can be explained not as the sum of individual parts, but as one which transcends and modifies the individual ones. That which gives pleasure will be the more pleasant as it is in greater contrast with the less pleasant. Connoisseurs frequently enjoy imperfect works of art because they are able to put them alongside still more imperfect works of early times. There follows the "Principle of Aesthetic Succession." As there is a tendency to advance from a lesser to a greater pleasure, the total resultant of pleasure is more considerable than if a person begins with the more powerful pleasure. With this there is allied the "Principle of Aesthetic Reconciliation." A very unpleasant stimulus

can be compensated for by a weak pleasant stimulus which follows because of the secondary pleasure of the succession. Aesthetic reconciliation occurs where an occasion of displeasure is compensated for by an occasion of pleasure in the aesthetic effect which follows it. Sources of unpleasantness must therefore be so arranged in relation to sources of pleasure that the principle of aesthetic reconciliation comes to the fore. Examples are all resolutions of dissonant chords by way of a consonant one or, in modern modes of expression, the happy-ending conclusion of films in which a sympathetic hero reaches a fortunate end following unfortunate incidents. The next principle, that of "Summation," insists upon the following: every stimulus requires a certain duration of its influence if its effect is really to be felt; the effect of the stimulus must add itself up only to a certain limit to cross over the threshold, and one's receptivity must be disposed to take it up. In connection with a stimulus which remains continually the same the impression increases up to a certain limit. A further principle is that of "Practice" ("*Übung*"). Continuing or repeated attention to finer modifications or to higher relations in a given sphere facilitates the proper comprehension of them. The principles which follow are mentioned only briefly, partly because they do not require more detailed comment, partly because they enter too far into the realm of psychology. Here belong: the "Principle of Blunting, Familiarity, and Over-Satiation"; the "Principle of Persistency in Mode of Occupation (*Beschäftigung*)"; the "Principle of the Degree or of the Variation in the Degree of Occupation"; the "Principle of the Expression of Pleasure and Displeasure"; the "Principle of Pleasure and Displeasure in Secondary Representation"; the "Principle of the Economical Use of the Means" (the minimum of energy); the "Principle of the Tendency towards Stability." Only the "Principle of the Aesthetic Mean" still requires brief mention: If an object succumbs for our intuition to accidental changes in size or form, then under conditions otherwise the same it is the median value which seems to be aesthetically preferred. The mean form appears to be the normal form.

Theodor Lipps, who likewise lists a great number of aesthetic principles, recognizes a central principle in the aesthetics of content which one might call the plenitude of life which makes empathy possible. Aesthetic effect of the positive sort takes place wherever a rich, complete life in a way which is unrestricted and without defects or falling-off meets us, a life which invites us to a complete, easily successful empathy of our own inner situation and therefore gives us occasion for an objectivized self-enjoyment. Consequently,

beauty is identified with active participation in life in general. The object which receives our positive aesthetic evaluation is "each life and each potentiality of life . . . insofar as this life is a real (that is, a positive) one." The basis of all aesthetic pleasure lies in the impression of life which is in the object; ugliness in its ultimate nature is the negation of life. Accordingly, the sense of beauty seems to Lipps to be a pleasurable sensation in the power, in the inner unanimity, and in the freedom in life-participation, or a pleasurable sensation which one has in the unconfined enjoying of one's own life to the full. The sense of ugliness is identical with the feeling of displeasure in what is poor or weak, in the inner contrariness of life-participations, in the living of one's life in a stunted fashion. "In pure aesthetic contemplation . . . that in which I feel an affirmation of life I call beautiful. That in which . . . I experience a denial of life I call ugly. The sense of beauty and of ugliness is nothing other than the sense of the objectivized life: that is, of the affirmation of life or the denial of it felt in the object." Aesthetic enjoyment thus reveals itself as a pleasure in the accord between the life of the object which presses into me and my own desire for participation in life or my yearning for it.

This central principle of aesthetic content is then supplemented by three laws of aesthetic form which go as follows: 1. The Law of Uniformity; 2. The Law of Unity in Multiplicity; and 3. The Principle of Monarchical Subordination. The first can be explained thus: in the constitution of the psyche, which is a unity, lies the tendency to bind every manifold into a unit or to link it together into a single act of comprehension. An aesthetically pleasurable sensation takes place when a manifold of itself coincides with this tendency, when as a consequence of its own nature it invites me to the concentration into a whole or into a unity, and when an object exhibits a qualitative uniformity (that is, when it is so created and organized that it therefore "meets the urgency that exists in me at all times to lock into a uniform whole a manifold given in simultaneity or in direct succession"). The second law limits the first by an opposite statement: We are delighted not only by uniformity, but also by difference and variety. It is in the nature of the psyche to act not only as a unit, but also as a diversity; but yet it is a unity which is divided into members, one which differentiates itself into its affects. The apprehension natural to the psyche is not merely that of the unitary, but also that of the articulated or the differentiated, and thus it includes perfect unity and clear particularity. When does a given multiplicity suit this mode of comprehension which is natural to

the psyche? When it satisfies a three-fold requirement: 1. it must offer itself according to its own nature to the free apperception of unity; 2. it must, according to its own nature, ask for a clear separation; 3. it must make both of these into one (that is, what offers itself to the apperception of unity must at the same time contain within itself an invitation to clear separation). "The manifold satisfies this three-pronged requirement not when it is any unified manifold at all, but when it is an intrinsically organized qualitative unity or a qualitative identity." The nature of all aesthetic unity in multiplicity lies in an inner agreement of the manifold which is at the same time divided, in an accord of what moves apart. Inversely, there is no aesthetic entirety when the activity of comprehension is required to concentrate into a unity a manifold which nevertheless is not intrinsically a unity. Aesthetic unity in multiplicity is the aesthetic harmony of differences. This harmony is pleasant; for it is accompanied by a feeling of something fitting together, of a qualitative or inward belonging together. The state of affairs defined by the first two laws corresponds to the tendency lying in the constitution of the psyche to apperceive unitarily or to grasp a multiplicity as a qualitative whole, and at the same time in this unity-apperception or in this one act of perception immediately to arrange several apperceptive acts of the particulars in such a manner that the one act of apperception in clinging tightly to its unity arranges itself in a multiplicity of acts of apperception. But it goes even further.

In the constitution of the psyche lies a tendency to subordinate the manifold, not only under something held in common in the manifold, but at the same time to subordinate that which is unified through such a subordination under an element or a part of the manifold. Lipps calls this subordination "monarchical" (and thus we have given the last of his laws of form). If we see a rectangle, we experience a differentiation as compared with a square, a differentiation which works pleasantly only if it is definite. A great difference in size may not be present and may not at the same time seem to be present. The rectangle must not suggest something approximating a square. The extension in the one direction must outweigh the other decisively. This subordination is not the kind which is under something held in common in a manifold or under a unitary whole, but under a factor placed alongside it within a totality, under something coordinated with it as regards its relation to the whole.

Another prominent adherent of psychological aesthetics, Oswald Külpe, also sets up a plurality of aesthetic principles, by which he

means the ultimate inclusive stipulations valid for all complex aesthetic impressions under the assumption of an ideal aesthetic attitude. He enumerates six such principles: The first is the Unity and Blending of Interest. The mind is aesthetically agitated only when the impression grips and interests us. For this it is necessary that the aesthetic objects create a unitary whole. With each aesthetic impression a demand must be raised that the interest which we take in it must itself be of a unitary nature and that the particularly separate interests which can be distinguished in a complex whole are in a structural blending with it. The unity of interest is possible not only where an impression alone is present, as in simple spatial forms, but also where a majority of impressions make up a total impression of simultaneity or succession, as in a landscape or a poem. If unity of interest is to be possible, the impression must be a totality complete in itself; it must lift itself out of its surroundings, and the individual parts must cohere inwardly with one another as with their surroundings. The unity of interest would never be present if subordination and a superior organization did not make possible the attentive grasping of the whole. Were the component parts of the complex entirely independent of one another, the interest would fall apart. For this reason the blending of interests must be seen as an aesthetically effective form of the attentive state. The blending makes inevitable the subordination of all coexisting interests to a chief interest; otherwise we would have to do only with a mere coexistence or a mere succession. Thus within the aesthetic object a component which is isolatable in attention must be the most stressed center of interest. For only in this way is a total impression made up of parts achieved. In art there are many means of helping us to distribute our attention freely on the impressions which arouse the blended interests. Külpe's predominantly psychological discussion now crosses over to an objective structural-theoretical analysis of aesthetic-artistic objectivity.

Placed second is the "Principle of Coherence." The inner relationship which governs the whole of an aesthetic impression is a coherence of its parts among themselves and with the whole. Within the direct factor this coherence has the qualities of similarity, neighborliness, and regularity; it is the outer coherence. Within the relative factor it is the existence of an inner relationship of images and thoughts, of empathized situations and faculties, to one another, an inner coherence. Within sympathy and participation it is a self-evident legality and the setting off of the course of events, a coherence of state or condition. Within the whole it is a mutuality of

condition and a complementing of all factors by one another, a total coherence. Marked infractions of this rule are offensive. Even here, then, there is an objective turn to this principle: regularity and symmetry as well as other means of producing a coherence in perception are discussed in detail.

Mentioned in third place is the "Principle of Clarity." It purports that the aesthetic effect is increased if the factors employed are given in full clarity. The mediums of contrast and repetition (of motifs) serve to increase the impression of clarity.

Fourth follows the "Principle of Plenitude [*Fülle*] and Depth." By the plenitude of an aesthetic impression one means, to begin with, the state of completeness and being set off which enhances the pleasant effect of homogeneity; then one speaks of it in terms of a multiple wealth by which the interest is very much more powerfully chained. One attributes depth to the object when it is adapted to exciting an aesthetic experience which is intensive, lasting, and fully realized empathically and sympathetically. Here too psychological discussion directly runs into a thorough-going objective artistic-aesthetic analysis of the means employed for the achieving of the effects mentioned.

The fifth law is the "Principle of Simplicity and Naturalness." According to Külpe, the plain formation which achieves profound effects with few means is preferred to artificial ones. Work growing freely and coming into existence freely is superior to work that is deliberately made. Therefore simplicity is still not a matter of poverty; it only means that the *lex parsimoniae* is operative. The requirement of naturalness does not mean that a slavish copy must be made of everyday grey reality. Rather, it means that the aesthetic impression and also what stems from the imagination must seem as if it were a blooming, rich reality, not a fiction, not a confused thing of fancy.

As the sixth and final rule Külpe mentions the "Principle of the Balancing of Value." This is not meant to be either a psychological-descriptive principle of the structure of the process of aesthetic experience or an objective-ontocentric one of aesthetic objectivity; but it is an axiological principle, a value-principle, such as is not under discussion here.

Ziehen names four intrinsic aspects of aesthetic things: 1. Perceptibility; 2. Recurrence; 3. Variation; 4. Complexity. To them belongs a great part of the aesthetic effect of an object, which nevertheless in Ziehen's view is not entirely explained by them.

We shall now conclude our examination of the attempts made in

professional writing to produce categorical aesthetic principles. It makes little sense to pursue them in a greater number of works because what would be achieved if we did so is evident in these few, but deliberately selected examples. What we have principally accomplished in the first place is not so much a confirmation of the principles we have worked out as, instead, a justification of the methodological procedure by means of which I have tried to avoid certain defects in the methods followed by other aestheticians.

In this chapter on aesthetic objectivity I have presented certain principles and suppressed the psychological constituents, and this has been justified by the procedure of the aestheticians I have named. These aestheticians, who are essentially psychological researchers, have tried to ascertain and formulate categorical laws of the aesthetic situation and attitude, but in so doing have constantly slid into objective definitions or have been unable to get around objective turns of expression and supplements which then brought out what was really fundamental. We have deliberately singled out leading psychological aestheticians, especially the father of modern psychological and experimental aesthetics, so that we could show by their procedure and its consequences that even their principles, which in the first instance were intended as experiential and psychological ones, could not help leading us step by step towards objective inferences and determinations. As a matter of fact, these principles belong to the sphere of ultimate categorical assertions as concerns aesthetic objectivity because they are attempts to answer the question of what objective endowment, what constitutional characteristics and structural traits, an object must have if it is to work in an aesthetically pleasant fashion. Naturally, experience belongs to these principles too, and they have their correspondences in the realm of the structure of situations and attitude; nevertheless, these principles, which, concentrated into a system, give a complete structural definition of aesthetic objectivity, are far better understood and presented in their objective formulation than in their psychological one. But in any case, they show that it is impossible to remain with determinations and definitions which are purely subjective-conditional and psychological-functional.

Acknowledging this methodologically basic principle, we have vigorously demanded and also accomplished a victory over the on-sidednesses of aesthetic subjectivism and psychologism; the means have been an inclusive theory of aesthetic matters which is an interpenetration of the subjective-psychological and the objective-ontocentric factors in the form of a higher synthesis, recently shown

as being necessary. The theory here presented tries to pursue neither a comfortable middle way which carries no obligations, nor a balanced kind of compromise, but adheres to the higher position on the basis of which one-sidedly placed questions of their own accord come to nothing as being intrinsically senseless and impossible; this theory follows a trend which has been frequently mentioned and which is immanent to the development of modern aesthetics. For instance, J. Volkelt thinks he is obliged to supplement the psychological formulation of the ultimate and fundamental laws governing the aesthetic realm with an objective grasp of the same categorical circumstances; and C. Siegel,²⁹⁶ in his program of an "aesthetic as the analytical-synthetic philosophy of art," in conjunction with A. Riehl²⁹⁷ tries to complete the psychological description of aesthetic enjoyment with an "objectively directed" aesthetic.

And it will further have become clear that such a mode of looking at principles takes on clarity if one determines to take seriously efforts which are indicated in implied and hazy fashion by the persons named: namely, the procedure of clearly separating aesthetic principles of content and those of form, a separation which (in Fechner, for example) is often made but not clearly carried out because the components of the two groups run pretty confusedly through one another. In the method of Külpe it becomes conclusively evident that these principles really cannot be treated by way of pure description, be it of the psychological-subjective or of the ontocentric-objective type, because all together they have an axiological-normative correlate and therefore can be dispatched completely only in the sphere of the requirements (norms) of aesthetic value. In their section, they will have to be spoken of again.*

* See the prospectus for Volume II, below. (H.M.S.)

THE OUTLOOK

Thus end our lectures of introduction to aesthetics. As will have become clear from the plan and execution of the whole, the task here has not been to bring together all of the materials and subjects of this science in the manner of an outline or to explain it in the manner of a compendium, but to convey the thinking related to this realm of fact and to solve the problems contained here. I did this by presenting some central subjects in a loose fashion and by discussing them thoroughly as I produced numerous examples. I have often repeated material and used illustrative paraphrases, and indeed I did so from the beginning on so that even the people studying individual sciences of concrete arts (historians of music, art, and literature) could derive something for their disciplines from these pages. But central as were the problems treated in the lectures now ending, they do not make up aesthetics as a whole. To round off this "Introduction" into a "system" of aesthetics and to complete it, one finds it necessary to give precise and detailed treatment to the following group of problems which for reasons of a preliminary survey were occasionally alluded to:

- I The Realms in which the Aesthetic is Realized: the Aesthetics of Nature, Civilization, and Art.
- II General Theory of Aesthetic Evolution (Genetic Aesthetics): the Aesthetic *a priori*; Aesthetic Education.
- III The Autonomy of Aesthetic Objects.
- IV The Theory of Aesthetic Types (Differential Aesthetics).
- V Aesthetic Norms.
- VI Aesthetically Basic Forms (Modifications of Aesthetic Objects): Beauty in the Narrower Sense; the Graceful; the Characteristic; the Sublime; the Tragic; the Comic; Humor.
- VII The Metaphysics of Aesthetics: The Question of Ultimate Meaning.

All of these objects of interest and all of these questions will be presented in a separate course of lectures.

NOTES

KEY TO PERIODICALS

ZÄAK	<i>Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft</i>
JPPF	<i>Jahrbuch für philosophische und phänomenologische Forschung</i>
KS	<i>Kunststudien</i>
KÄB	<i>Kongress für Ästhetik Bericht</i>
ZP	<i>Zeitschrift für Psychologie</i>
KEP	<i>Kongress für experimentelle Psychologie</i>
ZAP	<i>Zeitschrift für angewandte Psychologie</i>

ONE

1. As examples one might pick at random: Theodor Lipps, *Grundlegung der Ästhetik*, 3rd ed., 1924; Max Diez, *Allgemeine Ästhetik*, 1912; Albert Stöckl, *Lehrbuch der Ästhetik*, 3rd ed., 1889; Theodore A. Meyer, *Ästhetik*, 2nd ed., 1925.
2. For example, in Max Dessoir, *Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, 2nd ed., 1923.
3. O. Külpe, *Grundlagen der Ästhetik*, 1921.
4. See the altercation with Karl Marbe in my *Personalistische Ästhetik*, 1932.
5. Theodor Ziehen, *Vorlesungen über Ästhetik*, Vol. I, 1925. Richard Walschek (*Psychologie und Pathologie der Vorstellung*, 1905) also would like to make aesthetics into a natural science of the artistic creativity and enjoyment of human beings. H. Bahr, A. Mayer, and others follow the same view.
6. Similarly, M. Beck, "Die neue Problemlage der Ästhetik," ZÄAK, XXIII (1929).
7. Gustav Theodor Fechner, *Vorschule der Ästhetik*, 1876, and *Zur experimentalen Ästhetik*, 1871.
8. Külpe, *op. cit.*
9. Friedrich Schiller, *Vorlesungen über Ästhetik, Sämtliche Werke, Säkularausgabe*, XII, p. 351; also, *Kalliasbriefen*, ed. Jonas, III, p. 232.
10. T. A. Meyer, *op. cit.*

11. See the discussion about art between Socrates and Polycrates which Xenophon reported in his reminiscences of Socrates. Also, Emil Utitz, *Ästhetik (Quellenhandbücher der Philosophie)*, 1923.
12. Rudolf Odebrecht, *Grundlegung der ästhetischen Werttheorie*, Vol. I, 1927, and *Form und Geist: Der Aufstieg des dialektischen Gedankens in Kants Ästhetik*, 1930.
13. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*.
14. Dagobert Frey, "Das Kunstwerk als Willensproblem," IV KÄB, 1931.
15. Max Dessoir, *op. cit.*, and *Beiträge zur allgemeinen Kunstwissenschaft*, 1929; Emil Utitz, *Grundlegung der allgemeinen Kunstwissenschaft*, 1914 and following.
16. K. Heinrich von Stein, *Vorlesungen über Ästhetik*, 1897; Wilhelm Jerusalem, *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 9th and 10th eds., 1923; and also Kaarle S. Laurila, "Die emotionalistische Ästhetik," ZÄAK, XXXII (1938).
17. Robert Eisler, *Studien zur Werttheorie*, 1902.
18. Wallaschek, *op. cit.*
19. Fechner, *Vorschule*.
20. Anton Marty, *Was ist Philosophie?*, 1897.
21. Cf. Anton Marty, *Psyche und Sprachstruktur*, n.d. [1940], p. 11.
22. Alois Höfler, *Grundlehren der Logik*, 6th ed., 1919.
23. Moritz Geiger, "Ästhetik," *Die Kultur der Gegenwart: Systematische Philosophie*, 3rd ed., 1921.
24. Jean Paul, *Vorschule der Ästhetik*, 1805.
25. Oskar Katann, *Ästhetisch-literarische Arbeiten*, 1918.
26. Geiger, "Beiträge zur Phänomenologie des ästhetischen Genusses," JPFF (1913).
27. Hermann Cohen, *Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls*, 1912.
28. One might mention as an example his statements about the idea of the beautiful in the *Symposium*.
29. Observations about the nature of beauty are to be found in Plotinus' First *Ennead* (Book 6) and the Fifth *Ennead* (Book 8).
30. F. W. Schelling, "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Kunst" (first published in the collection of his posthumous works).
31. G. F. W. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über Ästhetik*.
32. Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. I, secs. 34-52, Vol. II, Chs. 29-39.
33. Katann, "Grundgedanken einer neuscholastischen Theorie des Schönen," *op. cit.*, pp. 14 ff (see note 25 above).
34. H. Glockner, "Philosophie und Ästhetik," ZÄAK, XX (1926).
35. Paul Häberlin, *Allgemeine Ästhetik*, 1929.
36. Johannes Volkelt, *System der Ästhetik*, Vol. III, 1914.
37. Ziehen, *op. cit.*, Vol. II.
38. P. Natorp, "Kant und die Marburger Schule," KS, XVII (1912).
39. Lenore Kühn, "Das Problem der ästhetischen Autonomie," ZÄAK, IV (1910).
40. Jonas Cohn, *Allgemeine Ästhetik*, 1901.
41. Ernst Meumann, *Einführung in die Ästhetik der Gegenwart*, 4th ed., 1930.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
43. F. Kreis, "Über die Möglichkeit einer Ästhetik vom Standpunkt der Wertphilosophie," II KÄB, 1925.

44. Geiger, "Phänomenologische Ästhetik," II KÄB, 1925.
45. E. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, 1900, and *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, Vol. I, 1913.
46. F. Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, 1874.
47. B. Bolzano, *Wissenschaftslehre*, 1837.
48. W. Ziegenfuss, *Die phänomenologische Ästhetik*, 1928.
49. As an example one could mention Waldemar Conrad, "Der ästhetische Gegenstand," ZÄAK (1909).
50. For this entire section: Paul Moos, *Die deutsche Ästhetik der Gegenwart*, Vol. I, and *Die psychologische Ästhetik*, n.d.
51. Külpe, *op. cit.*
52. Lipps, *Ästhetik*, 1903 ff.: Vol. I, 3rd ed., 1923; Vol. II, 2nd ed., 1920.
53. K. Bühler, *Die Krise der Psychologie*, 2nd ed., 1929.
54. R. Baerwald, "Die Methode der vereinigten Selbstwahrnehmung," ZP, XLVI.
55. With this separation of types, which will often play a role, compare Richard Müller-Freienfels, *Psychologie der Kunst*, 2nd ed., 1923.
56. For a first introduction to the method of experimental aesthetics see G. T. Fechner, *Zur experimentalen Ästhetik*, 1871; Meumann, *op. cit.*; and O. Külpe, "Über den gegenwärtigen Stand der experimentellen Ästhetik," II KEP, 1907.
57. A. Zeising, *Neue Lehre von den Proportionen des menschlichen Körpers*, 1854; *Ästhetische Forschungen*, 1855; *Der goldene Schnitt*, 1864.
58. Ziehen, *op. cit.*, Vol. I.
59. *Op. cit.*
60. Wilhelm Wundt, *Grundriss der Psychologie*, 15th ed., 1922; also *Völkerpsychologie*, Vol. I, Pt. I (Introduction).
61. Dessoir, "Objektivismus in der Ästhetik," ZÄAK, V (1910) or *Beiträge zur allgemeinen Kunstwissenschaft*, 1929.
62. Konrad Fiedler, *Schriften über Kunst*, Vol. I, 1913; also H. Konnerth, *Die Kunsttheorie Konrad Fiedlers*, 1909.
63. Hugo Spitzer, *H. Hettners kunstphilosophische Ansätze und Literaturästhetik*, Vol. I, 1903.
64. Besides Utitz' *Grundlegung*, mentioned above, one must mention "Ästhetik und Philosophie der Kunst," *Lehrbuch der Philosophie*, ed. by Max Dessoir (*Die Philosophie in ihren Einzelgebieten*), 1925.
65. Ernst Grosse, *Die Anfänge der Kunst*, 1895.
66. Yrjö Hirn, *Der Ursprung der Kunst*, 1904, the original being in English.
67. Carl Stumpf, *Die Anfänge der Musik*, 1911.
68. R. Wallaschek, *Die Anfänge der Tonkunst*, 1903.
69. M. Hoernes, *Urgeschichte der bildenden Kunst in Europa von den Anfängen bis 500 vor Christus*, 2nd ed., 1915, and "Die Anfänge der bildenden Kunst," I KÄB, 1914.
70. O. Menghin, *Weltgeschichte der Steinzeit*, 1931.
71. M. Verworn, *Zur Psychologie der primitiven Kunst*, 1908; *Die Anfänge der Kunst*, 1909, and *Ideoplastische Kunst*, 1914.
72. K. Weule, *Die Kultur der Kulturlosen*, 2nd ed., 1908.
73. A. Vierkandt, "Prinzipienfragen der ethnologischen Kunstforschung," II KÄB, 1925.
74. This thesis was followed with especial vigor by E. Grosse.
75. Wundt, *Völkerpsychologie*, Vol. III: *Die Kunst*, 3rd ed., 1912.

76. J. M. Guyau, *Die Kunst als soziologisches Problem*, 1911 (German translation); *Les problèmes de l'esthétique contemporaine*, 6th ed., 1904.
77. H. Taine, *Philosophie de l'art*, 5th ed., 1890.
78. Willy Hellpach, *Einführung in die Völkerpsychologie*, 2nd ed., 1944.
79. Hans Weinert, *Der geistige Aufstieg der Menschheit*, 1940.
80. Hugo Dingler, *Von der Tierseele zur Menschenseele*, 1941.
81. Herbert Spencer, *System of Synthetic Philosophy*, 1862-1896.
82. Primarily in the books: *Die Spiele der Tiere*, 2nd ed., 1907, and *Die Spiele der Menschen*, 1899. One might mention also Karl Groos, *Der ästhetische Genuss*, 1902.
83. Wilhelm Jerusalem, *Wege und Ziele der Ästhetik* (included also in *Einleitung in die Philosophie*).
84. Grant Allen, *Physiological Aesthetics*, 1896.
85. Karl Lange, *Sinnesgenüsse und Kunstgenuss*, 1905.
86. G. Hirth, *Das plastische Sehen als Rindenzwang*, 1892, and *Aufgaben der Kunstphysiologie*, 1891.
87. Richard Avenarius Carstenjen, *Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, 1896.
88. Hubert Rohrer, *Die Vorgänge im Gehirn und das geistige Leben*, 1939, and *Die elektrischen Vorgänge im menschlichen Gehirn*, 1942.
89. H. Berger, "Das Elektrenkephalogramm des Menschen," *ZP*, CXXVI (1932).
90. Gottfried Semper, *Der Stil in den technischen und tektonischen Künsten*, 1860-1863.
91. Hans Cornelius, *Elementargesetze der bildenden Kunst*, 1910.
92. Adolf von Hildebrand, *Das Problem der Form in der bildenden Kunst*, 1910.
93. Heinrich Wölfflin, *Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, 1915.
94. A. G. Baumgarten, *Aesthetica*, 1750-1758.
95. Edmund Burke, *Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful*, 1757.
96. Henry Home, Lord Kames, *Elements of Criticism*, 1762-1765.
97. Francis Hutcheson, *Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*, 1725.
98. Thomas Reid, *Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind*, 1803.
99. Dugald Stewart, *Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers*, 1828.
100. F. E. D. Schleiermacher, *Vorlesungen über Ästhetik*, ed. by Lommatsch, 1842.
101. K. W. F. Solger, *Erwin: Vier Gespräche über das Schöne und die Kunst*, 1815, and *Vorlesungen über Ästhetik*, 1819.
102. J. H. von Kirchmann, *Ästhetik auf realistischer Grundlage*, 1866.
103. As a characteristic example one might mention Lia J. Siweltschinskaja, *Opyt marksistikoj kritiki estetiki Kanta*, 1927.
104. Dessoir, "Skepizismus in der Ästhetik," *ZÄAK*, II (1907) and *Beiträge*, already mentioned, 1929.
105. Albert Görland, *Ästhetik*, 1937.
106. Hans Vaihinger, *Die Philosophie des Als-Ob*, 1911.
107. Konrad Lange, *Das Wesen der Kunst*, 2nd ed., 1907.
108. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 1927.
109. Hermann Pongs, *Das Bild in der Dichtung*, Vol. II, 1939.
110. Horst Oppel, *Die Literaturwissenschaft in der Gegenwart*, 1939.

111. Richard Müller-Freienfels, besides his *Psychologie der Kunst* and his *Psychologie der Künste* (in Kafka's *Handbuch der vergleichenden Psychologie*), which supplements the former, also wrote a small "Poetik," 2nd ed., 1921.
112. Friedrich Kainz, *Personalistische Ästhetik*, 1932.
113. Karl Groos, *Einleitung in die Ästhetik*, 1892, and *Der ästhetische Genuss*, 1902.
114. Friedrich Theodor Vischer, *Ästhetik*, 1847-1858, and *Das Schöne und die Kunst: Vorträge*, ed. by R. Vischer, 1898.
115. Johann Friedrich Herbart, *Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 1813, and *Kurze Enzyklopädie der Philosophie*, 1831.
116. Robert Zimmermann, *Allgemeine Ästhetik als Formwissenschaft*, 1865.
117. Paul Moos, *Die moderne Musikästhetik in Deutschland*, 1902. Moos depends primarily on the aesthetic of Eduard von Hartmann as described in the latter's *Die deutsche Ästhetik seit Kant*, 1886, and in his *Philosophie des Schönen*, 1887.
118. Eduard Hanslick, *Vom Musikalisch-Schönen*, 10th ed., 1902.
119. See note 104 above.
120. Häberlin, above note 35.
121. To understand the difference I have suggested, one might compare the treatments which the section on aesthetics has undergone in the first and second editions of the volume, *Systematische Philosophie*, in the collection called *Kultur der Gegenwart* edited by Paul Hinneberg. In the first edition Lipps, without entering into anything else, sketches a systematic outline of his aesthetics of empathy; in the second M. Geiger gives an instructive over-view of the research work accomplished in this field.
122. Kaarle S. Laurila, "Der ästhetische Eindruck in seinem Verhältnis zu Lust und Unlust," ZÄAK, XXII (1928); "Die emotionalistische Ästhetik," ZÄAK, XXII (1928); *Ästhetische Streitfragen*, 1934; and *Estetikan peruskysymyksia*, 1918.
123. More particulars are given about him in the historical chapter of the first edition (1906) of Dessoir, *Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*.
124. Victor Cousin, *Le Vrai, le Beau et le Bien*, 23rd ed., 1881.
125. T. S. Jouffroy, *Cours d'esthétique*, ed. by Damiron, 4th ed., 1883.
126. For the influence of modern *Gestalt*-psychology on aesthetics and the general science of art see my "Literaturwissenschaft und neue Psychologie," *Euphoriön*, XXVIII (1927), "Gestaltgesetzlichkeit und Ornamententstehung," *ZAP*, XXVIII (1927); and also the chapter, "Das Problem der Gestalt," in my *Personalistische Ästhetik*, 1932.
127. Stephan Witasek, *Grundzüge der allgemeinen Ästhetik*, 1904.
128. Wilhelm Dilthey, *Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie*, 1894; "Die Einbildungskraft des Dichters" (*Philosophical Essays Dedicated to E. Zeller*), 1889; and *Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung*, 2nd ed., 1907.
129. Eduard Spranger, *Lebensformen*, 7th ed., 1930.
130. T. A. Meyer, *Das Stilgesetz der Poesie*, 1901.
131. Christian F. Weiser, *Shaftesbury und das deutsche Geistesleben*, 1916.
132. Oskar Walzel, "Gehalt und Gestalt im Kunstwerk des Dichters," *Handbuch der Literaturwissenschaft*, III, 1923-1925.
133. Vladimir Bechterev, *Allgemeine Grundlagen der Reflexologie des Menschen*, 1926 (German translation).
134. For works about the history of aesthetics see: Hermann Lotze, *Geschichte*

- der *Ästhetik in Deutschland*, new impression, 1868; M. Schasler, *Kritische Geschichte der Ästhetik*, 1872; R. Zimmerman, *Geschichte der Ästhetik als philosophischer Wissenschaft*, 1858; Julius Walter, *Die Geschichte der Ästhetik im Altertum*, 1893; Bernard Bosanquet, *A History of Aesthetics*, 1892; The Earl of Listowel, *Critical History of Modern Aesthetics*, 1933; Emil Utitz has made a short outline of the history of the problems of our discipline: *Geschichte der Ästhetik (Geschichte der Philosophie in Längsschnitten*, number 6, 1932).
135. Rudolf Odebrecht in *Ästhetik der Gegenwart (Philosophische Forschungsberichte*, Vol. 15), 1932.
136. Richard Hamann (*Ästhetik*, 2nd ed., 1919) once attacked a certain philosopher and his "feeling-mode of carrying on aesthetics." But even if Hamann were right in reproaching this man, as in my opinion he is not, he is opposing a certain follower of our discipline, and not aesthetics itself and its scientific character; and Hamann admits as much when he contrasts those scientific works on aesthetics which are dubious and those which are unobjectionable.
137. Oskar Katann, "Prolegomena zur Ästhetik," *Ästhetisch-literarische Arbeiten*, 1918.

TWO

1. Ernst Bergmann, *Die Begründung der deutschen Ästhetik durch A. G. Baumgarten und G. F. Meier*, 1911.
2. Oskar Katann, "Prolegomena" (see Ch. I, note 137).
3. Benedetto Croce, *Ästhetik*, 1905 (German translation), and his *Giambattista Vico*, 1927.
4. Giambattista Vico, *Principii di una scienza nuova*, 1725.
5. Karl Köstlin, *Prolegomena zur Ästhetik*, 1889.
6. To this group belong, for example, Narziss Ach, *Über die Willenstätigkeit und das Denken*, 1905; August Messer, "Experimentellpsychologische Untersuchungen über das Denken," *Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie*, VIII (1906), and *Empfindung und Denken*, 2nd ed., 1924; Otto Selz, *Über die Gesetze des geordneten Denkverlaufs*, 1913.
7. Ziehen, *Vorlesungen*, Vol. I.
8. Volkelt, *System*, Vol. I.
9. J. G. von Herder, *Kalligone*, Sec. I, Pt. 4.
10. Jonas Cohn, *Allgemeine Ästhetik*, 1901.
11. Edith Landmann-Kalischer, *Analyse der ästhetischen Kontemplation*, 1902.
12. Karl von Roretz, "Bausteine zu einer Gedankenästhetik," *ZÄAK*, XXXIII (1939).
13. Ziehen, *Vorlesungen*, Vol. II.
14. Contributions to a theory of play are: Richard Meister, "Spiel und Arbeit als gegensätzliche Verhaltensweisen menschlicher Tätigkeit," *Beiträge zur Theorie der Erziehung*, 1947; H. Noack, "Das Spiel," *ZÄAK*, XXI (1927).
15. Schiller, "Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen," *Säkularausgabe*, Vol. XII.
16. Moritz Geiger, "Oberflächenwirkungen und Tiefenwirkungen der Kunst," *Zugänge zur Ästhetik*, 1928.
17. See Ch. I, note. 82.
18. R. Hamann, "Zur Begründung der Ästhetik," *ZÄAK*, X (1916).
19. See note 5, this chapter.
20. Ludwig Reiners, *Deutsche Stilkunst*, 1944; K. Riezler, *Traktat vom Schönen*, 1935; J. Pfeiffer, *Umgang mit Dichtung*, 1936.

21. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, Sec. 2.
22. Ernst Elster, *Prinzipien der Literaturwissenschaft*, Vol. I, 1897.
23. Eduard von Hartmann, *Philosophie des Schönen*.
24. Examples relevant here are brought together by Minjon, "Der Schönheitsbegriff der Hochscholastik," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, XXV, and de Wulf, "Les théories esthétiques propres à Saint Thomas," *Revue néoscholastique*, II.
25. See Ch. I, note 97.
26. See Ch. I, note 86.
27. Moses Mendelssohn, *Betrachtungen über die Quellen und Verbindungen der schönen Künste und Wissenschaften*, 1757; *Betrachtungen über das Erhabene und Naïve*, 1758; and *Rhapsodie über die Empfindungen*, 1760.
28. Charles Louis Montesquieu, *De l'esprit des lois*, 1748.
29. See K. F. Wize, F. J. Riedl und seine Ästhetik, 1907.
30. J. G. Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie der schönen Künste*, 1792-1794.
31. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. I, sec. 33 ff and sec. 38; Vol. II, Ch. 30.
32. E. D. Puffer, *The Psychology of Beauty*, 1905.
33. Volkelt, *System*, Vol. I, esp. Sec. 3, Ch. XI ff.
34. Wilhelm Wundt, *System der Philosophie*, 3rd ed., 1907, Vol. II.
35. See note 23 above; and Alexius Meinong, *Über emotionale Präsentation*, 1917.
36. Hermann Sicbeck, *Das Wesen der ästhetischen Anschauung*, 1875.
37. See Ch. I, note 35.
38. See Ch. I, note 127.
39. See Ch. I, note 76.
40. Karl Groos, "Ästhetisch und Schön," *Philosophische Monatshefte*, XXIX (1893).
41. Konrad Lange, *Das Wesen der Kunst*.
42. See Ch. I, note 35.
43. See Ch. I, note 40.
44. Wilhelm Windelband, *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 1914.
45. As an example one might mention the Duke des Essaintes in Huysmans' *A rebours*.
46. Lipps, *Ästhetik*, Vol. I.
47. See Felix Krueger, *Die Tiefendimension und die Gegensätzlichkeit des Gefühlslebens*, 1931.
48. Erich Rothacker, *Die Schichten der Persönlichkeit*, 2nd ed., 1941.
49. Ziehen in his *Vorlesungen*, Vol. II, follows this view.
50. Richard Hamann, *Der Impressionismus in Leben und Kunst*, 1907.
51. See above, note 5.
52. Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux, *L'art poétique*.
53. Ludwig Volkman, *Naturvorbild und Kunstwerk*, 1911, and also my *Das Steigerungsphänomen als künstlerisches Gestaltungsprinzip*, 1924.
54. Jonas Cohn (*Allgemeine Ästhetik*) goes more into detail about this point.
55. Ziehen, *Vorlesungen*, Vol. I.
56. See Ch. I, note 3.
57. Émile Zola, *Le roman expérimental*, 1880.
58. Arno Holz, *Die Kunst, ihr Wesen und ihre Gesetze*, 1891.
59. The expression "imitation" comes from Aristotle's *Poetics*.
60. Fechner, *Vorschule*.

61. Hermann Klaatsch, *Das Werden der Menschheit und die Anfänge der Kultur*, 1936.
62. Karl Köstlin, *Schönheitsbegriff*.
63. Walther Brecht, *Heinse und der ästhetische Immoralismus*, 1911.
64. K. Lorenz, "Durch Domestikation verursachte Störungen des arteigenen Verhaltens," ZAP, XLIX (1940).
65. See Ch. I, note 129.
66. For greater details about these transformations see Ziehen, *Vorlesungen*, Vol. I.
67. See Ch. I, note 40.
68. See Ch. I, note 93.
69. Partly in connection with Diez, see Ch. I, note 1.
70. See above, note 41.
71. See Ch. I, note 6.
72. A. G. Baumgarten, *Aesthetica*.
73. Paul Souriau, *La beauté rationnelle*, 1904.
74. Reference to the example in J. Zeitler's *Goethe-Handbuch*, article: "Schön."
75. Vischer, *Ästhetik und Kritische Gänge*.
76. T. A. Meyer, *Ästhetik*.
77. Betty Heimann, *Über den Geschmack*, 1924.
78. See Ch. I, notes 2 and 61.

THREE

1. Richard Müller-Freienfels, *Das Denken und die Phantasie*, 2nd ed., 1925 (Vol. II of *Grundzüge einer Lebenspsychologie*).
2. Häberlin, *Allgemeine Ästhetik*.
3. Külpe, *Grundlagen*.
4. Ziehen, *Vorlesungen*, Vol. I.
5. Volkelt, *System*, Vol. I.
6. Kaarle S. Laurila, "Zur Lehre von den ästhetischen Modifikationen," ZÄAK, VIII (1914) as well as other writings already mentioned.
7. See Max Deri, *Naturalismus, Idealismus, Expressionismus: Einführung in die Kunst der Gegenwart*, 1922.
8. Walther Ehrenstein, *Einführung in die Ganzheitspsychologie*, 1934.
9. Rupprecht Matthei, *Das Gestaltproblem*, 1929; Martin Scheerer, *Die Lehre von der Gestalt*, 1931; Kurt Koffka, *Principles of Gestalt Psychology*, 1935; Felix Krueger, *Über psychologische Ganzheit*, 1926; *Ganzheit und Struktur: Festschrift für F. Krueger: Neue psychologische Studien*, XII (1934).
10. Konrad Fiedler, *Schriften zur Kunst*.
11. For instance, Wolfgang Metzger, *Psychologie*, 1941.
12. William Stern, *Selbstdarstellung (Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen*, VI, 1927), and *Allgemeine Psychologie auf personalistischer Grundlage*, 1935 ff.
13. This notion plays the greatest role in Volkelt's *System*, Vol. I.
14. Henri Bergson, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, tr. by T. E. Hulme, 1912; *Creative Evolution*, 1906 (French version).
15. Walther Schmied-Kowarzik, *Intuition (Wissenschaftliche Beilage z. 23. Jahresbericht der Philosophischen Gesellschaft Wien)*, 1911, and "Intuition als Kern des ästhetischen Lebens," I KÄB (1914). See also the discussion held in I KÄB, in particular that with Schmalenbach.

16. Wundt, *System der Philosophie and Grundriss der Psychologie*.
17. I mean the group of psychologists composed of Köhler, Koffka, Wertheimer, and Gelb.
18. Wolfgang Köhler, *Psychologische Probleme*, 1933, and *Die physischen Gestalten in Ruhe und im stationären Zustand*, 1920.
19. In this connection see the discussion of Schmied-Kowarzik and Schmalenbach in I KÄB, and also Bruno Petermann, *Die Wertheimer-Köhler-Koffkasche Gestalttheorie und das Gestaltproblem*, 1929, and his *Das Gestaltproblem in der Psychologie*, 1931.
20. Spranger, *Lebensformen*.
21. Johannes Volkelt, *System*, Vols. I and III, and *Über den Symbolbegriff in der neuesten Ästhetik*, 1876.
22. Friedrich Kainz, *Über das Sprachgefühl*, 1944.
23. Dessoir, *Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*.
24. An example is to be found in my *Psychologie der Sprache*, Vol. I, 1941, p. 164.
25. Dessoir, "Über das Beschreiben von Bildern," ZÄAK, VIII (1914).
26. E. R. Jaensch, "Psychologie und Ästhetik," II KÄB (1925).
27. Othmar Sterzinger, *Grundlinien der Kunstpsychologie*, Vol. I, 1938.
28. Volkelt, *System*, Vol. I.
29. *Ibid.*
30. Metzger, *Psychologie*.
31. Elsenhans-Giese, *Lehrbuch der Psychologie*, 3rd ed., 1939.
32. Wundt, *Grundriss der Psychologie*.
33. Witasek, *Grundzüge*.
34. Ziehen, *Vorlesungen*, Vol. II.
35. Alois Höffler, *Psychologie*, 1897; 2nd ed., Vol. I, 1930.
36. Witasek, *op. cit.*
37. Volkelt, *System*, Vol. I.
38. All of these terms are from Ziehen's *Vorlesungen*.
39. Christian Ruths, *Experimentelluntersuchungen über Musikphantome*, 1898.
40. H. Werner produces a good example for this in IV KÄB.
41. See Paul Stern, *Einfühlung und Assoziation in der neueren Ästhetik*, 1898.
42. Home, *Elements of Criticism*.
43. Hans Christian Oersted, *Geist in der Natur*, 6th ed., 1874 (German translation).
44. R. H. Lotze, *Über den Begriff der Schönheit*, 1846, and *Über die Bedingungen der Kunstschönheit*, 1848; F. Koegel, *Lotzes Ästhetik*, 1886.
45. Fechner, *Vorschule*.
46. Wundt, *Grundriss*.
47. Meunmann, *Einführung*.
48. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, sec. 6.
49. Ziehen, *Vorlesungen*, Vol. II.
50. Richard Grassler, *Der Sinn der Sprache*, 1938.
51. August Messer, *Psychologie*, 5th ed., 1934, and *Einführung in die Erkenntnistheorie*, 3rd ed., 1927.
52. Dessoir, *Ästhetik*.
53. Volkelt, *System*, Vol. I.
54. Witasek, *Grundzüge*.
55. J. B. Proudhon, *De principe de l'art et de sa destination sociale*, 1865.

56. Charles Lalo, *Les sentiments esthétiques*, 1910.
57. Eduard von Hartmann, *Philosophie des Schönen*.
58. Volkelt, *System*, Vol. I.
59. Höfler, *Psychologie*. Of the psychologists of Graz one might mention too Stephen Witasek, *Grundlinien der Psychologie*, 2nd ed., 1923.
60. Dubos, *Réflexions critiques sur la poésie*, 1719.
61. Dessoir, see Ch. I, note 61.
62. Generally about the concept of empathy: A. Prandtl, *Die Einfühlung*, 1910; M. Geiger, "Über das Wesen und die Bedeutung der Einfühlung," IV KEP (1911).
63. Robert Vischer, *Über das optische Formgefühl*, 1875.
64. Lipps has employed the concept of empathy not only in his great *Ästhetik* and in the delineation of his aesthetic system in the culture of the present, but also in a series of smaller essays in each of which this central concept is somewhat differently interpreted.
65. Karl Du Prel, *Psychologie der Lyrik*, 1880.
66. Lotze, *Geschichte der Ästhetik in Deutschland*.
67. Ziehen, *Vorlesungen*, Vol. II.
68. Volkelt, *System*, Vol. I.
69. *Ibid.*
70. Dessoir, *Ästhetik*.
71. Oswald Külpe, *Vorlesungen über Psychologie*, ed. by K. Bühler, 1920; A. Messer, *Psychologie*.
72. Stephen Witasek, "Zur psychologischen Analyse der ästhetischen Einfühlung," ZP, XXV (1901).
73. Lipps in ZP, XXXI (1903).
74. Karl Groos, *Der ästhetische Genuss*, 1902.
75. See Witasek, *Grundzüge*, p. 121.
76. K. Groos, *Die Philosophie zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts* and *Einführung in die Ästhetik*.
77. I cannot understand how Moos (*Deutsche Ästhetik der Gegenwart*, pp. 242 ff) could call the empathy-aesthetician Lipps a kind of formalist.
78. Willy Hellpach, *Elementares Lehrbuch der Sozialpsychologie*, 133, and *Einführung in die Völkerpsychologie*, 2nd ed., 1944.
79. Richard Avenarius, *Kritik der reinen Erfahrung*, 2nd ed., 1908.
80. Hume, *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*.
81. Max Scheler, *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, 3rd ed., 1926, and *Theorie der Sympathiegefühle*, 1913.
82. Bruno Petermann, *Wesensfragen seelischen Seins*, 1938.
83. Metzger, *Psychologie*.
84. Laurila, "Die emotionalistische Ästhetik," ZÄAK, XXII (1928).
85. This antithesis comes from R. Müller-Freienfels, *Psychologie der Kunst*, but it is not identical with that of W. Worringer in *Abstraktion und Einfühlung*, 1908. What Worringer calls abstraction is not a functional counterpart of empathy, but only a particular case of it.
86. Meumann, *Einführung in die Ästhetik der Gegenwart*.
87. Dessoir, *Ästhetik*.
88. T. A. Meycr, *Ästhetik*.
89. Moos, *Deutsche Ästhetik der Gegenwart*.
90. Nicolai Hartmann, *Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie*, 2nd ed., 1941.

91. Kainz, *Personalistische Ästhetik*.
92. Wilhelm Jerusalem, *Lehrbuch der Psychologie*, 7th ed., 1921, *Die Urteilsfunktion*, 1895, and *Einleitung in die Philosophie* (especially the "Schlussbetrachtung").
93. See Ch. I, note 61.
94. D. Frey, *Das Kunstwerk als Willensproblem*.
95. Every one of the more important text-books on psychology talks about this opposition between the pleasure-pain philosophers and the pluralists in the theory of feeling; every monograph about the feeling-life does so also, as does, for instance, A. Wreschner in *Das Gefühl*, 1931.
96. Felix Krueger, *Das Wesen der Gefühle* and *Die Tiefendimension und die Gegensätzlichkeit des Gefühlslebens*, 1931.
97. Volkelt, *System*, Vol. I, and *Versuch über Fühlen und Wollen*, 1930.
98. Külpe, *Grundlagen*.
99. Richard Skala, *Die Gemütsbefriedigung als Angelegenheit der Ästhetik*, 1911.
100. Dessoir, *Ästhetik*.
101. Volkelt, *System*, Vol. III.
102. *Ibid.*, Vol. I.
103. Kaarle S. Laurila, *Versuch einer Stellungnahme zu den Hauptfragen der Kunstphilosophie*, 1893.
104. Theodor Ziegler, *Das Gefühl*, 1893.
105. It is the artists more than anyone else who guard themselves against the emotionalization of the enjoyment of art; and R. Hamann (*Ästhetik*, 2nd ed., 1919) speaks out against the emotionalization of aesthetics.
106. T. A. Meyer, *Ästhetik*.
107. Konrad Fiedler, *Schriften zur Kunst*.
108. Vladimir Bechterev, *Allgemeine Grundlagen der Reflexologie des Menschen*.
- 108a. Erich Rothacker, *Probleme der Kulturanthropologie*, 1942.
109. Emil Uritz, *Die Funktionsfreuden im ästhetischen Verhalten*, 1911.
110. J. B. Dubos, *Réflexions critiques*.
111. Jerusalem, *Einleitung*.
112. Emil Uritz, *Ästhetik und Philosophie der Kunst*.
113. The comprehensive and penetrating monograph by B. Heimann (*Über den Geschmack*, 1924) has been of the greatest importance in all parts of this section.
114. Köstlin, *Prolegomena*.
115. Pertinent here are statements by Richard Wallaschek, *Psychologische Ästhetik*, 1930.
116. K. Groos, *Der ästhetische Genuss*.
117. Volkelt, *System*, Vol. I.
118. E. T. A. Hoffmann, "Der Musikfeind," *Kreisleriana*, 5.
119. Here the expression "convergence" is understood in terms of the interpretation of William Stern.
120. Köstlin, *Prolegomena*.
121. A. Spir, *Denken und Wirklichkeit*, 1873, and *Moralität und Religion*, 1874. About the thesis mentioned see also R. Müller-Freienfels, *Philosophie der Individualität*, 2nd ed., 1923.
122. G. Pfahler, *System der Typenlehren*, 1929.

123. E. R. Jaensch, *Grundformen menschlichen Seins*, 1929, and "Das Verhältnis der Integrationstypologie zu anderen Formen der Typenlehre," ZP, CXXV (1932).
124. When Kant in section 13 of the *Critique of Judgment* apodictically says that "The judgment of taste is independent of sensation and emotion," he presupposes people enjoying things aesthetically who have a markedly fixed capacity; but for other types of persons this thesis is far less valid.
125. Köstlin, *Prolegomena*.
126. Avenarius, *Kritik der reinen Erfahrung*.
127. Conservatism in artistic things can thus have a double origin. One thinks of L. Klages (*Grundlage der Charakterkunde*, 7th and 8th eds., 1936) and of what he understands as relational qualities in the realm of character. He explains them as the opposition of two convergent factors whose relationship first determines the characterological valence of the constituents. Thus, for example, excitability of feeling depends on the convergence of vividness of feeling and depth of feeling. Great excitability of emotion can be the result of an extreme vividness in connection with an average depth of feeling-life or of a normal vividness with a very limited depth of feeling-life.
128. Erich Bernheimer, *Philosophische Kunstwissenschaft*, 1913.
129. Witasek, *Grundzüge*.
130. Diez, *Allgemeine Ästhetik*.
131. A. Höfler, *Psychologie*.
132. G. von Allesch, "Über adäquate ästhetische Anschauung," ZÄAK, VII (1913).
133. Meumann, *Einführung*.
134. T. A. Meyer, *Ästhetik*.
135. In the first edition of his aesthetics, Dessoir wrote a critique of this doctrine of this Scottish aesthetician.
136. William Stern, *Studien zur Personwissenschaft I: Personalistik als Wissenschaft*, 1930.
137. See my *Personalistische Ästhetik*.
138. T. A. Meyer, *Ästhetik*.
139. R. F. Arnold, *Das moderne Drama*, 2nd ed., 1912.
140. O. Sterzinger, *Grundlinien der Kunstpsychologie*, Vol. I.
141. About this entire group of questions see William Stern, *Differentielle Psychologie*, 1911; and my "Differentielle Psychologie und Ästhetik," ZAP, XLV (1933).
142. J. Segal, "Beiträge zur experimentellen Ästhetik, I," *Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie*, VII (1906).
143. J. Lindworsky, *Experimentelle Psychologie*, 1921.
144. Müller-Freienfels (*Psychologie der Kunst*) has especially worked out this antithesis of types.
145. Theodor Litt, *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 1933.
146. These types have been referred to by William Stern especially, in his *Allgemeine Psychologie auf personalistischer Grundlage*.
147. See William Stern, *Person und Sache: Wertphilosophie*, Vol. III, 1924.

FOUR

1. Nicolai Hartmann, *Das Problem des geistigen Seins*, 1933.
2. Volkelt, *System*, Vol. I.

3. August Messer, *Psychologie, and Einführung in die Erkenntnistheorie*, 3rd ed., 1927.
4. Wilhelm Windelband, *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 1914.
5. Heimann, *Über den Geschmack*.
6. John Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 1689.
7. Häberlin, *Allgemeine Ästhetik*.
8. Alexius Meinong, *Über emotionale Präsentation*, 1917.
9. Külpe, *Grundlagen*.
10. Ziehen, *Vorlesungen*, Vol. I.
11. With correlativism compare E. Laas, *Idealismus und Positivismus*, 1879-1884.
12. M. Beck, "Die neue Problemlage der Ästhetik, ZÄAK, XXIII (1929).
13. Messer, *Psychologie*.
14. Kurt Koffka, "Psychologie," in Dessoir's *Lehrbuch der Philosophie*.
15. Wolfgang Köhler, *Die physischen Gestalten in Ruhe und im stationären Zustand*, 1920.
16. M. Wertheimer, "Experimentelle Studien über das Sehen von Bewegung," ZP, LXI (1912), and "Über Gestalttheorie," *Symposion*, I (1925 ff).
17. Kainz, *Personalistische Ästhetik*.
18. William Stern, *Person und Sache*, Vols. I and II, 2nd ed., 1923; Vol. III, 1924; and *Selbstdarstellung in Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen*, Vol. VI (1921).
19. Karl Groos, *Einleitung in die Ästhetik*, 1892; *Der ästhetische Genuss*, 1902; and "Ästhetisch und Schön," *Philosophische Monatshefte*, XXIX (1893).
20. F. T. Vischer, *Ästhetik*, 1847-1858.
21. Robert Prölss, *Katechismus der Ästhetik*, 2nd ed., 1889.
22. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. I.
23. Witasek, *Grundzüge*.
24. R. H. Lotze, *Geschichte der Ästhetik in Deutschland*, 1868.
25. Alois Höfler, *Psychologie*, 1897; and "Gestalt und Beziehung-Gestalt und Anschauung," ZP, LX (1912).
26. Ernst Elster, *Prinzipien der Literaturwissenschaft*, Vol. I., 1897.
27. Hector Berlioz, *Instrumentationslehre*, German ed. by A. Dörffel, 1893.
28. Arnold Schering, *Die expressionistische Bewegung in der Kunst (Einführung in die Kunst der Gegenwart)*, 1919.
29. Wolfgang Metzger, *Psychologie*, 1941.
30. Koffka, see above, note 14.
31. Christian von Ehrenfels, *Über Gestaltqualitäten*, new impression, 1922.
32. Witasek, *Grundzüge*.
33. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. I.
34. See Friedrich Hartmann, *Ästhetik im Brückenbau*, 1928; Paul Zucker, *Die Brücke*, 1921; and E. Wehner, "Baukunst und Ingenieurästhetik," *Der Eisenbau*, 1920.
35. H. Sequenz, "Fragen der Ästhetik im Bau elektrischer Maschinen," *Zeitschrift für Elektrotechnik* (1945).
36. K. von Roretz, "Bausteine zu einer Gedankenästhetik," ZÄAK, XXX (1939).
37. Francis Hutcheson, *Inquiry Into the Origin of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*, 1725.
38. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, ed. by D. F. Gans, 1837.
39. Felix Auerbach, *Lebendige Mathematik*, 1929.

40. Adolf Kaeser, "Euler und die Variationsrechnung," *Festschrift zur Feier des 200. Geburtstags Leonhard Eulers*, 1907.
41. Theodor Lipps, *Raumästhetik und geometrisch-optische Täuschungen*, 1897; *Ästhetik*, Vol. I: Chapter: "Raumästhetik" and Vol. II: Chapter: "Ein Stück Raumästhetik."
42. Lipps, *Ästhetik*, Vol. I.
43. For the distinction between plane and surface colors see D. Katz, *Der Aufbau der Farbwelt*, 2nd ed., 1930.
44. Works generally applying to this section are: Emil Utitz, *Grundzüge der ästhetischen Farbenlehre*, 1908; G. J. von Allesch, *Die ästhetische Erscheinungsweise der Farben*, 1925.
45. Robert Heller, *Das Wesen der Schönheit*, 1936.
46. Ziehen, *Vorlesungen*, Vol. I.
47. T. A. Meyer, *Ästhetik*.
48. Emil Abderhalden, *Lehrbuch der Physiologie*, 2nd and 3rd eds., 1941.
49. Othmar Sterzinger, *Grundlinien der Kunstpsychologie*, Vol. I, 1938.
50. Carl Stumpf, *Gefühl und Gefühlsempfindung*, 1928.
51. T. A. Meyer, *Ästhetik*.
52. Sterzinger, *Grundlinien*, Vol. I.
53. Messer, *Psychologie*.
54. Narziss Ach, *Über die Objection der sinnlichen Qualitäten*, 1930.
55. E. Bleuler, "Zur Theorie der 'Sekundär'-Empfindungen," *ZP*, I.XV.
56. Pliny, *Historia naturalis*, XXXV, sec. 12.
57. August Schmarsow, *Grundbegriffe der Kunstwissenschaft*, 1905.
58. Jonas Cohn, "Experimentelle Untersuchungen über die Gefühlsbetonung der Farbenhelligkeit," *Philosophische Studien*, X.
59. See Major, "On the Affective Tone of Simple Sense Impressions," *American Journal of Psychology* (1907).
60. See also Meumann, *Ästhetik der Gegenwart*.
61. T. Volbehr, "Die Neidfarbe Gelb," *ZÄAK*, I (1906).
62. Ziehen, *Vorlesungen*, Vol. I.
63. Müller-Freienfels, *Psychologie der Künste: Handbuch der vergleichenden Psychologie*.
64. Külpe, *Grundlagen*.
65. T. A. Meyer, *Ästhetik*.
66. Sterzinger, *Grundlinien*, Vol. I.
67. Lipps, *Ästhetik*, Vol. I.
68. For a summary of these investigations see Meumann, *Ästhetik der Gegenwart*. Besides this book one might mention Jonas Cohn, "Gefühlston und Sättigung der Farben," *Philosophische Studien*, XV; Stefanescu-Goanga, "Experimentelle Untersuchungen zur Gefühlsbetonung," *Psychologische Studien*, VII; J. Sully, "Harmony of Colours," *Mind*, 1879; Gordon, "Aesthetics of Simple Colour Arrangements," *Psychological Review*, XIX (1912); Kirschmann, "Conceptions and Laws in Aesthetics," *University of Toronto Studies: Psychological Series*, I; Baker, "Experiments on the Aesthetics of Light and Colour" and Dobbie, "Experiments with School Children on Colour Combinations," both in *ibid*.
69. Gustav von Allesch, *Die ästhetische Erscheinungsweise der Farben*, 1925.
70. Helmholtz, *Vorträge und Reden*, 5th ed., Vol. II, 1905, and *Handbuch der physiologischen Optik*, 2nd ed., 1896.

71. R. Schick, *Tagebuch-Aufzeichnungen aus den Jahren 1866-1869*, with A. Böcklin, 1901.
72. Ernst Brücke, *Die Psychologie der Farben für die Zwecke des Kunstgewerbes*, 1887.
73. Müller-Freienfels, *Psychologie der Kunst*.
74. Lipps, *Ästhetik*, Vol. I.
75. L. Chevreul, *De la loi du contraste simultane des couleurs et de ses applications*, 1839.
76. Wilhelm Wundt, *Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie*, 6th ed., Vol. III, 1911.
77. Müller-Freienfels, *Psychologie der Kunst*, Vol. I.
78. Wilhelm Ostwald, *Die Harmonie der Farben*, 1923.
79. Theodor Lipps, *Die ethischen Grundfragen*, 1899.
80. In this connection see the work of A. Martin, *Pädagogisches Magazin*, number 831 (1919).
81. When Ziehen (*Vorlesungen*, Vol. I, p. 179) ridicules Lipps' illustrations with an argument which must be called a misapplication of physiological principle, he is naturally wrong.
82. Wilhelm Wundt, *Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie*, Vol. III.
83. Müller-Freienfels, *Psychologie der Kunst*.
84. Meumann, *Ästhetik der Gegenwart*.
85. Lipps, *Ästhetik*, Vol. I: "Die Farben und die Dinge."
- 85a. Geza Révész, *Einführung in die Musikpsychologie*, 1946. A number of quotations in sections to follow refer to this important and fertile work; in each instance only the author's name is cited.
- 85b. Geza Révész, "Gibt es einen Hörraum?" *Acta psychologica*, III (1937).
- 85c. W. Riezler, "Das neue Raumgefühl in bildender Kunst und Musik"; M. Schneider, "Raumriechen hören in der Musik"; H. Friedmann, "Raum und Zeit vom Standpunkt des morphologischen Idealismus"; and notes on the discussion in connection with discourse by Riezler: all in IV KÄB (1931).
86. Lipps, *Ästhetik*, Vol. I.
87. William Hogarth, *Analysis of Beauty*, New Edition, 1772.
88. Wehner, *Baukunst und Ingenieurästhetik*.
89. F. Hartmann, *Ästhetik im Brückenbau*.
90. Sterzinger, *Grundlinien*, Vol. I.
91. Müller-Freienfels, *Psychologie der Künste*.
92. Heinrich Wölfflin, *Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, 1915.
93. See my "Differentielle Psychologie und Ästhetik," ZAP, XLV (1933), and my "Ein Beitrag zur Werk- und Leistungspsychologie des höheren Gefühlslebens," ZP, CXXXII (1934).
94. In connection with this antithesis see F. Strich, *Deutsche Klassik und Romantik oder Vollendung und Unendlichkeit*, 2nd ed., 1924.
95. Konrad Lange, *Das Wesen der Kunst*, 2nd ed., 1907, and the work by Paul Moos, *Die deutsche Ästhetik der Gegenwart*, n.d.
96. Karl Bühler, *Die Gestaltwahrnehmungen*, Vol. I, 1913.
97. Wilhelm Ostwald, *Die Harmonie der Formen*, 1922.
98. See note 96 above.
99. See K. Koffka, *Psychologie*.
100. Rudolf von Laban, *Gymnastik und Tanz*, 1926, and *Choreographie*, 1926.
101. Adolf Stöhr, *Psychologie*, 1917.

1012. Otto J. Hartmann, *Menschenkunde*, 1941.
102. Müller-Freienfels, *Psychologie der Künste*.
103. Wilhelm Worringer, *Abstraktion und Einfühlung*, 1911.
104. T. A. Meyer, *Ästhetik*.
105. Lipps, *Ästhetik*, Vol. I.
106. Lipps, *Ästhetik*, Vol. II.
107. Kainz, "Gestaltgesetzlichkeit und Ornamententstehung," ZAP, XXVIII (1927).
108. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*.
109. Lessing, *Laokoon*.
110. Kainz, *Personalistische Ästhetik*.
111. Hugo Riemann in I KÄB, 1914.
112. Sterzinger, *Grundlinien*, Vol. I.
113. Franz Brentano, *Untersuchungen zur Sinnespsychologie*, 1907.
114. E. Mach, *Die Analyse der Empfindungen*, 7th ed., 1918.
115. Sterzinger, *Grundlinien*, Vol. I.
116. Müller-Freienfels, *Psychologie der Musik*, n.d. [1936].
117. David Katz, *Der Aufbau der Tastwelt*, 1925.
- 117a. Révész and D. Katz, *Musikgenuss Gehörloser*, 1926.
118. What follows is closed allied with Lipps, *Ästhetik*, Vol. I.
- 118a. Cited according to G. Révész.
119. Richard Wagner, *On Conducting*.
120. Müller-Freienfels, *Psychologie der Musik*.
121. Müller-Freienfels, *Psychologie der Künste*.
122. Examples of discoveries made in the realm of tone-color are to be found not only in his music, but also in his *Theory of Instrumentation*.
123. Richard Hamann, *Der Impressionismus*, 1907.
124. Müller-Freienfels, *Psychologie der Künste*.
125. Volkelt, *System*, Vol. I.
126. Dessoir, *Ästhetik*.
127. T. A. Meyer, *Ästhetik*.
- 127a. Ernst Kurth, *Musikpsychologie*, 1931.
128. Külpe, *Grundlagen*.
- 128a. O. Abraham und E. M. von Hornbostel, "Zur Psychologie der 'Ton-distanz,'" ZP, XCVIII (1926).
129. Elsenhans-Giese, *Lehrbuch der Psychologie*, 3rd ed., 1939.
130. H. Werner, "Über Mikromelodik und Mikroharmonik," ZP, XCVIII (1926).
131. Hermann Helmholtz, *Die Lehre von den Tonempfindungen*, 5th ed., 1896; *Populäre Vorträge und Reden*, 5th ed., Vol. II, 1903.
132. Müller-Freienfels, *Psychologie der Musik*.
133. Leonhard Euler, *Tentamen novum theoriae musicae*, 1739.
134. Leibniz, *Epistolae ad diversos*, ed. by Kornholt, 1734-1742, Vol. I, number
135. William Preyer, *Akustische Untersuchungen*, 1879.
136. Krüger, *Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie*, 1904/2.
137. Ziehen, *Vorlesungen*, Vol. I.
138. The critique of this theory essentially follows Höfler's *Psychologie*.
139. Helmholtz, *Die Lehre von den Tonempfindungen*.
- 139a. For the concept of tone-color consult K. L. Schäfer's article, "Gehörssinn" in Nagl's *Handbuch der Physiologie*, Vol. III, and C. Stumpf, *Tonpsychologie*,

- Vol. II, 1890. About further applications of the concept of color in music-psychology (the color of melody, interval, key, chord, chordal steps, voice-leading, and harmony) see the structural theory of music of A. Wellek in "Musik," *Neue psychologische Studien*, XII (1934) and *Zeitschrift für Musikwissenschaft*, XVI (1934).
140. Nicomachus Gerasenus, *Encheiridion harmonices* (ca. 150 A.D.).
141. C. Stumpf, *Tonpsychologie*, Vol. II, and ZP, XV (1897), and *Beiträge zur Akustik und Musik*, Vol. I (1898).
142. ZP, LVIII, (1911).
143. Müller-Freienfels, *Psychologie der Musik*.
144. Müller-Freienfels, *Psychologie der Künste*.
145. C. Stumpf, ZP, LVIII (1911).
146. Müller-Freienfels, *Psychologie der Musik*.
147. Rameau, *Traité d'harmonie*, 1722.
148. Dessoir, *Ästhetik*.
149. Müller-Freienfels, *Psychologie der Künste*.
150. Müller-Freienfels, *Psychologie der Musik*.
151. Lipps, *Ästhetik*, Vol. I.
152. M. Meyer, *Psychological Review*, VII (1900); H. Werner, *Sitzungsberichte der Wiener Akademie d. Wiss., Phil.-Hist. Kl.*, CLXXXII (1917).
153. Danzfuss, *Pädagogisches Magazin*, number 915 (1923).
154. Lipps, *Psychologische Studien*, 2nd ed., 1905.
155. H. Kretzschmar, *Führer durch den Konzertsaal*, 1900.
156. Plato in his dialog, *Laos*.
157. Volkelt, *System*, Vol. I.
158. H. Riemann, *Die Elemente der musikalischen Ästhetik*, 1900.
159. I am referring to Volkelt's *Das ästhetische Bewusstsein*, 1920.
160. William Stern, *Studien zur Personwissenschaft*, Vol. I, 1930.
161. Thus for instance R. Hennig, "Charakteristik der Tonarten," ZÄAK, XII (1918).
- 161a. F. M. von Hornbostel, "Melodie und Skala," *Jahrbuch Peters*, (1912).
- 161b. H. Conradin, "Die Tonreihe als Bewusstseinserscheinung," *Schweiz. Musikzeitung* (1944).
- 161c. Kurt Westphal, *Die moderne Musik*, 1928.
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INDEX OF SUBJECTS

This index, except for a few deletions, is practically the same as Kainz's. It is not a repetition of the Table of Contents, but a supplement to it. With a few exceptions, terms found in the Table of Contents are not listed here. Thus the central terms of aesthetics which are frequently repeated in the text (such as "aesthetic," "beauty," "feeling," "empathy," and so forth) are omitted. The purpose of this index is primarily to relate the contents of the book to allied studies, such as philosophy, psychology, and the history of the various arts.

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This manuscript was prepared for publication by Ita Kanter. The book was designed by S. R. Tenenbaum. The text typeface is Janson, cut by Mergenthaler Lintotype in 1932 and is based on a face cut by Nicholas Kis in Amsterdam, 1690, but erroneously accredited to Anton Janson. The display face is Times Roman designed by Sir Stanley Morison for *The Times* in 1931.

The book is printed on S. D. Warren Company's Olde Style Antique white wove paper and bound in Columbia Mills' Baltic Linen. Manufactured in the United States of America.

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